


## THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR



**MAP**  
showing all the operations  
of the  
**CHINA-JAPAN WAR**  
except

Uman in Formosa

English Miles  
0 10 20 30  
— Distance of the first year  
— Distance of the second year  
— Distance of the third year  
— Distance of the fourth year  
— Distance of the fifth year  
— Distance of the sixth year  
— Distance of the seventh year  
— Distance of the eighth year  
— Distance of the ninth year  
— Distance of the tenth year





# THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR

*COMPILED FROM JAPANESE, CHINESE, AND  
FOREIGN SOURCES*

BY

**VLADIMIR**

LATELY OF THE \* \* \* \* DIPLOMATIC MISSION TO COREA

“ . . . WROTE THE HISTORY OF THE WAR . . .  
HAVING BEGUN FROM ITS VERY OUTSET, WITH THE  
EXPECTATION IT WOULD PROVE A GREAT ONE.”

*Thucydides, Book I.*

ILLUSTRATED

LONDON  
SAMPSON LOW, MARSTON AND COMPANY  
LIMITED

*St. Dunstan's House*  
FETTER LANE, FLEET STREET, E.C.

1896



LONDON  
PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED  
STAMFORD STREET AND CHARING CROSS

## TO MY READERS.

---

My principal object in writing this book has been to render it clear and interesting. This object was not easily attained ; the history of a war to be correct and complete must, to a certain degree, be technical, and when it has to treat of distant places with difficult names, it risks to become unintelligible and wearisome to the majority of readers. I have had, therefore, to refrain as far as possible from details, and give as few names of places and persons as was consistent with a perspicuous narration. I have used only a small part of the materials collected for the purpose. These have been obtained from all available sources ; from Chinese and Japanese accounts, and from the reports of foreigners, whenever any were present, either on men-of-war or on land. My acknowledgments are chiefly due to the Japanese war publications, without which it would have been impossible, at least at present, to have compiled an intelligent account of the war. It is not one of the least surprising incidents of the war that Japan should have been able to produce, simultaneously with her great efforts by land and sea, a rich literature on the

subject of the war. Besides numerous pamphlets, two periodical publications, exclusively dedicated to the war, were issued during its progress, forming before its conclusion several volumes. The amount of information of every kind contained in them was extraordinary, and nothing was neglected to render the subject clear to the Japanese public.

My preference of Japanese sources does not affect the impartiality of the narration—the Japanese have been uniformly fair to their adversaries, far more just than their own countrymen; and it has always been easier to find the truth in the histories of the victors than in those of the vanquished. The former have greater self-possession, see events more clearly, and can afford to be impartial.

# CONTENTS.

---

## PART I.

### THE HISTORY OF THE COREAN QUESTION.

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. Short Historical Sketch of the Relations of the Three Countries . . . . .	9
Wars of the T'ang Dynasty.	
Kublai Khan's Armada.	
Hideyoshi's Invasions of Corea.	
II. Sketch of Modern History of Corea . . . . .	35
III. Events immediately preceding the Outbreak of Hostilities . . . . .	51
The Assassination of Kim-ok-Kiun.	
The Tong-Haks.	
Army and Navy of China.	
Army and Navy of Japan.	

## PART II.

### THE COREAN CAMPAIGN.

I. The Outbreak of Hostilities . . . . .	88
The Attack on the King's Palace at Seoul.	
The Naval Battle at Phung Island.	
II. The First Military Operations . . . . .	104
The Asan Campaign.	
The Declaration of War.	
The Naval Demonstrations at Port Arthur and Wei-hai-wei.	
III. The Ph्योंg-yang Campaign . . . . .	120
Preliminary Description.	
Advance of the Mixed Brigade.	
Advance of the Sak-ryोंg Detachment.	
Advance of the Main Body.	
Advance of the Gensan Detachment.	
Ph्योंg-yang and the Chinese Army.	

CHAPTER	PAGE
IV. The Attack on Ph्यों-gyang . . . . .	149
The Mixed Brigade.	
The Sak-ryōng and Gensan Detachments.	
The Main Body.	
The Retreat of the Chinese and Capture of Ph्यों-gyang.	

### PART III.

#### THE CAMPAIGN IN CHINA.

I. The Naval Battle at Hai-yang Island . . . . .	164
II. The First Army's Invasion of China . . . . .	186
The Crossing of the Yalu.	
Operations of the Fifth Division.	
Operations of the Third Division.	
III. The Campaign in the Regent Sword's Peninsula . . . . .	203
The Landing of the Second Army.	
The Advance and Capture of Chin-chow and Talien Bay.	
The Capture of Port Arthur.	
IV. The First Army in Manchuria . . . . .	237
Fifth Division or Right Wing of the First Army.	
Third Division or Left Wing of the First Army.	
V. The Advance of the Second Army . . . . .	261
VI. The Wei-hai-wei Campaign . . . . .	269
VII. The First Peace Embassy . . . . .	305
VIII. The Continuation of the Manchurian Campaign . . . . .	308
IX. The Second Peace Embassy . . . . .	322

### APPENDICES.

Appendix A. Otori's Programme of Reforms for Corea . . . . .	335
" B. Diplomatic Correspondence preceding the War . . . . .	338
" C. Statements of some of the Survivors of the <i>Kowshing</i> . . . . .	349
" D. The Declarations of War of China and Japan . . . . .	370
" E. Correspondence relating to the two Japanese in Shanghai . . . . .	375
" F. Correspondence between Admiral Ito and Admiral Ting . . . . .	380
" G. Capitulation of Wei-hai-wei . . . . .	387
" H. Correspondence between Taotai Niu and Admiral Ito . . . . .	389
" I. The Peace Conference at Hiroshima . . . . .	391
" J. The Armistice . . . . .	403
" K. Peace Negotiations and Text of Treaty . . . . .	405
INDEX . . . . .	438

## LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.

	PAGE
JAPANESE DOLLAR-NOTE, WITH THE HEAD OF EMPRESS JINGU, WHO INVADED COREA . . . . .	18
THE TAI-WEN-KUN, FATHER OF THE PRESENT KING OF COREA, AND REGENT DURING HIS MINISTRY . . . . .	40
KIM-OK-KIUN . . . . .	52
MAJOR-GENERAL OSHIMA . . . . .	64
OTORI, JAPANESE MINISTER IN COREA . . . . .	90
YUAN-SHI-KAI, CHINESE MINISTER RESIDENT IN COREA . . . . .	90
THE KING OF COREA . . . . .	92
CAPTAIN MATSUNAKI, KILLED AT AN-SONG . . . . .	108
THE BUGLER SHIRAKAMI GENJIRO . . . . .	112
SUB-LIEUTENANT TAKE-NO-UCHI, KILLED WHILE EXPLORING THE MOVEMENTS OF THE CHINESE ON THE TAI-DONG RIVER . . . . .	121
PLAN OF PHYÜNG-YANG CITY AND ENVIRONS . . . . .	148
MAJOR-GENERAL TACHIMI . . . . .	155
COLONEL SATO . . . . .	156
HARADA, THE HERO OF THE GEMMU GATE . . . . .	157
YOSHINO . . . . .	169
AKITSUSHIMA . . . . .	170
HIYEI . . . . .	171
LAI-YUEN . . . . .	173
SAIKIO MARU . . . . .	175
TING-YUEN . . . . .	176
CHEN-YUEN . . . . .	177
CHIYODA . . . . .	178
ITSUKUSHIMA . . . . .	179
HASHIDATE . . . . .	180
ADMIRAL ITO . . . . .	182
MARSHAL YAMAGATA . . . . .	190
MAJOR-GENERAL OSEKO . . . . .	197
MARSHAL OYAMA . . . . .	204
GATE OF CHIN-CHOW . . . . .	211
PRIVATE ONOGUCHI, OF THE ENGINEERS, WHO BLEW UP THE GATE . . . . .	212
CAPTAIN ASAKAWA SAVED BY PRIVATE TIO . . . . .	219

## LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.

	PAGE
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL YAMAGI . . . . .	227
HUANG-CHIN-SHAN (GOLDEN HILL) FORT . . . . .	230
SORTIE OF UNARMED JAPANESE COOLIES ON A BODY OF FUGITIVE CHINESE SOLDIERS IN THE NEIGHBOURHOOD OF CHIN-CHOW .	234
GENERAL OSHIMA AND HIS TROOPS FIGHTING IN THE SNOW .	253
JAPANESE ARMY ADVANCING THROUGH THE SNOW . . . . .	257
MAJOR-GENERAL NOGI . . . . .	264
JAPANESE SOLDIERS ADVANCING ON THE ICE . . . . .	265
MAJOR-GENERAL OTERA, KILLED AT WEI-HAI-WEI . . . . .	279
JAPANESE OFFICER SAVING GIRL AND BABY . . . . .	283
CAPTAIN TODA, COMMANDER OF THE 2ND TORPEDO FLOTILLA .	286
LIEUTENANT IMAI, COMMANDER OF THE 3RD TORPEDO FLOTILLA .	287
LIEUTENANT JAHUSHIMA, COMMANDER OF TORPEDO BOAT NO. 22	290
CAPTAIN MOCHIHARA, COMMANDER OF THE 1ST TORPEDO FLOTILLA	291
KOTAKA . . . . .	294
TORPEDO BOAT NO. 7 . . . . .	295
ADMIRAL TING . . . . .	303
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL KATSURA . . . . .	315
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL NONZU . . . . .	318

## MAPS.

MAP OF THE OPERATIONS DURING THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR	<i>Frontispiece</i>
DIAGRAMS ILLUSTRATING THE NAVAL BATTLE AT HAI-YANG ISLAND . . . . .	<i>Facing page 169</i>

# THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR.

---

## INTRODUCTION.

THE China-Japan War cannot be considered as one of those distant struggles between outlandish nations, only interesting to the curious reader, who seeks to satisfy his craving for the strange and the little-known. It is an event which has already produced great results, and it bids fair to produce even greater ones and to rank as one of the great events of the century. Indeed, for the magnitude, nature and duration of its results we think it will rank as the great war of the century. Even in a few months, after the first battles, we find that it produced a most rapid and startling change of public opinion. Japan, which it was fashionable to deride as a country of ridiculous little beings, who aped everything though with such inconsistent levity that no permanent results could be expected from their childlike imitations; the country which was supposed to possess but a "veneer" of civilisation was found by the



astonished world to possess an army and a navy which could rank with the same institutions of Europe and America. Her victories were the more conspicuous, because so unexpected; none of the grave writers who had formed western opinion of the Far East had ever given a thought to the military power of Japan; all serious consideration was given to China, and she was supposed to be carefully nursed to become the ally of Great Britain, as the only nation sufficiently powerful to arrest the eastern expansion of Russia. All wrote about the undeveloped latent military power of the Chinese Colossus, and Japan was relegated to the domain of art and prettiness.

People who had imbibed their opinion from these sources considered the war at first as a ludicrous one; they were irresistibly moved to laughter by the idea of little Japan.(forgetting that most nations of Europe are inferior to her in population and territory) daring to grapple with the Chinese Empire. These popular errors seemed moreover plausible on account of the numerical disparity of the two powers; quantity is more easily appreciated than quality: it requires less mental exertion. Those who had studied Japanese history, had travelled over the country with an attentive eye, even for a short time, or who had known educated Japanese, formed a far different opinion about the prospects of the war. They reflected that the Japanese had always been a warlike nation, that they had stopped even the

conquests of the Mongols when they were in the height of their glory, that the progress achieved by Japan in the last twenty years was not fictitious but spread through the whole people and their institutions ; on the other hand China had never been fond of war, and in her encounter with European troops in the present century had always cut a poor figure. At the same time, the warmest admirers of Japan, probably even her own statesmen, did not expect such a brilliant series of extraordinary successes.

Nobody doubted the valour of her soldiers, but the war was a revelation to the world of the strategical ability and coolness of her generals and admirals. To appreciate justly the merit of Japan, and the rapidity of her assimilation of foreign civilisation, it is necessary to bear in mind that the present war is the first foreign war that Japan has waged for the last three centuries, and that it was her first experiment with the new weapons and tactics which she has so lately adopted from the West. Notwithstanding this, everything passed smoothly, as if general manœuvres were being carried on. It is but fair to add one more remark ; the war being carried on in Corea and Manchuria required that soldiers, ammunition, stores, etc., should all be transported by sea, thus causing an immense increase of difficulty to the Japanese transport department. These difficulties were faced with coolness and overcome without effort. European officers who had an opportunity of witnessing the landing of considerable bodies of Japanese troops

confessed that the operation could not have been performed better by well-trained Western troops provided with an efficient transport service.

The secret of these unexpected successes is revealed by an attentive consideration of the ancient and recent history of Japan; the many centuries of insular isolation and the feudal system had trained the mass of the Japanese people to sentiments of loyalty, of unswerving devotion to their chieftains, and developed a spirit of heroic fortitude and love of war. The last quarter of a century had initiated the higher classes to all the science and progress of the West. When, therefore, Japan resolved to put forth her strength in a foreign war, she found herself possessed with an army composed of soldiers who were ready to advance joyfully to death at the bidding of the emperor and for the glory of their country, and of officers and generals who had profited by the experience of centuries of Western wars, and who had taken up the study of military science just as it had reached perfection at the hands of Napoleon and Moltke.

Japan had also great advantages in her vicinity and long intercourse with China, from whom she has received her early civilisation, and her writing. The peculiar nature of the Chinese characters—which express ideas rather than sounds, resembling thus our Arabic numerals, which have the same meaning from Finland to Portugal, though with such different sounds—enables the educated Japanese to understand

Chinese books and writing even when they cannot speak a word of the language. This common written medium not only facilitates the preparatory study of the enemy's country and forces, but is an incalculable benefit in the course of a campaign. All information which can be conveyed by writing can be obtained easily, without fear of mistakes, and needs no interpreters, which are only necessary in communicating with the illiterate and ignorant. This prompt means of information is a great advantage in modern warfare, where knowledge of every kind is the principal element of success. To such a cause must be attributed the relatively greater success of the Japanese as compared with the French and English in the China campaigns.

While we note the brilliant qualities of the Japanese army, we must not overlook that they are set off by corresponding defects on the part of China. That country, throughout her long history, has seldom been remarkable for military success: she has often been conquered by smaller nations, and for the last two centuries and a half has been governed by a handful of Manchus, a hardy northern race. The education of the Chinese people and public opinion all tend to discourage any latent warlike tendency of the nation. The military profession is looked down upon; mandarins of that class always ranking below civil mandarins; and a soldier is considered as the lowest of the people, as a person who cares for no decent calling and is unfit for it. Under such conditions, it

is natural that the Chinese soldiers should not be very brave, and generally unwilling to throw away their lives for a country which does not appreciate their services. Their pay is meagre, and often curtailed by dishonest superiors ; far from any pensions being given to the disabled, and to the relations of the killed in battle, even medical assistance and care of the wounded are not provided, and the end of a war generally means the dismissal of all those who have been hastily enlisted at the moment of danger.

While the lower classes in China are not warlike and are not encouraged to become so, the upper classes are almost totally ignorant of the scientific civilisation of the West and averse to it, as they consider its advent as a certain forerunner of the fall of their oligarchy. They consider that the only hope of continuance of their system lies in keeping the people ignorant, not only of what happens in other nations, but even in other provinces of the Chinese Empire. All attempts to achieve what we regard as freedom is completely smothered ; railways are not allowed to be built, and even good common roads are very seldom to be found in the interior, so that water-carriage of some kind is the general means of travelling over the greater part of the country. In the intellectual field matters are even worse : the ignorance even of the most learned Chinese is incredible ; they lack that mathematical training which is considered necessary to all educated persons in the West, and which has produced those bold general-

isations in all branches of science which have revolutionised the thought of Europe and America. In China the only military examinations consist in bending tough bows, lifting heavy weights and handling the sword.

If we keep in view all these simultaneous facts which operate in directing the conduct of the two countries, we shall find that the struggle in the Far East was not simply a war between two nations, but a war between the past and the present, between Western civilisation and a sporadic survival of the worn-out Eastern civilization; an encounter between such tactics as were employed by Agamemnon at Troy and those that might have been conceived by Moltke.

Though we point out China as the champion of the past, we must not consider that she enacts her part consistently: the worship of her ancient world is rather a pretext to avoid the trouble of reform than a sincere attachment to the great men of the past: she does not follow their precepts, and there is perhaps no country in the world where there is such a scarcity of ancient monuments—in fact, they may be said to be entirely absent. At the same time it is necessary to dispel the error bred by ignorance, that China has never changed; there is hardly any country that has undergone so many political vicissitudes. Her history counts twenty-four dynasties, many of which were foreign, and established themselves by a bloody conquest of the country: every political change has brought with it a complete change of

dress and customs, and a considerable change in the internal administration. In the points just dealt with, Japan may be considered far more conservative than China; she has had but one dynasty in the course of her whole history, and the internal changes up to the last generation have been far less than those of her neighbour; at the same time she has a worship for the great men of the past, and their heroic exploits are ever present in the mind of the people.

It has been fashionable among writers on the Far East to lay stress on the mysterious and awe-striking process which threatened the world in a near future: the "Awakening of China." These speculations about the future blinded them to what was really happening, the awakening of Japan: the phenomenon of a race that had slumbered for centuries in its beautiful ocean home, in those clusters of islands that remind one of Hellas, almost ignorant of the world that surrounded it, save for the casual advent of a Buddhist missionary, a Corean artist or a wave-tossed European, suddenly awakening to consciousness that it held a place in the world and resolved that it should be one of glory and honour.

# PART I.

## THE HISTORY OF THE COREAN QUESTION.

---

### CHAPTER I.

#### SHORT SKETCH OF THE HISTORICAL RELATIONS OF THE THREE COUNTRIES.

THE Corean question which has caused the war between China and Japan has its origin far into the past, and, to understand it clearly, a glance at the historical relations of the three countries is absolutely necessary.

China, Corea, and Japan form a group of nations connected by a bond of a peculiar nature, which it is difficult for a European reader to understand. It is not alone by their geographical proximity, and by the ancient civilisation born in the North of China, which gradually spread into Corea and Japan; nor by the diffusion of Buddhism, which China receiving from India passed on to her Eastern neighbours, that they feel bound together, but still more so by the use of the characters, invented in China, which spread into Corea and Japan, and are still used, notwithstanding both those countries have an



alphabetical writing of their own. Chinese characters do not necessarily express a sound, their primary use is to represent an idea or object, and they have thus become the written medium of communication for three nations whose languages are totally different. It is difficult to render this fact intelligible to those who are unacquainted with Chinese characters, but the following parallel case in the West may be of some assistance. All the nations of Europe use the Arabic figures, though they correspond to very different sounds in the various languages of the continent, and a traveller is able to understand the numbers on shop-doors, and the hours of departure of a railway train, though he is unable to read them with their foreign pronunciation. What happens in these few cases in Europe occurs in all cases where writing is used in the Far East. A well-educated Chinese, Japanese, or Corean can understand almost everything which is written in either of the other two neighbouring countries, though he cannot speak a word of their languages. This common medium of communication, which is especially useful for all those higher forms of thought which are best expressed and transmitted by writing, has created a deep-seated bond between nations which, by nature, would have little in common.

In fact, the three nations are very different both physically and intellectually: the Japanese are vivacious, artistic, warlike, and ever ready to adopt improvements from abroad; the Chinese are mostly

quiet, laborious, pacific and averse to change; and the Koreans, through centuries of oppression, have become slothful and indifferent to a degree which would be incredible to one who did not know them. The languages are different in structure, and have nothing in common except what has been imported by literature and religion. Modern Japanese is full of Chinese words and expressions, but these are like French and Latin words in English, or Arabic ones in Persian, a mere borrowing of convenient ready-made phrases, which has not affected the structure of the language, though it has increased the mental stock-in-trade of the people.

According to Chinese tradition, Korea owes its civilisation and even its political existence to a Chinese political refugee called Chi-tzu, who emigrated thither about 1100 B.C. The country, which he founded with the name of Chao-hsien (Morning Freshness) was not conterminous with modern Korea; it contained only the northern part of that country; but, on the other hand, a portion of the present Empire of China was within its boundaries. The southern part of the peninsula was divided into several states, and these, after several centuries of war among themselves and with Chao-hsien (which afterwards changed its name to Korai through the invasion of a northern people of that name), gradually united to form one country at the beginning of the tenth century of our era. Before this unity was achieved, Korea had to sustain many foreign wars, which were

often provoked by one of the warring states calling in assistance either from China or Japan.

The most persistent and terrible wars undertaken by China against Corea were during the Sui (589–618 A.D) and Han (618–905 A.D) dynasties. The celebrated and infamous Emperor Yang-ti, who extended the Grand Canal, and who distinguished himself by his debauchery, cruelty, and protection of literature, planned a series of gigantic invasions of Corea both by land and sea. The first expedition, said to have consisted of 300,000 men, met with disaster. The land force marched during the rainy season, which converts some parts of Liao-tung\* into an impassable bog; the provision-carts could not proceed, and the army was decimated by famine and an epidemic. The naval force started from Lai-chou, a port in Shantung, but met with storms which destroyed most of the vessels. Yang-ti was not discouraged, and began preparations for a new expedition on a vast scale. His disordered mind seems to have had a craving for the abnormal and the gigantic; his accession to the throne was sullied by incest and parricide; the lives of his subjects were wasted in excavating the Grand Canal, which, completed in after years, is one of the greatest works of man; and, if historians have not exaggerated, he collected the largest army which China has ever put into the field. More than a million of men are said to have been assembled for the invasion of Corea, but

\* The north-eastern part of China near Corea.

they performed very little. The different divisions of this unwieldy force, after having suffered much from mutual over-crowding, were arrested before the fortified cities of the Coreans. One general reached the capital (the present Phyöng-yang), but was deceived into believing that the Coreans were far superior in numbers, and commenced a retreat, which became a rout, owing to the harassing attacks of the Coreans and the scarcity of provisions. A naval force, which had also reached the capital, remained ignorant of the proximity of the army, and also retreated. It cannot be supposed that such a large army should fail so miserably ; it is therefore probable that the historians exaggerated the original numbers, and that very few of those who started ever marched into Corea, the majority deserting by the way. Even after these deductions it must have been a great military disaster ; and though Yang-ti stubbornly persisted in scheming new plans of invasions, he did not live to execute them—a band of conspirators, who could no longer bear his tyranny, put an end to his life and to his dynasty.

The Chinese people had been unwilling to support the mad schemes of Yang-ti, but they felt the humiliation which they had suffered from Corea, and the new dynasty, the T'ang, so famous in Chinese history,\*

\* The T'ang dynasty is the Augustan age of Chinese poetry, and the Southern Chinese delight to call themselves "T'ang-jeu" (men of T'ang), while the Northerners prefer to call themselves "men of Han."

was obliged to continue a policy of hostility towards Corea. There were many reasons to provoke a war, besides the desire of wiping out the disgrace of the former campaigns: Corea still held territory, which once had belonged to China, and a usurper had killed the King of Corea\* and several ministers at a banquet. These difficulties were at first overcome, and the Chinese Emperor consented to recognise the usurper as tributary sovereign of the disputed territory; but when Shinlo (one of the small states of Southern Corea) asked China for protection against the usurper, and he would not listen to the orders to desist from his invasions, the Emperor resolved to make war on Corea.

The war thus commenced lasted about half a century, through the reigns of several Chinese emperors, and ended with the conquest of northern and western Corea (then divided into the states of Korai and Po-chi). It introduces us also to one of the most beautiful figures in Chinese history—to a monarch who can be compared with some of the best of the Roman Empire. Tai-tsung, the son of the first Tang emperor, was the real founder of the greatness of his house. When both were in a private station he urged his father to rebel, and with his abilities he secured him the throne, which had been dishonoured by the vices of the tyrant Yang-ti. He commanded

\* Political assassination seems indigenous to the soil of Corea. After twelve centuries, parties unfortunately still employ the same methods.

in person the expedition sent against Corea; he encouraged his troops by his example, and comforted them with his kindness; he lived on the simplest food and saddled his horse himself; and inquired personally about the sick and wounded soldiers. His army was conducted with great skill, and won several victories, and the abilities of the general were adorned by the bravery of the man. At the siege of a town, when the soldiers were busy forming a mound to overtop the walls, the emperor picked up a large piece of earth, and galloping under the walls, placed it on the top of the rising mound. His campaign was not entirely successful, and he was foiled in his last siege. But this check did not arouse his vanity, and he preserved unruffled the sweetness of his disposition. When the orders to raise the siege were given, the Korean governor, who had bravely defended the place, appeared on the battlements and bowed to the retiring emperor. T'ai-tsung sent rich presents to his chivalrous adversary as an acknowledgment of his bravery. This was not the only instance of the T'ang emperor's magnanimity. When his soldiers complained that they were not allowed to sack a town, he replied that their reward should be given by the imperial treasury. At the end of the campaign, all the Korean prisoners, instead of being sold as slaves to enrich the troops, were ransomed and set free by the emperor, whose kind heart could not bear to tear apart children from their mothers, and wives from their husbands. The widow of a Korean general, who

had offered the most stubborn resistance, having fallen into his hands, he gave her rich silks and a fast cart that she might convey the dead body of her husband to Phyöng-yang. These episodes of a man, great by his position and his deeds, who could lead the rough life of a soldier, brave the dangers of the field, and still keep a kind and generous heart, are pleasant to read in the light of present events. They form a contrast to the actions of the present age, and they show that China may still be a great nation if, in her reverence for the past, she aim rather at imitating the noble actions recorded in her history, than at preserving customs which through the lapse of time have lost their significance. They show that the Japanese are right when they sing in their war-songs that China formerly was a land of sages and heroes.

Tai-tsung died shortly after (A.D. 650), and the war continued in a desultory way during the reign of his successors until the Empress Wu (A.D. 684-705) (one of the most remarkable characters in Chinese history) usurped the throne. This vindictive but strong-minded woman pushed on the war with such vigour that the greater part of Corea was conquered. After these long and bloody wars Corea submitted to the suzerainty of China; and if she occasionally relapsed from her allegiance, a short war was generally sufficient to recall her to sentiments of loyalty.

We have examined one aspect of the question: The ancient political relations between China and

Northern and Western Corea. We have now to study another aspect : The relations of Japan with Eastern Corea. From the inter-action of these two series of historical events arises the third and later aspect, when all three nations became engaged in long disastrous wars. From a very early age Corea was invaded by the Japanese. According to Japanese traditions about 202 A.D., the celebrated Empress Jingu, to revenge the death of her husband, who had been killed by the rebels in Kiushiu, undertook an expedition to Corea. This Amazon, celebrated in Japanese legends as the mother of Ojiu, the god of war, suspected that the rebellion in Kiushiu had been instigated by Shinra,\* a small kingdom which occupied the south-eastern part of the Korean peninsula, where the modern provinces of Kang-Wŏn and Kyōng-Sang are now situated, and was determined to inflict an exemplary punishment. The King of Shinra was unable to resist such a formidable invasion, and submitted to great humiliations. He declared himself the slave of Japan, and Jingu hung her bow over the gate of the palace, and is even said to have written on the gate, "The king of Shinra is the dog of Japan."

The account of this expedition is legendary, but the Japanese maintain its truth, adorn their paper money with illustrations of it, and supported their right of suzerainty over Corea on the basis of this submission of Shinra to Jingu. This claim of suzerainty was not officially relinquished until 1876,

\* It is read Shin-lo by the Chinese.



when Japan concluded the treaty which led to the opening of Corea to foreign trade.



JAPANESE DOLLAR-NOTE, WITH THE HEAD OF EMPEROR JINGU, WHO INVADDED COREA

Sixteen centuries is a long time to keep up an imaginary sovereignty, but we must remember that

time seems to run slower in the East, where history is reckoned by dynasties rather than by reigns; and even in European history we have the parallel case of England claiming for centuries the throne of France and her sovereigns assuming the title of kings of that country.

The expedition of Jingu has influenced Japanese policy towards Corea since the third century; that ancient episode impressed itself on the popular mind, and led all the restless warriors and politicians of Japan to embroil themselves in Corean wars, in the hope of rivalling the glory of Jingu. It also led to the third phase of the question: Hostility between China and Japan. As early as the seventh century, the Japanese sent an expedition to assist one of the small Corean States against China, but it was unsuccessful, being surprised by the Chinese fleet and almost destroyed.\* A great military expedition of the thirteenth century had, however, greater influence on the mutual relations of China, Japan, and Corea. Kublai Khan's attempted invasion revealed to Japan the strength of her position and her relative power among nations: after that national crisis Japan begins to appear as an aggressive factor in the politics of the Far East.

This famous expedition, whose defeat was lately commemorated by the Japanese, and whose history was recently re-written by Imperial order, has often been compared to the Invincible Armada of Philip II.

\* This happened during the reign of Kao-tsung, A.D. 650-684.

The incidents of the latter are well known to every English reader, and it will be interesting to give a few of the most striking features of the former. Kublai Khan, or Shih Tsu as he is called by Chinese historians, ruled over almost the whole of the continent of Asia; and the Mongol power extended even far into Europe to the frontiers of Germany. There was only a small outlying country in the sea which had not yet acknowledged his power. He tried at first to achieve its submission by diplomacy, and ambassadors with haughty messages were sent to Japan; but the Mongols had now met at last a people who could withstand their hitherto invincible arms. The Japanese, imbued with the pride and spirit of independence characteristic of all islanders, did not deign even to answer the summary intimation to submit of Kublai Khan. The Mongol emperor then tried the effect of arms, and sent an expedition of 300 vessels and 15,000 men, which was totally defeated by the Japanese near the Island of Iki. These diplomatic and military failures convinced the Mongol emperor that he had under-estimated the unknown enemy, and he prepared an expedition on a far larger scale. It is said that he assembled a fleet of 3,500 war-junks, and an army of above 100,000 men. This vast armada was unlucky from the beginning: the commander-in-chief fell sick, and his successor was unequal to the task of directing such an unwieldy host. Marco Polo asserts that dissension prevailed among the Mongol generals. As soon as it

reached Japan a dreadful tempest (the Japanese attribute it to the divine intervention of the goddess Ise, whose aid had been invoked by the emperor) destroyed the greater part of the fleet, and the few remaining vessels, together with the shipwrecked survivors, were cut to pieces by the Japanese.

This great victory over the Mongol arms, which had swept unresisted from the Yellow Sea to the frontiers of Silesia and Egypt, naturally exalted the self-confidence of the Japanese, who were determined to be revenged on the Chinese and Koreans who had been forced to assist the Mongols. Japan was for a long time a prey to feudal wars, and her government was not able to undertake foreign wars, but her people had ample opportunities to secure revenge. During the end of the Yuan dynasty, and almost all through the Ming period, A.D. 1368-1642, Japanese pirates infested the coast of China. Their ravages were so considerable that Hung-wu, the first Ming emperor (A.D. 1368-1399) had to organise a special body of militia for coast defence, and ordered watch-towers to be built along the coast.

The Japanese pirates scoured the whole coast of China, and no place was safe from their bold raids. The central provinces were of course those most affected, and from the reign of Hung-wu to the end of that of Shih-tsung (A.D. 1370-1567) they were devastated by Japanese adventurers, who not only raided the coast, but often established themselves ashore in strong positions, from which they used to

sally forth to plunder, destroy and burn. But they never lost their hold on the sea, and kept their ships, either to retreat to Japan when their situation became hopeless, or to remove to some other part of the coast. The Chinese in opposing their raids, often succeeded in destroying their "nests" (as they called their fortified positions) and burning their ships, in which cases there was an indiscriminate slaughter of the Japanese.

But the Chinese historians also record many victories of the Japanese, who then used to sweep over the whole country, at a considerable distance from the sea, plundering and slaying as they liked. They describe very well the national traits of the Japanese: their love of warfare, their indifference to danger and death, and their readiness to fight against superior numbers.

It would be tedious to describe, even summarily, the yearly and often monthly inroads of the Japanese. To give an idea of their character and extent it will suffice to give a few examples. In the 17th year of Cheng Tsu (A.D. 1419), in Liao-tung, near the present Port Arthur, 2,000 Japanese were destroyed by a series of ambushes and skilful stratagems of a Chinese general. In the 32nd year of Shih Tsung (A.D. 1553), during whose reign the Japanese raids were most frequent and terrible, the pirates attacked all the coast from Wenchow to Shanghai. There was no way to subdue these formidable invaders, who had always a retreat by the sea, and could transfer their operations rapidly from one province to another.

In the following year they defeated the Chinese troops with heavy loss, and spread all over the country to plunder. They defeated again the Chinese troops, and ravaging the country, they cut their way to the sea through another district. The losses through these incursions were immense; historians calculate that during the seven or eight years when they were most terrible, China lost several millions' worth in goods and slaves carried off, and over 100,000 soldiers and people were killed or drowned. To find anything to parallel it in our histories, we must go back to the dark ages, when the fairest parts of Europe were exposed to the fierce raids of Normans from the north and Saracens from the south.

These piratical forays were the spasmodic efforts of private adventurers, but they were followed by the greatest war in Japanese history. The evil government of the Ashikaga family, which rent Japan with civil wars, was finally put an end to by Nobunaga and Hideyoshi. The latter had risen from the position of a menial to the first rank in the empire; but by his courage and military skill he made men forget his low origin, and he ruled with absolute power the whole country in the name of the emperor. He was beloved by his army, which had won in every battle, and he was eager to employ it abroad, now that no enemy had been left in Japan. The shadowy suzerainty claimed by Japan over Corea for centuries was a ready pretext to provoke a war with that country, which was however only a first step towards

an invasion of China, a gigantic scheme which he might have realised if he had been a younger man. It is said that this scheme arose very early in the mind of Hideyoshi, and it recurred at intervals until he possessed the means of putting it into execution. Once when he was at the Kiyomidzu temple at Kioto, in the midst of the beauties of nature which all tourists have admired, grieving for the loss of his son, he turned to an attendant and said: "A great man ought to employ his army beyond ten thousand miles, and not give way to sorrow." He tried to smother his grief by gigantic schemes, and he parcelled out China among his generals in his day-dreams of conquest. The pride and ambition of this extraordinary man are well shown in the letter he sent to the King of Corea, when he said that, "he, the last scion of a humble stock had been predestined," that "wherever the sun shines, there will be no place which shall not be subject to him, and that his career had been like the rising sun, illuminating the whole earth."

The proposal of a joint invasion of China was rejected because the King of Corea considered the enterprise absurd, and compared it to a bee attempting to sting a tortoise. Hideyoshi prepared a formidable invasion of Corea. A large army, said to have been of 150,000 men, and supported by powerful reserves, was landed in Corea near Fusan. The soldiers were not only warlike, and accustomed to victory, but they were much better armed than the Coreans, and had a

good many firearms, whose use the Japanese had learnt from the Portuguese. The Japanese were commanded by two generals, Konishi Yukinaga and Kato Kiyomasa, very different in age and character ; Konishi was young and an ardent Christian, while Kato, a much older man, was a bigoted Buddhist. These differences soon created a bitter rivalry between the two generals, and the dissensions that followed probably influenced the result of the campaign.

A curious incident happened before the departure of the expedition ; the Japanese warriors of that age were almost as ignorant as our mediæval knights, and they told Hideyoshi that they would be very much embarrassed if they received letters from the Chinese generals. Hideyoshi then appointed some bonzes learned in Chinese characters to assist them.

At first the rapid success of the Japanese was astonishing. The impetuous young Konishi, by skilful seamanship, was able to land first in Corea, and immediately, the same day, took the castle of Tong-nai (near Fusan), then, proceeding by the valley of the Nak-tong, he attacked and took Sang-ju, and Chhung-ju. He made such despatch that he was able to enter the capital, Seoul, within eighteen days from his first landing. The joy of Hideyoshi, on hearing of these rapid successes, was so great that he exclaimed, " Now my own son seems risen from the dead."

Kato, who had landed the next day, was very much annoyed at being everywhere forestalled by his youth-



ful rival, who made every effort to retard his march, even removing the boats that were necessary for crossing the river in front of the capital. Notwithstanding these delays, he entered Seoul about the same time as Konishi.

The rapidity of the invasion utterly disconcerted the Korean Court, which was unprepared for war, and when the news of the fall of Chhung-ju reached Seoul, it caused such a panic, that the courtiers abandoned the king, and fled with the horses taken from the royal stables. The king was obliged to escape into Liao-tung and implore the assistance of China, while the royal princes were sent into the N.-E. provinces. The two Japanese generals, having found it impossible to act in concert, agreed to separate, Kato proceeding eastward to conquer Ham-gyöng, and Konishi pushing on to Phyöng-yang, which he reached about three weeks after leaving Seoul. Here the Japanese had some difficulty in crossing the Taidong river, but by a stratagem they succeeded, and defeated the Koreans, who were obliged to abandon Phyöng-yang.

The fall of this city, the ancient capital of the kingdom and a strong fortress, spread terror through all Korea and the Chinese province of Liao-tung, whither panic-struck fugitives repaired in great numbers.

The impetuous Konishi wished to follow up his victory and invade China, but he was so distant from his base of operations, that he was obliged to ask for

the co-operation of the Japanese fleet, which was lying at Fusan. It was ordered to sail round the western coast, and proceed up the Tai-dong river. Had such a junction been achieved, it is probable that Hideyoshi's dreams might have been realised. If the Japanese could have kept up their rapid advance, no resistance could have been offered to them; neither Chinese nor Koreans were yet quite ready for war, and the army, which in a few weeks had conquered almost the whole of Corea, would have found no difficulty in passing through Liao-tung in a somewhat longer time. But unfortunately for the brilliant projects of Hideyoshi and his generals, the fleet was unable to reach the rendezvous. The Koreans, staggered at first by the impetuous onslaught of the Japanese, gradually recovered themselves, and, imbued with the courage of despair, attacked with success the Japanese fleet, while on its way, at the island of Kô-je and drove it back to Fusan. This naval success was owing to the Korean vessels being stronger than the Japanese, and having thick boards for protection against arrows and bullets. This defeat prevented any further advance of Konishi, and as the Tai-dong river and Phÿông-yang marked the extreme limit of Japanese military operations during the celebrated invasions of the 16th century, the defeat of the Japanese fleet may be considered the turning-point of the war, and might be chosen as a far Eastern illustration of Capt. Mahan's theories of the influence of sea-power upon history.

While Konishi had advanced to Phyöng-yang, Kato marched to the northern frontier of Corea and besieged Hoi-ryöng, where the royal princes had fled for refuge : the princes were delivered up to him and the fortress was surrendered. Not satisfied with this success, Kato crossed the frontier and invaded the country of the (Orankai : \* here a touching episode is said to have taken place, which forms a favourite subject for Japanese artists. Towards the east, across the sea, the Japanese saw the dim outline of a mountain which they mistook for their beloved Fuji-san : Kato at once took off his helmet and reverently saluted his native land.†

When the King of Corea fled to Liao-tung, to implore assistance from the Chinese, the latter sent a small army, which was promptly routed by the Japanese. The Chinese, now realising the power of their enemy, prepared to send a larger force, and to gain time they entered into negotiations with the enemy. This was only the first of many diplomatic missions. During the long war there were many others in the field, and at Peking. Of course, the Chinese were at a great advantage in their negotiations, as they employed cunning agents, whom they could disown at pleasure ; while the Japanese employed their generals, who were only bluff, ignorant

\* At present it forms part of the Russian Amur province.

† The Japanese say the mountain may have been Yo-tei-rei in the northern island of Yezo. It was probably some island off the coast.

warriors, who could not even read Chinese characters, and were obliged to have recourse to their bonzes.

The Japanese had been promised by a wily Chinese, who had been sent to cajole them into waiting, the whole of Corea up to the Tai-dong river, *i.e.*, the territory they had conquered. But while they were waiting for the answer from Peking ratifying such arrangements, a large Ming army silently advanced to attack them at Phyong-yang. The position of the Japanese was very critical: all the Korean peasantry were in revolt, and the Chinese army was upon them. Konishi's courage and presence of mind did not fail him. He disdained to retreat, and boldly prepared for battle. Notwithstanding the great numerical superiority of the Chinese, the Japanese held their ground at Peony Mount (a strong position near Phyong-yang), but during the night they were obliged to retreat. The Chinese were then commanded by Li-yu-sung, a veteran who had already distinguished himself by subduing rebellions and warring with the then rising Manchus. He was angry at the escape of the Japanese, and proceeded at once to Seoul with an army estimated at 200,000 men, most of whom must have been ill-armed Korean peasants. Konishi resolved to make a stand at Seoul, where he had asked Kato and other generals to join him. The Chinese and Koreans defeated the Japanese advanced guard, and moved on to the capital, where a dreadful battle was fought, the most bloody of the war. At first the Japanese were overcome by the superior numbers of

their enemies, but they finally succeeded in driving them back with heavy loss, through the tactics of an old general, who employed a favourite stratagem of ancient warfare. He kept aloof with a strong reserve, and when the Chinese fell into confusion, pursuing the Japanese, he attacked and defeated them. This victory gave very undecided results. The Chinese had lost heavily, and were afraid that Kato, whom they thought had not yet joined Konishi, might attack them in flank, so they retired to P'yŏng-yang. The Japanese advanced, and took some castles garrisoned by the Koreans, but they were weary of the length of the campaign, and harassed by the incessant guerilla warfare of the Koreans. They were also hard pressed for food, as the protracted hostilities had caused a famine. At last the Japanese generals consented to listen to terms of peace. Japan was promised the three southern provinces of Korea, and the recognition of her suzerainty. Hideyoshi wished also to be considered as the equal of the Emperor of China—this petty piece of vanity finally frustrated the negotiations. Pending the discussion of these conditions the Japanese evacuated Seoul and retired to the coast, where they could receive their supplies from Japan. This was the end of the first invasion. The Japanese, through discord among their generals, insufficient support from their fleet, and incapacity to judge the crafty diplomacy of the Chinese, had lost all the results of their first brilliant military achievements, which for

their rapidity must be considered as wonderful for that age.

The negotiations were undertaken with very little sincerity on the part of the Chinese, and with an arrogant desire on the part of Hideyoshi to assert his personal power. The consequence of all these discordant causes was that the Chinese took umbrage at some Japanese attacks on the Koreans, and Hideyoshi was offended by an insufficient recognition from the Emperor of China. A second invasion of Corea was at once planned, and an army as powerful as the first invaded that unfortunate country. The success of this second invasion was inferior to the first. The Koreans were prepared, and had been trained by the former campaigns, while a large Chinese army was already in the country to support them. The Japanese armies, after several victories, advanced only as far as the capital; but they were obliged to retire almost at once, a defeat of their fleet, as in the former advance to P'yŏng-yang, depriving them of all means of obtaining supplies. As winter was approaching, and the country had been devastated by years of warfare, they had to retire down to the coast near Japan. The Japanese, now conscious they were leaving the country for ever, resolved to enrich themselves and to inflict as much injury as they could on the unfortunate Koreans. They sacked and burnt all the towns during their slow march south. The retreating army took up its positions at Fusan and Urusan, at which latter place

they were forced to stand at bay, as an immense army of Chinese and Koreans was coming up to avenge former defeats and the ruthless devastation of the country. The siege of Ulsan was the last important episode of the war, and it was a fitting end to the succession of horrors which had afflicted Korea for so many years. The Japanese, knowing the numbers and fury of their enemies, fortified their position. A triple enclosure of strong high walls, flanked by towers protected three sides of their camp, which was guarded by the sea on the fourth side. During the whole severe Korean winter the Japanese withstood furious assaults, amidst the horrors of famine and thirst. The lively imagination of the Japanese, so fond of the horrid and grotesque, has handed down innumerable incidents of that dreadful siege. The arrows shot into the fortress were so numerous that the besieged used them as fuel to cook the flesh of the frozen corpses of their horses. Every device was employed to eke out their scanty provisions. Rats and mice were caught and eaten, and even paper was chewed to allay the pangs of hunger. The famished soldiers suffered from the intense cold, and many were found frozen to death sitting on the sunny side of the walls, where they had vainly sought a little warmth. In the first assault the Chinese had won the first enclosure, and the Japanese found themselves in great straits for water, as the enemy guarded every stream and source. It is said the Japanese were reduced to lick the wounds

of the corpses, and chew the flesh to allay their thirst. Amidst famine and thirst they had to make such violent exertions that in the extreme cold their armour was covered with frozen sweat. Japanese historians amusingly relate that the warriors found their greave-bands constantly slipping down, as their legs had become like bamboo sticks. Amidst all these horrors one is charmed to find a few romantic episodes well befitting the chivalrous character of the feudal Japanese. Asano, one of the generals at Urusan, wrote of his distress to Kato, and as the latter had sworn to Asano's father to ever help his son, he at once proceeded to Urusan to share the dangers and privations of his friend. The distressed garrison of Urusan had sent many urgent messages for relief, but it was not until they were almost reduced by famine that an army marched from Fusan, and, after a desperate struggle, defeated the besiegers.

Both armies were too much exhausted by the winter campaign to engage in any decisive battle, and the military operations were confined to guerilla warfare. The death of Hideyoshi, the author of the war, soon after put an end to it; one of his last orders was to recall all his troops from Corea. The war, together with the different attempted negotiations, had lasted over six years—from the middle of 1592 to the end of 1598. During all this time Japan had fought against Corea and China, but though successful in most battles, want of supplies had obliged her gradually to retreat. The only practical result of the



two terrible invasions was the occupation of Fusan, which was kept and garrisoned by the Japanese, who probably clung to it as a souvenir of their military achievements, just as the English, after they had been driven out of France, long retained a hold of Calais, and were attached to it far beyond its intrinsic importance, as the last remnant of their continental possessions.

A long account has been given of Hideyoshi's campaign,\* but it is not superfluous, as that event forms a conspicuous episode of Japanese history which has deeply impressed itself on the national mind. Modern Japanese writers say that it is similar to the Crusades, and as those romantic expeditions have greatly contributed to fix the European mind on the East, so Hideyoshi's invasions have kept Japan's attention riveted to Corea,

\* Besides native historians, an article in a foreign paper published in the Far East has been of great use in compiling this description.

## CHAPTER II.

## SKETCH OF MODERN HISTORY OF KOREA.

SOON after Hideyoshi's death and the collapse of his ambitious schemes, great changes took place in China and Japan. In the former country the Ming dynasty grew feebler every day, and was finally supplanted by the Manchus, who govern the country still. In the latter, the Tokugawas, by rendering the post of Shogun hereditary in their family, monopolised the power in the country up to the restoration in 1868.

The terrible experiences of the Japanese invasions encouraged the love of isolation of the Koreans ; every measure was adopted to prevent foreigners penetrating into the country. Along the northern frontier a desolate tract of land called the Neutral Zone divided Korea from the Chinese Empire. The subjects of the two countries were only allowed commercial intercourse once a year at an appointed fair held at a border town. After the fair was closed, any Chinese (or Manchu) who was found on Korean territory was liable to be put to death. Great vigilance was exercised along the coasts, and an organised system of beacon-fires on the hill-tops served to convey rapid intelligence to the capital of the approach of any

strange vessel. Any foreigners who were cast ashore by shipwreck, were kept in strict confinement and not allowed to return to their country, or even to be seen by the Chinese envoys ; this was the lot of the Dutch sailors of the seventeenth century, who were detained fourteen years before they could effect their escape.

To avoid collisions with her neighbours, Corea consented to send tributary missions to Peking and Yedo, which were more flattering to the pride of China and Japan than burdensome to the Corean exchequer. The strict loyalty to the Western suzerain involved Corea in the beginning of the seventeenth century in some wars with the Manchus, who were then menacing the Chinese dynasty of the Ming. Two invasions in 1627 and 1637 forced the Coreans to transfer their allegiance to the Manchus, but as the latter soon after became the occupants of the Dragon throne, the Coreans were no longer embarrassed about the choice of their Western suzerain, and were able to enjoy over two centuries of immunity from foreign wars. Unfortunately, strife of some kind is inseparable from all forms of society, as it is a law which rules the whole organic world, and the care employed by Corea to avoid war with her neighbours and encroachment from more distant and enterprising nations, instead of producing a state of peace and tranquillity, developed a number of factious parties in the country which have rent her with conspiracies, political assassinations, and family feuds up to the present time.

This strange isolation, which earned for Corea the names of the Hermit Nation and the Forbidden Land, lasted until quite recently, and was a curious anomaly, when her two powerful neighbours had been forced open to the commerce of the world, and when steamers were constantly passing within sight of her coasts. Attempts of all kinds were made by persons of all descriptions, actuated by the most opposite motives to overcome this stubborn seclusion. Christianity, which had penetrated into the peninsula, about the end of last century through the conversion of some Coreans at Peking, soon inspired some French missionaries to enter the country in disguise (the only means open to them); the success of their mission soon caused a violent persecution. The French Government, which has always protected Catholic missionaries, tried in several ways to obtain religious toleration for their *protégés*. The first expedition of *La Gloire* and *La Victorieuse* was shipwrecked, owing to faulty charts and the high tides of the Corean coast. No redress having been obtained from the Chinese Government for the increasing persecution, in 1866 the French undertook to coerce the Coreans directly. On the 25th September the *Déroulède* and *Tardif*, with Bishop Ridel and three Corean converts as guides, anchored in front of Seoul, and caused such panic in the Corean capital, that no food was procurable from the neighbouring country. Had the French remained, they might have dictated their terms, but Admiral Roze refused to listen to the

entreaties of the bishop, and returned to Chefoo to organise a more powerful expedition. This consisted of the frigate *Guerrière*, the corvettes *Laplace* and *Primauget*, the despatch vessels *Déroulède* and *Kien-chan*, and the gun-boats *Tardif* and *Lebreton* with 600 soldiers. The French were successful at first, taking the city of Kang-hwa, and defeating the Koreans in several engagements; but growing careless, they were repulsed in the attack on a fortified monastery, which might have been shelled from the ships. This slight defeat was sufficient for the admiral to order a retreat, to the great disgust of the whole fleet. This unaccountable retreat was magnified by the Koreans into a national victory, and the persecution of the Christians became more violent.

At the same time attempts were made to establish commercial relations with Corea. In 1862, the Government of Emperor Napoleon III. tried to get the envoys of the Shogun (Tycoon) to obtain freedom for French trade in the peninsula, and Lord Russell wished that England should also enjoy the commercial privileges the Japanese had at Fusan: the Russians also established a station at Tsushima, which, however, they were obliged to abandon. In 1866, the Russians sent a war-vessel to Broughton's Bay to demand right of trade, but were told to apply at Peking. In the same year the adventurer Oppert (the author of the 'Forbidden Land'), who had set his mind to open Corea to the trade of the world,

visited the country twice, first in the *Rona*, and then in the *Emperor*; and the American schooner *General Sherman*, in attempting to trade in the Tai-dong river, was destroyed and all her crew massacred.

A double current of feeling impelled men to seek to break through Corea's seclusion: religious zeal for the diffusion of the Gospel, and the spirit of commercial enterprise which dreamed of countless wealth in the opening of a new country. These sentiments of such different nature united in inspiring one of the most extraordinary expeditions known in history. The French missionaries, under the pressure of the furious and relentless persecution which obliged them to hide like wild beasts, must often have been driven almost to insanity, and were led to countenance the mad schemes of their ignorant and persecuted converts. Some Coreans asserted that the Regent, or Tai-wen-Kun, who was the fiercest persecutor, was so superstitious that, if they could secure the bones contained in some royal mausoleum, they could obtain freedom of religion and commerce as ransom for the contents of the tombs.

Oppert, whom we have already mentioned, had entered into communication with the French priests and their Corean converts, during his two experimental commercial trips in 1866, so that when a French priest with four Corean Christians came to Shanghai, early in 1867, they laid before him the

plan of rifling the royal tombs. The scheme was approved by Oppert, who, with the assistance of some merchants in Shanghai, fitted out an expedition consisting of the s.s. *China*, of 680 tons, and a steam tender of 60 tons, manned by eight Europeans, twenty Manilamen, and about one hundred Chinamen. This strange combination of missionaries and adventurers had for its object the cessation of religious



THE TAI-WEN-KUN, FATHER OF THE PRESENT KING  
OF CORLA, AND REGENT DURING HIS MINISTRY

persecution and the opening of Corea to the commerce of the world. All this was to be obtained through the mysterious tombs which were not easily accessible. The nearest route lay in Prince Jerome's Bay, up a river which was only navigable on certain days of the month with favourable tides. As happens in such nicely calculated schemes, any delay meant failure; there was some loss of time,

and the expedition, after coaling at Nagasaki, reached Prince Jerome's Gulf on the 8th of May, 1867, and did not get up the river, in the tender, until almost the last favourable period of the tide. With the utmost despatch the tombs were found, and the work of excavation commenced, but, unfortunately, the work was stopped by a rocky slab, which could not be removed with the shovels they had brought. There was no time to go back to the ship for better instruments, as the favourable tide was almost over, besides the country was becoming alarmed at the nature of their proceedings. Thus the whole expedition failed through the unexpected presence of a stone slab.

In 1871, America, whose attention to Corea had been repeatedly drawn on account of the loss of the *General Sherman*, which had never been satisfactorily explained, made a vigorous attempt to open Corea as she had opened Japan. An expedition was fitted out, consisting of the flagship *Colorado*, the corvettes *Alaska* and *Benccia*, and the gunboats *Monocacy* and *Palos*. They proceeded near Kang-hwa Island, where the French expedition had been a few years before. After some fruitless parleying, the American ships being fired upon, the Corean forts were shelled and silenced, and a force of 759 men landed, which stormed another Corean fort. In all five forts were captured, but nothing else was effected. Admiral Rodgers, like the French Admiral Roze, preferred to retire, and Corean



conceit was not slow in imagining that America, like France, had been successfully repulsed by native valour.

While America and Europe, both Governments and individuals, were making frequent but feeble attempts to open Corea, great changes were taking place in the interior of that country, and in its relations with its two immediate neighbours, Japan and China. In 1864, the Yi dynasty, which had lasted since 1392, was abruptly terminated by the death of the last king before he had chosen an heir. After a series of palace intrigues the present king, then quite a boy, was elected under the regency of his father, who assumed the title of Tai-wen-Kun, a name familiar to foreigners in the Far East on account of his merciless persecution of the Christians, and endless intrigues, which have so often disturbed his country and its neighbours. Japan, by one of the most extraordinary revolutions in history, changed her whole political organisation and social customs, and, breaking away from Chinese influence, began to follow European models. These measures, which startled the whole Far East, were peculiarly obnoxious to the Tai-wen-Kun, who was strenuously opposing all foreign encroachments, religious and commercial, in Corea, and when Japan rather imprudently sent an invitation to Corea to resume her ancient vassalage, he took the opportunity of refusing in an insolent way. This insult caused deep indignation in Japan, and a war party, with Saigō of Satsuma

at its head, was immediately formed. Japan, however, then could not afford to go to war, and the question was left for later solution.

In 1875, there occurred two events which then passed almost unobserved, but which now must be considered of great importance, as they were the beginning of a persistent line of conduct which insensibly but inexorably has led China and Japan to war.

The neutral strip of land left uncultivated and ownerless, between China and Corea, had become the haunt of robbers, whose depredation ravaged the neighbouring Chinese districts. Li-Hung-Chang sent a body of troops across the border, a gun-boat on the Yalu, and destroyed the marauders. This military expedition had as its natural consequence the regular annexation in 1877 of the whole country to China, whose frontier thus extended to the Yalu river. Corea and China, having now a common boundary, became more closely connected, and the latter was forced to take greater interest in the affairs of the peninsula. On the other hand, in September of the same year, 1875, some Japanese sailors of the *Unyo Kan*, having landed for water on Kang-hwa Island, were fired upon by the Coreans. A party of thirty Japanese at once landed, stormed a fort, destroyed its defenders, and dismantled it; in fact, they accomplished almost as much as the 600 Frenchmen of Admiral Roze, and 759 Americans of Admiral Rodgers, and keen observers might have seen even then what

advantage the Japanese would have over European troops engaged in a war against either Koreans or Chinese. After such an outrage, all parties in Japan agreed to take strong measures: China's neutrality was secured, and an expedition of two men-of-war and three transports, with less than 800 men, was sent to Korea. The Japanese played off on the Koreans what had been done to them twenty-two years before by the Americans: they imitated Commodore Perry's stratagems by making a great display of their ships and men in sight of Seoul; and after three weeks, on the 27th February, 1876, a treaty was signed opening Fusan to Japanese trade. In 1880, Fusan and Chemulpo were also opened, and Japan found herself gradually committed to a policy of progress in Korea.

Japan's success in opening Korea soon aroused the rivalry of other nations. In 1882, Commodore Shufeldt signed the treaty which opened Korea to the trade of the United States, and in the same and following years most of the European States concluded treaties.

The Hermit Kingdom was, however, a disappointment to foreigners, the resources of the country were found to be very meagre, and the people indolent; no trade of any consequence passed through the hands of Europeans: Korea remained the field of enterprise of Chinese and Japanese.

The latter, especially, established themselves from the beginning in a way which showed they intended

to be paramount in the country which they had drawn from its secular seclusion. They built imposing Consulates, laid out flourishing settlements, and tried to play the part in Corea which for the last half century had been played by the Europeans in the open ports of China. Of course they met with the some opposition : all the Koreans averse to progress, either through ignorance or laziness, became enemies of the Japanese. The old party denominations which had satisfied the Koreans for centuries and had sufficed to fill the country with bloodshed and strife, were inadequate to the new and strange conditions of the peninsula. A Progressionist and a Conservative party now arose, and each tried to find support in one of the neighbouring countries.

The common name for China in Corea was Ta-kuc (the Great Country), and we know that nations are often willing to endure the greatest sacrifices to keep such proud designations.

The Chinese felt that they had responsibilities in the peninsula, and were disinclined that it should become a practising ground for that form of civilisation which the Japanese had imported from the West, and were desirous to acclimatise in the Far East. China was irresistibly led to give sooner or later her support to the Korean Conservative party.

On the other hand, Japan felt herself bound to support the Progressive party, which aimed at continuing the policy inaugurated by the Treaties, and wished to introduce into Corea the foreign customs

and learning adopted by the Eastern neighbour. The support of two opposite parties in a country which China and Japan wished to control, was a sufficient cause to provoke a conflict between the two powers, but there was a still greater cause of danger in the distrust and suspicion which each felt for the other. Every political disturbance (and they happen often in a disordered country like Corea, which has been the prey of family feuds for centuries) was sure to be attributed to the machinations of the rival nation. The prudence of statesmen was able to defer the conflict, but it was not likely to prevent it indefinitely.

The first complication in Corea which threatened the peace of the three countries of the Far East happened in July, 1882. Kim-Ok-Kiun and other Coreans had been over to Japan. Surprised and pleased at the wonders which they had seen, they came back partisans of progress and enthusiastic supporters of Japanese influence. These ideas were not favourably received by the ex-Regent or *Tai-Wen-kun*, who was a hater of everything foreign, and he began to intrigue with the Min, a powerful faction in Corea. It was decided to drive the Japanese out by violence. The soldiers were infuriated by having their rations diminished, and then malicious reports against the Japanese were spread about the capital. A furious mob began to hunt to death all the defenceless Japanese that could be found. A Japanese officer, who had been drilling the Corean troops, and seven

others were murdered in one day ; the Legation was attacked and burnt ; and the minister, with twenty-eight Japanese, had to fight their way through the streets of Seoul and through the country to the sea, where they embarked on a junk and were picked up by the British gun-boat *Flying Fish*, which took them to Nagasaki.

The Japanese Government at once took measures to obtain redress for the outrage : troops were got ready for any emergency, and the minister was sent back to Seoul with a military force. The Chinese also sent a body of troops to Corea, but it was not with the object of opposing the Japanese, it was with the laudable intention of making a serious effort to establish peace in that distracted country. In fact, as soon as the Japanese had obtained satisfaction, the Chinese succeeded in capturing the *Tai-Wen-kun*, the chief originator of all mischief in the peninsula, and conveyed him to China, where he was detained for several years. The Korean Government had to send a special embassy to tender apology to Japan, to pay an indemnity to the families of the victims and to Japan, and allowed a certain number of Japanese soldiers to remain in Seoul for the protection of the Legation. In consequence of this last condition China also stationed a body of troops in the capital.

The peace thus established lasted only a little over two years. The Min faction occupied the most important posts in the government, and this was

resented by the Progressive party, who, seeing they could not triumph by pacific means, resolved to have recourse to violence and assassination, the usual political methods of Corea. In December, 1884, to celebrate the opening of the post-office, an official dinner was given in Seoul, to which all the Foreign Ministers were invited, most of the Corean high officials being also present. During the dinner there was an alarm of fire, and Prince Min (one of the Conservative party) left the banquet-room to ascertain where the fire was, when he was attacked by assassins, who almost killed him with their swords. The banquet broke up in great confusion, most of the guests escaping in the scuffle. This was but the beginning of the plot. During the night several of the Conservative Ministers were killed, and the next morning a new government was formed by Kim-Ok-Kiun and other members of the Progressive party, who invited the Japanese troops to protect the Royal Palace. The Min party, however, soon recovered from the blow, and, with the assistance of the Chinese troops, they attacked the Japanese who guarded the Palace. The king fled during the fight, and the Japanese thus lost all object in continuing the defence, as they were no longer supported by the only generally recognised authority of the country. They retreated to their Legation, fighting their way through the streets. The same scenes of 1882 were now enacted on a grander scale. The Legation was attacked and burnt, and the Japanese soldiers, forming

in a square, cut their way, with characteristic bravery, through Chinese troops and Corean mobs from Seoul to the sea.

Though this second sedition in the Corean capital resembled so much the first that had happened only two years before, it was much graver and might lead to more serious consequences. The Japanese Legation had been burnt and the soldiers driven out, not by a Corean mob alone, but also by Chinese soldiers, and this might involve the two countries in a war. The Japanese, with their usual discriminating clearness, set themselves to settle the two questions separately. A Minister was sent to Corea to obtain redress from that Government, and conditions similar to those of the convention of 1882 were demanded and granted: Corea had to apologise, to pay an indemnity, to punish the murderers of a Japanese officer, and to rebuild the Legation at her own expense. Both China and Japan had sent military and naval forces to protect their interests in Corea at that juncture, but fortunately all further collision was avoided.

After settling with Corea, Japan sent Count Ito and a special embassy to negotiate with China, who, on her side appointed Li-Hung-Chang as her Plenipotentiary (assisted by Wu Ta Cheng). On the 18th April, 1885, the Tientsin Convention was signed. It consisted of three articles: in the first it was stipulated that both countries should withdraw their troops from Corea; in the second that no more officers should be sent by either country to drill the Corean



troops; and in the third, that if at any future time, in case of disturbances, either country should send troops to Corea, it must inform the other country. The Tientsin Convention secured peace in Corea for nine years, a very long period for such a restless and turbulent country; this fact redounds to the credit of the sagacity of the two negotiators, Li-Hung-Chang and Count Ito.

## CHAPTER III.

EVENTS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE OUTBREAK OF  
HOSTILITIES.*The Assassination of Kim-Ok-Kiun.*

ON the 28th of March, 1894, the pacific residents of Shanghai, whose tranquil existence is only excited by the result of the races and the fluctuations of exchange, were startled by the news that a political assassination of an extraordinary character had taken place on the Foreign Settlements. Kim-Ok-Kiun, the leader of the Korean Revolution of 1884, had fled to Japan after the defeat of his party, and lived there together with Boku-Eiko, another Korean refugee, up to March, 1894. At that time he was prevailed upon to go to Shanghai by a Korean, Hung Tjyong-Ou, who had been abroad and spent several years in Paris, where he had made many acquaintances, amongst whom the celebrated Père Hyacinthe Loyson. Kim-Ok-Kiun arrived in Shanghai on the 27th of March, accompanied by his Japanese servant, by the Korean Hung and by a Chinese, the whole party stopping at a Japanese hotel on the American Settlement. On the following day, Kim gave Hung a cheque for \$5,000 to cash on a Chinese bank; it was a bogus cheque, as

no such bank was to be found in Shanghai. Hung returned, saying that the manager was out, and he must return later to get the money, at the same time he sent away the Japanese servant on some trifling errand. There were no witnesses to what happened afterwards, but circumstances indicate that the drama was enacted as follows:—Kim-Ok-Kiun was on the bed on his right side when Hung drew a revolver and



KIM-OK-KIUN.

fired at him, first at his left cheek, and then at his stomach as he turned round; Kim-Ok-Kiun then jumped up and rushed out in the corridor, but Hung pursued him and with a third shot in the back, below the shoulder-blade, killed him. Hung then escaped.

The people who rushed in at the sound of the firing found the body of Kim-Ok-Kiun in a pool of blood at the top of the stairs, whence it was removed back to his room. The assassin was tracked by the Municipal

police and arrested on the following morning. He seemed to glory in his deed and said he had instructions from the King of Corea. At the inquest held over the body the assassin seemed totally unconcerned, except when he saw the Japanese servant of Kim-Ok-Kiun slowly approaching him—then he trembled and felt relieved when the police kept the Japanese away.

The foreigners in Shanghai, though not feeling much sympathy for the victim, were shocked at the crime that had been committed in their Settlements. One of the newspapers published the following appropriate reflections: "He is a very dangerous man safely out of the way; but whether his assassin was doing well for his country or not in removing him, he has no business to make our Settlement the scene of his crime. We do not want our Settlement made an Alsatia for political refugees from Corea and Japan, and for this at any rate Mr. Hung should be punished. Assassins commissioned by royalty should be warned that the foreign Settlement of Shanghai must be respected." Notwithstanding this expression of public opinion, Hung was given up to the Chinese authorities, and afterwards even the body of Kim-Ok-Kiun, which the Japanese servant wished to take back to Japan, was also delivered to them. While detained, Hung was visited by a Corean official, who prostrated himself before him; and on the 6th of April, at night, with the greatest precaution, surrounded by armed men, Hung was taken on board a Chinese man-of-war, which

also conveyed to Corea the body of his victim—the man he had treacherously decoyed to Shanghai. On their arrival in Corea, rich rewards were heaped upon Hung, while the body of Kim-Ok-Kiun was quartered and the mutilated fragments exposed in the different provinces of the kingdom.

The moral sentiment of the foreign community at Shanghai was shocked at this solution of the question, and it was vaguely felt that a mistake and a fault had been committed, though none could foresee the consequences it would bring. The crime of Hung had started a very complicated conflict of jurisdictions. The Foreign Settlements of Shanghai are in a very anomalous position; they may be best compared to the city of Cracow in 1815, which was declared independent under the protection of Austria, Prussia, and Russia. The foreigners residing in them are subject to the laws of their own country, and judged by their own Consuls; while the Chinese, if they are in the service of foreigners or in cases connected with foreigners, cannot be tried by their own magistrate unless he acts in concert with a foreign assessor.

Kim-Ok-Kiun and his murderer were both Coreans, but as Corea is not a Treaty Power and is considered to be a tributary State of China, it was difficult to decide by what law and by what judge the case should be tried. The question was much debated by the Consular Body. J. M. Travassos y Valdez, the Portuguese Consul-General and Senior Consul, treated the matter in an exhaustive manner. He showed

that the Consuls and the Municipal Council between them possessed the legislative, executive and judicial powers—all that constitutes a true sovereignty. He quoted articles of the different treaties and conventions between China and foreign powers which did not invalidate this sovereignty and proved that the payment of a small land-tax to the Chinese Emperor (who, by Chinese law, is the proprietor of all land in the empire and only leases it to his subjects) does not affect the question of sovereignty within the Settlements, no more than the payment of tribute by a tributary state lessens its sovereign rights within its frontiers. He demonstrated that by the rules of the Mixed Court the Chinese Magistrate had the least power; while all the Consuls had full power over their nationals in each and every case; the authority of the Chinese Magistrate was limited by the presence of a foreign assessor in many cases. After discussing the different legal theories which might be brought to bear on the case, he completely demolished the absurd assumption that, Corea being a tributary state, Coreans were to be treated like Chinese subjects; the suzerainty of China not affecting the sovereign rights of Corea, which had moreover been recognised by the different Treaties and by the diplomatic relations of that country. He concluded that the case should be tried by a member of the Consular Body and according to the laws of his country. Some opposition in the Consular Body prevented this rational conclusion, and Hung was delivered to the Chinese authorities with

the result we have seen. Mr. Valdez deplored this measure as an outrage to the foreign flags which defended the Settlements, as a violation to the sacred rights of asylum, and as a dangerous precedent which might lead to endless crimes. Any Korean Minister obnoxious to his Court might be murdered with impunity in the Foreign Settlements of Shanghai, and the assassin would be handed over to the Korean authorities to be handsomely rewarded.

Indeed it is regrettable that any foreigner should have forgotten the high mission which it behoves him to fulfil in China, where every European or American should consider himself as the pioneer of a nobler civilisation which has to be engrafted into the aged empire. The delivery of Hung and the body of Kim was a foolish and base action. It showed weakness, and it pandered to the vilest instincts of barbarism. It was sad that white men, forgetful of all the glories of their race, should descend from the high place to which they have been elevated by centuries of Christian and philosophical progress, and become accomplices in the shameful practices of the barbarous government of Corea. But it is not necessary to waste words to stigmatise this action, because it brought its own punishment on all those concerned. The rest of this book will show that the false step taken at Shanghai was the primary cause of that acute state of the Korean question which led to the war between China and Japan. The war had already been prevented on two former occasions, and it

might still have been averted for many years if further provocation had been spared to the excited political parties of the Korean Peninsula. China would not have lost thousands of lives and millions of money, and foreign merchants would not have suffered from a painful depression. If the step was taken in deference to the Chinese Government it showed an erroneous appreciation of the true aspects of the questions of the Far East ; in that case, as in all others, the most friendly action towards China is firmly to prevent her committing those mistakes which her ignorance of international law and usage renders her liable. True friends are never servile ; they never renounce their convictions and their feelings to subserve the weakness and prejudices of those in whom they feel an interest.

### *The Tong-Haks.*

It has been already mentioned that Corea, after the Japanese invasions of the 16th century, was rent by domestic factions, and that during the present century the Roman Catholic propaganda had aroused a violent persecution, which in late years was headed by the *Tai-Wen-Kun*, the great hater of foreigners and their doctrines. These facts had greatly disturbed the people ; internal dissension had produced misgovernment and dreadful oppression, every kind of commercial activity was burdened with taxes, and the peasants were liable to the *corvée*, which could only be



avoided by the payment of a fine; the teaching of the foreign missionaries, which was brought forcibly into public notice by official persecution, awakened men's minds to the existence of a body of doctrines totally different from those that had been taught for centuries and which compared favourably with them. In the second half of this century, the Korean people, debarred from all commercial and agricultural activity by vexatious taxation, and forced to do as little work as was sufficient for immediate subsistence to escape extortion, had plenty of leisure to occupy their minds with the moral problems imported from the West. The consequence was the birth of a new religious sect, which, from the conditions of the country, ended by becoming another political party.

In 1859, in the city of Kyeng-Jin, a walled town forty miles north of Fusan, in the province of Kyöng-Sang (the south-eastern province of Corea), a man called Ch'oi-Ch'ei-Ou, who had been very much impressed by the progress of Catholicism, fell sick, and, like other enthusiasts in such circumstances, had a vision which suggested a remedy for his sickness and a new doctrine for the welfare of the people. After his recovery, he composed a book under the name of 'Great Sacred Writings.' It consisted principally of doctrines taken from the three great religions of China, which are also known in Corea. He took the five relations \* from Confucianism, the

\* A doctrine of Confucius giving moral guidance in the relations of mankind, i.e., between sovereign and subject, father

law of heart-cleansing from Buddhism, the law of cleansing the body from moral as well as material filth from Taoism.\* To give these old doctrines some fresh flavour he added a few Christian ideas; the rejection of transmigration and the existence of one God, for whom he used the Catholic name Chun ('hu (Heavenly Master). The religion was called Tong-Hak Eastern Doctrine to distinguish it from the Western or Roman Catholic. This national reaction against the foreign teaching soon spread from Kyöng-Sang into the neighbouring provinces of Chhung-Chhōng and Chhōlla, that is to say, through the whole of Southern Corea. In 1865, during a persecution of the Roman Catholics, Choi was arrested as one of them and beheaded. Probably the officials could not discriminate nice points of doctrine, and considered one head more, even though not orthodox, would add to their merits with the Government. The unjust death of their founder naturally exasperated the Tong-Haks; this grievance against the government was the first provocation to become a political party, and they yielded to it as soon as the general discontent encouraged them to do so.

In the spring of 1893 a number of Tong-Haks came to the king's palace at Seoul to expose their

and son, elder brother and younger, husband and wife, friend and friend.

\* This account of Choi and his doctrines is taken from an article of Will. Jenkin in the *Corean Repository*, the only account of the sect to my knowledge.

grievances; they demanded that their martyred leader be declared innocent and rewarded with posthumous rank,\* that they should not be confounded with the Roman Catholics, and that their religion should not be condemned. They declared they would drive out all foreigners if these demands were not granted. They were sent away with soothing words, but some of them were arrested when they got back to their villages.

About a year afterwards, in the months of March and April, 1894, the Tong-Haks began to put their threats into execution. The first outbreak was at Ko-pho in the province of Ch'ölla, and this was soon followed by another at Kim-Hai in the neighbouring province of Kyöng-Sang. At first the Tong-Haks tried persuasion with the people, but whenever this failed they did not hesitate to use violence, ill-treating the stubborn and smashing their furniture. By these means they soon formed bands of several thousands, which moved about the country, putting to flight the officials and plundering public granaries and armouries. It was difficult to suppress them, as when they were attacked in one place they fled to another. But in a month or two their numbers had increased to such an extent that they required such tactics no longer; they were able to keep the field and engage the government troops.

In May, 1894, the insurrection became very serious;

\* The Government of Corea, like that of China, grants honours even after death.

it had spread to different places of the three southern provinces, and in one place alone, the Tong-Haks were said to be 20,000 or 30,000 strong. This was probably an exaggeration, but such a rumour showed the alarm of the country. The Government sent some troops by sea on two small steamers to the province of Ch'ölla, and despatched another force by land. The *Tai-Wen-Kun*, when he was in power, had organised a kind of popular army or militia which was supposed to muster 50,000 or 60,000 men for the whole kingdom, and now the Seoul contingent was marched south to Ch'ölla province. The Government troops had some success at first, and defeated the rebels, who then retreated to Paik-san, a mountain stronghold. This fastness can shelter several thousand men, and has perpendicular rocks 150 feet high on three sides. The Tong-Haks, feigning flight, inveigled the troops into a pursuit which led them into an ambuscade artfully prepared. The rebels were completely successful, routing their enemies with the loss of a high officer and over 300 men. The next day, 31st of Mäy, the Government at Seoul were informed of this disaster, and the greatest consternation prevailed in the capital. The ministers were consulting day and night, and the people expected the Tong-Haks at the gates. The danger, though not so imminent, was still great. On the 1st of June the rebels had taken the capital of Ch'ölla province, and the report of their success encouraged insurrection in every quarter. The most extraordinary rumours

circulated amongst the idle and ignorant people of Corea ; it was said that in the vanguard of the Tong-Haks, leading them to victory, could be seen a misty figure with a white helmet and cuirass, and this misty figure was believed to be the ghost of Kim-Ok-Kiun.

The death of Kim-Ok-Kiun, by his political prominence and by its sensational character, had deeply impressed the idle Coreans, and it was still more brought into public notice by the exultant Min faction when they displayed the fragments of his body all over the kingdom. It was therefore natural that all those who were friendly to his party, or who hated the Min faction, should see a retribution brought about by superhuman means in the revolution which so quickly followed his death and the dismemberment of his body.

The Min faction were so frightened by the news of the defeat of the Government troops, and of the capture of the provincial capital of Ch'ulla, that they resolved to invoke foreign aid and ask China to send troops to quell the rebellion. By the third article of the Tientsin Convention, Japan had an equal right to send troops to Corea, but it was hoped that the Japanese Government had too many internal difficulties with the Parliamentary opposition to be able to pay much attention to foreign complications. The application to China was made in the first days of June, and on the 8th of that month a small Chinese force was landed at Asan ; some additional troops were sent a few days later, when the Chinese soldiers

numbered probably about 2,000 men. It was a small force, but it came in the name of China, a country which is looked up to with sentiments of awe by the Korean people, who call it the Great Country. The moral effect of the landing, and a small victory of the Korean troops, soon checked the progress of the Tong-Ilaks, who abated their military activity, though they were still ready to recommence their reign of violence when an opportunity offered itself. The Chinese Government also sent some men-of-war: the *Yang-wei*, *Ping-yuen*, and *Tsao-kiang* to Chemulpo (the sea-port of the capital), and the *Chi-yuen* and *Chih-yuen* to Asan.

The Japanese Government had been informed by China that a force was being sent to Korea, and, profiting by the third clause of the Tientsin Convention, it resolved to follow the same course. Otori, the Japanese minister to Korea, who was then in Japan on leave, received orders to rejoin his post, and he made such despatch that on the 9th of June he arrived in Chemulpo. In that port there were six Japanese men-of-war, and a body of marines was landed to escort Otori to the capital. The Japanese minister left Chemulpo at 5 A.M. on the 10th of June and reached Seoul the same day; the marines, about 400 men, were quartered in the capital. This was only a preliminary measure. Japan prepared a much larger force to guard her interests in Korea: on the 5th June orders were issued to the military and naval authorities to prepare an expedition for the neigh-

bouring peninsula. It was composed of troops of the 5th Division under the command of Major-General Oshima, and from its irregular formation it afterwards acquired the name of Mixed Brigade, a name which the exploits of the war has rendered familiar throughout Japan. The military preparations were carried out with such rapidity, that the first detachment was able to leave Ujina (the port of Hiroshima, headquarters of the 5th Division) on the 9th of June.



MAJOR-GENERAL OSHIMA.

The people of Japan are intensely patriotic, and have always felt deep interest in Corea; they manifested therefore the greatest enthusiasm at the departure of the troops. From the 9th to the 11th of June, while the embarkation was going on, all the houses in Ujina and Hiroshima displayed the national flag.

The first detachment of Japanese troops reached Chemulpo on the 12th of June, and they proceeded at once to the capital to relieve the marines. Other

detachments arrived afterwards, and it has been stated that before the outbreak of hostilities the Japanese had 8,000 men around Seoul: this number, as will be shown later, was probably an exaggeration, but they certainly had a force superior to the Chinese in Asan.

The simultaneous presence of Chinese and Japanese soldiers in Corea created a situation full of difficulties, which were greatly increased by mutual distrust. Unfortunately, even in the diplomatic correspondence, the two countries could not find a common basis for discussion. The Chinese Government, though communicating the departure of their troops for Corea in compliance with the Tientsin Convention, considered they had a special right to send troops, as Corea was their tributary country, and had asked for assistance. The Japanese Government, on the other hand, only asked in conformity with the Tientsin Convention, which gave equal right to the two countries to send troops, and they refused to recognise Corea as a tributary state of China. On this last point, no agreement was possible; China continued asserting her suzerainty, and Japan refused to acknowledge it. By the treaty of 1876, Japan had renounced her claims to suzerainty, and treated with Corea as an independent power, thus virtually ignoring China's protectorate. In the succeeding treaties, Corea had always informed the European powers of China's suzerainty, adding, however, that such suzerainty did not affect her sovereign rights, either in internal or



foreign affairs, nor limit her powers of treaty-making. The people of Japan were quite as sensitive as their Government on this point, and an unlucky proclamation of the Chinese general at Asan, in which, besides promises of pardon to the rebels who submitted, and dreadful threats to those who resisted, Corea was mentioned as a tributary state of China, was loudly commented on in the Japanese press, and aroused great indignation.

Another difficulty also arose in the course of the negotiations. The Japanese Government considered the Tong-Hak movement not an accidental occurrence, but the inevitable consequence of the persisting misgovernment of the country, and argued that the rebellion could not be suppressed, nor its recurrence prevented, unless radical reforms were carried out in Corea. Japan proposed that reforms should be instituted, and asked China to assist her in enforcing them. China refused to join in such measures, not deeming them necessary, and not wishing to interfere in the internal affairs of the peninsula.

The suggestion of the Japanese Government, which had thus created another difficulty, was a very clever move; it placed China in a dilemma: the misgovernment of Corea was evident and difficult to be denied, yet China could not act against the party which caused the misgovernment, because they were her friends, and she had sent troops to support them.

Notwithstanding these reasons, it would have been

better for China to have accepted Japan's proposals ; Corea, a poor country, was not worth a war, and the nominal suzerainty was only a question of puerile vanity.

Besides showing greater diplomatic ability, Japan possessed great political and military advantages quite from the beginning of the crisis. While the Chinese had only a small force in an obscure corner of the country, the Japanese were masters of the capital, and had the Government under their control. They lost no time in using these advantages. Otori insisted that reforms should be carried out, and obtained the nomination of a special commission to that effect. His programme of reforms was very complete, and comprised five principal headings subdivided into minor ones.\*

The Koreans, though yielding apparently to Otori's persistent importunity, had no real desire to carry out such a thorough reorganisation of the country. They procrastinated, and later on answered that the reforms could not be initiated until the Japanese troops had left Corea. The situation became very grave. Neither China nor Japan would yield, and Corea hesitated in coming to a decision. Her sympathies were with China, but Japan held her capital, and could enforce what she liked.

Although the negotiations had been carried on all the time, and friendly Powers had offered their good offices in the cause of peace, no settlement could be

\* See Appendix A.

arrived at. Japan resolved to take her stand with China and Corea on the questions of reforms. She closed her correspondence with China, declaring that the latter country's refusal to entertain the proposal of reforms relieved the Japanese Government of all responsibility for any eventuality which might arise out of the situation.\* With Corea she determined to urge the reforms, employing all means, even force, when other methods had failed. In the latter half of July the prospects of peace were almost hopeless. It became only a matter of speculation what incident would precipitate hostilities. On the 16th of July the Chinese Government asked Japan to send no more men-of-war to the treaty ports (probably a renewal of the Foochow† affair was feared), and on the 24th of July it was known in Shanghai that the Japanese Government had promised not to include that port in their sphere of military operations.

Before describing the outbreak of hostilities and the course of the war it will be useful to cast a glance on the armies and navies of the two countries.

\* The whole correspondence which preceded the war is contained in Appendix B.

† The French fleet went up the Foochow river in 1884 before hostilities commenced, and blockaded the Chinese fleet, which afterwards they destroyed.

*The Chinese Army.*

The army of the Chinese Empire is nominally formed of four classes of troops :—

- I. The Eight Banners.
- II. The Green Standard (or Chinese Army).
- III. The Braves (or Volunteers).
- IV. The Drilled or Trained Army.

(I). The first class received its name because it was divided by the first sovereigns of the Manchu dynasty, now reigning in China, into the following divisions :—

- |                            |                           |
|----------------------------|---------------------------|
| 1. Bordered yellow . . . . | } Three superior banners. |
| 2. Plain yellow . . . .    |                           |
| 3. Plain white . . . .     |                           |
| 4. Bordered white . . . .  | } Five inferior banners.  |
| 5. Plain red . . . .       |                           |
| 6. Bordered red . . . .    |                           |
| 7. Plain blue . . . .      |                           |
| 8. Bordered blue . . . .   |                           |

Each of these banners is composed of Manchus, Mongols and Chinese, who form each a kusai, so that the whole banner force is divided into twenty-four kusai. The men (they cannot be called soldiers) who are enrolled in this force are the descendants of the army which conquered China about two hundred and fifty

years ago, and established the present dynasty. That army, originally composed of Manchus and Mongols, was afterwards reinforced by the defection of a part of the Chinese army who forsook the Ming dynasty. This united force of three nationalities conquered the whole country and established itself in garrisons in the principal cities of China. Where the hardy soldiers were placed two centuries ago, to guard the fortresses and curb rebellion, now their descendants can be seen, living peacefully among the Chinese, enjoying privileges, but totally indistinguishable from the rest of the people. There is not the slightest trace of that bravery and spirit of adventure which led the mixed horde from the barren north down to the fertile plains of China in the members of the present banner force. They consider that their ancestors earned glory enough for the succeeding generations, and limit themselves to drawing their pay.

The numerical strength of the Eight Banners may be estimated at about 250,000 men, of whom nearly two-thirds are either in Peking or the metropolitan province of Chihli, the rest are in garrisons in the principal cities of the empire. This distribution is in accordance with the ancient policy of the Dynasty, who at first treated China as a conquered country, and had to establish garrisons to check any incipient rebellion, and to keep the bulk of their army near Peking, ready to march in any direction on every emergency.

The subdivisions of the Eight Banners at Peking are as follows :—

	Men.
The "Proud Riders" (called "Paid Division" by Sir Thomas Wade), composed of Manchus, Mongols and Chinese. Each kusai furnishes 1 camp (battalion), i.e., 24 camps . . . . .	28,800
Guards or Flank Division, Manchus and Mongols, 8 camps . . . . .	15,000
Vanguard Division, Manchus and Mongols, 4 camps . . . . . about	1,700
Light Division, Manchus and Mongols, 2 camps . . . . .	2,000
Imperial Guard, Manchus and Mongols of three superior banners, 1 camp . . . . .	1,700
Gendarmerie Division, Manchus, Mongols and Chinese, 8 camps . . . . .	21,000
Artillery and Musketry Division, Manchus and Mongols, 4 camps . . . . . about	6,200
Peking Field Force, Manchus, Mongols and Chinese . . . . . about	20,000
<b>Total . . . .</b>	<b>96,400</b>

(Of the above force only about 20,000 or 30,000 can in any way be considered as soldiers.)

II. The second class, the Green Standard (or Chinese Army), is composed entirely of Chinese, and is but a modification of the ancient army which the Manchus found in existence when they conquered China. It numbers about 500,000 or 600,000 \* men, distributed

\* According to a memorial of Tseng-Kwo-Fan, the Green Standard from the reign of Yung-cheng (1723-36) to the forty-fifth year of Chien-Lung (1781), though nominally consisting of 640,000 men, was only about 60,000 or 70,000 strong. In the forty-sixth year (1782) about 60,000 more were added. This will show how unreliable Chinese military figures are.

in torpid garrisons which have a variety of duties, most of which are performed by the police in Europe. In fact, both the Eight Banners and the Green Standard are rather of the nature of a constabulary than an army; they are only useful for maintaining the peace and suppressing small riots. They are called armies by the Chinese, whose geographical and political ideas are limited to their own empire, which they consider conterminous with the world. With such notions the duties of a police and an army are easily confounded, and a rebellion is a small war, and a war a great rebellion; the use of force is necessary in both cases.

Owing to the profound tranquillity enjoyed by China for a long time after the conquest, the two classes we have described gradually lost all their military efficiency, and became simply an instrument for controlling the people in ordinary times. This was proved by the Tai-ping rebellion, when a rabble from the Kuangtung and Kuang-Hsi provinces overran half the empire and nearly overthrew the Government. It was then that some public-spirited men, seeing the inefficiency of the regular forces of the empire, started enrolling bands of volunteers amongst the peasantry of Hunan and Hupeh to assist the Government in suppressing the rebellion. This movement was taken up by Tseng-Kwo-Fan in the above-mentioned provinces and imitated by Li-Hung-Chang, who enlisted similar bands in the province of An-hui. These volunteers, enrolled to assist the

hereditary and professional soldiers of the regular army, led to the formation of the third class.

III. The Braves.—This class is formed of Chinese of different provinces ; men of the same province are kept together, and they are transferred from province to province when there is occasion for their services. Their number is naturally very uncertain, because being formed of volunteers enlisted on emergencies, their strength fluctuates with the internal conditions of the country ; a certain force, however, is always supposed to be kept on hand.

IV. The Trained Army.—This is composed of soldiers mostly from the Braves who have been drilled in the European fashion.\* Their number is very uncertain ; different authorities estimate them at from 50,000 to 100,000 men.

Every war or rebellion affecting the Chinese Empire has awakened the Government to the inefficiency of its military organisation, and some reform has been attempted ; but such laudable efforts have been smothered by the inertia of the nation and by bureaucratic corruption and conservatism. The T'ai-ping rebellion led to the formation of the Braves ; the war with France and England encouraged a slight adoption of European drill ; and the complications with Russia about Kuldja started the formation of a

\* This is an important distinction to remember when considering the Chinese army. During the course of the war a Governor reported on the proficiency of his soldiers in the use of the bow and arrow.



special army in Manchuria. This last army, which deserves special consideration in the present war, has been estimated at 70,000 men, armed in the European fashion; but this number probably indicates the intentions and not the results of the reform. A Japanese war publication says that, though the

Province.	Banner Army.	Green Standard.	Braves.	Trained Army.
Chihli . . . . .	162,646	47,138	22,700	4,000
Shansi . . . . .	4,119	26,288	5,700	
Shantung . . . . .	2,405	25,406	6,500	
Honan . . . . .	1,011	8,943	4,500	5,000
Kiang-su . . . . .	6,589	46,840	22,700	
An-hui . . . . .			4,400	
Kiang-Hai . . . . .	..	11,074	..	
Che-kiang . . . . .	4,055	37,546	2,850	
Fu-kien . . . . .	2,781	62,573	5,500	
Kuang-tung . . . . .	5,356	69,015	3,000	
Kuang-hai . . . . .	..	11,535	..	3,000
Szu-chuan . . . . .	2,065	34,790	12,900	
Hu-peh . . . . .	5,812	22,603	6,000	
Hunan . . . . .	..	26,470		
Shensi . . . . .	6,719	43,261		
Kan-su . . . . .	5,791	43,519		
Yun-nan . . . . .	..	36,110		
Kuei-chow . . . . .	..	30,613		
Sheng-ching, Manchuria.	19,582			
Kirin, Manchuria . . .	10,712			
Amur, Manchuria . . .	11,661			
Turkestan . . . . .	7,623	15,295		
Uli . . . . .	7,925			
Total . . . . .	266,872	599,019	96,750	12,000

soldiers on the registers of the three Manchurian provinces amounted to about 175,000, most of them were of no military value. It mentions also that Wu-Ta-Cheng, during his special appointment in Manchuria from 1884 to 1889, organised for each province a force of eight battalions of infantry (4,000 men) and two of cavalry (500 men) with twenty

guns, which would give a total of 13,500 men with sixty guns for the whole of Manchuria. Though this information dates from 1888, it is probable, as we shall see from the forces engaged in the war, that it was not increased in later years.

The table on the preceding page showing the territorial distribution of the armies of China is taken from a Japanese war-publication.

### *The Chinese Navy*

Is far superior to the Army, as they have had many foreign instructors, and for a time had the services of Captain Lang, R.N., as Admiral of their Navy. Even the native officers were many of them well instructed in their profession, and presented a strange contrast to their brother officers of the land service. This difference is not surprising; the navy, even in time of peace, requires constant care and a certain professional knowledge; a ship cannot be navigated unless some of the officers at least have received a scientific education.

The Chinese Navy was divided into four squadrons—the Pei-yang or Northern Squadron, the Nan-yang or Southern Squadron, and the Foochow and Canton Flotillas. The following tables give the list of the different vessels, with a brief description of their most striking points.

For the purposes of this book the Pei-yang

## PEI-YANG (OR NORTHERN) SQUADRON.

Name of Vessel.	Tonnage.	Horse-Power.	Thickness of Armour, Belt.	Number and kind of Guns.	Speed.	Crew.
			Inches.		Knots.	
Ting-yuen .	7,430	6,000	14	Four 304-cm Krupp; two 15-cm. Krupp; eight Hotchkiss; two landing guns . . . . .	14	330
Chen-yuen .	7,430	6,000	14	Two 21-cm. 10-ton; two 15-cm.; seven machine-guns . . . . .	14	330
King-yuen .	2,900	3,400	9½	One 26-cm Krupp; two 15-cm.; nine machine-guns . . . . .	15	202
Lai-yuen .	2,900	3,400	8	Two 21-cm. Krupp; one 15-cm.; nine machine-guns . . . . .	15	200
Ping-yuen .	2,850	2,400	8	Two 21-cm. Krupp; one 15-cm.; nine machine-guns . . . . .	15	180
Tai-yuen .	2,355	2,800	..	Three 8-inch 12 ton; two 6-inch 4-ton; seven 57-mm.; two 57-mm.; eight 27-mm. quick-firing . . . . .	18	202
Chih-yuen .	2,300	7,500	..	Two 10-inch Armstrong; four 12 cm. quick firing; seven machine-guns . . . . .	18	202
Ching-yuen	2,300	7,500	..	Two 10-inch Armstrong; four 12 cm. quick firing; seven machine-guns . . . . .	16	130
Chao-yung	1,350	2,600	..	Two 10-inch Armstrong; four 12 cm. quick firing; seven machine-guns . . . . .	16	130
Yang-wei .	1,350	2,600	..	Two 10-inch Armstrong; four 12 cm. quick firing; seven machine-guns . . . . .	16	130
Kang-chi .	1,200	750	..	Two 10-inch Armstrong; four 12 cm. quick firing; seven machine-guns . . . . .	16	130
Wei-yuan .	1,200	750	..	Two 10-inch Armstrong; four 12 cm. quick firing; seven machine-guns . . . . .	16	130
Min-chieh .	700	Sailing	trooping vessel.	Two 16-cm.; four 12 cm. . . . .	10	119
Chen-hai .	440	380	..	One 35-ton Armstrong; two 22-pounders . . . . .	10	119
Chen-pei .	440	380	..	One 35-ton Armstrong; two 22-pounders . . . . .	10	119
Chen-nan .	440	380	..	One 35-ton Armstrong; two 22-pounders . . . . .	10	119
Chen-hai .	440	380	..	One 35-ton Armstrong; two 22-pounders . . . . .	10	119
Chen-tung .	440	380	..	One 35-ton Armstrong; two 22-pounders . . . . .	10	119
Chen-chung	440	380	..	One 35-ton Armstrong; two 22-pounders . . . . .	10	119
Chen-pien .	440	380	..	One 35-ton Armstrong; two 22-pounders . . . . .	10	119
Chen-an .	440	380	..	One 35-ton Armstrong; two 22-pounders . . . . .	10	119
Before the war this squadron was reinforced by the following vessels from the other squadrons:—						
Tai-an .	1,258	600	..	One 16 cm.; four 12-cm. . . . .	10	180
Kuang-chia	1,296	1,600	..	Three 15-cm.; four 12 cm.; four Hotchkiss . . . . .	14	
Kuang-ping	1,100	3,400	..	One 15-cm.; one 12-cm.; four machine-guns . . . . .		
Kuang-yi .	600	500	..	Three 12-cm quick-firing . . . . .		
Mei-yun .	515	400	..	One 16-cm. Vavasseur; two 12-cm.; four 6-pounder Vavasseurs . . . . .		70
Tsao-kiong	572	400	..	Four 16-cm. Vavasseurs . . . . .		

## NAN YANG CO. (S. R. L.) SHIPBUILDING SOCIETY

Name of Vessel.	Tonnage.	Horse-Power.	Number and kind of guns.	Speed.	Crew.
Hai-an . . .	2,600	1,750	Two 21-cm. Krupp; four 15-cm. Krupp; twenty 12-cm. Krupp . . .	Knots. 12	372
Yu-yuan . . .	2,600	1,750	Twenty-six guns (probably same as above) . . .	14	372
Nan-jui . . .	2,200	2,400	Two 8-inch Armstrong; eight 12-cm. (quick-firing); ten Hotchkiss . . .	15	250
Nan-shen . . .	2,200	2,400	Two 21-cm. Krupp; six 12-cm. Krupp; four Nordenfeldts . . .	15	250
Kai-chi . . .	2,153	2,400	Two 200-pounders; six 70-pounders . . .	16	270
Pao-min . . .	1,477	2,400	Two 15-cm. Krupp; five 12-cm. Krupp; four machine-guns . . .	15	15
Huan-kai . . .	1,477	2,400	One 16-cm. ; four 12-cm. . .	12	12
Teng-ying-chou . . .	1,258	600	Five guns . . .	12½	12½
Cheng-ching . . .	1,209	750	Fifteen 12-cm. . .	12½	12½
Wei-Ching . . .	1,100	600	One 38-ton Armstrong; two 12-pounders; two machine-guns . . .	9	9
Tei-hai . . .	700	430	Besides three or four smaller gunboats mounting a heavy gun.	9	9
Fei-ting . . .	400	310			
Tao-tien . . .	400	310			
FOOCHOW SQUADRON.					
Fu-ching . . .	2,200	2,400	Two 8-inch Armstrong; eight 4-7-inch (quick-firing); four machine-guns . . .	17	180
Fu-po . . .	1,258	600	One 16-cm. Vavasseur; one 9-ton; four 40-pounders; six 46-pounders . . .	10	180
Yuan-kai . . .	1,250	600	One 16-cm.; four 40-pounders . . .	11½	180
Chao-wu . . .	1,250	750	One 19-cm.; four 40-pounders . . .	8	100
Ching-yuen . . .	600	480	Two 16-cm. Vavasseur; two 40-pounders . . .	9	100
Ting-hai . . .	600	480	One 7-ton; four 56-pounders . . .	9	100
CANTON SQUADRON.					
Yung-pao . . .	2,500	2,400	Three 8 inch 10-ton; seven 12-cm. Krupp . . .	15	180
Hai-ching . . .	1,450	600	One 16-cm.; two 12 cm. . .	9	180
Chen-hong . . .	1,391	550	Two guns . . .		
Kuang-ki . . .	1,030	2,400	Three 12-cm. (quick-firing); eight machine-guns . . .	16½	16½
Kuang-king . . .	1,030	2,400		16½	16½
Kuang-ting . . .	1,030	2,400		16½	16½

There are besides twenty or thirty small gunboats ranging from 600 tons to 120 tons; but their guns are small, and their only use is for suppressing smuggling and piracy in the inland waters.

Squadron is the only one which deserves any attention, as it was the only one engaged. Besides, it was the most formidable fleet of China, specially formed for the defence of the capital, and possessing two splendid fortified harbours at Port Arthur and Wei-hai-wei.

### *Japanese Army.*

When Japan started to reorganise the whole national system she naturally introduced great reforms in her army: a proud warlike people felt the necessity, after the severe lessons of Shimonoseki and Kagoshima, of keeping up with the military progress of the age. It is said that during the war of the Restoration (only about thirty years ago) some warriors even used armour: though this could have been only a sporadic survival of antiquity, still, the whole military system of Japan was more adapted for feudal squabbles than for foreign warfare. When the feudal system, which recognised and maintained a military caste to whom the exclusive use of arms was confined, had been abolished, it was necessary to adopt other methods for the formation of an army; it was a period when military re-organisation was going on all over the world, when the astonishing results of the Franco-German War had awakened all nations to the necessity of enlisting all able-bodied men for military purposes. Japan adopted that system which, originating in Prussia, has been accepted with very

slight modifications by all the Continental nations of Europe.

By the law of 28 November, 1872, which was further extended by the law of 21 January, 1889, every Japanese subject is liable to military service at the age of twenty ; remains for three years in the active army (or four years in the navy), four years in the reserve (or three years in the naval reserve), and five years in the territorial army. Besides these forces, every male between the ages of seventeen and forty forms part of the national army. It is perhaps necessary to inform the English reader that this sweeping conscription is not, and never can be, entirely carried out in any country : even France and Germany, with their huge standing armies of half a million, only take about half of the young men liable to service ; and Japan, that has no invasion to fear and no heavy taxation to furnish the funds, takes into the active army but a very small fraction of the men who, by law, are compelled to serve. A good many are refused for physical weakness, and others are exempted for family reasons, such as the necessity of providing for parents, or the service of another brother in the army : after this repeated winnowing, there are still too many for the requirements of the state, and the necessary contingent is selected by drawing lots.

The organisation of the Japanese army is slightly different from that of European armies ; it has no *corps d'armée*—the largest military unit is the divi-

sion. It possesses six of these, besides the Imperial Body Guard, which may also be considered as a division, which it almost equals in numerical strength. The formation of these divisions is not entirely uniform ; they all have two brigades or four regiments of infantry, but the artillery, cavalry, engineers and train attached to each division vary slightly in number. An infantry regiment is formed by three battalions of four companies each ; a cavalry battalion is composed of three companies ; a regiment of artillery is divided into two battalions and four companies of field artillery and one battalion of two companies of mountain artillery (the body guard regiment of artillery has only two battalions) ; a battalion of engineers consists of three companies (in the body guard of two only) ; a battalion of train has two companies. Table I. gives the territorial distribution of the six divisions as well as of the brigades and regiments of infantry : it also shows what troops form each division.

Besides this general organisation for the whole empire, there are two special local corps : troops for the Island of Yezo (the most northern of the archipelago), composed of four battalions of infantry (of two to six companies each), one corps of cavalry, one corps of mountain artillery, one corps of engineers, the Tsushima (two small islands between Japan and Corea) defence corps, composed of one corps of infantry and one corps of fortress artillery. There are also six corps of gendarmerie, one for each of the divisional districts.

As for the numerical strength of each corps and of the whole army, a careful comparison of different authorities, Japanese and foreign, leads to the following results, which are as exact as it is possible under the circumstances. The numbers of an army are not only subject to constant fluctuations, which give different figures at different dates, but they may be estimated differently at the same time by authors who include or leave out certain classes either of auxiliary troops or of non-combatants attached to the army. Table II. gives the peace strength of each military unit of the Japanese army, with all the subdivisions of the combatant and non-combatant class. If we apply these figures to the different corps we shall get the following result :—

	Men.
Infantry . . . . .	48,440
Cavalry . . . . .	2,570
Field artillery . . . . .	5,159
Fortress artillery . . . . .	1,698
Engineers . . . . .	2,596
Train . . . . .	3,840
Total . . . . .	<hr/> 64,308

To which must be added about 1,000 gendarmes and about 4,000 Yeso troops. The final total thus obtained is slightly higher than that generally given for the peace-strength of the Japanese army, but it represents its regulation numbers, and would be nearer the truth at the commencement of a war, when every regiment would be brought up to its effective strength.



TABLE I

Divisions.	Brigades.	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Artillery.	Engineers.	Train.	Fortress Artillery.
Body Guard	..	4 Regiments (Tokyo)	1 battalion	1 regiment	1 company	1 battalion	
1st Division (Tokyo)	{ 1st Brigade (Tokyo) { 2nd Brigade (Sakura)	I. Regiment (Tokyo). XV. " (Takaaki) II. " (Sakura) III. " (Tokyo)	{ 1 battalion { 1 battalion	1 regiment	1 battalion	1 battalion	2 battalions
2nd Division (Sendai)	{ 3rd Brigade (Sendai) { 4th Brigade (Aomori)	IV. " (Sendai). XVI. " (Shibata) V. " (Aomori) XVII. " (Sendai)	{ 1 company, 2 troops { 1 company, 2 troops	1 regiment	1 battalion	1 battalion	
3rd Division (Nagoya)	{ 5th Brigade (Nagoya) { 6th Brigade (Kanazawa)	VI. " (Nagoya) XVIII. " (Toyohashi) VII. " (Kanazawa) XIX. " (Nagoya)	{ 1 company, 2 troops { 1 company, 2 troops	1 regiment	1 battalion	1 battalion	
4th Division (Osaka)	{ 7th Brigade (Osaka) { 8th Brigade (Himeji)	VIII. " (Osaka) IX. " (Osaka) X. " (Himeji) XX. " (Osaka)	{ 2 companies { 2 companies	1 regiment	1 battalion	1 battalion	
5th Division (Hiroshima)	{ 9th Brigade (Hiroshima) { 10th Brigade (Matsuyama)	XI. " (Hiroshima) XXI. " (Hiroshima) XXII. " (Matsuyama) XII. " (Matsuyama)	{ 1 company, 2 troops { 1 company, 2 troops	1 regiment	1 battalion	1 battalion	
6th Division (Kumamoto)	{ 11th Brigade (Kumamoto) { 12th Brigade (Fukuoka)	XIII. " (Kumamoto) XXIII. " (Kumamoto) XIV. " (Kokura) XXIV. " (Fukuoka)	{ 2 companies { 2 companies	1 regiment	1 battalion	1 battalion	1 battalion

TABLE II.

	Infantry Regt. ment.	Cavalry Battalion.	Artillery Regiment.	Fortress Artillery Regiment.	Engineer Battalion.	Train Battalion
<b>Combatants:—</b>						
Colonel (or lieutenant-colonel)	1	1	1	1	1	..
Majors	4	4	3	3	4	1
Captains	13	7	9	15	7	3
Lieutenants	27	7	15	27	6	5
Ensigns	25	6	12	24	3	4
Special sergent-majors	12	3	6	11	.	2
Sergeant-majors	12	3	7	13	3	3
Sergeants	130	35	64	136	32	31
Soldiers	1,440	426	576	1,404	330	180-360
Total.	1,664	485	693	1,634	386	589
<b>Non-combatants:—</b>						
Chief surgeon	1	..	..	1	..	..
Surgeons	5	2	3	2	1	2
Chief hospital attendants	3	1	1	3	1	1
Hospital attendants	12	3	6	12	3	2
Veterinaries	..	2	2	..	..	2
Employés.	7	2	8	7	2	2
Gunsmiths	6	2	..	2	2	1
Farriers	..	4	2	..	..	3
Saddlers	..	1	2	11	..	..
Blacksmiths	..	..	2	2	1	..
Tailors	21	7	10	21	7	7
Shoemakers	11	5	6	..	5	5
Carpenters	..	..	2	..	2	..
Total.	66	29	44	63	24	25
Grand total.	1,730	514	737	1,697	410	614

The numbers contained in each division are as follows :—

	Men
Body-guard . . . . .	7,359
1st Division (Tokyo) . . . . .	10,243
2nd „ (Sendai) . . . . .	8,872
3rd „ (Nagoya) . . . . .	8,943
4th „ (Osaka) . . . . .	9,107
5th „ (Hiroshima) . . . . .	8,898
6th „ (Kumamoto) . . . . .	10,271
Total . . . . .	<hr/> 63,693

The Reserve contains 91,190 men, and the territorial army 106,088 men, so that in time of war each Japanese division is reinforced by about 13,000 men, ready to be marched to the seat of war, besides about 15,000 which remain for the defence of the country. But the *cadres* are insufficient for such a large force, and it is doubtful whether on a war-footing a Japanese division ever reaches 20,000 men. Of course the surplus men are always useful and readily used to fill up the gaps produced by the enemy and by sickness.

The infantry regiment of three battalions and twelve companies has 120 soldiers in each company on a peace-footing, and 210 in time of war, thus raising its war strength to 2,810 men, of which 2,744 are combatants. If the other corps are proportionately increased we should have the war strength of a cavalry battalion equal to about 800 men, of an artillery regiment about 1,200 men, of an engineers

battalion about 600, and of a train battalion about 1,000 men.\* This would give nearly 15,000 men for a division on the war-footing. Any higher number must be obtained by an increase in the men attached in sundry capacities to the train. The Japanese statistical tables indicating the distribution of the men allot a large portion of the reserve and territorial army to the transport. Such an arrangement explains the excellent commissariat organisation of the Japanese army in its distant expeditions.

The artillery regiment consists of six batteries, each battery having four pieces on a peace-footing and six pieces in time of war ; four of these batteries are of field-pieces, and two of mountain-guns.

The Japanese infantry, at the time of the war, was armed with the Murata rifle, a breech-loader invented by a Japanese officer of that name ; it had then no magazine. The cavalry was armed with sabres and Murata carbines, only the cavalry of the Imperial Guard having lances. The artillery had 7-centimetre pieces of compressed bronze of the Italian model, made at Osaka, where a cannon-foundry was established and directed by Italian officers specially engaged for the purpose.

\* Some of these details of the Japanese forces on a war-footing are extracted from a lecture delivered by Captain Uchiyama at the Education Meeting of Kioto.

*The Japanese Navy.*

This requires little description, as the navies of all countries are similarly organised, but it calls for some remarks. It is strange that Japan, an empire constituted solely of islands, with such an extensive sea-coast and numerous maritime population should have such a relatively weak navy. While her army, so superior in discipline and military science, was also actually superior in numbers to the Chinese, her navy was inferior and possessed no vessels powerful enough to cope with the *Chen-yuen* and *Ting-yuen*, the two big ironclads of the Pei-yang squadron. Japan had several fast vessels; one of them, the *Yoshino*, the fastest in the world, but her victories were due to the skill and daring of her sailors and not to the ships which they manned.

Japan has three military ports, Yokosuka, Kure and Sasebo, to each of which a squadron is attached; but during the war the fleet was divided into several small squadrons of four vessels (rarely of more), which acted as tactical units in their military operations.

The following table gives the most important particulars of the Japanese war-vessels:—

## JAPANESE FLEET

Name of Vessel.	Tonnage.	Horse-Power.	Armament.	Speed.	Crew.
Tuso . . .	3,718	3,500	Four 24-cm. 15-ton Krupp; two 17-cm. Krupp; five machine-guns.	13.2	377
Hashidate . .	4,277	5,400	One 32-cm. Canet; eleven 12-cm. quick-firing; six 3-pounders; six machine-guns.	17.5	360
Naniwa . . .	3,650	7,235	{ Two 26-cm. 28-ton Armstrong; six 15-cm. 5-ton Krupp; two quick-firing; ten machine-guns	18.7	337
Takao . . .	1,760	2,330	Four 6-inch quick-firing; one 4½-inch quick-firing	15.0	222
Yaezama . .	1,600	5,400	Three 12-cm. quick-firing; six machine-guns	20.0	217
Musashi . .	1,476	1,600	Two 17-cm. Krupp; eight 12-cm. Krupp; two machine-guns	13.5	256
Amagi . . .	1,030	720	One 15-cm. Krupp; four 12-cm. Krupp; two machine-guns	11.0	159
Atago . . .	615	700	Four 15-cm. Krupp; two machine-guns	..	104
Itsukushima	4,277	5,400	{ One 32-cm. Canet; eleven 12-cm; five 6-pounder quick-firing; eleven 3-pounder Hotchkiss; six machine-guns	17.5	360
Chiyoda . .	2,450	5,600	Ten 12-cm. quick-firing; fourteen 47-cm. quick-firing; three machine-guns	19.0	300
Kongo . . .	2,200	2,450	Three 17-cm. Krupp; six 15-cm. Krupp	13.7	286
Hiei . . .	2,200	2,490	Three 17-cm. Krupp; six 15-cm. Krupp	13.0	286
Yamato . .	1,476	1,600	Two 17-cm. Krupp; five 12-cm. Krupp; eight machine-guns	13.5	231
Tenkuishi . .	1,500	2,887	Two 25-ton Armstrong; four 4-inch Armstrong; four machine guns	17.0	177
Tenryo . . .	1,490	1,250	One 17-cm. 6-ton Krupp; six 12-cm. Krupp	12.0	214
Maya . . .	615	700	Four 15-cm. Krupp; two machine-guns	12.0	104
Akagi . . .	615	700	One 24-cm. Krupp; one 12-cm. Krupp; two machine-guns	12.0	126
Matsushima	4,277	5,400	{ One 32-cm. Canet; eleven 12-cm. Canet; five 6-pounder quick-firing; eleven 3-pounder Hotchkiss; six machine-guns	17.5	360
Yoshino . .	4,150	15,000	{ Four 6-inch quick-firing; eight 4.7-inch quick-firing; twenty-two 3-pounder quick-firing	23.0	..
Takachihō . .	3,650	7,500	Two 26-cm. 28-ton Armstrong; six 15-cm. 5-ton Armstrong; twelve machine-guns	18.7	357
Akitenshima	3,150	8,400	One 32-cm. Canet; twelve 12-cm. quick-firing; six machine-guns	19.0	..
Katsuragi . .	1,476	1,600	Two 17-cm. Krupp; five 12-cm. Krupp	13.0	231
Kaimon . . .	1,490	1,250	One 17-cm. Krupp; six 12-cm. Krupp	12.0	211
Nishin . . .	1,470	1,270	One 7-inch M.L.R. Armstrong; five 12-cm. Krupp	..	157
Iwaki . . .	600	650	One 15-cm. Krupp; two 12 cm. Krupp	10.0	112
Chokai . . .	615	700	One 21-cm. Krupp; one 12-cm. Krupp; two machine-guns	10.0	104
Oshima . . .	640	1,200	Four 12-cm. quick-firing; eight 47-mm. quick-firing	..	129

## PART II.

## THE COREAN CAMPAIGN.



## CHAPTER I.

## THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES.

*The Attack on the King's Palace at Seoul.*

It has been already shown that in the middle of July the Corean question became so complicated, that it was well-nigh impossible to resolve it by pacific means. The Japanese Government had proposed a programme of reforms, which China thought unnecessary, and had refused her co-operation; the Corean Government had consented at first, but afterwards procrastinated, urging that the withdrawal of the Japanese troops must precede any measures of reform. This tergiversation of Corea was attributed to the machinations of China, and the Japanese Government determined to deprive the Min party of that power which they used in the interests of China. Even if the Japanese Government had been unwilling, it would have been compelled to adopt this strong line of policy: popular feeling throughout Japan was

very excited, and the whole nation was resolved to suffer no more humiliations in Corea. The pacific policy, which led to the first treaty with Corea in 1876, had been distasteful to a party in the country, and the consequent discontent caused, in 1877, the Satsuma Rebellion, which cost Japan thousands of lives and millions of money during the seven months of civil war. The two attacks on the Japanese Legation at Seoul had deeply hurt the proud susceptible character of the Japanese, who considered the apologies and indemnities of the Corean Government an insufficient atonement for the murders and outrages committed on their fellow-countrymen. On this occasion, Japan must assert itself, and with an energy which would render impossible any further trifling with her dignity.

On the other hand, the opportunity was so favourable that it must not be allowed to slip ; the Japanese had been quicker and more clever. They had offered China a share in the re-organisation of the country, and she had refused ; they had a strong force in the capital, and they could act without her assistance. The question could not be settled without a war, and in such a case rapidity would be the chief element of success.

The march of events was very rapid. On the 18th of July the Corean Government informed Otori, the Japanese Minister, that the presence of such a large body of Japanese soldiers troubled the minds of the people, and that they could not undertake the



reforms until after the withdrawal of the Japanese troops. On the 19th, Yuan-Shi-kai, the Chinese Minister, who had been at Seoul since 1885, and who was suspected by the Japanese to be encouraging the Koreans in their resistance, left the capital, and, embarking on a Chinese man-of-war at Chemulpo, returned to China. On the 20th July, Otori sent an ultimatum to the Korean Government; he reminded



OTORI,  
JAPANESE MINISTER IN KOREA.



YUAN-SHI-KAI,  
CHINESE MINISTER RESIDENT IN KOREA

them that by the Convention of 1885, Korea had bound itself to build barracks for the Japanese soldiers (he thus insinuated that Japan had a perfect right *vis-à-vis* of Korea to send troops in the country); he added, that the presence of soldiers, who had publicly proclaimed \* their object of protecting a dependent state was incompatible with the independence of that

\* He alluded to the proclamation of the Chinese generals.'

country, and he gave the Corean Government three days' time for a final answer to his demands; if it were not satisfactory Japan would carry out the reforms by force. The Corean Government, considering its helplessness, showed considerable resolution. On the night of the 22nd it answered that the Chinese troops had come at their request, and would not leave until similarly requested.

Orders were at once given to the Japanese troops encamped near the capital to attack the King's Palace next morning. Two battalions, led by Majors Mori and Hashimoto, marched out of their camp early in the morning; their object was declared to be an attack on the Chinese troops at Asan, but they soon changed their direction, and moved towards the front and rear of the palace. After a short engagement they drove out the Corean troops and took possession of the person of the King, to whom they declared they had come to guard the Palace and deliver him from an obnoxious faction. There was another short scuffle with some Corean troops outside the Palace, but with the loss of only two killed and five wounded in both engagements, the Japanese became masters of the capital and the Government. The Japanese loudly declared that the 23rd July marked the beginning of a new era for Corea, and set themselves to remodel the Government; the Min party were driven out and replaced by progressive politicians. The notorious Tai-Wen-Kun, the father of the King, who had not been allowed to see his son for years, was

called to the Palace and entrusted with high authority. Strange changes take place in the politics of the Far East as well as in those of Western countries, and it was indeed extraordinary that one of the first steps in the revolution brought about by Japan, in the name of progress and civilisation, was to replace in power the Tai-Wen-Kun, the relentless persecutor of Christianity,



THE KING OF KOREA

the hater of all foreigners, the man who had been confined for years in China because he was suspected to have promoted the attack on the Japanese in 1883.

The occupation of the Palace and the change in the Government gave the Japanese legal sanction for all their future proceedings; they at once received a request from the Korean Government to drive out

from Asan the Chinese, who now instead of defenders were considered intruders. With the feeble resistance at the Palace, hostilities between Japan and Corea commenced and ended ; it now became only a question of a few days when hostilities would break out between China and Japan. It was conjectured that the first engagement would take place somewhere between Seoul and Asan. But circumstances ruled a far different and more startling opening to the great drama that was to be enacted in the Far East.

### *The Naval Fight at Phung Island.*

When the situation in Corea became critical, China, as well as Japan, began to reinforce her troops in that country. On the 21st of July and following days, eleven steamers carrying over 8,000 soldiers were despatched from Tientsin to Corea. They were sent in two directions, some to the Yalu, the boundary river of Corea, and others to Asan, to increase the strength of the small expedition which originally had been sent simply to intimidate the Tong-Haks. The object of the Chinese was to reinforce the Asan detachment to such an extent that it could resist any attack of the Japanese, while at the same time troops should be constantly sent to the frontier, to form a large army to march south to the capital and drive out the Japanese, who thus would be attacked on both sides and driven into the sea. The plan was good, but to be effective it required rapid mobilisation,

a condition which all the subsequent history of the war shows to have been impossible for China. Besides a defective military organisation of her few fighting troops, the absence of railways and good roads rendered a rapid concentration by land impossible. China, though possessing a long frontier with Corea, was compelled to depend on the sea for the rapid conveyance of troops to the neighbouring country.

Japan, from her insular conditions, found herself in the same position; the sea was the only open route. The relative situation of the two forces in Corea rendered this sea route longer and more dangerous. The Japanese at Seoul had a Chinese force on the south, which could intercept all communication with Fusan, the Corean port nearest to Japan; their communications therefore had all to pass *viâ* Chemulpo. The Chinese at Asan had a strong Japanese force in the north, and could only communicate by sea with China. As Asan is a little south of Chemulpo even the sea-routes of communication intersected. The immediate object of the Japanese was to prevent the troops in Asan receiving reinforcements; their own troops at Seoul were in sufficient numbers not only to hold their own, but to crush the enemy at Asan, and the Chinese army coming from the north was not near enough to constitute a danger for some time; if this object could not be attained, the position of the Japanese troops at Seoul might become dangerous. Indeed,

for a moment, the situation of both armies seemed critical, the Chinese at Asan and the Japanese at Seoul were equally far from their base of operations, and it was doubtful which would succeed in strengthening its own position or weakening that of its adversary.

The Japanese Government was informed of the departure of the Chinese transports, and on the 23rd of July the *Akitsushima*, *Yoshino*, and *Naniwa* left Sasebo ; these three vessels are the fastest in the Japanese navy and eminently qualified for the work that was expected from them. On the 25th, at 7 A.M., when they were near the islands of Phung and Shapain, they met two Chinese men-of-war, the *Tsi-yuen* and the *Kuang-yi* ; the Chinese vessels came from the neighbourhood of Asan, where, as we know from other evidence,\* the attack of the Japanese troops on the King's Palace at Seoul was known at 5 20 P.M. of the preceding day. They therefore knew that war was all but declared, and probably expected to be attacked by the enemy's vessels. The Japanese vessels, on the other hand, had been at sea for two days and knew nothing of the grave events that had taken place at Seoul on the 23rd, but they must have known that such events would happen, and they probably had instructions to stop all transports. They were, however, astonished that the Chinese did not salute their flag and that they were cleared for action. The Japanese likewise made preparations, and as the

\* The log of the ss. *Feichung*, published in the Shanghai papers.

passage among the islands was very narrow they changed their course south-west to go out into the open sea, when the Chinese vessels which had come very near opened fire.

The action was short and decisive. In about an hour the *Kuang-yi* was crippled, and had to be run into shallow water. The *Tsi-yuen* had her bow gun disabled, twenty of the crew were killed, and she had to fly to Wei-hai-wei, so riddled with shot, that some eye-witnesses of her condition said she looked like a pepper-box. During the engagement it is said the *Tsi-yuen* hoisted a white and a Japanese flag, and when one of the Japanese men-of-war approached, discharged a torpedo, which missed. She was pursued for some time by the *Yoshino*.

The above is the Japanese account. The Chinese say the Japanese fired first, but the *Tsi-yuen* fought so well that a Japanese man-of-war was obliged to hoist the white flag, and only the arrival of other vessels saved her from capture. Further details were also added, that a shot had demolished the bridge, killing the Japanese admiral, who was seen to turn several somersaults in the air. This account is contradicted by the fact that several Europeans \* saw the *Tsi-yuen* running away with a white and Japanese flag. Unfortunately Chinese military and naval officers are obliged to spread exaggerated reports to please the taste of the majority of the nation, who are thoroughly

\* Von Hannecken, Mr. Muhlenstedt and the officer of the *Kowshin-j*.

ignorant of military matters, and would not be satisfied with the plain recital of the most heroic action. Throughout the war the Japanese have been far more just in their appreciation of the Chinese generals and officers than their own countrymen. The fight of the *Tsi-yuen* and *Kuang-yi* with the three Japanese men-of-war, each of which would have been more than a match for both of them, was certainly a plucky affair. It is the boldest action of the war—the only one in which the Chinese engaged overwhelming odds, and it is strange that Fong, the captain of the *Tsi-yuen*, was beheaded two months afterwards for cowardice. It is the duty of history to correct the mistakes and prejudices of the transient moment, when men's passions are excited and their judgment blinded; and against the hasty death-sentence pronounced by literary mandarins ignorant of warfare, it is fair to adduce the opinion of the competent Japanese naval officers \* who had fought against Fong, and the testimony of the German engineer,† who had served on his ship.

The engagement was certainly imprudent on the part of the Chinese, and if they commenced firing, the only explanation that can be suggested is that they had

\* When the Japanese captured the torpedo-boats at Wei-hai-wei the next year, among the questions they asked the Chinese prisoners was: Why was Fong, who fought so well at Phung Island, decapitated? and the Chinese officers answered that they did not know, but Admiral Ting had tried to save him.

† Mr. Hoffmann, who made a declaration in a Shanghai paper that Fong had fought his ship well at the battle of the Yalu.



orders to protect the transports at any cost, and they hoped either to disable the Japanese vessels, or draw them away from the Korean coast by a running fight.

While the *Yoshino* was pursuing the *Tsi-yuen* two other vessels came in sight, the *Tsao-Kiang*, a small Chinese despatch vessel, and the British s.s. *Kowshing*. The *Akitsushima* gave chase to the former, and soon captured her, as she could offer no resistance. The *Naniwa* took charge of the latter, and through ignorance and mistrust a bloody drama was enacted which cost over a thousand human lives.

The *Naniwa*, at about 9 A.M., signalled to the *Kowshing* to anchor, and emphasised the signal by two blind guns, then, after some more signals and consultation with the other men-of-war, she sent a boat with an officer to board the steamer. The officer examined the ship's papers, and found she was a British steamer which had been chartered by the Chinese Government to convey troops to Corea (she had on board about 1,200 men, besides twelve guns, ammunition, etc., and Mr. von Hannecken, a German officer who had been employed by the Chinese for many years in constructing their forts, travelling as a passenger). After putting several questions the Japanese officer informed the captain of the *Kowshing* that he must follow the *Naniwa*, and left so abruptly that the captain had only time to say that he was obliged to obey a man-of-war, though he would do so under protest.

After the Japanese boat had left, and when

preparations were being made to follow out the orders received, there was a scene of terrible confusion. When the *Naniwa* had stopped the *Kowshing*, the two Chinese generals who were in charge of the troops, had become very excited, and had informed von Hannecken that they would perish rather than be taken prisoners. Von Hannecken was the only European who could speak Chinese, and had to negotiate the whole business. He informed Captain Galsworthy of the intentions of the Chinese, and they agreed together that he should insist to be allowed to return to Taku, the port he had left on the 23rd of July before any declaration of war. But the Japanese officer had departed so suddenly that the captain had no time to make objections nor call for von Hannecken.

As soon as the Chinese generals understood what was proposed to be done, their excitement increased, and was communicated to their soldiers, who began rushing about the deck in a wild manner. Arms and ammunition were served out to some of the soldiers by the generals, who declared they would not follow the *Naniwa*, but would fight the Japanese ; and when the officers of the *Kowshing* declared they would leave the ship if the Chinese intended to fight, armed soldiers were detached to guard all Europeans with threats of instant death if any sign was shown of obeying the Japanese orders or of abandoning the vessel. It was truly a pitiable sight that such a number of officers, amongst whom were two generals, should not have sufficient military experience to

understand the absurdity of attempting resistance in a merchant vessel against a powerful man-of-war. But in their ignorance of international law, they probably trusted to the protection afforded by the foreign flag, and by the presence of the Europeans on board, and concluded they were safe as long as they could keep these hostages. They had paid for their passage, and paid a large price, and they considered they were entitled to be landed either at Asan or Taku. Their ignorance sealed their fate and that of the poor wretches who were under their orders.

While the Chinese had taken possession of the steamer, the Japanese were signalling to follow, so then von Hannecken asked Captain Galsworthy to ask the *Naniwa* by signal to send the boat again, which was immediately done. This time von Hannecken himself went to parley with the Japanese, and the scene was truly dramatic. The deck was swarming with armed and excited soldiers who were kept back with difficulty. Von Hannecken, a man of commanding presence, was at the gangway; the Japanese officers were on the ladder with their hand on the sword-hilt. Von Hannecken explained that the captain was not free to obey. The Chinese would not allow him to follow the *Naniwa* and wanted to return to Taku. This request seemed reasonable to von Hannecken and to the captain. The Japanese officer promised to refer the question to the captain of the *Naniwa*.

The only answer which came from the *Naniwa*

after some time, which was probably employed in deliberation, was the signal "quit the ship at once." This of course was meant for the Europeans, but they could not leave, as the Chinese soldiers guarded all the davits. Captain Galsworthy signalled: "We are not allowed," and then "send a boat," to which the Japanese answered: "Life-boat cannot come." Then the *Naniwa* steamed around and placing herself alongside of the *Kowshing* at 150 metres on the port side, launched a torpedo and fired two broadsides. It is not certain whether the torpedo struck the ship, but there was a terrific explosion which filled the air with coal-dust and obscured everything. In the confusion, von Hannecken and the Europeans jumped overboard, and swam for their lives under a hail of bullets; the Chinese soldiers who could not swim and knew they must die, were firing wildly both at the Japanese and at their comrades in the water. The *Naniwa* opened fire at about 1 P.M., and in half-an-hour the *Kowshing* was sunk. The captain, first officer, and a quartermaster were picked up by a Japanese boat: von Hannecken and some of the soldiers swam ashore, others clung to the masts of the *Kowshing* and were rescued next morning by the French gun-boat *Lion*, but the total lives saved did not exceed 170, so that over 1,000 died.\*

The sinking of the *Kowshing*, on account of the European lives lost, and the international question it

\* The statements of some of the survivors will be found in Appendix C.

raised, led people to forget the other incidents of that eventful morning, and obscured the salient points of that memorable day. If it had not been for these extraneous considerations, the 25th July would have revealed to the world the business-like rapidity with which the Japanese carried on warfare—even at that early date the military qualities of the Japanese would have been understood. The Japanese men-of-war met the *Tsi-yuen* and *Kuang-yi* at 7 A.M., and at 1.30 P.M. the *Kowshing* was sunk. In about six hours a man-of-war had been destroyed, another disabled, a despatch vessel captured and a transport sunk. Though the Japanese were supposed to be an excitable people, all this had been done without flurry and without losing sight of the principal points of each question. The engagement with the *Tsi-yuen* had not tempted the Japanese to pursue and destroy the disabled ship; they remained to intercept the transports. The *Kowshing* presented a complicated question of international law, which the Japanese officers had to settle in a few hours just after an engagement, and with the apprehensions that at any moment other Chinese vessels might arrive to renew the battle. This question was resolved correctly, but it must be remembered that such a solution entailed firing upon the British flag—a flag which commands respect all over the world, and in the Far East is looked upon with sentiments of awe. It was therefore an act of singular boldness for the Japanese to act so resolutely on so short a reflection.

From a military point of view the events of the 25th were very important. The sinking of the *Kowshing* with 1,000 picked soldiers was equal to the loss of a bloody battle, and it may be said that fate of the troops at Asan, and the prospects of the the Chinese plan of campaign, were settled on that day. If the *Kowshing* had arrived at Asan, the landing of 1,200 fresh soldiers, the presence of a brave, skilful officer like von Hannecken, and the encouragement felt by the Chinese in finding themselves always able to receive reinforcements, would have materially affected the results of the first land engagement. Perhaps the Japanese, who have shown always so much prudence together with their boldness, might have hesitated to attack the position at Asan before receiving reinforcements. It produced also other consequences which lasted during the whole war. It made neutrals more careful in embarking in doubtful enterprises, and it showed the Chinese that the conveyance of soldiers by sea was fraught with difficulty and danger.

## CHAPTER II.

## THE FIRST MILITARY OPERATIONS.

*The Asan Campaign.*

WHEN the Japanese assaulted the Palace and changed the Korean Government on the 23rd July, they prepared to face the Chinese armies which were already in the country. The northern army was of uncertain numbers, and its exact position was unknown ; but as it did not constitute an immediate danger, it was considered sufficient to despatch on the 23rd a small party of cavalry scouts to watch the movements of the Chinese. The southern force at Asan was very near, and though not formidable in numbers might be reinforced, and in any case must be destroyed before the northern army approached, as otherwise the Japanese would be exposed to a double attack. Besides these military reasons, there were others of a different kind, which imperatively required a prompt defeat of the Chinese at Asan : the wavering attachment of the Korean party favourable to the Japanese must be strengthened by some striking military success evincing the manifest superiority of Japan ; and the further presence of Chinese troops might

spread disaffection in the already disturbed southern provinces.

On the 25th July, General Oshima, leaving a small force to guard the capital, started with the bulk of his troops for Asan. The Japanese advance was rapid: on the 26th they were at Su-Wön, on the 27th at Chin-wé, and on the 28th at Su-sa-chang, within sight of the Chinese camps. The march had been full of difficulties, beasts of burden were not easily procured, and the Korean coolies who had been hired as carriers \* decamped on the first day; for a short time the advanced guard, which was about a day's march in front of the main body, was blocked at Su-Wön and could not proceed: the commander, Major Koshi, was so chagrined, that after fruitlessly spending day and night in endeavouring to requisition coolies and beasts, he committed suicide. On the 26th, when the rest of the troops reached Su-Wön, the difficulties were gradually adjusted. Otori wrote from Seoul, that the Korean Government had entrusted to Japan the task of driving out the Chinese from Asan, and had issued a proclamation to all officials, that the Japanese army should be provided with beasts of burden and coolies, whose services would be properly paid. The Korean peasants, accustomed to

\* The European reader should know that in the Far East men are employed for a variety of work confined to animals in Europe; they pull small carriages and carry loads great distances. During the whole war the Japanese army was accompanied by large numbers of coolies, who did almost all the transport.



be plundered by their own troops, scarcely believed the possibility of being paid for anything that was taken, but they joyfully accepted the strange custom of the Japanese and furnished all the assistance required. On the 26th, General Oshima also received from Otori the news of the naval engagement off the coast, which had taken place the preceding day, and the troops were immediately informed of the victory, which filled them with enthusiasm and impatience to rival the success of the navy.

The Chinese, when they foresaw the probability of a Japanese attack, decided not to resist it at Asan, where their retreat would have been cut off by the sea, but chose, with great skill, a strong defensive position near Song-hwan, which they fortified with great pains. The road from Seoul to Asan at Su-sa-chang has to cross two small rivers, one of which forms a pond: the ground is entirely without cover and cut up with paddy-fields; beyond these, there is a ridge of hills. The Chinese broke the bridges, dammed the rivers, and built six redoubts protected by abattis on the hills.

The Japanese arrived at Su-sa-chang, five miles from the Chinese position, before noon of the 28th of July; the officers, with their field-glasses, soon discovered the Chinese entrenchments, gaily bedecked with a liberal supply of flags. Some Japanese officers disguised themselves, and approached very near to the Chinese lines: when they returned in the evening, General Oshima summoned a hasty council, in which

it was decided that, owing to the strength of the position, and the difficulty of approach through paddy-fields exposed to the enemy's fire without shelter, a night attack was necessary. The troops were not informed of the plan, but suddenly awakened at midnight, when noiselessly and without confusion they marched towards the enemy. The Japanese were divided into two wings: the right wing, under Lieutenant-Colonel Takeda, consisted of four companies of infantry and one company of engineers, and was to make a strong diversion on the enemy's left; the left wing, under General Oshima, consisted of nine companies of infantry, one battalion of artillery, and one company of cavalry; by a circuitous route it was to attack the flank and rear of the Chinese right wing.

Captain Matsusaki, with a company of infantry, was at the head of the right wing; the two streams were forded with difficulty, the water reaching to the shoulders, and a narrow road turning to the left led across a pond and through paddy-fields to a hamlet. The darkness of the night and the difficulties of the road soon threw the Japanese into confusion. Some detachments lost their way, and Lieut.-Col. Takeda called to the interpreters to inquire the road at the Korean houses, when suddenly a white figure darted past and shouted. The Chinese soldiers ambushed in the hamlet immediately opened a heavy fire. The Japanese lying down behind the embankments returned the fire, but they were in a very embarrassing

position ; the nature of the ground hampered their movements, and they were crowding up under the enemy's fire. Lieutenant Tokiyama with twenty men, in their anxiety to push forward to the assistance of the vanguard, jumped into the pond where it was deepest, and were drowned.



CAPTAIN MATSUSAKI, KILLED AT AN-SONG.

Captain Matsusaki encouraged his men to hold their ground, standing up on the embankment of the rice-field and waving his sword ; a bullet hit him in the thigh, but he still continued to brave all danger until another bullet killed him. Gradually reinforcements came up, and the Japanese charged the Chinese, driving them out of the village into the paddy-fields to the south. This skirmish, which was called after

the name of the ford of An-söng (the second of the two streams), lasted from 3.0 to 3.30 A.M.

At 5.0 A.M. the battle was renewed by an attack on the redoubts. At this time the left wing, under Oshima, came into action, and a heavy artillery fire was directed on the Chinese entrenchments. The Chinese are said to have made bad practice with their guns, while the Japanese shells bursting inside the forts made great havoc amongst the Chinese. Under cover of the smoke the Japanese stormed the extreme forts on the right and left; the Chinese, hemmed in on both sides, abandoned all their forts at 5.30 A.M. and retreated in disorder. General Oshima, with the 11th Regiment, pursued the Chinese along the road to Chhon-an, while Lieutenant-Colonel Takeda, with the 21st Regiment, marched on Asan. The Japanese expected to meet a desperate resistance at this place, but they found it evacuated by the Chinese, who had preferred to make their stand at Song-hwan, where they had a good line of retreat to Chhon-an.

The forces engaged in this battle were exaggerated at the time: as we have seen the two wings of the Japanese consisted of thirteen companies of infantry, one of engineers, one of cavalry, and a battalion of artillery. These, on a peace-footing (they could not have received their reserves at that time), would give a total of about 2,500 men. The Chinese force, according to the prisoners captured by the Japanese, amounted to 3,000 men, but only a portion were

engaged at Söng-hwan ; the commander-in-chief, Yeh-chih-chao, had already retired, so that probably no more than 1,500 fought against the Japanese.

The Chinese lost eight guns, a great many flags (these do not count much, as there is such a large supply in the Chinese army), large quantities of stores and ammunition, and according to Japanese accounts 500 killed and wounded. The Japanese losses were six officers and eighty-two men killed and wounded. The proportion of officers deserves to be noted. If we take as a basis the regimental tables given in the account of the Japanese army, we shall find that out of a total loss of eighty-eight, only three or four should have been officers ; the greater actual loss redounds to the credit of the officers of the Japanese army. It shows better than any words, better than the florid descriptions of the Japanese newspapers and war publications, how the Japanese officers exposed their lives to encourage their men.


The first reports of the battle announced that the Chinese had been annihilated, afterwards it was found that some of the routed Chinese, about 1,500 men, had succeeded, by a circuitous route, in escaping north and joining the Chinese army at Phyöng-yang. This retreat was described by General Yeh as a brilliant strategical movement (he incidentally described the battle of Söng-hwan as a heavy loss to the Japanese), and it gradually became so magnified that he received honours and rewards from his emperor, and the Japanese were contemptuously criticised for allowing

him to escape. The truth lies away from all these exaggerations. General Yeh, when he heard of the loss of the *Kowshing* and knew that he could get no further reinforcements, was right in saving a portion of his army, though with such a splendid military position he ought to have made a much better resistance at Söng-hwan. General Oshima, on the other side, was quite right in neglecting the small band of fugitives, and attending to the more important duties of the campaign.

One of the great merits of the Japanese throughout the war has been to waste no attention on details and to keep always in mind the principal object of the campaign. On the 29th of July General Oshima had to sacrifice all minor points and to reserve his forces for maintaining Japanese supremacy in the capital, and for opposing the large Chinese army which was expected to march down from the north.

The Japanese left Asan on the 31st of July, and arrived at Seoul on the 5th of August, when a triumphal entry was made; all the spoils of the campaign, guns, flags, etc., were displayed to dazzle the Koreans and convince them of Japan's military superiority over the country they had been accustomed to consider the greatest in the world. But the victory of Söng-hwan, though unimportant as regards the number of troops engaged, has in some points a high historical value. It was the first battle fought by Japan in a foreign war since three centuries, and it

was the first experiment of the new army organised entirely on the European system. Although the Japanese were confident of success, it must have been satisfactory to them to find their expectations so fully realised. The Asan campaign was a small affair, but its prompt execution showed that the generals knew how to command, and that the army organisation



THE BUGLER SHIRAKAMI GENJIRO.

worked smoothly, even in a country unprovided with good roads. Officers and men behaved with steady valour, and there were some instances of heroism which proved that the foreign-looking uniform had not changed the spirit of the old *samurai*. Captain Matsusaki, who had shown such bravery in the critical moment of the battle, encouraging his men until he

died, and the poor bugler, Shirakami Genjiro,\* who was by his side, and mortally wounded, and continued blowing his bugle until he breathed his last and fell dead, became the first popular heroes of the war.

### *The Declaration of War.*

The naval and land engagements of the 25th and 29th of July had taken place without any formal declaration of war, which was issued simultaneously by China and Japan on the 1st of August. In an Appendix † will be found the text of these two interesting documents. Chinese subjects in Japan and Japanese subjects in China were placed under the protection of the United States. The official announcement of a state of war produced very different impressions in the two countries. The people of Japan, always so susceptible about the national honour, and who had desired the war, hailed the news with joy, and prepared themselves for the greatest sacrifices for the purpose of securing a

\* When the local M.P. was asked to give some presents to the bugler's family, the bereaved father answered like a true Japanese: "It is the lot of all men to die. My son had to die sometime. Instead of falling asleep in a corner of this miserable hovel, unmourned save by a few relatives, he has fallen on the field of honour and received the encomiums of a multitude of his superiors. Hence his mother and I cannot look upon this as a mournful occasion. We rejoice that our son has been loyal to Japan, even to the point of shedding his blood in defence of her honour."—(Taken from the *Japan Mail*.)

† See Appendix D.



glorious victory to their country. Notwithstanding the alleged poverty of Japan, the war loans were covered with facility, and the country was able to bear all expenses without having recourse to foreign capital. Societies of all kinds were formed to nurse the wounded and to provide the soldiers with every imaginable comfort. Offers of money and useful articles came not only from the noble and rich, but even the poor stinted themselves that they might contribute their mite for the good of the men who were battling far away for the glory of Japan. When the soldiers travelled by train to embark for the seat of war, crowds welcomed them at every station, offering them delicacies and shouting farewell. Each report of a military success was solemnised by displaying the national flag at every house, and by walking through the streets it was always possible to know when a victory had been achieved by the Japanese arms. China presented a far different spectacle. The people are not warlike, and are indifferent to military glory; moreover, they felt no deep interest in the Korean question. Some attempts were made to excite hostility against Japan, but it never rose above rough assaults on quiet, inoffensive Japanese by the rowdies of the treaty ports. Shanghai unfortunately was the scene of a disgraceful episode. Immediately after the outbreak of hostilities the Chinese became frenzied with the suspicion that the country was full of Japanese spies (considering the want of military preparation, and

the small numbers of the army, it is "inconceivable what they could report"); every individual in foreign clothes with a dark skin was supposed to be a Japanese spy. At first an Arab, a stoker in a French steamer, was arrested and released; but later on two genuine Japanese, dressed as Chinese, were seized in the foreign settlement and delivered to the American Consul, who was supposed to protect Japanese subjects. That the men should have been tried by a fair court, and, if found guilty, shot, would have been perfectly right by the laws of war. But they were unconditionally surrendered to the Chinese authorities, taken to Nanking, frightfully tortured, and beheaded. The United States Consul at Shanghai was not responsible for this crime, as he acted under orders from Washington, but it was the greatest disgrace that ever sullied the American flag—the flag which is supposed to symbolise freedom and progress. The men who had so fearlessly trusted to its protection should not have been delivered to courts where the employment of torture precludes all justice and invalidates every decision. This deplorable action of the American Government has lowered its dignity and destroyed its prestige in the Far East, and it will take many years before she can recover them and cancel the memory of that dark deed. It was, moreover, an infringement of the rights of the foreign settlements, where a mixed court can judge even the Chinese in certain cases. If America declined to try Japanese in China, she

could not renounce doing so on the foreign settlements. It was also a doubtful favour to China. She gained little by the death of those two poor wretches and she was disgraced in the eyes of the whole civilised world. Foreigners, for the honour of their own civilisation, and for the gradual improvement of China, should never let an opportunity escape to prevent the blind, irresponsible action of the antiquated laws of that empire.

The Chinese authorities also offered rewards for the heads of Japanese, and for the destruction of men-of-war, quite unconscious that such primitive methods were of no practical utility and only paraded her barbarism before the world. Other methods equally futile were employed to meet the urgent requirements of the war. It was supposed, on no substantial evidence, that Japan was suffering from scarcity of food, and the exportation of provisions to Japan was prohibited. The only persons that could be injured by such a measure were the Chinese producers.

Military operations had been pushed on very vigorously during the days preceding the formal declaration of war, but very strangely, after that solemn act, there was a lull which lasted nearly two months. The foreign spectators became tired of waiting, and they supposed that the efficiency of the Japanese army had been exaggerated, and augured ill for its final success. In fact, it was the general opinion of foreigners in Europe and the Far East that the only chance of victory for Japan was in

striking a few rapid, stunning blows before China could gather together her mighty strength, *i.e.*, the countless multitudes of coolies that it was fashionable to call raw material for soldiers.

But Japan had planned her campaign and was determined not to carry it out until all preparations were complete. Any slight check caused by overhaste would raise the courage of the enemy and diminish the prestige of the Japanese arms.

*The Naval Demonstration at Port Arthur and  
Wei-hai-wei.*

On the 10th of August Admiral Ito with the Japanese fleet—about 20 vessels—made an attack on Port Arthur and Wei-hai-wei, the two naval ports of China. It was a very slight affair— an exchange of shots at long range between the forts and the men-of-war.

For some time people were puzzled to find out the meaning of this reconnaissance. It was generally thought an attempt to provoke Admiral Ting, the commander of the Chinese fleet, to come out and engage a great naval battle ; but after about a month the true object became evident : it was to cover the movements of the Japanese transports, who were pouring troops into Corea all the time. The fear of a naval engagement before they were ready kept the Chinese fleet inactive during that precious time.

When the Japanese became convinced that China

would not yield until severely defeated they pushed on their preparations with marvellous rapidity. Realising the difficulties of a campaign across the sea they purchased all the steamers they could buy. It is said they bought 47—most of them large vessels—during the war. This number, added to their respectable mercantile navy, formed an imposing fleet of transports for the conveyance of troops, ammunition, and other necessities for a campaign. To strengthen their position in Corea, they concluded a defensive treaty with that country on the 25th of August for the purpose of establishing its independence. To this object Japan contributed the necessary military force, and Corea promised to render every assistance for the easy transit of the troops through the country. In the first half of September another important measure was decided upon in Japan. The headquarters of the army, which had been established in the imperial palace, were transferred to Hiroshima, a town on the Inland Sea conveniently situated for the despatch of troops to the seat of war. The Emperor arrived there on the 15th of September—a day which will be celebrated in the annals of Japan—and at once dedicated his whole time to the conduct of the war. His quarters were modest—two small rooms—and he passed almost the whole day there in the despatch of business, rising early and retiring late. The imperial physicians became alarmed lest this incessant occupation should injure his health, but the vigorous constitution of the sovereign enabled him to resist all fatigue.

During this lull of military operations, which extended from the 29th of July to the middle of September, the Japanese landed troops at Chemulpo (Yinsen), Gensan and Fusan. The latter port was however soon abandoned, as it lay too far from the seat of war, and Yinsen and Gensan became the chief landing-places for their forces, especially the former. The Chinese were also hurrying forward their troops both by sea and land. The armies of the three Manchurian provinces were slowly marching south, some to P'yong-yang and others to the banks of the Yalu, the border river between China and Corea, where a second army was being formed. Near the mouth of this river was the chief landing-place for the Chinese troops which were conveyed by sea.

## CHAPTER III.

## THE PHYÖNG-YANG CAMPAIGN.

*Preliminary Description.*

THE original plan of the Chinese was to send troops to Corea by two routes: by sea direct to Asan, and by land over the Yalu. The former were to keep the Japanese in check while the latter, a much larger force, thus gained time to advance south and drive the enemy out of the peninsula. The Japanese were to be attacked on both sides, and as the Asan force was situated between the Japanese troops and their country, it would impede the facility of communications and at least render impossible the erection of a telegraph line.

In the account of the Asan campaign we have seen that the first part of the plan was rendered abortive by the prompt and successful attack of the Japanese.

There still remained the second part of the plan: the army descending from the north, whose numbers were magnified by rumour, and which the Chinese confidently supposed would be able to sweep the Japanese out of Corea. The movements of this army had been closely watched by the Japanese, even when

they had other matters to attend to. On the 23rd of July, when they had not yet commenced their march against Asan, a small party of mounted scouts under Machida, lieutenant of the line, and Take-no-Uchi, sub-lieutenant of cavalry, were sent north to reconnoitre.

The adventures of this small party read like a chapter of romance, and show what a spirit of enterprise and daring animates the Japanese army.



SUB-LIEUTENANT TAKE-NO-UCHI,  
KILLED WHILE EXPLORING THE MOVEMENTS OF  
THE CHINESE ON THE TAI-DONG RIVER.

From Seoul they rode through an unknown country, full of natural obstacles, up to the Tai-dong river, opposite to Phyang-yang, where they knew that the Chinese troops were being concentrated. In this neighbourhood, almost within sight of the enemy, they remained nine days, observing his movements and attempting the most desperate and daring



ventures to annoy him. In the hopes of destroying a telegraph station of the Chinese, they tried repeatedly to get boats and cross the river by night, but no ferry-boats could be found. Then Sergeant Kawasaki holdly swam across the river, and when discovered, swam back amidst a hail of bullets and returned to his companions, who received him clapping their hands at his bravery.

Their persistence in spying the enemy cost most of them their lives. On the night of the 9th of August they were attacked by 200 Chinese, and after a brave resistance all were killed except two, who succeeded in escaping, and returned to the Japanese army. This successful skirmish gave courage to the Chinese, who advanced to Hwang-ju. The Japanese, in recording the brave swimmer's exploits, remark that in Hideyoshi's time a similar feat was performed.

A more serious advance was made shortly after by Major Ichinohe, who, commanding the vanguard of the Japanese army, started north from Seoul on the 8th of August.

The same day they rested at Ko-yang, and the next day they reached Pha-ju. On the 10th they crossed the river Ch'hong with boats which had been prepared beforehand.

As the opposite bank is formed by high hills, the place constitutes an important strategic position on the high road from the capital northwards. On the 11th Major Ichinohe arrived at Kai-söng, an important city, which once was the capital of Corea, and

which the Japanese compared to Kioto, their ancient capital.

The Japanese remained two days in this place, and received the report of the survivors of the party of cavalry scouts, which had advanced as far as Chung-kwa. After their desperate escape they had retired to So Heung, while the Chinese who had crossed the Tai-dong river advanced to Phung-san.

On account of this news the Japanese, when they left Kai-song on the 13th of August, proceeded with great caution. They might almost be considered to be marching in the enemy's country, and besides, the nature of the ground was such! that the advance was full of danger. The road from Kai-söng to Kim-chhön at first winds round the southern side of a mountain range, and presents great natural difficulties to an advancing enemy. The Japanese mention one pass of several ri which a few men could have defended against thousands, and which would have formed, well defended, an impregnable stronghold. The Japanese passed these defiles without opposition and rested at Kim-chhön on the same day.

On the 14th the Japanese advanced to Phung-san, a small town among the hills, and sent detachments to reconnoitre, but they found no Chinese. The Japanese, as they approached the enemy, advanced slower. It was not until the 17th that they marched to Nam-chhön-chön. Here they heard that the Chinese were advancing south from Hwang-ju. Up to Nam-chhön-chön the Japanese army had been

accompanied by a Corcan official, who had been despatched by the central Government for the purpose of informing officials and people that the Japanese were advancing with the consent of the King of Corea, who was allied with Japan. This official, as soon as he got to Kai-söng, feigned illness and telegraphed to be recalled, but he was ordered to remain with the Japanese. He did so until they arrived at Nam-chhön-chhön, when he ran away, together with the local officials.

On the 19th the Japanese made a farther advance of two ri, pushing a detachment under Captain Machida even to Sö-Heung; and they remained in these positions for the whole of the 20th, reconnoitring the movements of the Chinese army, which, having the Tai-dong river as a line of defence, and Phyöng-yang as base of operations, had pushed a body across the river to build forts. The position of this Japanese force, so far advanced in the enemy's country, was considered hazardous, as it could not be properly supported from its distant base, and it suffered also from scarcity of provisions. In consequence of this Major Ichinohe received orders to retire. On the 21st he withdrew to Kim-chhön, and on the 22nd to Kai-söng.

At this juncture a very curious thing happened. The Chinese who had crossed the Tai-dong, probably thinking themselves too much exposed, and imagining that the Japanese were advancing in force, also retreated, so that the two vanguards, which had

approached within ten ri of each other, recoiled simultaneously, leaving the whole country from Kai-sōng to Phyōng-yang free of troops. The Chinese however only reported that all the country north of Kai-sōng was free of Japanese on the 23rd of August, and they filled up the preceding days with a variety of engagements in which they were victorious. It was popularly supposed in China that the Japanese were being exterminated in detail, and the Chinese confidently expected to hear that their troops, after these desultory skirmishes, had entered Seoul.

The prudence of the Chinese would have been justified if Major-General Oshima had followed out his first plan, which was to attack the Chinese and drive them out of Phyong-yang without awaiting reinforcements from Japan, and only with the force which he commanded, and which was called the Mixed Brigade. But on the 19th of August Lieutenant-General Nodzu arrived at Seoul, having come overland from Fusan. He at once informed himself of the enemy's position and movements. He justly argued that the Chinese would not easily abandon their base of operations at Phyōng-yang, because it was the strongest place in the north-west of Corea, protected by a river and surrounded by hills, easily defended, and the key to all operations for the defence of the Chinese frontier or the attack of the Corean capital. He knew also that the Chinese would relinquish with difficulty their old habit of always resting on strong places in warfare. He concluded that there

was very little apprehension of a Chinese advance. On the other hand, as the orders he had received from headquarters were to drive the Chinese completely out of Corea and not leave a single man in the country, he had no option but to attack Phyöng-yang, and occupied himself with the arrangement of his forces and plans to achieve that end.

Besides the forces which Oshima had at Seoul and Kai-song, he had sent a battalion to Sak-riöng, a small town about as far from the capital as Kai-söng, but on another road leading to Phyöng-yang. On the other hand, a small reinforcement had approached the capital and was awaiting for orders. On the 8th of August a battalion of infantry of the 12th Regiment (10th Brigade) and a company of artillery had reached Gensan and marched at once for the capital. On arriving at a short distance from Seoul they reported their arrival. Division-Commander Nodzu at once ordered them to turn back and proceed to Sak-riöng and reinforce the battalion of the Mixed Brigade which was already there. This united force came to be called the Sak-riöng detachment, and consisted of two battalions of infantry and one company of artillery.

On the 23rd of August orders were given to General Oshima to advance north with his Mixed Brigade, and he encamped that day at Kim-chhöng, and on the next day entered Kai-song, where Major Ichinohe with the retreating vanguard had been waiting since the 22nd. On receiving this reinforcement Major

Ichinohe pushed on north the following day, the 25th of August.

On the 21st Major-General Tadzumi, commander of the 10th Brigade, reached Chemulpo and proceeded to the capital the following day. He was appointed to command the Sak-riöng detachment. Thus the Japanese forces were so disposed that they could advance on Phyong-yang by two roads : by the one which passed through Sak-riöng, and by the main road, which had been already traversed by Major Ichinohe in his first advance at the beginning of August.

This attack by the front, though by two different roads, was not thought adequate to the purpose at headquarters, and General Nodzu was informed telegraphically that on the 26th of August a Mixed Brigade of the third division had landed at Gensan, and, though belonging to another division, was put under his orders. The plan for the attack of Phyong-yang, now decided upon by Marshal Yamagata, was as follows : General Nodzu with the main body and General Oshima with the Mixed Brigade were to advance by the main road ; General Tadzumi with the detachment at Sak-riöng was to advance by that road ; and Colonel Sato (General Oseko not being able to arrive in time to take command) was to advance from Gensan with the troops of the third division, which had been put under the orders of General Nodzu. It was hoped in this way to be able to surround and destroy the Chinese army at

Phyong-yang. As the country to be traversed was in some places little known and full of difficulties, owing to the want of proper roads, fifteen days were allowed for the execution of the plan. The different detachments were to reach Phyong-yang between the 31st of August and the 15th of September, but the real attack was not to be delivered until the last date, and the movements of all the detachments, with the exception of the Mixed Brigade, were to be kept as secret as possible, and Phyong-yang was not to be approached too near before the 15th of September.

Before describing the execution of the plan it is necessary to show what movements were made prior to the 31st of August. The Mixed Brigade had reached Kai-song on the 24th of August, and it remained there up to the 28th, when it advanced to Kim-chhon, and on the 29th arrived at Phyong-san. It was still there on the 31st, the date fixed for the concentric advance on Phyong-yang. The Sak-riong detachment by the 31st of August had reached Sin-ge. The Gensan force was still at that port and the main body was stationed along the main road, divided in two columns at about two days' distance from each other, one at Kai-song and the other at the capital, Seoul. The following table gives the particulars of the different detachments :—

DISTRIBUTION OF JAPANESE FORCES FOR THE ATTACK ON PHŨNG-YANG.

—	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Artillery.	Engineers.	War Strength of each Detachment.
Mixed Brigade (Maj. Gen. Oshima) . . .	{ 11th Regiment . . . . . 21st Regiment (less 1 bat- talion) . . . . . }	1 company	1 battalion	1 company . .	5,540 <sup>1</sup>
Sak-rŭng detachment (Maj.-Gen. Tadzumi)	{ 1st battalion of 12th Regi- ment (less 1 company) . . . 2nd battalion of 21st Regi- ment (less 1 company) . . }	2 troops	1 company	..	2,160
Gensan detachment (Colonel Sato) . . .	18th Regiment . . . . .	1 troop	1 battalion	{ 1 battalion (less 1 company) . }	3,640
Main body (Lieut.-Gen. Nodzu) :—					
First column (Lieut.-Col. Shibada) . .	{ 22nd Regiment (less 3rd battalion) . . . . . }	..	1 battalion	..	2,300
Second column (Lieut.-Col. Tomoyasu) .	{ 12th Regiment (less 1st bat- talion) . . . . . }	1 battalion	..	{ 1 battalion (less 1 company) . }	3,100
				Total . . .	16,740 <sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This total, calculated from the theoretical war strength given in the statistical tables, is slightly in excess of the real numbers. The Japanese had only about 14,000 men to attack Phŭng-yang, and we get this number if we calculate the Mixed Brigade on a peace footing, which would give about 3,500 men to that detachment. The Mixed Brigade was sent to Corea very early—before the reserves were called out—and must have remained a long time on a peace footing. The most conclusive evidence for the above is the fact that, unless we take the peace strength, the Mixed Brigade would have been more numerous than the main body.



Besides the above there were the following Japanese troops stationed in Corea :—

	Infantry.	Cavalry.
Detachment for protection of Seoul (Major Yasumitsu) . . .	{ 2nd battalion of 22nd Regiment (less 1 company).	1 company
Detachment at Gensan (Maj.-Gen. Oseko) . . .		
Detachment for protection of telegraph . . . . .	6th Regiment . . . . .	
Detachment for protection of communications . . . . .	8th company of 21st Regiment.	
Detachment at Jinsen . . . . .	{ 5th company of 22nd Regiment.	1 troop
Detachment at Ryong-san . . .	{ 1st company of 12th Regiment . . . . .	

The Sak-riŏng detachment, the main body, and the Mixed Brigade might be considered the right wing, centre, and left wing of the Japanese army marching on Phyŏng-yang by three routes, two of which often intersected each other. The Chinese army, however defective in reconnoitring arrangements, must have had some information of this simultaneous advance, and been informed of the approximate force of each detachment. Before the battle of Phyŏng-yang the Chinese had numerous adherents all over Corea ; even in the capital and amongst the favourites of the Japanese they had their informers and secret supporters. The Tai-wen-kun himself corresponded with the Chinese generals and encouraged them to march on the capital.\*

\* His correspondence fell into the hands of the Japanese after the capture of Phyŏng-yang.

The departure of large forces from Seoul and its neighbourhood could not be concealed, so that the Chinese must have expected to be attacked in strong force in front, with strong demonstrations on the right and left. As will be seen later on, even in this very just anticipation they were deceived by the strategic ability of the Japanese.

The force which advanced from Gensan is sometimes called the Reserve by the Japanese, as well as by the name of Gensan detachment. The Chinese remained totally ignorant of the approach of this body, even when it was at a small distance. This purpose was achieved by the strict orders which all the Japanese forces—with the exception of the Mixed Brigade—had, to keep as quiet as possible until the 15th of September.

For greater clearness we have to describe separately the advance of each corps, but whenever the simultaneous movements or position of another detachment have any relation to the subject in hand we shall briefly allude to it.

### *The Advance of the Mixed Brigade.*

The Mixed Brigade had reached Phyong-san on the 29th of August, and it did not leave that place until the 3rd of September, when it advanced to Tsung-llsin. General Tadzumi (the commander of the Sak-riong detachment) had accompanied General

Oshima up to Phyöng-san, and on the 3rd left for Sin-ge to take up his command. Tsung-Hsin is a small sequestered place among the hills, which could not afford accommodation for the Japanese army, so that the troops slept in tents. From this place a plain stretches to Sö-Heung for above twenty Korean ri. Since the Japanese left the capital it was the first plain they had met. This circumstance is a sufficient indication of the difficulties the Japanese must have faced in marching through such a mountainous country. On the 4th they reached So-Heung, on the 5th another small place, and on the 6th Phung-san. While the army was advancing to Phung-san, about seventy Chinese who were there fled in great fear and recrossed the Tai-dong. They hid their military stores, which were subsequently discovered by the Japanese, who were astonished to find amongst them about 10,000 cauldrons, probably intended to retard the Japanese advance, but which they considered merely as playthings.

All this time the advanced guard was about half-way between Phung-san and Hwang-ju, and Nishishima, with his regiment, was at Phung-san. On the 6th Nishishima advanced to She-jeu-kwan, to support Major Ichinohe, who marched to Hwang-ju and had the first encounter with the enemy. Scouts had reported that there was a force of Koreans and Chinese in that city, but they made a very feeble resistance, and the Japanese pursued them into the city and out again into the country at the opposite

side. The capture of Hwang-ju did not cost the Japanese the life of a single soldier, and they became masters of a city of over 1,000 houses, protected by a good stone wall, and conveniently situated, at about ten ri, from Phyöng-yang. There was good accommodation for the army, and Oshima arrived here on the 7th and remained up to the 10th of September.

The days passed at Hwang-ju were employed in reconnoitring the enemy, and as there were no indications of his advancing in force, the Japanese, on the 10th, marched to Chung-hwa, the next town on the road to Phyöng-yang. On the way there was a touching episode. They passed the spot where Lieutenant Machida and sub-Lieutenant Take-no-Uchi, with the handful of horsemen, had been surrounded and cut to pieces by the Chinese. By the information of the survivors they were able to trace each spot—the hillock on the wayside, and the pine-wood where Take-no-Uchi had been killed. Farther on they saw the place where he had fallen from his horse—the bones of the poor animal were still there. The vivid imagination of the Japanese pictured the whole scene of desperate bravery and sad slaughter, and tears came to the eyes of many. Seven wooden tablets, brought for the purpose, were erected to the memory of their dead comrades, and the soldiers silently presented arms as a respectful homage to the manes of the dead. This incident reveals the secret spring of Japanese heroism. It is the ever-present bond between the

living and the dead which makes every Japanese soldier ready to throw away his life for his country's benefit. He knows that his name will be ever remembered and cherished, and for this hope of immortal glory he thinks he can well sacrifice a few years of vulgar existence, with its deceptive pleasures and wearying cares.

On their march to Chung-hwa the Japanese found strewn on the road several hundreds of those oil-paper covers which the Chinese soldiers use to put on their hats and protect themselves from the rain. At the same time the scouts were informed by the Koreans that there had been fighting in the neighbourhood. The whole Japanese force, expecting to find itself soon in the presence of the enemy, marched ready for action; but no farther traces of the Chinese were found, and stricter inquiries from the country people elicited the following information.

On the preceding night 3,000 Chinese who were encamped in that neighbourhood had, in the darkness and heavy rain, mistaken some Koreans for the advancing Japanese. The outposts began at once a general fusillade, and retreated wildly to the main body, which, catching the alarm, took them for Japanese also, and a sharp action took place between different detachments of the Chinese force. Firing continued from 8 to 11 P.M., and when the mistake was discovered the Chinese had lost heavily in killed and wounded. The next morning they hastily buried their dead and retired to Phŷng-yang. The hat-

covers for the rain had been thrown away in this night scuffle.\*

The Japanese remained at Chung-hwa on the 10th and 11th of September.

It is now necessary to make a slight digression and consider a little the movements of the main body, which, under General Nodzu, had been advancing from Seoul along the road to Phyöng-yang, almost in the track of the Mixed Brigade. This digression of the present moment will enable us to appreciate an important strategical evolution. Up to the present time the main body, whenever possible, had kept to the right of the Mixed Brigade, in its proper place as centre of the army advancing from Seoul; but from the 10th of September the direction of these bodies changed. The Mixed Brigade, as we have seen, pushed on to Chung-hwa, moving to the right, and General Nodzu advanced towards the left, marching to Hwang-ju, and making preparations for the passage of the River Tai-dong. The two detachments crossed each other, the centre becoming left wing. This evolution, performed at a short distance from the enemy, and only a few days before the date of the real attack, was a part of the general plan to keep the Chinese ignorant of the direction where the real attack was to be delivered.

On the 12th, at 4 A.M., the Mixed Brigade left Chung-hwa, and at 9.25 the van engaged the Chinese

\* Probably the reports of the Korean peasants were somewhat exaggerated.

in the neighbourhood of their first fort, on the left bank of the Tai-dong, opposite to Phyang-yang. The Chinese were driven into the forts. Orders came from headquarters to explore the country, and the Japanese forces were disposed as follows :—

Right wing under Nishishima.

11th Regiment, infantry, with eight guns (including two captured from the Chinese at Asan).

Left wing under Takeda.

21st Regiment,\* infantry, with about ten guns.

The Chinese began a cannonade from their forts which the Japanese did not answer. They evidently expected to be attacked in force, and made great preparations. Several thousand Chinese soldiers came out of Phyang-yang and, crossing by the bridge of boats which had been built for the purpose, they manned the forts on the left bank. Cavalry was sent out to reconnoitre the Japanese; a constant fire of rifles and cannon was kept up, and flags were waved in the fields and on the hills.

The 13th was employed by the Mixed Brigade in making a series of demonstrations calculated to strengthen the Chinese opinion that the main body of the Japanese forces was in front of them, and intended to take the bull by the horns with a front attack. Some sergeants, with a handful of soldiers belonging to the 3rd company of the 21st Regiment undertook one of those enterprises of reckless daring

\* Less one battalion which formed part of the Sak-riong detachment.

so congenial to the Japanese soldier. They crossed the Tai-dong river and attacked twenty of the enemy's vessels moored on the opposite shore, and, though exposed to heavy artillery and rifle fire, they succeeded in coming back with five Chinese vessels of different sizes. On their way back they also rescued fifty or sixty Koreans who had been left to starve in an island on the river. The Japanese artillery also kept up a brisk cannonade with the forts. The object of this latter feint was to discover the number of the enemy's guns, and they were ascertained to be about ten to fourteen. The capture of the junks was to convince the Chinese that the Japanese were making preparations to cross the river in the neighbourhood of Phyong-yang, and to mask the real passage which, about that time, was being effected lower down the river by General Nodzu with the main body.

The 14th was a very clear day, and the Chinese commenced their cannonade at 6.30 A.M., but the Japanese did not answer; their officers were busy with their field-glasses watching all the movements of the Chinese. It was feared they might suspect what was coming on the next day, and divide their forces, but it was soon discovered that their principal apprehensions were for the front attack of the Mixed Brigade. The last preparations were made for the coming action, which was to commence at 3 A.M. of the next day, the 15th of September. The ambulance was brought forward to headquarters. The left wing was to send a detachment, under Major Okuyama,



across the river in boats to attack the enemy's flank, and all the artillery was transferred to the right wing to cannonade the Chinese forts outside the Tai-dong gate of Phyong-yang city.

*Advance of the Sak-riong Detachment.*

We have already stated that this body was formed of a battalion of infantry detached from the capital, and of a battalion of infantry and company of artillery which, on their march from Gensan to Seoul, had received orders to alter their destination and reinforce the battalion stationed at Sak-riong. This place being the rendezvous, gave the name to the detachment. We have also seen that General Tadzumi, who was to command it, had proceeded by the main road, together with General Oshima and the Mixed Brigade, up to Phyong-san. From this place, on the 2nd of September, he altered his route and reached Sin-gé on the 3rd, where he found his troops awaiting him under Majors Yamaguchi and Tomita. Sin-gé had been a populous and wealthy place on the road from Sak-riong to Phyong-yang, but a short time before the routed Chinese, flying from Asan, had passed through, the town had been devastated and the people had fled. The Japanese suffered from great scarcity of food while they remained there.

On the 6th of September they advanced five ri, and on the 7th they advanced four ri more, to Su-an, a town of about 1,000 houses. On the 8th, after

climbing a steep pass, they reached a small village with no accommodation, so that the troops had to sleep in a pine forest. On the 9th they started for Sam-deung, detaching the eighth company of the 21st Regiment, under Captain Tanabe, to reconnoitre on the road to Sang-wön. The road to Sam-deung was very difficult, and they had to cross a river with no bridge and with only a few boats. As there was a heavy rain-storm the troops had to sleep in their wet clothes in the fields. At Sam-deung they found that all the inhabitants had fled. As they were now only eight ri from Phyöng-yang, and the attack had been arranged for the 15th, they rested for three days (9th to 11th). Captain Tanabe returned from Sang-wön and reported that the Chinese fugitives from Asan had been at that place for several days.

On the 12th the Japanese advanced again. Major Yamaguchi, with the vanguard, at 8 A.M. reached the Tai-dong. On the opposite bank they saw about fifty Chinese cavalry, who soon dispersed, but were replaced by about 1,000 infantry. Two sections of Japanese infantry then deployed on the hills and fired several volleys at the Chinese on the opposite bank, who soon entirely disappeared. Preparations were made for crossing the river. At first they could only find one damaged vessel, which, however, they managed to convert into a ferry-boat, and Major Yamaguchi crossed the Tai-dong, which at this place narrows to a breadth of 330 yards. He occupied a small village of some strategical importance and threw out outposts.

General Tadzumi, with the main body of the detachment, had intended to advance only as far as Kang-dong, but on hearing the firing he advanced. The want of boats prevented the passage that night, and it was only at 10 A.M. of the 13th that five vessels were requisitioned and the whole detachment crossed to the right bank of the Tai-dong.

On that same day Major Yamaguchi, with the advanced guard which had crossed the day before, pushed forwards. The Japanese proceeded very cautiously, and as they reached the top of some high ground a mounted scout returned reporting that the enemy's forts were in sight. The Japanese halted, and their officers were busy with their field-glasses. They could plainly see the streets of Phyong-yang and the flags of the Chinese generals.\* On the right and in front of the city there was Mok-tan-son, a high hill which has historical associations for the Japanese, as it was there that their General Konishi, during Hideyoshi's first expedition, made a stand against the united Chinese and Korean force and was defeated. Behind this, on a hill, they could see a great number of tents. The Japanese soldiers were forbidden to advance, as the appointed time for attack had not yet come; but they heard artillery firing in the distance, and knew that General Oshima, advancing from the main road, was engaging the enemy's attention.

\* Chinese generals have large flags, with their names written in gigantic characters, flying from high staffs at their headquarters.

General Tadzumi remarked that when an army immures itself in fortifications it is in no hurry to fight.

On the 14th the Japanese had their lines from mount Tai-söng on the right to the top of Kuk-chu-si on the left, and made ready for the attack of the ensuing morning. The night, that of the autumnal equinox, was beautiful, and the full moon shone on Phyöng-yang and the enemy's camps, where so many thousands were sleeping, all unconscious of the slaughter that awaited their awakening.

### *The Advance of the Main Body.*

This detachment, which formed the centre of the forces advancing on Phyöng-yang by two routes from Seoul, marched in two columns, which proceeded almost by the same road employed by the Mixed Brigade. Up to the 10th there were only occasional unimportant divergences, but on that date, when the Mixed Brigade moved up to Chung-hwa, the first column reached Hwang-ju and the second column Phüng-san, and, as we have already explained, the centre became left wing, and *vice versa*. The main body, to follow up this plan, had to proceed to Kang-so on the other bank of the Tai-long, which had therefore to be crossed. Preparations for that purpose were made on the same day. Major Baba, of the engineers, soon reported that he had secured some ferry-boats in the neighbourhood of Iron Island, and later on he sent a further report that twenty-five

ferry-boats were ready. The passage of the Tai-dong commenced on the 11th of September; it proceeded slowly, because the river at that point is about 1,000 yards across and the tide is very strong. The fast boats took two hours to go across and come back (for the return trip), and the slow ones even as much as four hours. Only the infantry of the first column succeeded in crossing over on that day, and the artillery had to wait till the following day.

On the 12th the second column also reached the Tai-dong. The number of vessels was quite insufficient, especially as many had been damaged by the work of the preceding day. The officers' baggage and pack-horses had to be left at Hwang-ju, and on the 13th of September the whole army had not completely crossed the Tai-dong. The passage of this large river, though the principal, was not the only obstacle the main body had to overcome in their advance. Two creeks had to be traversed before reaching Phyöng-yang. On the 14th the Japanese advanced to four ri from Phyöng-yang, and the vanguard pushed on one ri nearer to that city. Since the 12th cannon-firing in the direction of Phyöng-yang had been heard, and it was known that General Oshima was keeping the Chinese occupied with his preparations of attack. The Japanese advanced as near as they could to Phyöng-yang, so as to be ready to attack on the following morning, as soon as the Gensan and Sak-riong detachments began their assaults on the opposite side of the city.

*Advance of the Gensan Detachment.*

It was formed of troops of the 3rd (Nagoya) Division, but only the 18th Regiment of infantry had landed, and this, with a sufficient allotment of artillery and engineers, under Colonel Sato, advanced towards Phyöng-yang by Yang-dök and Söng-chhön. The roads that had to be traversed were dreadful, and the troops suffered great hardships. On their way to Yang-dök, which was reached by two columns on the 2nd and 4th of September, the artillery lost thirteen out of their hundred and twenty horses, and when they arrived at that place they found no provisions. From Yang-dök westward all the people were pro-Chinese, and fled with their officials at the approach of the Japanese. Nowhere could provisions be found; all had been taken for the use of the Chinese army. The Japanese remained at Yang-dök till the 5th, when they left and reached Söng-chhön on the 8th. Here they remained till the 11th, when a farther advance of one ri was made to a small place which is only eight ri from Phyöng-yang. Their advance was not expected, so that not a single Chinese soldier was found in the neighbourhood. On the 13th they advanced to Sun-an, well to the rear of the Chinese position, and only five ri from Phyöng-yang. As the Chinese still showed no signs of being aware of the enemy's advance in this direction, Colonel Sato advanced to within one ri of Phyöng-yang, driving

away a small force of Chinese cavalry which he found in his way. The brisk cannonade and the busy preparations of General Oshima had thoroughly convinced the Chinese that the main attack was to be delivered where they expected it, on the southern bank of the Tai-dong.

*Phyöng-yang and the Chinese Army.*

Phyöng-yang is an important city of about 20,000 inhabitants in the north-west of Corea. It is the capital of the province of Phyöng-an, and has played an important part in the history of the country. For some time the capital of ancient Corea, which extended far north of its present limits, it was the constant object of Chinese attacks by land and sea when the Celestial emperors were engaged in war with their small neighbour. It marked the farthest northern advance of the Japanese armies during the invasions of Hideyoshi, and the Chinese victory gained at Mount Mok-tan (Peony), on the north side of the city, saved China and Corea from the Japanese armies.

Phyöng-yang is very strong, both by nature and art. On the east it has the Tai-dong river, which winds almost round three sides of the city. On the north there is a very high hill, Mok-tan-san (Peony Mountain), where Konishi was defeated in 1592, and the banks of the river are steep and convenient for defence. The city is surrounded by high strong walls,

and the Chinese had added very considerably to the defences they had found.

The Chinese forces consisted of what they called four armies :—

The Sheng-tzū army, under General Wei-ju-kuei . .	10 camps* of infantry . 1 battalion of artillery . 1 company of cavalry .	About 6,000 men
The I-tzū army, under General Ma-yü-kun. . . .	4 camps . . . . .	" 2,000 "
The Feng army, under General Tao-pao-kuei . . .	6 battalions of infantry 2 battalions of cavalry . 1 battalion of artillery .	" 3,500 "
The Feng-tien drilled army, under General Feng-sheng-a . . . . .	2 battalions of infantry 2 battalions of cavalry .	" 1,500 "
	Total . . . . .	13,000

\* The Chinese camp is a military term indicating a body of about 500 men.

Each camp or battalion occupied a square fort. The number and disposition of these forts were approximately as follows :—

	Forts.
On the south of the city (which were covered by a line of entrenchments for a length of about 2,000 metres, forming the first line of defence) .	15
Outside the Tai-dong gate on the left bank (besides a very strong <i>tête-de-pont</i> ) . . . . .	5
On the north, on hills outside the city . . . . .	4
Mok-tak-san (Peony Mountain) . . . . .	1
In the north corner, inside the city . . . . .	2
Total . . . . .	27

These fortifications were constructed with great care, and were far stronger than anything the Japanese ever imagined they should find. They were well




provided with field and mountain guns, and the troops were armed with magazine rifles. The Chinese generals were so confident of the strength of their position, and of the measures of defence they had taken, that they boasted that they could hold the place for years against myriads\* of Japanese. It is but fair to add that though the Japanese did not know the strength of the fortifications, they had prepared for a possible check in the attack intended for the 15th. On the 12th of September large reinforcements reached Yinsen, and were at once sent to the front. They were under the command of Marshal Yamagata, the new commander-in-chief of the Japanese forces in Corea, but their presence was not required at Phyöng-yang, which fell before they reached the Tai-dong river.

\* The Chinese and Japanese use myriad (or 10,000) as a unit of calculation. Thus they say ten myriads for 100,000, 100 myriads for 1,000,000.



# PLAN OF PHŨY-ÔNG CITY AND ENVIRONS



## CHAPTER IV.

## THE ATTACK ON PHYÖNG-YANG.

*The Mixed Brigade.*

IN describing the advance of this body, it has been noted that skirmishing had been going on during all the days from the 12th to the 15th of September. To understand the events of those days, as well as the grand attack of the 15th, it will be necessary to throw a glance on the map of Phyong-yang city. It will be seen that the road from Chung-hwa (along which the Mixed Brigade had to advance) turns north as it approaches the Tai-dong river, and after passing between two forts, and crossing a small stream, it runs nearly parallel to that river, flanked by forts, until it reaches the *tête-de-pont* which the Chinese had built to protect the bridge of boats. When the Japanese advanced on the 12th of September they occupied the two first forts, which were abandoned by the Chinese, and then proceeded to a bridge across the small stream. Here they met a few Chinese, who exchanged shots. The Japanese drove the Chinese back, but did not pursue them, as the road beyond the stream was unsheltered by trees, and exposed to the flank fire of the Chinese forts on the other side of

the Tai-dong river. To prosecute the attack on Phyöng-yang, the Mixed Brigade had to advance in unsheltered ground, under the fire of three strong forts, built near the bridge of boats, and the flank fire of the forts across the river; at the same time it received little assistance from its own artillery, as the only favourable ground for placing the guns was at a considerable distance from the Chinese forts.

On the 14th of September arrangements were made for the attack of the following morning. The Mixed Brigade was divided into several detachments. One was pushed north to join with the Sak-riöng detachment; another was to advance between some hills and attack the Chinese forts in front; another body was to advance by the main road from Chung-hwa, while another detachment, under Major Okuyama, was to cross the Tai-dong and attack the south-eastern corner of Phyöng-yang, co-operating with the main body under Lieutenant-General Nodzu.

The attack began before daylight, at 4.30 A.M., on the 15th of September, with a furious cannonade. The Japanese guns were directed on the forts on the left bank of the river, which protected the bridge of boats, and on the forts of the opposite shore, which could direct a dangerous flank fire on an advancing enemy. The Chinese answered vigorously, but they fared worst in this artillery duel, as their aim was much inferior to the Japanese. Gradually, under cover of the artillery, the Japanese advanced, but they met a stubborn resistance. The

best Chinese troops, under General Ma-yü-kun, besides the defeated troops of Asan—who were placed in the front to redeem their lost reputation—had all been stationed in the forts on the left bank, and, well armed with Mauser repeating rifles, they poured a hail of bullets on the advancing enemy. The Japanese could find no shelter in the open ground in front of the forts, and the rising sun revealed their position to the enemy. The Japanese officers, always at the head of their troops, kept shouting and encouraging their men. With a desperate effort the Japanese succeeded in capturing the outworks of the two first of the four forts which the Chinese were defending on the left bank, and planted the flag of the 11th Regiment on the earthworks. But the Chinese, retiring to the central part of the forts, kept on the same incessant fire, before which the Japanese soldiers fell like chessmen, to use their own graphic expression. The Chinese had an abundant supply of ammunition in their redoubts, and fresh supplies were being constantly sent across the bridge of boats, which the Japanese artillery in vain tried to destroy. The Japanese exhausted their ammunition, and were obliged to search for cartridges on the bodies of their killed and wounded comrades, and at last had only their bayonets to oppose to the dreadful cross-fire of the Chinese forts, which were so placed that the enemy had to advance between them in the attack.

For a moment the position was so critical that Ensign Omori, fearing the regimental colours might

fall into the hands of the Chinese, ran with them to the side of the outwork, and digging a hole, buried them in the ground, showing the place to some soldiers, that they might recover the flag in case he was killed.

A fresh body of Japanese troops, the 2nd battalion of the 21st Regiment, with half the 9th company, made a desperate attempt to rush the Chinese forts, but the earthworks were too high and steep, and they had to retire with heavy loss. The Japanese soldiers had been from three in the morning up till past noon without any food, and having exhausted their ammunition, they were forced to slowly retire to their old positions. The object of their attack was a simple demonstration to draw away the Chinese troops, but they had carried it out with such earnestness that, had the Chinese resistance been less vigorous, they would have taken the forts and the bridge of boats. The Chinese troops on this side of the river were probably more numerous than the Japanese attacking force, and with their fortifications and advantage of position they were able to repulse them easily.

The losses of the Japanese were very heavy. The 11th Regiment had three captains and one lieutenant killed; the 2nd and 10th companies of the 21st Regiment had all their officers killed and wounded, and the 4th company had only one ensign left. Even General Oshima was wounded. He had shown the most reckless bravery. During the heat of the action, he had ridden up to the flag of one of the regiments

and declared to the soldiers he would die there unless they took the forts.

Major Okuyama, with the left wing, was more fortunate in his share of the attacks. He crossed the Tai-dong river and succeeded in setting fire to the houses in the neighbourhood of the Chinese forts.

### *The Sak-riöng and Gensan Detachments.*

As these two detachments, though starting from such distant places, converged on the same side of the city of Phyöng-yang, their attack must not be dealt with separately. The north side of the city—the object of this combined attack—was defended by five forts, one of which was on the celebrated Peony Mountain, a hill that commands the whole of Phyöng-yang. The forts were disposed in a zigzag line, which presented three forts as a first defence and two (including that on Peony Mount) as a second line of defence. The Sak-riöng detachment was to attack the right (the side nearest the Tai-dong river) and the Gensan detachment the left of this line of forts. The latter detachment had been very fortunate in its approach on Phyöng-yang. As its advance was not expected by the Chinese—fully occupied with the demonstrations of General Oshima's Mixed Brigade—it had been able to take position on a hill favourably situated at 1,500 metres from the extreme Chinese fort on the left. Mountain guns were at once



dragged on the top of this hill, on the 14th of September, in readiness for the attack of the following morning.

The Sak-riōng detachment began the attack at daybreak in two bodies—Major Yamaguchi, with one battalion on the Chinese right, and Major Tomida, with another battalion on the Chinese centre. The Chinese, with their Mauser magazine rifles, kept up a steady fire on the advancing Japanese, but Major Yamaguchi's battalion made such a desperate assault that with heavy loss it captured the first Chinese fort (the one nearest the river) by 7.30 A.M. The third fort (the one in the centre of the first line) opposed a longer resistance, but the company of artillery brought up its guns to a hill at 800 metres and shelled the Chinese with such accurate aim that they fell into confusion, and Major Tomida, seizing the opportunity, stormed the third fort at 8 A.M.

The Gensan detachment in the meantime had taken, without much difficulty, the fifth fort, the Chinese probably becoming bewildered by the multiple attacks to which they were exposed—the cannon roaring in every direction on both sides of the river. The first line of forts being taken, the two detachments converged on the two remaining. The smaller was abandoned without resistance, but the fort on Peony Mount held out for a short time. General Tachimi,\* the commander of the Sak-riōng detachment, ordered Major Yamaguchi to move from

\* It is the same as Tadzumi: both pronunciations are correct.

the fort he had taken and attack Peony Mount in front, while Major Tomida was to advance in the rear from the third fort. Colonel Sato, with two battalions, also advanced from the fifth fort towards Peony Mount, which thus was attacked on three sides. As it constituted the principal defence of Phyŭng-yang it was obstinately defended for a short time, but the Japanese artillery (the company of the Sak-riong and



MAJOR-GENERAL TACHIMI

the battalion of the Gensan detachments), which had been attempting to breach the city walls, seeing the difficult position of the infantry, turned the guns on Peony Mount. This artillery fire was so heavy that the Chinese began to waver, and the Japanese infantry, swarming up the hill on three sides like ants (to borrow their expression), took the celebrated Peony Mount at 8.30 A.M.

As soon as Colonel Sato saw that Peony Mount had been taken he directed his efforts against the Gemmu \* Gate, the nearest on that side of the city. The Chinese defended the walls so well and kept up such a brisk fire that the Japanese assault was repulsed. The soldiers were reluctantly retreating, regretting the wasted lives of their brave comrades, when an episode happened which resembles rather a



COLONEL SATO.

feat of a romance of chivalry than an incident in the sober scientific warfare of modern times. Lieutenant Mimura, burning with shame at the repulse, shouted to his men, "Who will come with me to open that gate?" and at once rushed towards the Gemmu Gate.

\* This is the Japanese pronunciation of the characters. In Coröan it should be Hyön-mu, but after Harada's celebrated exploit the gate deserves to be called by a Japanese name.

Harada, one of the soldiers of Mimura, then said, "Who will be the first on the wall!" and flew after his officer. They ran so quickly that only eleven other soldiers were able to join them under the wall after passing through a rain of lead. Mimura and his small band of heroes found the gate too strong to be forced, so the lieutenant gave the order to scale the



HARADA, THE HERO OF THE GEMMU GATE

walls. The Chinese were busy firing in front, keeping the Japanese troops back, and never imagined that a handful of men would have the boldness to climb the walls like monkeys under their very eyes. Mimura and his men came upon them with such surprise that they were scattered in an instant. The Japanese at once jumped down inside the walls and

rushed to the gate, killing three of its defenders and dispersing the rest, Mimura cutting right and left with his sword.

The gate was difficult to open, and while they were striving to succeed, the Chinese, who began to increase in numbers, kept firing from a distance. Soon one soldier was killed and another wounded. The lieutenant ordered that the rest of the company should be called from without, but another soldier was killed before Harada succeeded in unbolting and opening the gate to the astonished Japanese who were outside.

With the taking of Peony Mount and the Gemmu Gate, Phyöng-yang was virtually captured. The glory of this brilliant achievement was due to General Tachimi and Colonel Sato, with their troops, who were, however, also greatly aided by fortune. Colonel Sato was able to occupy a favourable position, on the 14th of September, which had been neglected by the Chinese; and during the fierce engagement of the 15th the death of Tso-pao-kuei, the bravest Chinese general that the war has produced, disheartened his troops and facilitated the Japanese victory. The easy capture of Peony Mount was due to this event. General Tso was wounded early in the fight, but he tore up his clothes, bound up his wound, and continued encouraging his men; another wound did not abate his courage, and he still cheered on his soldiers until a third bullet killed him. His death threw disorder into his troops, who broke up and fled in every direction.

Shortly after the storming of the Gemmu Gate white flags were displayed at the principal gates of Phyöng-yang. General Tachimi advanced on horseback to find out the cause of these flags, but he found difficulty in communicating with the Chinese—they could not understand him ; and when he had recourse to writing he could only obtain a letter from the Korean official of the city. As the Chinese soldiers were gathering in numbers on the walls, and looked threatening, Tachimi thought it useless to expose himself and his men to a sudden attack from an enemy whose intentions were not clear. He therefore retired, and, as a heavy storm began at the time, the Japanese troops were withdrawn to Peony Mount.

### *The Main Body.*

General Nodzu with his troops did not begin the attack till 8 A.M., when his artillery opened a heavy fire upon the Chinese forts on the south of the city. Under cover of this fire a company of Japanese infantry approached the forts, when, at the same time, a body of Chinese cavalry over 100 strong issued from the forts. The Japanese artillery saw at once this sortie of the enemy, as well as the danger of their infantry, who had not yet discovered the approach of the Chinese cavalry, and they turned their guns from the forts on to the horsemen. The fire of the artillery revealed to the infantry the advance of the Chinese, and the unfortunate cavalry was welcomed with such

a dreadful artillery and rifle fire that very few escaped. A few were made prisoners, and from them it was ascertained that they belonged to the army of Tso-pao-kuei, which had broken up after the death of its leader.

Soon after over 1,000 cavalry were seen escaping behind the forts, and as they passed through the fields they were exposed to a murderous fire. The troops of the main body were thus reduced to the condition of spectators of the consequences of the fierce fight which had been fought on the north of the city and won by the Gensan and Sak-riöng detachments; they had only to stop the flight of the routed Chinese.

Major Okuyama, of the Mixed Brigade, who had crossed the river and set fire to the houses near the Chinese forts, assisted the easy work of the main body. At 2 p.m. a body of infantry assaulted the forts and, after driving out the Chinese without difficulty, set fire to them. They then retreated to their original positions.

### *The Retreat of the Chinese and Capture of Phyeng-yang.*

The white flags had been hoisted only to gain time. The Chinese had no heart to remain and defend the place. Even on the preceding day, in a council of war, Yeh-chih-chao and other generals had advised a retreat, and it was only owing to the angry expostu-

lations of Tso-pao-kuei that any defence was made. When Tso died Phyöng-yang lost its only brave defender, and all officers and soldiers were only anxious to escape as rapidly as possible. During the whole night of the 15th a mob of soldiers streamed out of the gates of Phyöng-yang. Unfortunately, the two roads of escape were guarded by the main body and the Gensan detachment, and the Chinese had to run the gauntlet of the Japanese fire. The work of slaughter lasted the whole night up till morning, and the light of day revealed the sickening sights of war: heaps of corpses and dead horses were strewn about right and left of the two fatal roads. It is estimated that the Chinese lost about 1,500 men in that dreadful night of disorderly flight.

The next morning not a single Chinese soldier was left in Phyong-yang, and the Japanese marched through the different gates and occupied the city with cheers to their emperor.

The spoils captured by the Japanese were of every possible kind: 35 good guns, over 500 magazine rifles, 500 breech-loaders, an immense quantity of ammunition for cannon and rifles, tents, horses, money, and an endless variety of sundries, such as drums, trumpets, carts, etc., which the Japanese, with amusing precision, carefully enumerate.

The fortifications erected by the Chinese formed the marvel of the Japanese, who did not expect to find such finished work, and could not imagine how it had been possible to execute it in the forty-two



days the city had been occupied. On inquiry it was found that not only all the Chinese troops, but all Koreans, from seventeen to fifty years of age, had been compelled to work, so that each fort, besides its garrison of about 500 men, had had 360 Korean coolies to assist in building it.

The loss of the different Japanese detachments in the battle of Phŷng-yang was as follows :—

	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.
<b>Mixed Brigade—</b>			
Officers . . . . .	6	18	..
Rank and file . . . . .	110	257	13
<b>Sak-rŷng detachment—</b>			
Officers . . . . .	0	3	..
Rank and file . . . . .	9	45	1
<b>Gensan detachment—</b>			
Officers . . . . .	2	5	..
Rank and file . . . . .	31	87	19
<b>Main body—</b>			
Officers . . . . .	0	1	..
Rank and file . . . . .	4	22	..
<b>Total . . . . .</b>	<b>162</b>	<b>438</b>	<b>33</b>

Giving a total of 8 officers killed and 27 wounded, and 154 soldiers killed and 411 wounded, besides 33 missing. The Japanese lists of losses were most carefully compiled, the name and native village of every common soldier being published. The Chinese losses cannot be so accurately known; but the Japanese, who are not addicted to exaggeration, estimate that during the battle and the retreat about 2,000 Chinese were killed; besides a larger number of wounded, 600 prisoners were taken.

The consequences of the victory at Phyöng-yang were enormous. The strongest city of Corea had been taken in a day; the great Chinese army, which was to enter Seoul, had been dispersed; all hopes of assistance from China were lost by the Conservative party in Corea. With the battle around Phyöng-yang the Corean campaign may be said to have finished; no further resistance was offered, and the Chinese retired beyond the Yalu to defend the frontiers of their empire. Hostilities commenced on the 25th of July, and on the 15th of September Corea was conquered—in less than two months—and at a very trifling cost of life. It is estimated that in battle, from wounds and sickness, the Japanese only lost 663 men in Corea.

If we are astonished at the rapid conquest of the Japanese we must not forget that their ancestors three centuries ago were almost as quick. In a little over two months from the date of landing, Konishi had taken Phyöng-yang, and he had to march his troops through the country, without steamers, to convey them to convenient landing-places on the coast. The difference lies in the sequel. While the Japanese invasion of the sixteenth century stopped at Phyöng-yang—which marked their last great victory—in the war of the nineteenth century the battle of Phyöng-yang was only the first of a series of brilliant and unexpected victories. The reasons of the different success of the two campaigns will appear in the next part of this book.

## PART III.

## THE CAMPAIGN IN CHINA.



## CHAPTER I.

## THE NAVAL BATTLE OF HAI-YANG ISLAND.

DURING the period preceding the battle of Phyöng-yang the Japanese navy had been very busy. After the demonstrations at Port Arthur and Wei-hai-wei, on the 10th of August, it had confined itself to patrolling the Korean coasts and protecting the Japanese transports which conveyed the reinforcements for the army in Corea. The last of these expeditions arrived at Cheumipo (Yinsen) on the 12th of September. It consisted of 30 transports, and had on board Marshal Yamagata, the new commander-in-chief of the Japanese army in Corea, 10,000 soldiers, 4,000 coolies, and 3,500 horses. The troops were landed and despatched to the front with such rapidity that it called forth the admiration of the foreign men-of-war that were in harbour. This fleet of transports was protected by a strong force of men-of-war divided into several squadrons.

On the 14th, after the landing of the troops and stores had been completed, a portion of the fleet left for the mouth of the Tai-dong river, where some of the vessels and a few torpedo-boats were detached to proceed up the river and assist the troops that were preparing to attack Phyöng-yang. The rest of the fleet anchored at Cape Shoppek. On the 16th of September the Main and 1st Flying Squadrons proceeded towards Hai-yang Island to watch the enemy's movements. As the Japanese did not expect to fight a battle, they had left their torpedo-boats in the Tai-dong river.

About this time the Chinese fleet was similarly employed. On the 14th of September five steamers left Taku with 4,000 troops destined for the Yalu river, where the Chinese were concentrating a second army to support the first one at Phyong-yang. These transports were convoyed at first by six cruisers and four torpedo-boats, but when they passed near Talien Bay they were joined by the bigger vessels of the Pei-yang squadron. The whole fleet then proceeded to the Yalu, where the troops were all disembarked by the 16th, and on the morning of the 17th, their object being attained, the Chinese prepared to return to their ports.

On the same morning the Japanese fleet reached the island of Hai-yang, and after exploring it they advanced towards Tahi Island, when, a little after 9 A.M., smoke was seen in the distance, and at 11.40 the Chinese fleet came in sight. Admiral Ito at once

ordered his vessels to prepare for action. His squadron was composed of vessels of very different speed and power, and it was a difficult task to conceive a plan which should enable them to act in concert without incurring the loss of any of the weaker, slower vessels. His fleet was formed: by the 1st Flying Squadron, a fine group of four cruisers with speed from 19 to 23 knots; by the Main Squadron, six vessels of very different speed, as the first four ranged from 17.5 to 19 knots, and the two last could only steam 13. Besides these he had the *Akagi*, a gun-vessel of a little over 600 tons, and the *Saikio Maru*, an armed merchant steamer. Neither of the latter could be considered as fighting vessels, and they were ordered to place themselves to the left of the two squadrons, which thus covered them from the Chinese fleet. It will be seen in the sequel that Admiral Ito's anxiety for the safety of these vessels, and of one of the slow vessels of the Main Squadron, the *Hiyei*, obliged him often to modify his tactics.

The Chinese fleet, composed also of twelve\* vessels, with six torpedo-boats, was possessed of much more uniform though far inferior speed to the Japanese. It was also somewhat at a disadvantage, because two of the vessels with the torpedo-boats, having delayed their departure from the Yalu, were separated from

\* Some statements give the Chinese fourteen vessels, but as only ten were effectively engaged the total number is unimportant.

the rest of the fleet. The Chinese thus had only ten vessels in the line of battle, which was also the number of the Japanese fighting ships.

To render clear the following description there is attached a table with the names, tonnage, speed and guns of all the vessels engaged. Each vessel has also a number by which its position may be traced in the diagrams illustrating the evolutions of the battle. As for these diagrams, of course, their accuracy can only be approximate. The relative positions of vessels and their evolutions can only be judged with imperfect precision, especially in the heat of an action, which was fought generally at long range.

The ten Chinese vessels were placed in order of battle, in a single line, with the strongest vessels in the centre and the weaker ones on the wings. Admiral Ito disposed his fleet in a single column, led by the 1st Flying Squadron, with the *Yoshino* at the head. As the two fleets approached, the Chinese opened fire at 6,000 metres, but the Japanese reserved their fire until they were at 3,000 metres. The action began about 1 P.M. The Japanese fleet at first seemed as if it intended to attack the Chinese centre, for which reason perhaps Ting, the Chinese admiral, placed his largest vessels there, but as they approached the 1st Flying Squadron swerved from its original direction, so as to pass by the right wing of the Chinese fleet, at the same time it increased its speed from ten to fourteen knots. Diagram I. shows the

		Tonnage.	Speed.	Armament.	
CHINESE VESSELS.					
1. Yang-wei . . . . .		1,350	Knots. 16·0	Two 10-inch 25-ton Armstrong; four 12 cm. quick-firing.	
2. Chao-yung . . . . .		1,350	16·8	Three 8-inch 12-ton; two 6-inch 4-ton; seventeen quick-firing.	
3. Ching-yuen . . . . .		2,300	18·0	Two 8½-inch 10-ton; two 6-inch 4-ton; seven machine.	
4. Lai-yuen . . . . .		2,850	16·5	Four 30½-cm. Krupp; two 15-cm. 4-ton; eight machine.	
5. Chen-yuen . . . . .		7,430	14·5	Two 8½-inch 10 ton; two 6-inch 4-ton; seven machine.	
6. Ting-yuen . . . . .		7,430	14·5	Three 8½-inch 10-ton; two 6-inch 4-ton; seventeen quick-firing.	
7. King-yuen . . . . .		2,850	16·5	Two 21-cm. Krupp; one 15-cm. Krupp; nine machine.	
8. Chih-yuen . . . . .		2,800	18·0	One 10·2-inch Krupp; two 6-inch Krupp; eight quick-firing.	
9. Wei-yuen . . . . .		1,350			
10. Tai-yuen . . . . .		2,355	15·0		
11. Kuang-ping . . . . .		1,100			
12. Ping-yuen . . . . .		2,850	10·5		
JAPANESE VESSELS.					
1st Flying Squadron—					
1. Yoshino . . . . .		4,150	23·0	Four 15-cm. quick-firing; eight 12-cm. quick-firing; twenty-two quick-firing.	
2. Takachihō . . . . .		3,650	18·7	{ Two 26-cm. Armstrong 28-ton, six 15-cm. 5-ton Armstrong; two quick-firing; ten machine.	
3. Akitsushima . . . . .		3,150	19·0	One 32-cm. Canet; twelve 12-cm. quick-firing; six machine.	
4. Naniwa . . . . .		3,650	18·7	Two 26 cm. 28-ton Armstrong; six 15-cm. Krupp; twelve quick-firing and machine.	
Main Squadron—					
5. Matsushima . . . . .		4,277	17·5	One 32-cm. Canet; eleven 12-cm.; sixteen quick-firing Hotchkiss; six machine.	
6. Chiyoda . . . . .		2,450	19·0	Ten 12-cm. quick-firing; fourteen 4·2-cm. quick-firing; two machine.	
7. Itsukushima . . . . .		4,277	17·5	One 32-cm. Canet; eleven 12-cm.; sixteen quick-firing.	
8. Hashidate . . . . .		4,277	17·5	One 32-cm. Canet; eleven 12-cm.; sixteen quick-firing.	
9. Hiyel . . . . .		2,200	13·0	Three 17-cm. 3½-ton Krupp; six 15-cm. Krupp.	
10. Fuso . . . . .		3,718	13·2	Four 24-cm 15-ton Krupp; two 17-cm. 6-ton Krupp.	
Vessels not in the line of battle—					
11. Saikio Maru . . . . .		2,913		One 24-cm. Krupp; one 12-cm. Krupp; two machine.	
12. Abagi . . . . .		615	12·0		







*Diagrams showing the Manœuvres of the Naval Battle of Hai-Yang Island*



*Diagram I*




*Diagram IV*




*Diagram II*



*Diagram V*




*Diagram III*



*Diagram VI*

position of the two fleets at this moment of the battle.\*

The Main Squadron, after following for a short time the original course, also deviated in the same direction as the 1st Flying Squadron. The *Yoshino* [1], which led the movement, was for a moment a target for the whole of the Chinese fleet, but her speed soon enabled




YOSHINO

her and her consorts of the Flying Squadron to sweep past their right wing, pouring a deadly fire on the

\* The number [1] indicates Chinese vessels, and [1] indicates Japanese. By referring to the table their names and particulars will be ascertained. As the evolutions of the Japanese fleet become very complicated in the successive diagrams, different colours have been used to mark the course of the vessels. The 1st Flying Squadron's path is marked red, that of the Main Squadron blue, and the manœuvres of the *Saikio Maru*, *Akagi* and *Hiyei* are marked with green lines.

weak vessels that had been placed at the end of the line. The poor little *Yang-wei* [1] was in flames, as the first Japanese vessels steamed past.

The object of this skilful evolution of Admiral Ito had been to take advantage of his superior speed and circle round the Chinese; in following this course, his ships kept at a distance from the large vessels and heavy guns of the centre and concentrated their fire, with fatal effect, on the small flanking




AKITSUSHIMA

vessels that they could approach without danger. The original plan had been to continue the circle, and come round the other wing, and the Flying Squadron had already begun to port when it saw two other Chinese vessels with six torpedo-boats coming up to join the rest of the fleet.

The Flying Squadron then starboarded to attack these new enemies, who prudently retired from the

unequal contest. Admiral Ito observed this new course, and signalled to the Flying Squadron that they should change again and follow the Main Squadron. Diagram II. shows the *Yang-wei* [1] in flames after the passage of the Japanese vessels, and the Flying Squadron commencing to starboard to pursue the new Chinese vessels.



HITEL.

The Main Squadron, following in the wake of the Flying Squadron, swept past the Chinese right wing, and concentrating its artillery on the *Chao-yung* [2], set that vessel on fire. While full success attended the fast vessels of the Japanese fleet, the slow ones were exposed to great danger, which they only


avoided by the display of skill and intrepidity. The *Hiyei* [9], one of the slowest, was lagging in the rear, unable to keep up with her consorts of the Main Squadron; she now found herself obliged to run the gauntlet of the whole Chinese fleet which was fast approaching. Rather than run such a risk, the commander boldly resolved to pass through the Chinese line; by such a course he shortened the distance which separated him from the rest of his squadron—he followed the chord of the arc—and was exposed to the fire of fewer vessels for a shorter time. He passed between the *T'ing-yuen* [6] and *King-yuen* [7] at the distance of 500 metres, and escaped two torpedoes which were launched at him. He had, however, to sustain the fire of several Chinese vessels, and the *Hiyei* [9] was in flames when he successfully brought her out of the enemy's line.

Diagram III. shows the *Hiyei* [9] passing through the Chinese fleet, and the Flying Squadron starboarding all the time to follow up the Main Squadron.

The *Hiyei* [9] signalled at 1.55 P.M. that she was in flames, and the little *Akagi* [12], whose slowness had kept her behind, bravely went to her assistance. The *Akagi* [12] had been hotly pursued by the *Lai-yuen* [4], whose guns had killed her commander and destroyed the steam-pipe, so that the supply of shells at the fore-castle was cut off. The *Akagi* [12] fought on bravely, and when her main-mast was struck down, the flag was reset upon the stump. At one time the *Lai-yuen* [4] was only at 300 metres distance, and

her shells caused great havoc, but a lucky shot from the *Akagi* [12] set her on fire, after which she had to give up the pursuit.

Admiral Ito, who, with the Main Squadron, was circling round and approaching the Chinese fleet, did not lose sight of the distress of the *Hiyei* [9] and *Akagi* [12], and he signalled to the Flying Squadron to



LAI-YUEN.


alter their course again, and starboard so that they might interpose between those vessels and the Chinese.

Diagram IV. shows the *Akagi* [12] near the *Hiyei* [9] and the Chinese vessels in pursuit; the Flying Squadron is about to starboard again; the Main Squadron is approaching the rear of the Chinese fleet.

At the same time the *Saikio Maru* [11] is starboarding.

At 2.23 P.M., as the Main Squadron passed the *Chao-yung* [2] at 800 metres, that vessel sank. The Japanese say that the cries of the drowning men could be heard above the roar of the cannon, and that it was quite heart-rending. The *Saikio Maru* [11] that by her speed had escaped hitherto from the advancing Chinese fleet, now perceived that the detached Chinese vessels and torpedo-boats, which had turned off at first, when the Flying Squadron swept round the right wing of the enemy's fleet, were approaching again in an attempt to join the rest of the Chinese fleet. To avoid running into them, the *Saikio Maru* [11] had to alter her course, and in Diagram IV. she was shown to be starboarding. In avoiding this danger, she approached the *Hiyei* [9] and *Akagi* [12] and became exposed to the fire of the Chinese fleet that was pursuing those vessels. For some time the *Saikio Maru* was in extreme danger ; one of the 30½-centimetre shells from the *Ting-yuen* [6] struck her, and destroyed the boiler connected with her steering-gear ; she had to lower speed before a hand-wheel could be fixed. In the meantime the detached Chinese vessels [11] [12] and some torpedo-boats came up on the other side, and the *Saikio Maru* [11] was between two fires. One of the torpedo-boats crossed her bows and discharged two torpedoes, which luckily missed, as she was going full speed at the time ; one torpedo is said to have passed right under her coming up on

the other side. It has already been mentioned that Admiral Ito had signalled to the Flying Squadron to alter their course again, and instead of following the Main Squadron, to advance in an opposite direction and protect the *Hiyei* [9] and *Akagi* [12]. The approach of the Flying Squadron also saved the *Saikio Maru* [11], and the three weak vessels were able to escape from the battle.



SAIKIO MARU.

Diagram V. shows the position of the fleets after these evolutions had taken place; the *Hiyei* [9] and *Akagi* [12] are safely out of the battle, and the *Saikio Maru* [11] has already turned round to effect her escape. It is a pity that none of the Japanese diagrams show the torpedo attack on the *Saikio Maru* [11], but carefully noting the successive positions of that vessel, the reader's imagination can supply the



omission. The Flying and Main Squadrons have swept round the Chinese fleet almost in a circle, but in opposite directions. The position where the *Chao-yung* [2] sank is also marked.

When the two Japanese squadrons closed on the Chinese fleet on both sides, the fiercest encounter of the battle took place. The two flagships the *Matsushima* [5] and the *Ting-yuen* [6] exchanged



TING-YUEN.

shots with dreadful effect; the Chinese ship was soon in flames, while one of her 30½-centimetre shells bursting on the *Matsushima* [5] set fire to a heap of ammunition and killed or wounded eighty of the crew; a fire also broke out, but it was soon extinguished. The Japanese stood the dreadful carnage with great courage; almost all the gunners were killed, but even the band players offered to work the

guns. On the Chinese side, when the fire broke out on the flagship and she was unable to work her guns, the *Chen-yuen* [5] came bravely to her assistance and remained by her all the time; it was owing to this intervention that the flagship was not destroyed. The fire was finally put out by von Hanneken\* and some other foreigners on board the *Ting-yuen* [6], who encouraged the disheartened Chinese.



CHEN-YUEN.

At about 3.30 P.M. the *Chih-yuen* [8] was sunk, and then the Japanese directed their attention to the *King-yuen* [7]. After passing round the Chinese fleet, the two Japanese squadrons came back hemming

\* Mr. von Hanneken, the passenger of the *Kowshing*, was sent to assist Admiral Ting. The European reader must not be surprised that a land officer was chosen for this purpose, because the Chinese admiral himself was an old cavalry officer.

in the Chinese vessels who now were in great disorder, some escaping and none keeping in any order. When the Flying Squadron swept back it repeated the attack on the *King-yuen* [7], which sank at 4.48 P.M. Now again the two squadrons surrounded the scattered Chinese vessels, directing their fire principally against the two large Chinese ironclads, the *Ting-yuen* [6] and *Chen-yuen* [5]; but the 14-inch armour belts of




CHIYODA.

these vessels were proof against all the guns of the Japanese; though their upper works were burnt and riddled with shot, they still floated and could continue to fight. Some months afterwards, a Japanese officer said that the resistance of these ironclads had shown their value to the Japanese navy, which could not feel safe until they were either captured or sunk. The same officer, however, remarked that had the

battle lasted an hour longer the two ironclads must have been taken. At sunset the Flying Squadron was recalled from her pursuit of the Chinese vessels.

Diagram VI. shows the last phase of the battle when the two squadrons are turning back to surround



ITSUKUSHIMA.

the Chinese again ; the places where the *Chih-yuen* [8] and *King-yuen* [7] sank are also marked.

At sunset, as the torpedo-boats had joined the *Chen-yuen* [5] and *Ting-yuen* [6], the Japanese feared to risk a night engagement, and followed the Chinese at a distance, but next morning they lost sight of

them. It is probable that both fleets were exhausted by the long fight. The losses of the Chinese were very heavy; four vessels, the *Yang-wei* [1] *Chao-yung* [2] *King-yuen* [7] and *Chih-yuen* [8], besides one which ran aground in the retreat near Talien Bay, and was blown up by her crew lest she should fall into the hands of the Japanese. The Japanese did not lose any vessels, but the *Matsushima* [5] and



HASHIDATE.

*Hiyei* [9] were badly damaged; their loss in men was also very slight, only 115 killed and 103\* wounded for the whole fleet, but to this total the flagship contributed fifty-one killed and forty-one wounded--ninety-two out of 360 on board. The Chinese loss of life was far more considerable; they lost about 600

\* These are only those who were attended to in hospital; some more remained on board.

men by the sinking of three vessels, but on the other vessels there were only about 100 killed and 200 or 300 wounded.

The naval battle of Hai-yang Island was the only considerable one of the war, and is one of the most remarkable of modern times. It is the first naval engagement between two fleets provided with modern improvements in the art of war, and it was carried out on an entirely original plan ; the beautiful evolutions of the Japanese fleet were totally different from ancient tactics, but they are the only ones adapted to the high speed and heavy armament in quick-firing guns of modern navies. Rapid concentration and a crushing fire on the enemy's weak point can now be easily effected by a skilful admiral, and the ancient line of battle, with its series of single engagements between vessels battering away at each other until one struck its flag, is to be completely discarded. Some critics have contemptuously remarked that a naval battle between two European fleets could never have lasted nearly five hours without the complete destruction of one or both of the fleets. This is a false conclusion drawn from a confusion of modern vessels with ancient tactics. They imagine two fleets running alongside of each other in the good old-fashion and discharging their quick-firing guns incessantly until one side surrenders or is destroyed. They do not understand that the introduction of quick-firing guns has modified naval warfare like breech-loading rifles transformed infantry tactics ; as

in land warfare, infantry has to advance in open order, and profit by every shelter the ground may offer to escape the shower of bullets that greets its approach, so in naval warfare ships will have to trust to their speed to avoid being crushed by a rapid fire, and by



ADMIRAL ITO.

skilful evolutions choose the time and the distance of the engagement.

Admiral Ito has also been blamed for not having destroyed the whole Chinese fleet, but it must be remembered that history offers few instances of the

destruction of an entire fleet, and in such cases, like the battle of the Nile, the fleet was at anchor or had its movements cramped by the land ; but even in such cases, as at Salamis and Lepanto, a large number of vessels often succeeded in escaping.

In the present instance the Chinese lost four vessels, nearly a third of their fighting force, and when we consider that most of the naval battles of the last century were decided by the loss of only a small part of one of the fleets, we shall not hesitate to recognise that the Chinese had a crushing defeat. It must also be remembered that Admiral Ito had three weak vessels which hampered his movements, and that he succeeded in not losing one of them, though one was a merchant steamer that could have been disabled by a single lucky shot in the engines, and another a gun-boat of about 600 tons. We cannot tell what the Japanese might have done without these vessels. They also had no torpedo-boats, and considering the way the Japanese handled these craft a few months later at Wei-hai-wei, it may be logically inferred that had any of them been present at Hai-yang Island, very few of the Chinese vessels would have escaped during the night.

We must feel a deep admiration for Admiral Ito when we consider how, surmounting all these difficulties, he was able to win the battle by a series of beautiful evolutions, which, guarding the weak vessels, always had for their ultimate aim the destruction of the enemy. As he did not expect to meet the Chinese,



and had to form his plans on the spur of the moment, his merit is all the more surprising: he had, in about an hour, to conceive evolutions for which he had no historical precedents, as no considerable naval battle had yet been fought with ironclads and none with quick-firing guns. The battle at Hai-yang Island, by its originality claims the attention of all students of naval tactics. It is truly wonderful that lessons in modern naval warfare should be given by Japan, a nation that a little over thirty years ago had nothing but a fleet of junks.

This naval battle exercised great influence over the whole war. In the Japanese campaign of 1592, Konishi, after the capture of Phyóng-yang, was arrested in the triumphant march through China, which he meditated, by the failure of the Japanese fleet to co-operate with him, after its defeat at the island of Ko-je. That was the turning-point in the Japanese invasion of the sixteenth century. It would be attributing an exaggerated influence to sea-power, to infer that without the victory at Hai-yang Island, the Japanese campaign in China in the present war would have failed. Japan's military superiority was so overwhelming and China's collapse so complete, that no single event could have altered the fortunes of the war. But the crushing defeat of the Chinese, the consequent command of the sea held by the Japanese, facilitated all their operations and enabled them to land their armies when and where they chose, and to conceive bold plans of campaign which would have been too

hazardous without such a naval supremacy. It is for this reason, that, though the battle of Hai-yang Island was fought only two days after the battle at Phyöng-yang, and while all the Japanese troops were still in Corea, and remained there for over a month longer before invading China, this naval engagement is placed in its present place at the beginning of the campaign in China. The naval battle had no influence over the Korean campaign, which had already been decided two days before, but it was a most important factor in the next campaign of the Japanese, and contributed to their brilliant success.

## CHAPTER II.

## THE FIRST ARMY'S INVASION OF CHINA.

*The Crossing of the Yalu.*

THE battle of Phyöng-yang ended the war in Corea. The Chinese troops attempted no further resistance in that country, and retired to the Yalu, the river which forms the boundary between the Chinese empire and Corea. If they had been less dispirited they might have made a stand at two places offering good defensive positions. At An-ju, a strong town with very high walls, the main road passes through a defile which could have easily been defended by a small force; and during a retreat of forty miles the Chinese should have had time to recover their courage. At Chöng-ju, thirty miles farther away from Phyöng-yang, instructions had been given to prepare some resistance, but the troops were disheartened and in a hurry to put the Yalu between them and their pursuers, so the place was abandoned.

The Japanese army, after the capture of Phyöng-yang and a short rest, advanced north towards the frontier. Tachimi, with the advance-guard, was at An-ju on the 5th of October, at Ka-san on the 6th, at Chöng-ju on the 7th, at Sön-chhön on the 9th, and

at Wi-sun (near Wi-ju and the Yalu) on the 10th. But the Japanese scouts were at Wi-ju as early as the 6th of October, and a telegraph line from that place to Phyöng-yang was completed on the 18th of that month. The Japanese found the roads in Northern Corea from Phyöng-yang to Wi-ju much better than any they had met before. They had to thank the Chinese for this, as they had been obliged to mend the roads to convey their artillery to Phyöng-yang. About the 20th of October the whole Japanese army was around Wi-ju, on the southern bank of the Yalu. It was composed of the 3rd and 5th Divisions, which had now been formed into a *corps d'armée*, a novelty in the Japanese army, whose largest unit had hitherto been the division. This force was called the First Army, and was commanded by Marshal Yamagata.

The naval victory of the 17th of September, the consequent command of the sea, opened new views to the staff of the Japanese army, and they decided to continue on a vaster scale the principle which had hitherto governed their strategical movements. They were now able to use army corps as they had used detachments in the Korean campaign, and to advance them simultaneously, subservient to the great scheme of the invasion of China. A force, composed of a division and a brigade, and styled the Second Army, was being prepared, while the First Army was advancing in Corea towards the Yalu, and it was arranged that the invasion and advance into China of

these two armies should be almost synchronous and directed in such a way that in the unlikely hypothesis of a strong advance on the part of the Chinese, one army could relieve the danger of the other. To preserve continuity of narration it is impossible to describe the action of the two armies simultaneously, but cross-references will be made whenever any advance or engagement affects the other army.

The Yalu, between China and Corea, is a broad deep river forming a formidable natural obstacle. The Chinese general Sung, the new commander-in-chief, wisely chose it as the first line of defence against the threatened invasion of the empire. As the defence of this river has always been an important consideration both for China and Corea, two strong towns are placed on the opposite sides of the river, Chiu-lien-ch'eng on the northern, and Wi-ju on the southern bank. These two cities now were the headquarters of Sung and Yamagata. As soon as the Japanese troops reached the Yalu they began to make preparations for crossing it. The engineers of the 5th Division, who had arrived about the 12th of October, proceeded to ascertain the width of the river, no easy matter, as the opposite shore was swarming with Chinese soldiers. The daring of the Japanese found a solution to the difficulty. Mihara, a soldier of the engineers, a strong swimmer, volunteered to swim across with a line, but the numbing coldness of the water deprived him of the use of his limbs, and he was drowned, his corpse floating away to the other shore.

Not discouraged by his fate, Sergeant Miyake, of the engineers, with a soldier, whose name is not recorded, plunged into the icy stream, and succeeded in swimming across with a line, and coming back with the desired information. It seems that the Japanese found they had not enough pontoons to bridge the river, because they began to collect timber and build rafts. The life of the poor soldier drowned in the Yalu was therefore of some use to his country. About the 20th of October the Japanese troops began to make demonstrations on the southern bank of the Yalu, now appearing in one place, and then in another, with the object of tiring the Chinese and of rendering them less watchful, an easy task, as that people are very careless in military matters.

Marshal Yamagata had chosen for his residence a building on high ground, called the General's Pavilion. A beautiful view was enjoyed from this place; below flowed the Yalu river; on the right Su-ku-chong and Li-tzù-yüan; on the left An-tung and Wu-tiao-kou, and in the centre Chiu-lien-ch'eng studded the vast plain which stretched before the eye. Only on the right, there was a hill, which from its resemblance to a crouching tiger is called Hu-shan (Tiger Mountain). Its height is only about 100 metres. Near Chiu-lien-ch'eng and Wi-ju the Yalu receives a tributary, the Ai-ho or Ai river, and is divided by several islands. Marshal Yamagata in the General's Pavilion, after carefully studying the country and comparing it with his maps, saw that the key of the position lay

at Hu-shan (Tiger Mountain), and formed his plans accordingly. On the night of the 23rd of October orders were sent to Colonel Sato to proceed up the river to Su-ku-chōng and cross the Yalu.

Colonel Sato, with seven companies of the 18th Regiment, a small force of cavalry and two guns, proceeded to Su-ku-chōng, and on the 24th crossed the Yalu. The Chinese forts fired upon the Japanese,



MARSHAL YAMAGATA

and a small force of 300 infantry and 60 cavalry attacked them; but the Japanese drove them back and stormed a fort, capturing two mountain guns, ammunition and a quantity of winter clothing. It was a very tame affair, as the Japanese had only one soldier slightly wounded. The Chinese fled when the Japanese approached at 600 metres. Colonel Sato, as soon as he had secured his position on the left

bank of the Yalu, sent a mounted messenger to inform the headquarters of his victory, and proceeded to complete the soundings of the river.

Marshal Yamagata decided to make a general attack on Hu-shan (Tiger Mountain) on the following day, and on the night of the 24th of October gave orders for the distribution of the troops.

The army was divided into five bodies as follows :—

**BRIDGE DIVISION.**

(Colonel Yabuki of the Engineers.)

One battalion of infantry.

Two battalions of engineers.

Pontoons of the third division.

**THIRD DIVISION.**

(Lieutenant-General Katsura.)

One brigade of infantry.

One battalion of cavalry.

One regiment of artillery.

**FIFTH DIVISION.**

(Lieutenant-General Nodzu.)

One brigade of infantry.

One battalion of cavalry.

One regiment of artillery.

**MIXED BRIGADE.**

(Major-General Tachimi.)

One brigade of infantry.

One battalion of cavalry, and

Artillery.



## RESERVE PARK OF ARTILLERY,

(Major-General Kuroda.)

Batteries of mortars and field-pieces.

During the night from the 24th to the 25th the engineers completed a bridge with pontoons and rafts. The Yalu at that place divides into three branches, the first 60 metres wide, and 80 centimetres deep, the second 150 metres wide and 3 deep, and the third about 110 metres wide. At 4.30 A.M. on the 25th the 3rd Division crossed the river and moved towards Hu-shan (Tiger Mountain), the artillery park under Kuroda taking a position N.E. of Wi-ju, to protect the passage with the mortars. Tachimi's Brigade followed the 3rd Division and took up a position on its left wing, the 5th Division remaining on the other bank ready to give assistance.

The Chinese, in their usual way, had been building forts for a long time as if they intended to oppose a determined resistance, but the sudden appearance of the Japanese army on their side of the river surprised and disheartened them. After an engagement which lasted from 6.15 to 7.45 A.M. they broke and retreated across the Ai river in the direction of Chiu-lien-ch'eng. The Chinese general now became conscious of the important event which had taken place, and fresh troops from Chiu-lien-ch'eng advanced in three columns to attack the Japanese. Oseko and Tachimi attacked the Chinese right wing, while Katsura engaged them in front, and after a short

struggle they were defeated, some retreating again across the Ai river, and others dispersing in the mountains. The battle was over at 10.30 A.M. and at half-past eleven Yamagata was already at Hu-shan.

Preparations were made during the night for attacking Chiu-lien-ch'eng on the following day (26th). General Katsura with the 3rd Division was to attack in the rear, while General Nodzu with the 5th Division advanced along the right bank of Ai river; but the next morning when the Japanese advanced to attack, they found that the Chinese had evacuated the town during the night. The Japanese, though so near to the enemy, had been obliged to light fires in the night to dry their drenched clothes, and the Chinese kept up a harmless fire with their guns, probably to protect their retreat. The Japanese acknowledge their imprudence in fighting a battle with a river at their backs, but considered such a risk legitimate in the face of an enemy ignorant of the art of war.

While these events had taken place up the river, Major Okuyama with three companies of infantry had descended opposite to An-tung on the 25th, and had made demonstrations against that place to prevent the sending of reinforcements to Chiu-lien-ch'eng. The Chinese kept firing volleys with their rifles all night, but it was not until the morning of the 26th that the Japanese began to fire with two field-pieces. As the Chinese made no answer, Major Okuyama

crossed over at 9 A.M. and found that the Japanese army had already occupied An-tung. They captured several Krupp guns not yet used, and 900 magazine rifles in unopened cases. An-tung had been the residence of General Sung, and his house was occupied by General Katsura, who used the furniture of his adversary; amongst it, there were the Chinese military works of Sun\* and Wu† and a variety of maps of Corea and Japan. The Japanese were much amused to find their country of an elliptical figure.

The Japanese losses in the battles around Chiu-lien-ch'eng were one officer and thirty-two men killed, and three officers and 108 men wounded: they buried 495 Chinese, but many more must have been drowned in the Ai river. The spoils were:

74 field-pieces and 4 machine-guns.

4,395 rifles.

36,384 rounds of artillery ammunition.

4,300,660 rounds of small arm ammunition.

The Japanese were surprised at the forts they found, and they observed that from Song-huan to P'hyong-yang up to Chiu-lien-ch'eng, there was a constant improvement. But good soldiers were wanting, and they remarked that war depends more on men than things.

\* A commander of the sixth century B.C. to whom a celebrated military treatise is ascribed.

† A famous general of the beginning of the fourth century B.C.

The defeated Chinese troops under General Sung retreated to Feng-huang-cheng (Phoenix City), which was held by General Sin with fourteen or sixteen camps. It is necessary now to remind the reader, that up to 1875 a neutral zone forty miles broad, and uncultivated, existed between China and Corea; in the historical sketch at the beginning of the book this has been mentioned. Feng-huang was a border town on this neutral zone, and several roads converged there: it is therefore a place of considerable strategical importance. The Japanese resolved to attack it on the 3rd of November, their emperor's birthday, as they wished to solemnise that day by a victory. But these hopes were frustrated by the Chinese, for when General Tachimi reached Tang-shan, a town five ri from Feng-Huang, his cavalry scouts reported that on the 29th of October the Chinese had set fire to the town and retreated. Tachimi entered Feng-huang on the 30th of October without any resistance. The Japanese captured two mountain guns, three mortars, and a quantity of rifles and tents. From the reports of prisoners, they ascertained that the Chinese army, discouraged of fighting, had dispersed: the greater part of the soldiers had fled seawards to Ta-ku-shan (Great Orphan Hill), while General Sung with a few of his men had retreated north towards Mukden.

After the capture of Feng-huang, the two divisions of the First Army were separated; the third division continuing the campaign westwards, while the fifth carried on operations to the north and east. The

headquarters of the First Army were at Chiu-lien-ch'eng, and afterwards at An-tung, and Generals Oseko and Tachimi led the van of the third and fifth divisions.


### *Operations of the Fifth Division.*

General Tachimi, on the 9th of November, sent out detachments on the two roads leading from Feng-huang to Mukden; the first on the western road proceeded up to Lien-shan-kuan (United Mountain Pass) on the 11th of November, and on the 12th explored the celebrated Mo-tien-ling (Heaven-touching Pass), which is the strongest place on that road to Mukden. It found the pass strongly defended by the Chinese, and after a skirmish, in which one soldier was killed and three wounded, it retired to Lien-shan-kuan the object of the reconnaissance having been attained.

As the Chinese kept appearing in the neighbourhood of Tsao-ho-kou (Grass River Pass), thus threatening to cut the communication of the Japanese at Lien-shan-kuan, Tachimi sent orders that the detachment should concentrate on Tsao-ho-kou. The other detachment advanced on the northern road; but when it passed Ta-hsi-kou (Great Western Ditch), it found the enemy in force; and as its object was to reconnoitre, it retired. General Tachimi was now aware that the enemy was in the neighbourhood of Lien-shan-kuan (United Mountain Pass) and Tsao-ho-kou (Grass River Pass) on one route, and near Ai-yang-pien-men on the other route.

*Operations of the Third Division.*

General Oseko, who was in command of the van of the third division, which was to act westwards, on the 5th of November pushed on to Ta-tung kou (Great Eastern Ditch) and Tai-ku-shan (Great Orphan



MAJOR-GENERAL OSEKO

Mountain). One of the prisoners taken at the battle of Phyöng-yang was a native of Tai-ku-shan, and had been very kindly treated by General Oseko; he now became very useful in obtaining information. He reported that the disbanded soldiers flying from Feng-huang had committed great excesses, pillaging and

ravishing in all the villages; some of them had fled to Chin-chow and others to Hsin-yen. As the latter was a place of considerable strategical importance, where roads converged from every direction, it was decided to attack it. As usual, the Japanese planned a double attack. While General Oseko was to advance from Tai-ku-shan on one road, Major Mihara, detached by General Tachimi, was to proceed from Feng-huang on another, and the Chinese were to be puzzled by a simultaneous attack in front and rear.

General Oseko, with three battalions of infantry, one company of cavalry, and one battalion of artillery (minus a company) started from Tai-ku-shan on the 14th of November. On the 16th, after a slight skirmish with the Chinese cavalry, he entered Tumen-tzù (mud-door) at 11.30 A.M.; several bodies of Chinese cavalry and infantry attacked the place, but they were repulsed. On the morning of the 17th no trace of the Chinese could be seen, and Oseko advanced to Hung-chia-po-tzù (Red-House Village); at 11.20 A.M. firing was heard in the distance, and he knew that Mihara was attacking Hsin-yen on the north-east. Oseko's vanguard continued to advance, and met a body of Chinese, who commenced firing at long range, while the guns of Hsin-yen also joined in the attack. The Chinese were gradually reinforced until at 2 P.M. they were about 2,000 strong, and they threatened the Japanese flanks. The Japanese deployed, and as they advanced the Chinese retreated (like a coy maiden the Japanese observed); they

preferred fighting at a distance, and considered 600 metres as uncomfortably near. The fall of night prevented the Japanese taking Hsin-yen, and its capture was reserved for the next day; but on the morning of the 18th, when they advanced, they found the town abandoned: the double attack of the preceding day had entirely disconcerted the Chinese, who, fearing to be surrounded, retreated westwards. The main body of Oseko's detachment at 8.30 P.M. entered Hsin-yen, where they found nine guns and a number of rifles.

(olonel Mihara, who led the flank attack, left Feng Huang on the 14th of November with a battalion of infantry and a troop of cavalry videttes. On the 15th the cavalry had reached Huang-hua-tien (yellow-flower field), and the infantry Lau-yeh-miao (gentleman temple). On the 16th the infantry arrived at Ling-kou (collar-hook); as the cavalry was insufficient, a section of foot-soldiers assisted as scouts. This mixed vanguard met the Chinese near Huang-chin-tzù (yellow-peak), and had a sharp engagement. On the 17th Mihara came up with his whole force and attacked Huang-chin-tzù (yellow-peak). The Chinese had already engaged Oseko's force at Tu-men-tzù (mud-door) on the 16th, and they were obliged now to divide their forces to meet the double attack. At Huang-chin-tzù (yellow-peak), the Chinese stationed four camps of infantry and one camp of cavalry; \*

\* This should give a force of 2,250 men; but probably after so many defeats the Chinese *cadres* were very deficient.



this force, availing itself of its advantageous position on the brow of the hill, opposed a determined resistance to the Japanese. Mihara ordered two companies to deploy on the right and left of the road, and to climb up the hill. Lieutenant Machida, who commanded the forty picked soldiers of the vanguard, distinguished himself on the right, driving the Chinese from rock to rock; but as soon as the Japanese had taken one height, they found, as is usual in a very mountainous country, another height to be stormed. After a succession of these attacks they took the crowning height Huang-chin-tzù (yellow-peak) itself, and captured a mountain gun. The Chinese retired to Hsing-lung-kou (eminent hook), but the principal force at Hsin-yen, during the night, retired to To-mu-cheng (knocker-wood town). While engaged with Oseko at Tu-men-tzù (mud door), the unexpected attack of Mihara from the rear alarmed them, and they retired for fear of having their communications cut off. A rear-guard was left to defend Hsin-yen, and delay the Japanese advance, but Colonel Mihara soon defeated this force and entered the city.

From the names on the captured flags, and from the reports of the inhabitants it was ascertained that Generals Feng, Nieh, and Chia were in Hsin-yen, with about ten camps of infantry and 1,000 cavalry. The Japanese mention, that, during Mihara's advance, Sergeant Kawasaki with a cavalry soldier were sent by another road to keep up communications with

Oseko's detachment. On passing through a village, the sergeant separated from his companion for a short time, but when he came back, he only found his headless trunk. This was the second narrow escape of Sergeant Kawasaki; he was one of the mounted scouts that were sent towards Phyüŋ-yang at the end of July, and after swimming across the Tai-dong he luckily saved himself during the Chinese surprise at Chung-hwa, where almost all his comrades were killed.

The combined attack of Oseko and Mihara who started from Tai-ku-shan (Great Orphan Mountain) and Feng-huang-cheng (Phoenix City), two points over fifty miles distant, was so exactly timed that it succeeded completely. A garrison was left in Hsin-yen with the captured guns, but Oseko with his main body withdrew to Tai-ku-shan. The Japanese did not intend to advance the First Army until the Second Army, which had already landed and was marching on Port Arthur, should be in a condition to co-operate by advancing north. The First Army confined itself to spreading out detachments like a fan, radiating from Chiu-lien-ch'eng; the outposts were situated at Tai-ku-shan, Hsin-yen and Lien-shan-kuan, in touch with the enemy, and ready to be reinforced if the enemy advanced. The Japanese in these advanced stations suffered great hardships; they were often without food for days, the provisions having to be brought over very steep mountain roads in carts dragged by Japanese army-coolies.

For the present the plan was a defensive one, and had for its object to keep up a line of communications by driving away any attack from the north. Of course this plan was not divulged, and it was popularly supposed that the First Army intended to march on Mukden, a city which from its having been the ancient capital of the Manchu dynasty, and containing the imperial ancestral tombs, had a great moral importance for the Chinese Government. This grand scheme which was openly discussed, and probably feared by the Chinese, kept a large force occupied in defending the northern passes. People were astonished at the Japanese delay in taking Mukden. This rest in the military operations of the First Army, will enable us to turn our attention to the Second Army which was very active about this time.

The First Army, as soon as it had occupied a part of Manchuria, began to organise a civil administration in the principal places, with the the civil employes which were sent over from Japan. The successes in Manchuria deeply moved the hearts of the people of Japan; their soldiers had crossed the Yalu, the river which their poets had always sung should slacken the thirst of their war-horses. A civil administration in Manchuria—the extension of Japanese laws to a portion of the great Asiatic continent—roused the pride of an insular people that for millenniums had been confined by the ocean.

## CHAPTER III.

## THE CAMPAIGN IN THE REGENT'S SWORD PENINSULA.

*The Landing of the Second Army.*

AFTER the naval victory of the 17th of September the Second Army was rapidly prepared for the war. It was to consist of a division (the first) and a Mixed Brigade (from the sixth division), commanded respectively by Lieutenant-General Yamaji and Major-General Hasegawa. The former is considered the representative of stern determination in the Japanese army, and from having lost an eye he is called the One-eyed Dragon.\* The mobilisation of the first division took place on the 22nd of September, and on the 27th the whole division was quartered at Hiroshima, the imperial headquarters. On the 26th Marshal Oyama, Minister of War, was appointed commander-in-chief.

The brigade was first landed in Corea near the mouth of the Tai-dong, and on the 15th of October transports were ready at Ujina (the port of Hiroshima) to embark the division, which left at various dates from the 15th to the 20th of October. As on former occasions, the greatest popular enthusiasm

\* A name which the Japanese have given also to Gambetta.

prevailed at the departure of the troops, and the members of both houses of the diet accompanied Marshal Oyama to Ujina.

The Japanese fleet for some time had been exploring the coasts of Manchuria to discover a suitable landing-place, and when their choice was made they found disagreement amongst the staff of the Second Army, who complained that the chosen spot was too far from Port Arthur, the principal object of attack.



MARSHAL OYAMA.

The naval officers, recognising the justice of the observation, maintained that no other place could be selected. The sea along the coasts of Manchuria is shallow, and in most places the land cannot be approached for miles. Landing under such circumstances entails wading for a long distance. At the place chosen by the fleet it was possible to land on the rocks at high water.

On the 23rd of October the transports conveying the brigade of the Second Army left the mouth of the Tui-long river, convoyed by fourteen men-of-war. On the morning of the 24th the whole fleet anchored at five miles from Hua-yuan-kon (Flower Garden Port), a small village at the mouth of the Hua-yüan-chiang (Flower Garden River). The weather was misty and the shore could only be dimly discerned, but before daybreak a party of marines landed and planted a Japanese flag on a hill as a signal for the transports. Soon after the marines were relieved by a detachment of infantry. The engineers landed soon after, and with pontoons built a landing-stage for the horses and guns.

The quiet inhabitants of the village were struck with amazement at the arrival of this armada in the quiet harbour only casually visited by junks ; many fled in terror, but were captured and brought back to be convinced of the peaceful intentions of the Japanese. Four peasants were brought on board and asked to sell their clothes, which were promptly put on by Japanese interpreters, who wore pigtails, and only required the local dress to be able to explore the country like natives. A proclamation in the name of Marshal Oyama was published to tranquillise the inhabitants and enforce discipline in the army. It declared that, by international law, an army in the enemy's country had the right to levy contributions. but such a right was vested in the whole army and not in any single individual. Therefore any soldier

who took things without the consent of the owner, and without having paid him his price, would be severely punished. Later on (29th of October) a set of regulations for the guidance of those who had to levy requisitions were also published.

The Japanese army pushed inland almost as soon as it landed. On the 25th a detachment was sent six miles up river, and a battalion under Major Saito marched towards Pi-tzŭ-wo, a town about thirty miles distant on the road to Port Arthur, and which at first had been chosen as the landing-place, but afterwards abandoned on account of the shoals and shallow water which extended five miles from the shore. On the 26th Marshal Oyama with his staff arrived. He had boldly started from the Tai-dong on the 25th without the escort of a single man-of-war.

The Chinese fleet did not give any trouble to the transports, and these vessels were able even to take the offensive, the *Asaki Maru* and another capturing 15 or 16 junks laden with timber and mortars. The Japanese fleet was not idle. Some men-of-war took on board two or three land officers and explored the coast. They caught some fishermen to use as pilots, in addition to four which had been brought over from the mouth of the Tai-dong. A torpedo-boat cruising near Ta-lien Bay captured a small steamer of 30 tons, which was utilised as a steam-tug.

The disembarkation of such a large force took a long time, and it was not before twelve days that all

the horses were landed. It is worthy of notice that the landing at Hua-yüan-kon, on the 24th of October, occurred on the same day that Colonel Sato crossed the Yalu.

*The Advance and Capture of Chin-chow and  
Ta-lien Bay.*

Port Arthur, or Lü-shun-kou, as it is called by the Chinese, is not only very strongly defended by sea and land, but its approaches offer such natural advantages that, properly defended, they are almost impregnable. The southern part of Sheng-ching, one of the three Manchurian provinces, juts out into the sea, forming at its extremity an elongated peninsula with a very narrow isthmus called the Regent's Sword. Port Arthur is at the extremity of this peninsula, and the neck or isthmus is defended by the fortified city of Chin-chow and by the forts of Ta-lien Bay, the anchorage of the Chinese fleet. In their march to Port Arthur the Japanese were obliged to attack Chin-chow, but when they had captured that city and the forts of Ta-lien Bay, not only was the road to Port Arthur open, but they held its defenders closed in a bag, to use the Japanese expression. The distance from Hua-yüan-kon to Chin-chow is about 90 miles, and it was decided to attack that place on the 6th of November.

On the 2nd of November Major Saito left Pi-tzü-wo, which is about 38 miles from Chin-chow, with a



reconnoitring detachment. It was composed of one battalion of infantry, one battalion of engineers, and a company of cavalry. Besides reconnoitring the enemy's position he was to mend the roads for the march of the main body. On the 4th Major Saito met a small body of Chinese at Liu-chia-tun (Liu-house Village) that were easily dispersed. This was the first engagement of the Second Army after its landing in China. Major Saito was followed by the first division, which left Pi-tzū-wo on the 3rd of November, under General Yamaji, its van, composed of a regiment of infantry, a troop of cavalry and a company of mountain artillery, was commanded by Major-General Nogi, and its rear was under Major-General Nishi.

To understand the operations against Chin-chow it is necessary to bear in mind the configuration of southern Sheng-king. The promontory, as it advances into the sea, narrows until at the south of Chin-chow the land is only about two miles broad. Therefore the two roads which run along the coasts gradually approach each other and join at Chin-chow. This town can be approached by two main roads, one from Hua-yüan-kon and Pi-tzū-wo, and the other from Fuchow and Pu-lan-tien (Port Adams). When the Japanese approached Chin-chow, it was not difficult for them to pass from one road to the other and employ their usual tactics of disconcerting the simple-minded Chinese by a double attack.

Advancing by the Pi-tzū-wo road, the Japanese

very soon sent detachments on the other road. On the 4th Major Saito sent his company of cavalry on the Fuchow road to cut the telegraph-line: a messenger was also captured bearing despatches from Port Arthur to Fuchow announcing the approach of the Japanese. This Chinese prisoner attempted to kill himself by dashing out his brains against the stones. Major Saito, admiring his courage, informed him that the Japanese never killed their prisoners, and asked if he had a father and mother. The Chinaman was moved at these words, and answered that he had a mother who was praying day and night for his return.

On the 5th of November the Japanese came upon the first defences of the Chinese; these consisted of two forts built on hills flanking the road, and each mounted with four guns. At first the Japanese only made a reconnaissance and retired. General Yamaji being informed that the Chinese position was very strong in front, while comparatively weak on the Fuchow road, diverged towards that road with the bulk of the division; the remaining forces were partly on the Pi-tzü-wo road and partly between the two roads. The detachment which had first engaged the forts renewed the fight at noon, and firing continued until 2 P.M., when the Japanese, finding their position too disadvantageous, retired. Of course these slight checks had elated the Chinese, who considered them as victories.


During the night orders were given that a general

attack should be made on the following morning (6th). At 4 A.M. Major Saito led his detachment over the mountains to turn the right flank of the first fort. This was reached about 6 A.M., and the Japanese stormed both forts in about half-an-hour. Major Saito himself took part in the fight, for, seeing a Chinese soldier about to fire a mine, he rushed into the fort amidst a hail of bullets and, with one blow of his sword, cleft the man's skull to the teeth.

It was probably during this engagement that the French military attaché with the Japanese troops remarked that they had manoeuvred in a way that would have been creditable to the French Alpine troops.

After the capture of the forts the Pi-tzü-wo road to Chin-chow was open. General Yamaji in the meantime had advanced from the Fuchow road, and at 8 A.M. began to plant his batteries against Chin-chow. In a short time thirty field pieces were thundering on the town. The Chinese answered with Krupp guns for about fifty minutes, when their fire stopped. General Yamaji then galloped through the ranks and ordered the assault. Chin-chow, like most towns of northern China, is a perfect square with its sides to the four points of the compass. The assault was delivered on the northern and eastern sides. The walls are 30 feet high and very steep, so the Japanese could not climb up, but the engineers were brought forward to blow up the gates. On the northern side there is the Yung-an-Men (Eternal Tranquillity Gate),

which is 50 feet high and plated with iron. Lieutenant Yanome rushed towards it, commanding the detachment which was to blow it open. Private Onoguchi carried the case of gun-cotton and advanced while the Chinese from the loop-holes were raining




GATE OF CHIN-CHOW.

bullets upon him. He was wounded in the arm, but though dripping with blood he took his burden to the gate, which was shattered to pieces by the explosion. The Japanese rushed through the gate

and right across the town to the eastern side, where they opened the gate to their companions, the Chinese in the meanwhile escaping by the western gate to Port Arthur.

During this attack there was a curious episode. Major Tseiji had advanced at first to the gate, but



PRIVATE ONOGUCHI, OF THE ENGINEERS,  
WHO BLEW UP THE GATE.

finding it could not be stormed he retired about 120 yards, when he remarked on the ground a cross 30 feet long. Not liking these suspicious marks he advanced again, and, the gate having been blown up, entered the city. Afterwards the engineers dug up

the place and found a mine which by its explosion might have killed nearly 100 men if the officer had not withdrawn in time. The Chinese put great faith in such contrivances, which require great labour and waste of powder, and seldom produce any effect. At the taking of Feng-Huang-cheng the Japanese had a mine exploded right in front of them, but which only killed a luckless dog. Another in the same place was exploded by lightning.

The Japanese pursued and killed some of the Chinese, who, in their hurry to escape, even threw themselves from the walls. But the fighting around Chin-chow on the 5th and 6th of November was very tame, as the Japanese had no killed, and only a few wounded. They remark themselves that it was an event unparalleled in military history, but it was surpassed by the events of the next day.

After the capture of Chin-chow the next object of attack was Ta-lien Bay, the anchorage of the Chinese navy, whose land forts protected the narrow isthmus of the Regent's Sword peninsula. As this place was considered next in importance to Port Arthur and Wei-hei-Wei, the Japanese made elaborate preparations for an attack on the morning of the 7th of November. Three detachments, each consisting of a regiment of infantry, besides cavalry and artillery, were to advance on the various forts. The soldiers, in high spirits after their victory, swore they would die rather than retire without taking the place. These noble resolutions were, however, quite unnecessary,

for when the Japanese advanced the small remaining garrison ran away after firing a few rounds. On taking the forts the Japanese found some of the cannon still loaded. It is unnecessary to waste details on such an incredible affair.

The forts had been built by von Hannecken on the most approved modern system, and they were very heavily armed. Hoshang-tao had three batteries, one with two 21-cm. and two 15-cm. guns, and the other two had each two 24-cm. guns. The Hsu-chia fort had four 15-cm. guns. Lao-lung fort two 24-cm. and two 21-cm. guns, and Huang-shan fort two 24-cm. guns and two 12-cm. guns. These heavy guns were besides flanked by smaller and machine guns. A Japanese officer, on inspecting one of the forts, said that with one company he could hold it against a division.

The garrison, if it had remained, was amply sufficient to oppose a successful resistance. It has been estimated that between Chin-chow and Ta-lien the Chinese had the following troops :—

			Men
Huai-tzu army . . . . .	{ infantry	6 camps	3,000
	{ " cavalry	1 company	200
	{ infantry	1 " "	50
Hou-ying army . . . . .	{ infantry	3 camps	1,500
	{ cavalry	1 camp	250
	{ artillery	1 " "	500
Drilled bannermen army . . . . .	{ infantry	..	500
	{ cavalry	..	200
Total .			6,200
Hunan army . . . . .	{ infantry	}	Unknown
	{ cavalry		

The spoils taken by the Japanese were enormous, as will be seen by the following list :—

621 rifles (70 modern German ones and many other magazine rifles);  
129 guns (7 Gatling, many made at Nankin, not yet used, and on the sea all Krupp guns);  
33,814,300 rounds of small arm ammunition;  
2,468,271 rounds of cannon ammunition;  
6,000 dollars in specie,

besides rice, horses and other sundries. As the Japanese carefully enumerate everything, their officers must have been more busy with the pen than with the sword.

The Japanese also found the plan of the mines and torpedoes defending the entrance to the bay, and they were thus able to render them harmless without the laborious process of "sweeping." The common characters used by both nations enable any educated man to read the documents and despatches of the other country.

The Japanese fleet had intended to assist the army in its attack on Ta-lien, not suspecting the easy nature of that task, and at 6 A.M. of the 6th November it left for Ta-lien Bay, disposed in the following order :—

Main Squadron:—*Hashidate, Ohiyoda, Itsukushima, Naniwa, Matsushima.*

1st Flying Squadron:—*Yoshino, Takachiho, Akitsushima.*

2nd Flying Squadron:—*Fusò, Katsuragi, Kongo, Takad.*

4th Flying Squadron:—*Tsukushi, Akagi, Maya, Oshima, Ohokai.*



The fleet reached its destination in the afternoon, and knowing that the entrance to the bay was guarded by torpedoes it proceeded very cautiously. A small squadron of six steam launches was ordered to "sweep" the bay and remove the torpedoes. All the time firing could be heard in the distance, and as it was known that the army was attacking Chin-chow the men in the fleet were very much excited.

On the next day a scene was enacted which, from its comical nature, seems discordant with the usual notions of war, though it was but a consequence of the absurd conduct of the Chinese in the morning. At six A.M. of the 7th November the Japanese vessels slowly entered the bay—at first only the 4th Flying Squadron, which fired some shots at the forts, but no answer was made. At 9 A.M. the Main Squadron entered Ta-lien Bay. At 10 o'clock some more shots were fired, which elicited no reply. The fleet was greatly puzzled at the harmless nature of the grim-looking forts around the bay, until at last, after careful examination, they saw the dark caps and uniforms of the Japanese infantry, and later on they saw their national flag flying over the forts. Boats were sent ashore and came back with the joyful news that all the forts had been taken that morning by the land forces.

The capture of Ta-lien Bay was a most important step in the campaign against Port Arthur. Not only were the formidable approaches, which should have constituted the true land defence of that port, taken, but the possession of that anchorage, with its wharves

and appliances for the landing of heavy guns, enabled the Japanese to land their siege-train at a short distance from Port Arthur instead of painfully dragging it along from Hua-yüan-kou or Pi-tzü-wo.

### *The Capture of Port Arthur.*

After the taking of Chin-chow and Ta-lien, Marshal Oyama waited for the arrival of the Mixed Brigade, and after leaving a small garrison at Chin-chow to defend the isthmus and guard the rear, he advanced, on the 17th of November, with the whole army. There are two roads leading to Port Arthur, one along the northern shore, and the other along the southern shore of the peninsula. The Japanese, following their usual tactics, advanced along both routes; the detachment which advanced south was very small and was only meant to create a diversion. It consisted of two battalions of infantry, a troop of cavalry, a company of mountain artillery, and two companies of engineers under Lieutenant-Colonel Masumidzu, and formed the left column. The rest of the army, with the exception of three battalions, two at Chin-chow, and one to guard the communications, advanced along the northern route, which had been found the best by the reconnoitring parties. It proceeded in the following order:—

- 1st. The reconnoitring cavalry, two battalions (minus five troops), under Major Akiyama.
- 2nd. The First Division and the Mixed Brigade (less the troops stationed at Chin-chow, or forming part of the left column).

Both these bodies proceeded by the same route, passing through Nan-kuo-ling (Difficult Pass), Ying-cheng-tzū (Camp Town), Shuang-tai-kou (Double Terrace Ditch), and Tu-cheng-tzū (Mud Town), to Shui-shih-ying (Naval Camp), which is close to Port Arthur. The whole distance was covered in four days, and by the 20th of November the whole army was in position and ready to attack Port Arthur.

There had been some slight engagements during these days. On the 18th, Major Akijama, advancing from Tu-cheng-tzū (Mud Town), with a single company of cavalry, met a body of Chinese from Shui-shih-ying (Naval Camp), which gradually increased to about 3,000 men, who completely surrounded the Japanese horsemen. These fought with great bravery, and succeeded in cutting their way through the enemy and retreating to Shuang-tai-kow (Double Terrace Ditch). On hearing of the engagement, Major Marui had sent a company of infantry to assist the cavalry, and they now in turn were attacked and surrounded by the Chinese. Seeing the danger of their rescuers, a handful of cavalry, under Captain Asakawa, made a desperate charge to extricate them. The infantry and cavalry succeeded in retiring, but they were obliged to abandon their wounded, who preferred to kill themselves rather than be tortured by the enemy. Lieutenant Nakaman was severely wounded, and his servant cut off his head and brought it back to the camp to be honourably buried. Captain Asakawa was also wounded, and his horse shot under him; but



CAPTAIN AKAWA SAVED BY PRIVATE TIO.



private Tio, though mortally wounded, gave his horse to his officer, and led him out of danger, when he fell down dead. Major Marui, with the rest of the battalion, came up to rescue the advanced guard, but he was not able to repulse the Chinese, who now had mounted four guns on a hill. It was not until the artillery of the advanced guard arrived and unlimbered their guns that the Chinese retired. The Japanese lost one officer and eleven men killed, and one officer and thirty-two men wounded.

Encouraged by this success, on the 20th of November, when the whole Japanese army lay before Port Arthur, the Chinese made a sortie with over 3,000 men. General Yamaji, informed of their movements, made his preparations very quietly, and when the enemy surrounded a hill occupied by a Japanese regiment, they received a severe flank attack from the artillery, which obliged them to retire, leaving about 100 dead on the field.

It will now be useful to throw a glance on the defences of Port Arthur; these were both on the land and sea, and so arranged that they could mutually assist each other. Around the oval harbour, divided into two basins, there was an almost continuous chain of forts. On the land side, on the northern shore of the harbour, beginning at the west, we find three forts on the I-tzū-shan (Chair Hill), which were respectively called I-tzū-shan (Chair Hill), An-tzū-shan (Table Hill), and Wang-tai (Hope Terrace) forts; their height is 86, 128, and 137 metres, and as they lie

rather behind the general line of defence, they can fire on the back of the other forts which they command by their superior elevation. They form the key to the whole defence of Port Arthur. Proceeding eastwards we find another fort on Sung-shu-shan (Pine-Tree Hill), 103 metres high. Farther east and sloping south we find a group of seven forts on Erh-lung-shan (Two Dragon Hill), 82 metres high, and on Chi-huan-shan (Cock's-comb Hill), 126 metres high. These forts almost surround Port Arthur on the land side; the *enceinte* is completed by two forts near the sea, one on Fan-tao Hill, 84 metres high, and the other, Lao-li-tsui (Old Oyster Mouth), close to the shore, which may be considered a coast fort. Proceeding now along the sea in a westerly direction we meet the fort on Huang-chin-shan (Golden Hill), 78 metres high, which is one of the most important of the whole defence; its guns were mounted in such a way that they could sweep round in every direction, and not only repel a sea-attack, but co-operate also in the land defence. We now have to cross the mouth of the harbour and proceed to an elongated strip of land which runs into the harbour and which the Chinese have appropriately called Ian-hu-wei (Tiger's Tail). On this strip of land, and on the peninsula to which it is attached, there are eight forts, whose names need not trouble us, as they played an insignificant part in the great military drama which was to follow. One of them on Man-ton-shan (Bread Hill), 111 metres high, is also important for the land defence, as it

can fire across the harbour and protect the land forts.

The guns mounted on these forts were numerous, and many of them of the best pattern ; the following is a list of some of them :—

I-Tzū Hill Forts :—Not given.

Sung-shu (Pine-tree) Hill :—

Two 20-cm. ; two 9-cm. ; one quick-firing ; one 12-cm.

Krupp ; two mountain Krupp ; one mountain ; one 7-cm. mountain.

Erh-lung (Two Dragon), Chi-huan (Cock's Comb) :—

1st fort. Three quick-firing.

2nd „ Two quick-firing ; one 9-cm.

3rd „ Two quick-firing ; two 12-cm. Krupp.

4th „ Two quick-firing ; three 9-cm.

5th „ Four 9-cm. Krupp ; one quick-firing ; two 12-cm. Armstrong.

6th „ One 9-cm. Krupp ; two quick-firing.

7th „ Two 12-cm. Armstrong ; one 15-cm. and one 9-cm. Krupp ; one quick-firing.

Fan-tao :—Not given.

Lau-li-tsui :—Not given.

Huang-chin (Golden Hill) :—

Three 24-cm. ; four field-guns ; four 9-cm. Krupp ; two 21-cm. Krupp ; two 18-cm. ; four 9-cm.

Lan-hu-wei (Tiger's Tail) :—

1st fort. Two 21-cm. Krupp ; three 9-cm.

2nd „ Three 9-cm. Krupp.

3rd „ Two 15-cm. Krupp.

4th „ Four 16-cm. Krupp ; one 9-cm.

5th „ Four 16-cm. Krupp ; two 12-cm.

Manton Hill :—

Three 24-cm. Krupp ; two 12-cm. Krupp.

Cheng-tou :—

Two 12-cm. Krupp ; six 9-cm. Krupp.

Lan-tieh :—

„ Nine 9-cm.



The guns here enumerated total up to over a hundred, but they form only a small part, as the Japanese captured 330 guns.

The garrison troops were estimated as follows :—

		Men.
Chiu-ching army . . . . .	8 camps	4,000
Kuei-tzu army . . . . .	4 „	2,000
Ho-tzu army . . . . .	8 „	1,500
Sheng-tzu army . . . . .	5 „	2,500
Huai-tzu army (fled from Chinchow) . .	6 „	1,800
Kung-wei army . . . . .	4 „	1,200
	1 cavalry	200
Ming-tzu army . . . . .	6 companies	400
	Total .	18,600

Even if we admit that the Chinese camps, as is usually the case, did not contain their full complement of men, still there must have been about 10,000 men in the place, a force fully adequate for a stubborn resistance. General Yamaji expected it, and talking with an officer, while marching to Port Arthur, he calculated losing over a thousand men before taking this formidable fortress, which Admiral Courbet considered could hold out a long time against a strong fleet and an army of 20,000 men.

The attack was fixed for the morning of the 21st of November, but the heavy siege guns did not arrive till the night from the 20th to the 21st; they had been dragged over the difficult mountain roads by the transport coolies, who, in their patriotic ardour, worked incessantly for two days and nights to bring

up the artillery. General Yamaji naturally relied very much on his siege-train for the success of the assault which he meditated for next morning: the attack on Chin-chow had shown him that a heavy preliminary cannonade soon demoralised the Chinese, and rendered an assault possible. He intended to concentrate on Port Arthur the fire of thirty-six siege guns and sixty-four field-pieces: the assault was to be delivered in the order in which we have described the forts. The division was to take first the three forts on I-tzū-shan (Chair Hill), and then the one on Sung-shu-shan (Pine-tree Hill); the Mixed Brigade was to wait for the capture of these forts, and then attack the seven forts on Erh-lung-shan (Two Dragon Hill) and 'Chi-huan-shan (Cock's-comb Hill); the left column, which had marched to Port Arthur by another route, was to make a demonstration to the north-east of the line of forts and divert the attention of the Chinese from the main attack, which was to be delivered at the opposite extremity of the land defences. These directions were thought sufficient for the day, but the attack proceeded with such rapid success that the programme was exhausted a little after noon, and it had to be extended during the battle.

The Japanese marched to take up their positions at midnight, and at 2 A.M. all was ready for the attack. Before daybreak, siege, field and mountain guns opened fire, arousing the Chinese from their slumbers: on the I-tzū forts alone forty guns were pointed and

fired incessantly. These forts answered vigorously and were assisted by Sung-shu-shan (Pine-tree Hill) and Huang-chin-shan (Golden Hill) forts, the latter also employing the heavy coast guns, which could be pointed in every direction. After about an hour, the guns on I-tzū-shan (Chair Hill) were silenced, and the Japanese infantry, which had taken up its position to the west of that hill, rushed to the assault. Major Marui, who had been driven back by the Chinese at Tu-cheng-tzū (Mud Town), burned to revenge this disgrace, and with his battalion he rushed into the first fort, killing or driving out the garrison. The Japanese lost eighty killed and wounded in this assault. The capture of I-tzū-shan (Chair Hill) fort, which was effected at 8 A.M., so scared the Chinese in An-tzū-shan (Table Hill) and Wang-tai (Hope Terrace) forts, that they all fled, but were met by General Nogi, who, with a regiment, was advancing to the parade-ground between I-tzū-shan and Sung-shu-shan.

Man-tou-shan (Bread Hill) fort began firing shells to assist them, but the fugitives were all dispersed; and as they tried to escape north, after running along the side of the harbour, they were shelled by the Japanese men-of-war, which were cruising to the west of the Port Arthur peninsula. The poor hunted Chinese were obliged to take refuge on the rocks of Lao-tieh-shan (Old Iron Hill).

Now the field guns were brought up to attack the Sung-shu-shan (Pine-tree Hill) fort, but the Chinese were so disheartened, that a few rounds of shell

sufficed to put them to flight. The capture of I-tzū-shan forts, from their elevation, and position slightly behind the line of defence, enabled the Japanese to fire down on the rear of the other forts. When General Yamagi, who has a very grim, saturnine expression, saw the fall of the Sung-shu-shan (Pine-tree Hill) fort, he smiled, and the circumstance was thought so extraordinary that an officer at once communicated the



LIEUTENANT-GENERAL YAMAGI.

information that he had seen his General smile. The Sung-shu-shan fort was taken at 11 A.M.

The Mixed Brigade had the hardest fighting of the day. Great part of its force had been detached to the Left Column, so that it was reduced to a single regiment; moreover, as there were no field-pieces on that side, and the siege guns were too far, only mountain guns could be brought to play on the seven forts which it was their object to attack. But the

Japanese say that the Kiushiu\* men were worth more than a siege train.

The attacking force was composed of the 3rd battalion against the Chi-huan-shan (Cock's-comb Hill) forts, and the 2nd battalion against the Erh-lung-shan (Two Dragon Hill) forts, as these troops were not found sufficient. Three companies of the 1st battalion were sent to reinforce them. The Japanese advanced under such a heavy fire that they had to take refuge in a small hamlet, and then afterwards in a spot where the guns could not fire, and which was too far for the enemy's rifles. For a time, before Sung-shu-shan fell, they were exposed to a double flank fire from that fort and those on Chi-huan-shan. It was resolved then to take the latter first, and at 11.30 A.M. the 3rd battalion took the Chi-huan-shan (Cock's-comb Hill) forts. At 12.30 the 2nd battalion took the Erh-lung-shan (Two Dragon Hill) fort, and the whole land defences of Port Arthur had fallen.

There are two dramatic episodes connected with this attack of the Mixed Brigade. Major Hanaoka was mortally wounded, but still he rushed up to the fort shouting, "Long live the Emperor! Long live our flag!" When afterwards taken to the hospital, and asked if he had any parting words to say, he replied: he died for his country, and begged his mother to

\* Kiushiu is the southern island of Japan, which has produced the statesmen that have reformed their country, and most of the principal leaders of this war.

take care of herself, and his children to study. Asked if he had any words for his soldiers, he answered : his good wishes. The officers around his death-bed comforted him by saying that he had earned eternal glory in taking such a strong fort ; but he replied, " What have I to do now with the glory of this world ? " The bystanders then mournfully said what a pity he cannot see Peking ! This last observation sounds strange to those who do not know the wild enthusiasm in the Japanese army to enter the great capital of China.

Kani, the captain of one of the companies detached to attack the Erh-lung-shan (Two Dragon Hill) forts, had long been suffering from dysentery, but on the day of the assault he overcame his weakness and marched at the head of his men ; but when within 100 yards of the fort, he broke down, and had to lie on the ground, while his men rushed on. Taken to the hospital, he never could forgive his weakness, and on the morning of the 28th of November (a week after the battle) he escaped from the hospital, went to the spot where he had succumbed, and killed himself with his sword.


The following letter was found by his side :—

" It was here that disease compelled me to halt and suffer my men to attack the fort without me. Never can I wipe out the disgrace while I live. To vindicate my honour I die here, and leave this letter to speak for me." \*

The programme assigned by Yamaji was exhausted at 12.30 P.M. It was therefore resolved to utilise the

\* From the *Japan Mail*.

remainder of the day, and the 2nd Regiment which had not yet been engaged, was ordered to attack Huang-chin-shan (Golden Hill) fort, which was the principal coast fort, and had rendered important assistance to the defence during the morning. The Japanese passed through the streets of the town of



HUANG-CHIN-SHAN (GOLDEN HILL) FORT.

Port Arthur, and charged up the hill, taking the fort without much difficulty. There still remained the forts on the Tiger's Tail, and the others on the opposite side of the entrance of the harbour, but as the Chinese abandoned them and fled during the night, it may be said that the formidable fortress of Port Arthur was taken in a single day.

This wonderful result was owing to the fundamental error of the Chinese, who consider that war consists in preparing a vast amount of first-class war material, regardless whether the soldiers that are to use it are a mere undisciplined rabble enlisted on the spur of the moment. The Chinese fired their guns willingly, but did not employ much infantry fire; and when they used their rifles it must have been at very long range, judging from the small proportion of killed to wounded among the Japanese troops.

By the fall of Port Arthur the Japanese were in possession of the best dockyard in the Far East, provided with every requisite for repairing their vessels. They had now a splendid naval base of operations at the enemy's door. It is calculated that the machinery, docks, etc., at Port Arthur represented a value of 60 million *yen*, about six million pounds sterling.

All this was purchased at a very small cost of life; only 270 *hors de combat*, of which the ridiculously small number of eighteen represent those actually killed in battle, though of course many afterwards succumbed to their wounds. The Chinese lost over a thousand killed.

The Japanese celebrated their marvellous victory by great rejoicings; the soldiers assembled on the parade-ground, and shouted "Banzai!" ("Long live!") to their emperor and to Great Japan. Marshal Oyama gave a great banquet, at which General Nishi sang a well-known Japanese verse:



“that he would need a voice like the fall of a mountain to celebrate the great victory of his country.”

But the Japanese did not allow their enthusiasm to interfere with business. On the 26th of November a telegram from Hiroshima (the imperial headquarters) announced, with Spartan terseness, that the naval base of operations was transferred to Port Arthur. It was the epitaph of the Chinese stronghold, which had cost so many millions and years of labour to Viceroy Li-Hung-Chang.

The Regent's Sword peninsula was for administrative purposes divided into two districts, and Japanese officials appointed. On the 1st of December, Marshal Oyama transferred his headquarters to Chin-chow.

The Japanese fleet had prepared to take part in the operation, hoping that the Chinese admiral, Ting, would strike a blow in defence of Port Arthur; but though Admiral Ito on the 11th of November, with a squadron of twelve vessels and six torpedo-boats, tried to tempt him out of Wei-hai-wei, Ting wisely declined to risk his remaining fleet.

On the day of the assault on Port Arthur (21st of November), the Japanese fleet cruised around the harbour, exchanging long-range shots with the coast forts, and, as we have seen, shelled the Chinese fugitives; but their co-operation was purely perfunctory. At the time Port Arthur was taken, a report went abroad that the Japanese torpedo-boats made a daring dash into the harbour, distracting the





**SORTIE OF UNARMED JAPANESE COOLIES ON A BODY OF FUGITIVE CHINESE SOLDIERS  
IN THE NEIGHBOURHOOD OF CHIN CHOW**

attention of the forts, and contributing to the fall of the fortress, but no such incident is mentioned in the Japanese war publications, and it is unlikely they would have omitted such an heroic exploit so congenial to the daring character of the Japanese people.

While the Japanese army was taking Port Arthur, the small garrison which had been left at Chin-chow to guard the isthmus was exposed to a dangerous attack from the Chinese, who suspected that the place was insufficiently defended, and might be taken by a *coup de main*. The garrison, though far inferior in numbers, made a most gallant resistance. A few marines from the fleet taught the infantry to handle the fortress guns captured at Chin-chow, and even the transport coolies volunteered to fight, and on one occasion made a desperate sortie, armed only with cudgels against a body of Chinese fugitives. Chin-chow was for some time exposed to danger on both sides. While the Chinese troops were advancing south by the Fuchou road, bodies of fugitives from Port Arthur were advancing north—their only way of escape. The Japanese, with coolness and boldness, succeeded, however, in warding off the danger from both sides.

The fall of Port Arthur caused an immense sensation. The foreigners in the Far East had been inclined to discount the Japanese victories. These had been won in obscure corners of Corea and the Chinese frontier, and they suspected exaggeration in

the Japanese accounts. They also considered that China had not had time to put forth her whole strength, and imagined that with a few months of preparation the Chinese could repulse any Japanese attack on such a formidable fortress as Port Arthur. All these surmises were refuted by a day's fighting, and it caused great sensation.

At Peking, for the first time, serious alarm was felt and acknowledged. The despised enemy now seemed to be at the gates. An attempt was hurriedly made to avert the imminent danger, and a peace mission was projected. But Chinese love of subterfuge was not yet crushed, and instead of sending well-known statesmen with full powers, a few irresponsible Europeans with inadequate credentials were forwarded to Japan. Mr. Detring, the Commissioner of Customs at Tientsin, and the trusted adviser of the Viceroy Li-Hung-Chang, was sent, bearing a letter from the Viceroy to Count Ito, the Japanese minister, in which there was some reference to an Imperial edict about the peace. The Japanese Government naturally refused to open negotiations with such an envoy, and politely sent him back. The people were indignant, and considered the mission as an insult to the national dignity.

## CHAPTER IV.

## THE FIRST ARMY IN MANCHURIA.

It has been already shown that up to about the middle of November the operations of the two divisions of this army had been confined to two objectives. General Tachimi, with the van of the fifth division, had pushed out numerous reconnaissances to clear the roads north and east, and keep in touch with the Chinese, who might descend south and threaten the Japanese line of communications. General Oseko, with the advanced guard of the third division, had pushed west and captured Hsin-yen on the 18th of November, as a preliminary step to an important strategical movement which would be carried out as soon as the second army, having captured Port Arthur, was free to march north. We must now consider the further operations of the two divisions.

*Fifth Division, or Right Wing of the First Army.*

To understand the operations in this part of Manchuria it is necessary to cast a glance on the roads which intersect the country. There is, first, the main road which, from Chiu-lien-ch'eng and Feng-huang, leads to Liao-yang and Mukden. The

celebrated Mo-tien (Heaven-touching) Pass lies on this road, and we have seen that the Japanese, after a reconnaissance, renounced attacking it, and withdrew their outposts first to Lien-shan-kuan and then to Tsao-ho-kou. Then there is another road which from 'hiu-lien-ch'eng takes a circular sweep east and north, and by Chang-tien, Tuan-tien, Kuan-tien, Ai-yang-pien-men, and Sai-ma-chi joins the main road at Tsao-ho-kou. Between these two roads there are three cross-roads, two of which form a loop between Feng-huang and Ai-yang-pien-men; there is, besides, a road at Sai-ma-chi which leads to northern Manchuria. We need not notice the roads from Chiu-lien-ch'eng to Tai-ku-shan, and from Feng-huang to Hsin-yen, as they lead to that part of the country where the third division intended to operate. Towards the end of November two reconnaissances were made by the fifth division: one by the circular road from 'hiu-lien-ch'eng to Sai-ma-chi, in which the Japanese met only a slight resistance from a few Chinese soldiers supported by peasants armed with matchlocks; the other, led by Tachimi himself, had a far more important object. The Japanese were informed that a body of well-trained Tartar troops from the Amur province, led by General I-ko-teng-a, were marching south by the road which abuts at Sai-ma-chi on the circular road just mentioned. The object of the Chinese general was to retake Feng-huang, and at the same time cut off the Japanese outposts at Lien-shan-kuan. As the Japanese had

already a Chinese force in front of them at Mo-tien Pass, it became important to prevent the junction of these two armies. The Tartars of I-ko-teng-a and the Chinese at the Mo-tien Pass could unite in two ways, either by the road from Tsao-ho-kou to Sai-ma-chi, or by the mountain roads to the north, out of reach of the enemy. To prevent the junction of the two armies, it was sufficient for the Japanese to hold Tsao-ho-kou, which is placed at the intersection of the main road with the road to Sai-ma-chi. Therefore, on the 23rd November, the outpost at Lien-shan-kuan was withdrawn, as too much exposed and of inferior strategical importance.

On the 25th of November the Chinese at Mo-tien Pass came down about 1,500 strong with two guns, and attacked the Japanese outpost at Tsao-ho-kou; while General I-ko-teng-a, with 4,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry and six guns, from Sai-ma-chi, attacked on the other side. The Japanese were hard pressed, but finally drove the enemy back after a sharp engagement. If the Chinese had succeeded, they would have had the road from Tsao-ho-kou to Sai-ma-chi open, and could have joined with the Tartars of I-ko-teng-a.

General Tachimi in the meanwhile started from Feng-huang on the 26th of November, and, taking the other road by Ai-yang-pien-men and Sai-ma-chi, pushed on north-east of Tsao-ho-kou, where, at a place called Tsui-chia-fang, he defeated the Chinese; they were said to be 5,000 strong, and were probably



the force which had attacked Tsao-ho-kou a few days before. The Japanese suffered great hardships, having to ford torrents over ten times, and having their wet clothes frozen by the cold night wind. After this success General Tachimi returned by the main road, and was at Feng-huang on the 5th of December. In ten days he had made a circular march by Ai-yang-pien-men, Sai-ma-chi, Tsao-ho-kou, and back to Feng-huang; he had also pursued into the mountains the force which had been defeated at Tsao-ho-kou on the 25th of November. Thus far the Japanese had not only prevented the junction of the two Chinese forces along the road from Mo-tien Pass to Sai-ma-chi, but they had rendered such a junction difficult, even by the mountain roads.

The Japanese, however, were obliged to retire after these successes. It is probable that they found great difficulty in provisioning their outposts; and, as these were always liable to attack, they probably thought it better to allow the enemy to advance, and then give him such a lesson that would enable them to enjoy a protracted rest. The outpost at Tsao-ho-kou was withdrawn, and General Tachimi took up a position south.

The road from Mo-tien Pass to Sai-ma-chi, which had been hitherto blocked by the Japanese outpost, was now open to the Chinese, who could join with the Tartars. General I-ko-teng-a seized the opportunity, and prepared to attack Feng-huang; his forces advanced by three roads, the main road from

Tsao-ho-kou to Feng-huang, and the two roads which from the latter place, forming a loop, join again at Ai-yang-pien-men. The Tartar general himself led the detachment on the main road.

General Tachimi, being informed of the enemy's advance, left Feng-huang on the 9th of December, and, marching north, met the enemy near Pan-chia-tai. At this place the road and a small river run between two hills about 250 metres high, and from 1,200 to 2,000 metres apart. General I-ko-teng-a had 2,000 drilled troops and over 1,000 new levies, with two guns; the Japanese had three battalions, with a small force of artillery. General Tachimi made a vigorous attack on the Chinese centre, and broke the enemy's force in two, dispersing it right and left. The engagement lasted from 10 A.M. to 4 P.M. The Chinese losses were over 100 killed, and the Japanese pursued the enemy all the next day.

The rest of the Amur army, estimated at 6,000, marched towards Feng-huan by the two roads from Ai-yang-pien-men. The Japanese were obliged to call up reinforcements, and a battalion stationed at *Tang-shan* was sent to Feng-huang, its place being taken by a battalion from Chiu-lien. Thus reinforced, Colonel Tomoyasu marched out of Feng-huang, and met the Chinese on the morning of the 14th of December, and defeated them, capturing four guns. At the same time General Tachimi, who was far away in front on the main road, was informed of the enemy's approach, and ordered to send a detachment to inter-

cept their retreat. This unexpected attack in the rear completed the rout of the Chinese, and they gave no further trouble in this part of Manchuria.

We now take leave of General Tachimi, who earned such glory in the first great battle of the war, when, together with Colonel Sato, he stormed the Peony Mount at Phyöng-yang, and decided the fall of that city. Since that brilliant exploit he had no chance of distinguishing himself in any considerable action; his time was spent in mountain marches and desultory warfare, which, though requiring eminent qualities, and of considerable importance to the safety of the line of communications of the Japanese army, were not of a nature to attract popular attention. His soldiers, however, appreciated him, because the Japanese say that Tachimi possessed the qualities of Napoleon in knowing how to make the enemy's country support an army; his men were always well-provided, although they had to camp and march in a mountainous country during a rigorous winter. In fact, the sufferings of the Japanese were of no ordinary character, and could not have been borne without the foresight of the staff and the excellent arrangements of the commissariat. As soon as it became evident that a winter campaign was necessary, the Japanese Government purchased a large quantity of sheepskin \* overcoats, which were distributed to the troops. Throughout the whole campaign the

\* Most of these skins were said to have been bought in China.

columns of transport coolies dragged carts over the mountain roads to the Japanese outposts, constantly supplying them with all that was necessary.

General Tachimi was confronted in Manchuria by the ablest and boldest of the Chinese generals; the Japanese remark that I-ko-teng-a was the first who assumed the offensive; the other generals at Söng-huang, Ph्योंg-yang, and Chiu-lien, ensconced behind their forts, apathetically waited for the enemy to come. I-ko-teng-a also showed some strategical ability in the disposition of his forces, which might have been attended with success if some of the detachments had advanced sooner, so as to combine a simultaneous attack. His attempts to take Feng-huang were most persistent, and he probably would have renewed them if the bold advance of the third division had not obliged him, for strategical reasons, to retreat and take his forces to a region where a greater danger threatened the armies of his country.

*The Third Division or Left Wing of the First Army.*

We have just seen how the fifth division repulsed the Chinese attempts to recover Feng-huang, and break the Japanese line of communications; we have now to follow the movements of the other portion of the first army—the third division—which about this time performed one of the most brilliant strategical operations of the war. From the time the Japanese crossed the Yalu they declared they had two

objectives in the campaign—Mukden and Peking. The first was more of the nature of a feint to mislead the enemy ; but the Japanese, as we have seen with Oshima's attack at Phyōng-yang, carry out their demonstrations with an earnestness which renders them true attacks, and, besides, the genius of Yamagata evolved a plan which menaced both objectives at the same time. It is truly surprising what complexity of results the Japanese can produce from the simplest military movement. They obtain this by never losing sight of the principal object of the campaign ; the details then naturally follow as an inevitable consequence.

A glance at the map of Northern China and Manchuria will show that the main road from Peking to Mukden, after running parallel to the coast and nearly straight up to the neighbourhood of Chin-chow (not the Chin-chow near Port Arthur), there takes a sweep eastward to Mukden. At the same place there is another road which continues along by Ying-kow (modern Newchwang) to Kai-ping, and at the latter town, after sending off a branch road to Hsin-yen and Chin-lien, continues along the coast to Port Arthur. There is also another road from Chiu-lien-cheng and Hsin-yen, which leads to Hai-cheng, and thence by Newchwang \* (old) to the main road from Peking to Mukden. Resuming, we may say that the Japanese armies at Port Arthur, and near the Yalu,

\* It is called old to distinguish it from Ying-kow, the treaty port, which foreigners generally call Newchwang.

had three roads to advance towards China proper : one that keeps always along the coast from Port Arthur, by Fuchow, Kai-ping, and Ying-kow, which was destined for the second army ; another from Feng-huang, by the Mo-tien (Heaven-touching) Pass and Liao-yang to Mukden, where the main road would lead to Peking ; this road, besides being very circuitous, was strongly guarded at the Mo-tien (Heaven-touching) Pass ; and, finally, there was the third route, between the two former, which leads from Feng-huang by Hsin-yen to Hai-cheng. It was now the object of the third division to occupy Hai-cheng. If this object could be achieved, the following results would follow : the defence of Mukden at the formidable Mo-tien Pass would be destroyed, as that pass would be turned, and the Japanese could approach directly by Liao-yang ; the Chinese armies stationed along the line—Mukden, Liao-yang, Hai-cheng, and Kai-ping—would be cut in two, and as Hai-cheng is a centre of roads irradiating in every direction, the Japanese could advance and beat in detail their scattered adversaries ; lastly, as Hai-cheng is only seventy-five miles from Shih-san-shan (near Chinchow (Thirteen Hills)), while Mukden is 135 miles from that point, the Japanese could at any time continue their direct advance by the chord of the arc described by the main road, and completely cut off from China the troops stationed at Liao-yang and Mukden. By a simple march the Japanese would be able, while attacking the enemy's front, to threaten

his line of retreat, and force him either to retire or be broken in two and defeated in detail.

A preliminary step to this strategical movement had already been made when Oseko occupied Hsin-yen, but his force was inadequate to carry out the entire operation, so the third division was organised to act independently. On the 3rd of December the main body of this division left the headquarters at An-tung, and on the 8th had reached Hsin-yen, when it was joined by its commander, General Katsura, who had started from An-tung on the 5th of December. A day's rest was granted to the troops, and on the 10th they started for Tomu-cheng (knocker-wood town), where it was ascertained the Chinese had a force to defend the road to Hai-cheng. The day before (the 9th) two detachments had been sent out, one under Colonel Sato, to advance towards Kai-ping, and guard against any flank attack from the Chinese army stationed in that neighbourhood; and the other, under General Oseko, to advance upon Tomu-cheng by another route. On the 11th of December the main body met Chinese forces at Erh-tao-ho-tzū (two-road river) and Pai-tsao-wa-kou (white-grass-hollow-ditch), respectively about 4,000 and 2,000 strong; after a short engagement these troops were defeated, and on the 12th the main body entered Tomu-cheng at the same time with General Oseko, who had taken another road, and defeated a body of 3,000 Chinese. The next day (the 13th) the Japanese advanced on Hai-cheng, where the Chinese had taken a position

on two hills flanking the town ; after a very short resistance they retired, and the Japanese occupied the town. It is not necessary to give details of these skirmishes, because during the fighting on the 11th and 12th the Japanese only lost seven wounded, and on the 13th they captured Hai-cheng without any loss. Considering the great strategical importance of that town, it was very cheaply purchased. For the rest of the campaign Hai-cheng was the pivot of all the operations of the two hostile armies.

As soon as they had abandoned Hai-cheng, the Chinese began to feel the importance of that loss ; they probably did not grasp at once the remote contingencies of the position, and recognise the danger of a Japanese advance direct to Shih-san-shan (thirteen hills) or Chin-chow, thus cutting off all the Manchurian armies from China ; but they felt immediately the inconvenience of an enemy thrust in between their armies. The direct communication between Liao-yang and Ying-kow (modern Newchwang) passes through Hai-cheng, and was therefore intercepted by the Japanese ; the Chinese could communicate by a circuitous route through Newchwang (old), but even this was dangerous, as the Japanese at Hai-cheng, by advancing on Newchwang, could cut that route also. Not only were the Chinese communications rendered difficult, but to avoid losing them, they had to further disperse their forces by detaching troops to protect Newchwang. For the rest of the war the Chinese armies were stationed in



the environs of Liao-yang, Newchwang (old), and Ying-kow (modern Newchwang), and the Japanese, situated in the midst of them, at Hai-cheng, kept beating back their advances and preventing their junction. Of course, the Japanese accepted great risks by taking up such a position; but events showed they had been justified in running these hazards against a slow, inactive foe like the Chinese. Katsura's march to Hai-cheng had been undertaken a month before the advance of the second army on Kai-ping; he was therefore unsupported, and if the Chinese had attacked him simultaneously with all their armies, before he could fortify his position, he would have been exposed to great danger; but such concerted action was wanting, and the Chinese neglected the opportunity. Katsura, when he marched from Ilsin-yen, had foreseen the possible dangers of his advance, and had detached Colonel Sato towards Kai-ping to guard his flank; that officer proceeded as far as Chien-ma-ho-tzù (thousand horse river) on the 13th of December, and remained there watching the movements of the enemy.

General Sung advanced from Ying-kow (modern Newchwang) with about 10,000 men, hoping to dislodge the Japanese from their advantageous position. Katsura, being informed of this movement by his scouts, feared that if he gave the Chinese time, the Liao-yang army might attack on the other side and crush him; he, therefore, resolved to assume the offensive and defeat Sung before the other generals

had fixed their plans. The two armies met at Kang-wa-sai (vat-brick village), where Sung had commenced to entrench himself, probably with the intention of waiting until the Liao-yang army was ready for a combined attack.

General Katsura left a small force to guard Hai-cheng, and advanced with the bulk of his forces to Pa-li-ho (eight *li* river), a village situated at the junction of two roads, one leading by Ta-shih-chiao (great stone bridge) to Kaiping, and the other by Kang-wa-sai (vat-brick village) and Kao-kan (high cutting) to Ying-kow (modern Newchwang). He was thus able to protect Hai-cheng from an advance from either road. On the morning of the 19th of December, Major-General Oseko was ordered to advance towards Kang-wa-sai, with a regiment of infantry, some cavalry and three batteries of artillery : his force probably numbered about 2,500 men. Oseko arrived at Kai-chia-tun (covered house village) about 11 A.M., without encountering Chinese troops, but his cavalry videttes informed him that they were massed in great numbers at Kang-wa-sai. He reported the news to Katsura and attacked the enemy.

The road from Hai-cheng to Ying-kow, between Kai-chia-tun (covered house village) and Kang-wa-sai, takes a bend south, passing through the villages of Shang-chia-ho (upper extra river) and Hsia-chia-ho (lower extra river). At the latter place a side road leads to Ma-chüan-tzü (horse pen), and from thence another road passing through Hsiang-shui-pao-tzü

(fragrant water bubbles) goes to Kang-wa-sai. These roads form a rough triangle, which contains a hillock and a pine-wood. Chinese troops were observed in Kang-wa-sai and Ma-chüan-tzū (horse pen), and when the Japanese, advancing by the main road, arrived at Hsia-chia-ho (lower extra river), they saw the necessity of first attacking Ma-chüan-tzū, otherwise the Chinese from that place could deliver a dangerous flank attack, threatening to cut them off from the rest of the army which was on the road to Hai-cheng.

A battalion (consisting only of three companies) was detached for this work. One company was kept back as a reserve, and the other two advanced towards Ma-chüan-tzū, but were exposed to a heavy fire on the left flank by the Chinese ambushed in the pine-wood. This necessitated another change of front, the enemy in the wood having to be dealt with first. The Japanese turned, and drove back the enemy on their left flank; but while the Chinese in the wood were retreating, those in Ma-chüan-tzū opened fire on the right flank of the new Japanese formation. This brought about a new change of front, which was executed with great difficulty, the soldiers having to march knee-deep in the snow. The third company was now brought forward, and the eighteen guns originally intended for the attack of Kang-wa-sai concentrated their fire on Ma-chüan-tzū, which was taken by a rush of the Japanese infantry.

Oseko, having defeated the Chinese left wing and secured his right flank, proceeded with the original attack on Kang-wa-sai, directing all his artillery against that place, but the superior numbers and strong position of the Chinese were too much for his small force, and it was not until 4 P.M., when Major-General Oshima \* arrived with reinforcements, that he was able to deliver a serious attack. At that time the battalion which had taken Ma-chüan-tzü was able to co-operate, attacking the Chinese left flank; but the enemy had placed four guns in Kang-wa-sai, had cut loop-holes in the mud walls, had piled furniture on the top of them, for shelter against the Japanese fire, and opposed a stubborn resistance. It was not until 5 P.M. that the Japanese became masters of the place.

The whole Japanese force engaged in the battle amounted to 4,537 men, but the brunt of the fighting fell on Oseko with about half that number. The losses were very severe, nearly 400 killed and wounded, about 9 per cent. of the total number engaged. The Chinese loss could not be ascertained, as they carried away their wounded and even their dead; but it was estimated at about 200 killed and 200 or 300 wounded. The Japanese remark that this was the first time during the war that the losses on both sides were nearly equal: hitherto, contrary to all military experience, though the Japanese had been always the attackers, and the Chinese the

\* Not the Oshima of Asan and Ph्योंg-yang.

defenders, of strong positions, the Chinese losses had been much greater in every engagement. Various reasons are suggested to explain the relatively heavy Japanese losses; the most probable are, that, owing to the snow which covered the ground, the dark outline of the advancing Japanese became an easy target for the Chinese guns and rifles; and that, as the battle ended at night-fall, there was no pursuit, during which the greatest slaughter of a routed enemy takes place.

General Sung's forces can be enumerated as follows :—

I-tzū army	.	.	.	.	5 camps.
Ming-tzū army	.	.	.	.	13 „
Sung-wu „	.	.	.	.	4 „
Other soldiers	.	.	.	.	6 „
<hr/>					
Total	.	.	.	.	28 „
<hr/>					

This would give a nominal strength of 14,000 men, but as most of the troops had already been engaged, and defeated, it is probable they had dwindled down to less than 10,000 men. Though Sung was attacked at Kang-wa-sai, yet as he had advanced from Kaiping, we may consider him to have undertaken an offensive operation, which in itself is a remarkable feat for a Chinese general; moreover, with the support of hastily constructed entrenchments, he succeeded in inflicting on the Japanese the heaviest percentage of losses of the whole war. We cannot therefore deny him exceptional praise, especially when we consider



GENERAL OSHIMA AND HIS TROOPS FIGHTING IN THE SNOW



that he was a very old man: properly supported by the Liao-yang army, he might have seriously embarrassed Katsura's advanced position at Hai-cheng.

We left Colonel Sato in observation at Chien-ma-ho-tzū (thousand horse river). There he witnessed the movements of the Chinese army as they advanced from Kaiping by Tang-chih (soup-pond) and Ta-shih-chiao (great stone bridge) towards Hai-cheng. On the night of the 18th of December, he received orders from General Katsura to retreat to Tomu-cheng (knocker-wood town), as General Sung was reported to be advancing with 20,000 men. On the 19th he heard firing in the direction of Kang-wa-sai, and on the same night left for Tomu-cheng, which place he reached on the 22nd of December.

General Sung, after his defeat, retreated with the bulk of his forces to Kao-Kan (high cutting), protecting the road to Ying-kou: another portion of his army retreated to Newchwang (old).

The severe check inflicted on Sung at Kang-wa-sai discouraged the Chinese army at Liao-yang, and secured a month's rest to Katsura, which he diligently employed in fortifying his position. Hai-cheng is surrounded by hills: on the south there are Chiao-moi-shan and Tan-wan-shan, on the east Ching-chia-shan, and on the north Huan-hsi-shan (joy mountain) and Shuang-lung-shan (double dragon mountain). These hills form an excellent line of defence, within which Katsura kept his army, only sending out reconnoitring parties to watch the



enemy's movements. Major-General Oseko was entrusted with the south-western defence and Major-General Oshima with the north-eastern.

On the 13th of January it was reported that a Chinese force of about 20,000 men was coming from Liao-yang. The advance was slow and cautious on the 14th they were about ten miles from Hai-cheng, on the 15th about five or six, and on the night of the 16th the Chinese line in some places approached to within  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles of Hai-cheng. On the 17th the Chinese commenced firing at daybreak, and continued until night-fall: as they never approached closer than 1,600 metres, the Japanese did not answer up till noon, in the vain hope of encouraging the enemy to advance. But the Chinese were not caught by this artful trick, and kept firing from a safe distance. About 1 P.M. the Japanese, finding it useless to wait, pushed forward their artillery, and a brisk cannonade soon threw the Chinese into disorder, and they commenced a retreat which was hastened by the advance of the Japanese infantry. This brief summary is quite sufficient for such a paltry affair, which was justly considered as the most ridiculous battle on record (though it was to be surpassed later on). About 14,000 Chinese with artillery fired at Hai-cheng all day, and the Japanese losses were only one killed and forty-nine wounded: they evidently hoped to frighten the Japanese out of the place by making a great noise.

Throughout the latter part of the war the Chinese



JAPANESE ARMY ADVANCING THROUGH THE SNOW



infantry seem to have preferred long-range firing, while the Japanese invariably reserved their rifles for 600 metres, and continued up to 200 metres, when they employed the bayonet.

The Chinese losses had been very slight, and encouraged by the arrival of reinforcements which brought up their number to about 20,000, they advanced in a similar manner against Hai-cheng on the 22nd of January. This time they were a little bolder, and advanced to within 600 metres of the enemy's positions, when the Japanese, with seven battalions and three batteries, drove back their right wing, while with another force they threatened their line of retreat. The Chinese retreated with a loss of about 200 or 300 men: the Japanese loss was even more insignificant than on the former occasion—one killed and twenty-six wounded. What makes these trifling engagements worthy of an historical notice is, that at the time rumours were circulated in China and Japan that the first army (at least that portion in Hai-cheng) had been annihilated. The two soldiers killed in the engagements of the 17th and 22nd of January were, we must suppose, the foundation of this colossal "canard."

The only difficulties the Japanese had to encounter at Hai-cheng came from the climate, and the distance of their source of supplies. The cold was intense, reaching 20° Fahrenheit below zero (—29 Centigrade), but the Japanese are a hardy race, capable of resisting very low temperatures, and during the cold winter of

northern China the soldiers used to strip naked in the freezing wind to enjoy their favourite national pastime of wrestling.\* Though supplies were scarce, and even the generals reduced to a ration of one bad candle per night, still food was always at hand, and the soldier never went without his three substantial meals a day.

While the third division had to endure nearly a month of military inactivity, we may glance back at what had been done in another direction by the second army.

\* This was actually witnessed by foreigners near Wei-hai-wei, but probably the same was done in Manchuria.

## CHAPTER V.

## THE ADVANCE OF THE SECOND ARMY.

WE have already explained that Lt.-General Katsura's advance on Hai-cheng was hazardous, and would have been inexcusable in the face of any except a Chinese army; it is strange he was left to advance alone when the second army could have co-operated by advancing northward at the same time. On the 10th of December Katsura commenced his march on Hai-cheng; by that time the second army had not only rested after the Port Arthur campaign, but had fixed its headquarters at Chin-chow since the 1st of December. It could have marched forward immediately, and arrived at Kaiping about the time that Katsura occupied Hai-cheng, but instead it delayed its departure for a month. It is probable that difficulties of transport rendered long preparatory work necessary before commencing an advance. Winter had set in, and the roads were difficult. The Japanese gave up coolie transport and resorted to the natives, who provided bullock carts for the use of the commissariat; the road to be traversed was divided into stations, each station being provided with relays of carts and bullocks.

There must, however, have been reasons of another nature that dictated a certain delay before prosecuting the campaign with vigour. Soon after the first battles of the war, probably after the crossing of the Yalu, the Japanese staff must have known that they could carry on the campaign as they liked, and that China was a mere dummy on which they were experimenting. There were also political reasons : it was generally supposed that Japan could win only by a rush, taking China by surprise--the Japanese were resolved to 'explode this error, by beating their adversary leisurely, and convince the world that they could win as they liked. A prolongation of the hostilities, moreover, would gradually inform all the inhabitants of China that there was a war, and permeate throughout the vast empire the consciousness of defeat. Besides the Japanese troops had a unique occasion to practise the modern art of war and to carry on huge experiments in *corpoore belli*. Whether any or all these reasons actuated the Japanese Government, it is certain that the second army remained over a month in complete inactivity.

On the 30th of December, a mixed brigade, under the command of Major-General Nogi, was ordered to march north : it consisted of two regiments of infantry, a battalion of cavalry, a company of engineers, and a battalion of artillery, probably about 8,000 men. It started on the 1st of January, 1895, for Pu-lan-tien (Port Adams), whence, by two roads, it advanced to Hsinng-yo-cheng (Bear Rock Town), a town about

eighteen miles from Kaiping, where the two roads meet again. General Nogi reached this place on the 8th of January. On the following day a further advance was made to within eight miles of Kaiping, where the scouts had ascertained the Chinese were in force. On the 8th of January an officer and a few soldiers of the first army from To-mu-cheng joined the mixed brigade, establishing the first communications between the two armies. The Japanese in their march from Chin-chow, a distance of about 115 miles, met with very severe weather, but each soldier was provided with a fur-coat, which was sent on ahead to the station where he was to bivouack.

Kaiping has about 15,000 inhabitants, and is surrounded by a wall thirty feet high and ten feet thick. The Kaiping river, from fifty to seventy metres wide, runs in front of it, and in the space of about 300 metres between the town and the river, the Chinese had built semicircular redoubts. As the river was frozen, the Chinese, following one of their old military rules, had cut up the ice so as to make the passage difficult. The defending force was about 4,000 or 5,000 strong, and the position so formidable that the Japanese officers afterwards declared, that if they had known it, they would have hesitated in attacking.

General Nogi made the following dispositions for the attack: Colonel Kano, with two battalions of infantry, was to make a feint on the Chinese right; Colonel Oki, on the right, with two battalions, was to attack the enemy's left wing, while Nogi himself, with



two battalions of infantry and the artillery and engineers, was to attack the centre.

On the morning of the 10th of January at 5.30 A.M., the Japanese commenced their march on Kaiping—the battle commenced at about 7 A.M. Colonel Oki, looking at the enemy's position, saw on their left a



MAJOR-GENERAL NOGRI.

hill called Feng-Huang-shan (Phoenix Hill), which he at once compared to Tem-san,\* and ordered the first battalion to cross the frozen river and dislodge the Chinese. The battalion advanced and occupied Feng-

\* A mountain that played an important part in the celebrated Japanese battle of Yanuzaki, fought between Hideyoshi and Aketchi.



JAPANESE SOLDIERS ADVANCING ON THE ICE



Huang-shan (Phoenix Hill), throwing the Chinese left wing into great disorder. Oki then ordered the second battalion to cross the river and attack the wavering Chinese, following himself with two companies. The enemy's left wing was broken and retreated west into the fields, receiving a heavy flank fire from the Japanese battalion on Feng-huang-shan, which killed over 100 of them. Ensign Ogawa, at this time rushed through a hail of bullets and, though wounded, climbed on the south-western corner of Kaiping, planting the flag of the first regiment on the walls.

In the meantime the Japanese centre had made little progress, and the left wing was threatened with a flank attack by reinforcements which were coming up from Ying-kow. It became necessary to finish the battle soon, and the reserves were called up; a simultaneous advance was made by the centre and the two wings, and at 9.40 A.M. Kaiping was in the hands of the Japanese.

The Chinese tactics in this battle were far superior to those in any previous engagement. Instead of hiding behind walls, their troops were stationed on the north bank of the river, presenting a line of fire of 2,000 metres to the advancing Japanese; they also utilised the river in a proper military way, as an obstacle to retard the enemy while he was exposed to their fire. They dispensed with the foolish custom of waving a lot of flags, and did not waste their ammunition at long ranges, but reserved their fire for 400 and 500 metres. There was also another point

in which they showed improvement: the Japanese troops, attacking a position, always advance by a succession of rushes, lying down from time to time; hitherto the Chinese fired all the time, regardless whether the enemy was advancing or lying down, but at Kaiping the Chinese only fired when the Japanese were advancing. In consequence of these tactics, the Japanese losses were heavy, forty-six killed and 263 wounded in about three hours' fighting.

The Chinese retreated towards Ying-Kow in good order, covering their retreat with a rear-guard, and stopped at Ho-chia-tien, about four miles from Kaiping. The Japanese outposts were advanced to Haisan-sui (Sea Hill Village).

The capture of Kaiping was of great strategical importance: not only was Katsura's position at Hai-cheng rendered perfectly safe, and communications established between the two armies, which could, if necessary, render each other assistance, but by the possession of Kaiping and Hai-cheng the Japanese commanded all the roads leading to China. The former place being a centre of the coast routes, and the latter of the inland roads. With a secure position and the means of striking when they pleased in any direction, the two Japanese armies halted for some time, until more favourable weather, and the progress of military events in another region, rendered a vigorous prosecution of the campaign easy and profitable.

## CHAPTER VI.

## THE WEI-HAI-WEI CAMPAIGN.

THE forces at Hai-cheng and Kaiping had decided to act on the defensive until their proper time of action should come ; but those at the latter place represented only a small part of the second army. Only one brigade under General Nogi had been advanced, thus leaving two in the Regent's Sword Peninsula. One was required to guard the important fortresses of Ta-lien and Port Arthur ; but the other, the Kuroki Brigade, could be employed in a naval expedition during the remainder of the winter, while operations were arrested in Manchuria. The second (Sendai) division was now mobilised and sent to Ta-lien, which had become the Japanese naval base of operations since the capture of Port Arthur. Marshal Oyama, with his staff, took command of this new army, composed, like his former one, of a brigade and a division.

The Japanese, when they wisely judged that a rapid prosecution of the Manchurian campaign was unadvisable, sought some other object which should employ their troops and contribute to the general ends of the war. Wei-hai-wei answered all these views. It was conveniently situated near Ta-lien Bay ; it was the second naval stronghold of China, or,

to use the picturesque language of the Emperor of Japan, it was one of the leaves of the gate of China, the other being Port Arthur; it also sheltered the Pei-yang squadron. That fleet, though severely handled at Hai-yuan Island, was still a formidable collection of vessels, and the Japanese could never feel entirely secure until it was destroyed. That factor eliminated from the campaign, the Japanese could prosecute the war at their pleasure, and advance their armies by land or sea, or by both ways. Taken in such a light, the capture of Wei-hai-wei would be more important than was the fall of Port Arthur, as in all probability the Chinese fleet would be either taken or destroyed.

The Japanese, as usual, commenced by a feigned attack. On the 18th of January a squadron of three vessels, the *Yoshino*, *Akitsushima*, and *Naniwa*, left Ta-lien and proceeded towards Teng-chou, a city of 10,000 inhabitants, about 100 miles west of the Shantung promontory. Owing to a snow-storm the Japanese could not commence the attack until 4 P.M., when they fired blank cartridges at a Chinese fort; they soon employed shells, as the enemy answered vigorously with a battery of eight guns, amongst which was one of 12 centimetres. On the following morning it snowed again, but as soon as it cleared up the Japanese recommenced firing, and were briskly answered by the forts. During this bombardment one of the most comic incidents of the war occurred: in this out-of-the-way town some missionaries lived

the kind of life the Spaniards lived in California, so inimitably described by Bret Harte in his 'Eye of the 'Comandante;' they were ruthlessly awakened from their dreamy existence by the sound of the Japanese artillery, and 'flattering themselves that the seat of war was being transferred to their neighbourhood, one of them, with visions of the Pope stopping Attila in his mind, embarked in a small boat with a white flag and an American flag. His object was to go and "try and induce the ships to refrain from cruel and wanton destruction of innocent lives and property." The Japanese naturally imagined that he had come out to enjoy the fight, and left him to his devices. What rendered the situation still more comical is, that the whole operation was a diversion; while the three men-of-war were firing at Teng-chou, the real expedition was starting in a different direction, and the missionary with his small boat contributed to the realistic *mise-en-scène* of the Japanese feigned attack. The Chinese had been fearing an attack on Teng-chou, as there are excellent landing-places in the neighbourhood, and the news of the bombardment sent all the disposable Chinese forces in Shantung in the direction of Teng-chou.

The real expedition started from Ta-lien Bay on the 19th of January. It was composed of fifty transports, and reached the coast of Shantung in three squadrons on the 20th, 21st, and 23rd respectively; it was protected by almost the whole Japanese fleet of twenty vessels, some escorting and others watching



the Chinese fleet in Wei-hai-wei. The place chosen for the landing was a convenient beach near the city of Yung-cheng, sheltered from the northerly winds. The Chinese had made some slight preparations for resistance, and there were about 200 or 300 soldiers with four guns, who opened fire on the Japanese boats as they attempted to land. The *Yaeyama*, on perceiving this, signalled to the boats to come back, and opened fire with shell on the Chinese battery. A few rounds were sufficient to disperse the defending force, and the Japanese landed and captured the guns. Arrangements were made at once for the landing of the troops; to avoid confusion, the naval officers divided the beach into sections, allotting one to each regiment or battalion, and though there was a heavy fall of snow, all proceeded with order and rapidity.

The landing of such a large force required several days; it was not until the 26th of January that the Japanese army, divided into two columns, marched by the two roads which lead from Yung-cheng to Wei-hai-wei. The inland route was taken by the second (Sendai) division, and the sea-route by the Kumamoto brigade. The roads were found to be wretched, impassable even for field-pieces, so that the army had to advance only with mountain guns. The city of Yung-cheng had been occupied shortly after the landing, and though five battalions of 350 men were supposed to defend it, the Chinese offered hardly any resistance; six Japanese soldiers scaled one of the gates and threw it open to their comrades. There

were a few skirmishes on the way to Wei-hai-wei, but, nothing worth recording happened until the Japanese were in the neighbourhood of that fortress.

The fleet had been, all this time, very active, watching Wei-hai-wei and the Chinese fleet. On the 21st of January, a squadron of eleven vessels steamed near that port, and when it retired, a man-of-war was left to keep constant watch; this duty was undertaken by several vessels who relieved each other by turns. On the 25th the British man-of-war *Seyn*\* carried to Wei-hai-wei a letter from Admiral Ito to Ting, the Chinese admiral, advising him to surrender. This step was not a new one on the part of the Japanese; before the attack on Port Arthur, a Japanese officer, who had resided long in China, addressed a letter to the Chinese generals advising surrender, as resistance was useless. When the Japanese took Port Arthur they found the draft of a contemptuous answer which was, however, never sent. The present letter from Ito to Ting will be alluded to again when the whole correspondence about the surrender of Wei-hai-wei is mentioned; it is contained in an appendix, and is worth reading, as it is a remarkable document, showing great breadth of views and historical knowledge.

\* This letter, written in English, was published in the *Japan Mail*, but without any date, and no mention of its having been delivered by a British man-of-war. The latter statement is derived from a Japanese war publication; if it is correct, it would explain why Admiral Ting proposed that the British admiral should be guarantor of the surrender of Wei-hai-wei.

Wei-hai-wei, the last refuge of the Pei-yang Squadron, is a semicircular bay whose coasts measure about eighteen or twenty miles in length. The entrance is protected by two islands, Liu-kung, 500 feet high and about six miles in circumference, and Jih, which is small and only contains a fort. The water is mostly shallow, but near the western corner of Liu-kung Island there is excellent anchorage. The large island at the mouth of the bay naturally forms two entrances; the eastern is the widest, but has Jih Island in the centre. Around the bay and on the two islands at its mouth, numerous batteries and forts had been erected to guard against attacks from land and sea. In describing the fortifications, it will be advisable to follow the order in which they were attacked by the Japanese, to render the following narrative clearer.

(On the southern shore, near the eastern entrance, coming from the sea, three littoral forts presented themselves in the following order :—

Chao-peï-tsui	.	.	{	three 24-centimetre guns.
			{	two 28-       "       "
Lu-chueh-tsui	.	.		four 24-       "       "
Lung-Miao-tsui	.	.	{	two 21-       "       "
			{	two 15-       "       "

These batteries were protected on the land side by four forts mounting respectively—

Four 15-centimetre guns.
Two 12-       "       "       " quick-firing.
Four 12-       "       "       "
Two 12-       "       "       " quick-firing.

On Jih Island there was a fort with

**Two 26-centimetre guns.**

Two 12- " " quick-firing,

two of which were mounted on disappearing carriages.

On Liu-kung Island there were forts on the eastern and western corners :—

**Eastern** . . . two 24-centimetre guns.

Western . : six 24- " "

**There also were disappearing guns.**

On the northern shore, near the western entrance, there were likewise three forts, which, coming from the sea, were in the following order :—

**First Poshan** . six 24-centimetre guns.

Second „ . two 21- „ „

Third	"	"	two 21-	"	"
			two 15-	"	"

To the back of these forts, for protection against land attack, there were two forts :—

First (two 15-centimetre guns.

First . . . two 12- " " quick-firing.

Second (two 15- " "

Second . . . (two 12- " " quick-firing.

Besides all these forts there were some unfinished batteries on the western side of the harbour, between the northern and southern shores. To defend all the forts on land and on the islands, there must have been nearly 10,000 men \*—a force fully adequate for a stubborn resistance if properly trained and well led. There were a few foreigners stationed in the batteries,

\* This probably includes the sailors of the fleet.

but they had little professional training, and were destitute of any real authority.

The above description of the forts, their armament and garrisons, does not exhaust the defences of Wei-hai-wei: Admiral Ting had with him the remainder of the Pei-yang squadron, a formidable array of twenty-five vessels. Their particulars are as follows: the *Chen-yuen*, *Ting-yuen*, *Tsi-yuen*, *Lai-yuen*, *Ping-yuen*, *Kuang-ping*, *Wei-yuen*, *Ching-yuen*, and *Kang-chi*; six small gun-boats, seven large torpedo-boats and four small. All these vessels could be used for the defence of the harbour, the small gun-boats from their shallow draught being able to approach the land, and sweep the shore with their guns. On board the fleet there must have been at least 4,000 sailors, and, as they were well disciplined, they constituted a really valuable force.

To guard against torpedo attacks, and to prevent the Japanese fleet forcing its way into the bay, two formidable booms had been constructed across the two entrances; they consisted of hawsers,  $2\frac{1}{2}$  metres apart, formed of three strands of steel wire, each strand from three to four centimetres in thickness; at intervals of nine metres, baulks of timber forty centimetres thick were attached, and the whole boom was fixed by chains and anchors, and torpedoes were placed in front of both booms.

The Japanese army commenced its advance on the 26th of January. On the 25th orders had been given that the right column (the Kumamoto brigade)

should advance as far as Pao-chia (Awabi-house), keeping up communications with the fleet; the left column should advance to Chang-chia-kou-tzŭ (Chang-house Pass), keeping touch with the right column. Both columns were to throw out scouts to reconnoitre the enemy's position. On the 29th the troops had reached their destination, and it was ascertained that the Chinese were massed in large numbers around P'ô-chih-ya-so (Place of the 100-foot Cliff), the headland which closes the bay to the east. At Feng-lin-chi (Phoenix-grove) there is a junction of several roads, amongst which the one that serves for the communications of the eastern defences with the town of Wei-hai-wei and the western forts: an attack, therefore, on Feng-lin-chi (Phoenix-grove) threatened the retreat of the defenders at P'ô-chih-ya-so (Place of the 100-foot Cliff). The Japanese employed their usual tactics, attacking the front, and at the same time threatening the line of retreat. On the night of the 29th of January orders were issued that, on the following morning, the second division should advance and take the hills to the south and east of Feng-lin-chi, while the Kumamoto brigade should attack P'ô-chih-ya-so and the land defences of the three eastern littoral forts. The fleet was to co-operate by bombarding those forts from the sea.

The second division advanced at 6 A.M. on the 30th of January, and at 7 A.M. it encountered the Chinese, and gradually drove them, without much resistance, from height to height, until it pursued


them to the sea-shore. The retreat of the defenders of the eastern forts was thus cut off; but a new military element appeared on the scene, which destroyed the results of the Japanese tactics: the Chinese fleet approached the shore, and shelled the Japanese troops so heavily \* that they had to retire to Feng-lin-chi. It was now 9.50 A.M., and the second division pushed on to Mo-tien-ling (Heaven-touching Pass),† and after taking it occupied Lung-niao-tsui, the third of the littoral forts. The guns were found in good order, and were at once directed on the Chinese ships and island forts; but the *Ting-yuen*, which with the gunboats had shelled back the Japanese infantry, now steamed quite close to the fort, and in about half-an-hour silenced it. One of the 24-centimetre guns in the fort was struck by a shell and broken in two, the free end flying away about forty feet.

The Kumamoto brigade began to advance at 3.30 A.M., and at 7 A.M. it was in action. The Chinese entrenchments extended in successive lines from Mo-tien-ling to Po-chih-ya-so, and the Japanese met vigorous resistance. At 10 A.M. the Mo-tien-ling entrenchments were stormed, and at the same time the fleet began firing on the littoral forts; by 1 P.M. the three sea batteries and the four land forts were taken; the latter were in some instances blown up by

\* One shell alone killed fourteen men.

† The reader will remember that there is a pass of this name in Manchuria.

the Chinese soldiers, but the sea forts remained intact, and their guns were at once utilised by a body of



MAJOR GENERAL OTERA, KILLED AT WEE-HAI-WEI.

marines which had been landed for the purpose, and had accompanied the Kumamoto brigade. Before the



attack, Admiral Ting had vainly urged on the Chinese generals to accept a body of volunteers from the fleet, who could have served the guns and destroyed them before leaving. The refusal of this wise suggestion materially hastened the fall of Wei-hai-wei. The Japanese had brought up no siege guns, and the state of the roads would not have allowed any to be transported for a long time, so that their only chance of injuring the Chinese ships and island forts lay in the guns which they might capture from the enemy. In the eastern forts the Japanese found twelve powerful guns, well-protected, at their disposal, and when properly officered and manned by the navy, they were able to keep the Chinese fleet confined in the western part of the harbour.

The Japanese losses were not at all commensurate with the results obtained; the second division lost only twenty-eight killed and fifty-four wounded, the Kumamoto brigade about one hundred killed and wounded; but this included many officers, amongst whom Major-General Otera,\* who was wounded by splinters of a shell, and died in two hours.

A romantic episode is said to have taken place during the attack of the 30th of January. A Japanese

\* The news was conveyed to his wife by the following message: "The Major-General has died a glorious death: do not give way to grief." As Mrs. Otera was prepared for such news she was not surprised. His mother, 87 years old, remarked that her son had fallen in the discharge of his duty, and she regretted that he was not permitted to live longer, and be of more service to his Sovereign.

officer, on entering one of the forts, found a beautiful Chinese girl crying; with great gallantry he at once ordered two non-commissioned officers to accompany her to the next village. Later on the same officer found a baby, two years old, in a basket; he at once picked it up, and the child, without evincing the slightest fear, stretched out its arms and smiled. When the fort was entirely captured, the officer chose the least ill-favoured of the Chinese prisoners, and released him on condition that he should take the child to its parents. It is said that the baby showed reluctance to be separated from the protector in whose arms it had been sheltered during the fight.

The Japanese were determined to push on the attack vigorously. On the first night (30th of January) the torpedo-boats tried to get through the boom at the eastern entrance. This bold attempt had been planned so rapidly that the land forces were not warned, and the Japanese troops in the eastern forts, thinking the Chinese were attacking, fired on the torpedo-boats, which were obliged to retreat. On the following day arrangements were made, and the army informed of the operation the torpedo-boats intended to perform during the night of the 31st of January. But at the appointed time a terrific storm broke out, which compelled, not only the torpedo-boats, but the greater part of the fleet, to seek a refuge. The torpedo-boats went to a neighbouring island, and their absence caused Admiral Ito great anxiety until the storm abated: he had left only

the first Flying Squadron to watch Wei-hai-wei, and prevent the Chinese escaping; the rest of his vessels went to Yung-cheng Bay, where the British fleet and the other foreign vessels which followed the operations had already anchored. The storm was attended by such intense cold that blocks of ice were frozen into the mouths of the guns.

The storm raged the whole day and night of the 1st of February. It was a very unlucky occurrence for the Japanese, as it compelled them to suspend all military operations for two days. Admiral Ting seized the opportunity, and knowing from former experience how worthless would be the resistance of the soldiers, he landed on the 1st of February with a body of volunteers from the fleet, and destroyed all the guns in the western forts. This act of the Chinese admiral prolonged the resistance, probably for a week. The Japanese occupied the city of Wei-hai-wei and the western forts in the afternoon of the 2nd, the Chinese soldiers having fled to Chefoo; if they had found the guns in a serviceable condition, they could have bombarded the Chinese fleet and Liu-kung Island from a comparatively short range, and a surrender would have been inevitable in a few days. The storm of the 31st of January and 1st of February prevented the Japanese from following up their rush, which probably would have been too quick to allow the Chinese soldiers time to destroy the guns. This short respite was admirably utilised by Ting, who also destroyed all the junks and boats in the harbour



JAPANESE OFFICER SAVING GIRL AND BABY.



The situation of the two hostile forces was now very strange. The Japanese completely enveloped the Chinese: on the sea a powerful fleet prevented all exit, and the whole coast was occupied by their army. Ting had only his ships, island forts, and the booms to protect him. But now that the Chinese navy showed foresight and bravery, there seemed to be even in their desperate conditions some hopes of a protracted resistance. The island of Liu-kung is almost perpendicular on the seaside, and landing is impossible; there was no chance for those desperate rushes with which the Japanese hitherto had carried all the defences they could approach. The forts on Liu-kung Island were too strong and too sheltered to be silenced by the fire of the fleet, especially as the Japanese did not wish to risk their vessels, and had no armoured ship that could approach with impunity. The captured forts on the eastern side were too far to inflict any damage to the forts on Liu-kung Island and the fleet which they sheltered, so that the Chinese, though completely surrounded, were able, owing to the length of Wei-hai-wei Bay, to lie at anchor in complete security. It was thought by many that in this strange position the Chinese could hold out indefinitely, as long as they had provisions and ammunition.

The Japanese were, however, determined to refute these prognostications. They had powerful reasons to urge them to make the most desperate efforts; they could not allow the Pei-yang squadron to escape

capture or destruction now that it was almost in their grasp ; they felt also that their military prestige was at stake on the rapid success of this military operation. The few unprofessional foreigners with the Chinese forces must not baffle them, in the sight of the war-



CAPTAIN TODA,  
COMMANDER OF THE 2ND TORPEDO FLOTILLA.

vessels of the principal nations of the world. As soon as the storm subsided the Japanese pushed on their operations with unceasing pertinacity.

On the 3rd of February the second, third, and fourth Flying Squadrons (12 vessels) attacked the Chinese island forts, with the assistance of the eastern

batteries, and many Chinese were killed, according to their own accounts. The Chinese fleet moved about the harbour shelling the Japanese forts. At night the torpedo-boats made another attempt to break through the boom at the eastern entrance, but though they even employed dynamite they could not break



LIEUTENANT IMAI,  
COMMANDER OF THE 3RD TORPEDO FLUILLA

it, they then turned their attention to its extremity near the shore, and they succeeded in widening the interval which separated it from the rocks.

On the night of the 4th of February preparations were made for a second attempt with the torpedo-boats, which were divided into three squadrons: the



first watching outside, and the second and third passing through the interval of the boom which had widened on the preceding night. There is some discrepancy in the minor details of the operation. According to one account, the torpedo attack was preceded by a diversion of two small gun-boats, the *Chokai* and *Otago*, which, piloted by Captain Togo, an officer who had studied the China coast, and could navigate through the bay of Wei-hai-wei even in the dark, steamed into the harbour after the moon set, at 1 A.M. of the 5th, and advanced close to the Chinese squadron and opened fire.\* While this action was going on, the torpedo-boats crept along the eastern shore at half-speed (11 knots), and waited for their opportunity.

The rest of the operation is described almost identically in the different accounts. The flotilla was composed of ten torpedo-boats, which advanced in the following order, one behind the other :—

Third Squadron . . . . .	{	No. 6.
		„ 22.
		„ 5.
		„ 10.
Second Squadron . . . . .	{	No. 21.
		„ 8.
		„ 14.
		„ 9.
		„ 18.
		„ 19.

---

\* This diversion of the gun-boats is not mentioned in the official reports of the engagement.

*Third Squadron.*

- No. 6. When she reached the south of the harbour, she steered west, and passing between the Chinese vessels fired two torpedoes which were not discharged owing to ice in the tubes. She was struck by forty-six rifle bullets and one Hotchkiss shell.
- No. 22. Fired three torpedoes, but the Chinese cannonade was so warm that she had to retire without ascertaining the result. On her way back she ran aground near the Lung-miao-tsui fort (one of the eastern ones).
- No. 5. Aimed two torpedoes at the *Lai-yuen* which apparently missed.
- No. 10. Fired a torpedo at the *Ting-yuen* which seemed to hit her. She received ten rifle bullets.

*Second Squadron.*

- No. 21. Had steered for centre of Liu-kung Island, but emerged in the neighbourhood of Jih Island—as she turned into the harbour again, she found No. 8 disabled and towed her out.
- No. 8. Was injured by fouling the boom or a sunken rock.
- No. 14. Fared like the preceding boat (No. 8).
- No. 9. Observing that the boats ahead of her were aground, she steered north, and seeing two Chinese torpedo-boats approach the *Ting-yuen* she steered between them, and discharged two torpedoes—the second, which was fired from the side-tube, seemed to strike the stern of the big vessel. Immediately afterwards she received a shell in her boiler, and most of the men near the engines were scalded to death: steam escaped, and she lay helpless at 200 or 300 metres from the Chinese fleet.
- No. 18. Ran ashore near boom.
- No. 19. Was the last, and fearing to be late, steered for the flashes of the enemy's guns, when she came upon No. 9 lying helpless after the explosion in the boiler: she attempted to tow No. 9, but finding that task impossible she took out the crew and retreated just before dawn.

From the above description, it appears that only four boats discharged eight torpedoes; one boat had her tubes frozen, and the other five were either injured by running ashore or delayed by the assistance tendered to damaged consorts, and took no part in the attack. The injuries received were mostly slight,



LIEUTENANT JAHLSHIMA,  
COMMANDER OF TORPEDO BOAT NO 22

only Nos. 8 and 14 were sent to Port Arthur for repairs. Two boats were lost; No. 9 abandoned after the explosion in the boiler, and No. 22, which ran aground near the eastern forts, and was fired upon by the Chinese forts. Some of the crew escaped

ashore, but others fell into the icy water and were frozen to death; the remainder were obliged to keep quiet for fear of being noticed by the Chinese, until they were rescued on the evening of the 5th of February.



CAPTAIN MOCHIMARA,  
COMMANDER OF THE 1ST TORPEDO FLOTILLA.

Several torpedo-boats reported that they had struck the *Ting-yuen*, and the Japanese were much disappointed at seeing her still afloat on the morning of the 5th. She gradually sank, her decks remaining out of water. The Chinese had lost their most formidable vessel.

On the 5th of February it was decided to make another night-attack with the torpedo-boats. Admiral Ito has afterwards confessed that he felt more pain in giving that order than for any other he had given during the campaign. On the preceding night some had been scalded, others frozen to death, and as it was probable that the Chinese fleet would now keep better watch, it seemed as if he was sending his men to an inevitable and horrible death; yet the order was given, and executed with the utmost promptitude. Commander Mochihara, the chief of the flotilla, told his men that there was hardly any chance of escaping, and death was almost certain; it was better to remove all unnecessary articles, a hand-lamp being sufficient, no signals except port and starboard being required for such a desperate enterprise. "Our boats and our bodies are the enemy's." He accordingly sent away all the naval records, signal sheets, and written orders. But there was not the slightest trepidation; all the men were overjoyed at the dangerous duty on which they were detached. At 4 A.M. of the 6th of February, while the second and third torpedo squadrons were watching outside the bay, the First Squadron entered the harbour. It was composed of the following boats:—

Kotaka.

No. 23.

„ 13.

„ 7.

„ 11.

Nos. 13 and 7 had their screws fouled and could not approach the enemy, but the other three boats discharged seven torpedoes and destroyed three of the enemy's vessels: the *Lai-yuen*, *Wei-yuen*, and a gun-boat, the *Pao-hua*. None of the Japanese crews were wounded in this attack. The Chinese lost about 200 men drowned, but the moral effect of this dreadful night-attack must have been appalling, when on the following morning the fleet witnessed its numbers dwindling away beneath the insidious blows of the fearless enemy. It was on this day that the subject of a surrender was first mooted: the inhabitants, male and female, of Liu-kung Island assembling around the jetties and begging the authorities to save their lives.

The two torpedo attacks in the nights preceding the mornings of the 5th and 6th of February decided the fate of Liu-kung Island and of the remaining vessels of the Pei-yang squadron: from that moment all successful resistance was impossible, and the surrender was only deferred by the obstinacy of sullen despair.

The Japanese observe that the results obtained by the heroism of the torpedo-boats compare favourably with those achieved by the fleet at Hai-yuan Island. In the battle of the 17th of September, 12 Japanese vessels encountering 14 Chinese with 8 torpedo-boats, succeeded in burning or sinking 5 ships, with trifling damage to themselves and with a loss of 69 killed and 160 wounded. In the torpedo attacks at Wei-

hai-wei a total force of 14\* boats succeeded in sinking an ironclad and 3 other vessels. with a loss of 2 torpedo-boats, 9 killed, 31 wounded, and 5 drowned. The indirect result of these attacks was also the fall of the island forts and the capture of the remaining vessels.


The last days of the siege were sufficient to unnerve the stoutest troops: the hulls of the sunken



ships were a constant reminder to the survivors what their fate might be any night: this wearying apprehension must have told with even greater effect than the attacks themselves. The Chinese report another torpedo attack, which was repulsed, at 4.30 A.M., of the 7th of February, but as it is not mentioned by the Japanese, it must have been a false alarm of the

\* It should be fifteen according to the lists given before, probably the *Kotaka* is not reckoned.

excited crews. The real attack was made by the Japanese fleet—by the captured forts near the eastern entrance—and by some rifled mortars which the Japanese had now planted on the northern shore. The eastern forts, by a heavy cannonade, succeeded in blowing up, at 8 A.M., the magazine on Jih Island ; that fort was now lost to the unfortunate defenders. Later in the morning, all the Chinese torpedo-boats and two steam-launches, 13 vessels, escaped by the western entrance, but they were pursued by the First Flying



TORPEDO BOAT NO

Squadron \* and all captured, some in a serviceable condition, and others only needing repairs for the injuries sustained by the rocks when run aground.

After dark the Chinese soldiers on Liu-kung Island begged their commanders to save their lives, but were finally pacified by Admiral Ting and General Chang.

The Chinese report another unsuccessful torpedo

\* The *Yoshino* could certainly steam faster than any of them, and probably her consorts could do the same.



attack before dawn of the 8th, but it is not mentioned by the Japanese, though it may have been a feint to fatigue the defenders. After dawn the eastern forts again opened fire, and one of their shells struck the *Ching-yuen*, killing and wounding about 40 sailors. Fresh petitions were made to Admiral Ting, who said it was the duty of both sailors and soldiers to fight to the end; but if he did not receive reinforcements by the 11th of February he would find means to save their lives.

On the 9th of February the Japanese made another combined attack by sea and land; the *Ching-yuen* having steamed out to shell the forts, Captain Naruta of the Japanese Navy, by very careful sighting, succeeded in hitting her near the water-line with two shells from one of the 28-centimetre guns of the forts. The *Ching-yuen* sank so rapidly that her crew had not time to haul down her flag.

The Chinese fleet was now reduced to four vessels and a few gun-boats, with crews much diminished by the enemy's fire: the soldiers and inhabitants on Liu-kung Island were dispirited by the effects of the Japanese shells: almost every night a torpedo attack is reported, and though such reports are not confirmed, the constant alarm must have had a terribly demoralising effect. Their ammunition also had almost run short. It was under these circumstances that Admiral Ting, on the night of the 11th of February, received a telegram from Li-Hung-chang announcing that reinforcements could not be sent,

and advising the fleet to escape to some other port. There was no possibility of following this advice : the powerful Japanese squadron was ever watchful, and the Chinese men-of-war had very low speeds. At the same time sailors, soldiers, and inhabitants clamoured for a surrender, alleging that the promised time had come and no reinforcements had arrived.

The heroic resolution of Admiral Ting had to yield at last, and on the same night he made arrangements for sending Captain Chang of the *Kuang-ping* with a letter to Admiral Ito proposing a capitulation. The messenger left on the morning of the 12th of February on the *Chen-pei*, flying a white flag, and returned the same day with a favourable answer from Admiral Ito, together with some presents of champagne and other luxuries. Admiral Ting then wrote another letter (it was to be his last) to Admiral Ito, in which, after thanking him for saving the lives of his men, he requested a prolongation of the time allotted for the surrender of the forts and ships. He declined accepting the presents, as their two countries were at war.\* After finishing this letter, he wrote a telegram to Li-Hung-chang, retired to his cabin and committed suicide by swallowing a large dose of opium.

The correspondence between the two admirals

\* A system of petty suspicion is rampant in China, and if Admiral Ting had accepted Ito's presents, he would have been suspected by millions of his countrymen of having been bribed to surrender by a case of champagne.

forms a noble page of history. The first letter from Ito, which is rather in the form of a memorial, was sent, according to a Japanese review, through the British man-of-war *Severn* on the 25th of January, some days before the attack on Wei-hai-wei commenced. It will seem strange to European readers that an invitation to surrender was sent so early, but the Japanese were so fully aware of their own superiority, and of the rottenness of the Chinese military system, that they thought it generous to give a fellow-soldier timely warning. This document is a remarkable production; it shows a wonderful grasp of the modern history of the world, and the warmest friend of China could not point out better the defects of her social organisation, and indicate their remedies, than did Admiral Ito in his letter forwarded a few days before the Japanese army and navy were to destroy China's last stronghold and capture her only fighting fleet. No summary can give it justice, and the reader is earnestly entreated to refer to the appendix in which it is contained.\* China in her hour of shame and disgrace may seek consolation by the reflection that she has fallen before a nation of heroes, who, in the exultation of unparalleled triumphs preserved those rare sentiments of equanimity which dictate friendship even to the enemy.

Admiral Ting has been blamed for not having destroyed all his ships and war material before surrendering, but to these ungenerous critics it may

\* See Appendix F.

he pointed out that he vainly tried to induce his sailors, to destroy the ships, and that in most European capitulations the war material is delivered intact to the enemy. Others have blamed him for committing suicide. To the latter accusation it is sufficient to answer that in the ethical code of China suicide is not blameworthy in certain cases. It may also be added that in his peculiar circumstances suicide would have been excusable even for a European: the barbarous laws of China involve the whole family in the guilt of one of its members, and if Ting had not committed suicide he would have brought ruin on his relations. Even after performing that supreme act of self-sacrifice he was denied posthumous honours by his Government.

Ting was honoured only by strangers. On hearing of his death Admiral Ito, deeply moved, ordered that one of the captured Chinese vessels should be returned, to convey his body with befitting decorum to Chefoo. Before this ship left, the Japanese officers paid a visit to his mortal remains—the profound respect they showed greatly touched the Chinese and foreigners who beheld them. At Chefoo the foreign men-of-war sent detachments to accompany the bier.

The death of Admiral Ting, which was followed by the suicide of the Chinese general and other chief officers, left the Japanese in great embarrassment how to continue the negotiations for the surrender. They refused to treat with any foreigner, and insisted that

the highest Chinese official on Liu-kung Island should arrange the capitulation. Taotai Niu was the highest surviving official, and on him devolved the duty to sign with the Japanese admiral a stipulation\* in 11 articles for the surrender of forts, ships, etc., and for the departure of the Chinese soldiers and sailors.

The Chinese were much touched when Admiral Ito gave back the *Kang-chi* that she might convey Ting's coffin to Chefoo. Taotai Niu wrote a letter thanking him for the gracious act. Up to this moment the negotiations had proceeded with the dignity befitting such a grave occasion, but at the last moment a comic incident was introduced. The *Kuang-ping*, one of the vessels to be delivered to the Japanese, did not belong to the Pei-yang squadron, but had been detached, together with the *Kuang-yi* and *Kuang-chia* from Canton, to take part in the manoeuvres of the northern fleet. They had been detained for some time when the war broke out, and they were not allowed to return. The *Kuang-yi* was destroyed at Phung Island on the 25th of July, the *Kuang-chia* ran aground and was blown up after the battle of Hai-yuan Island on the 17th of September; the *Kuang-ping* was the only remaining vessel. Her captain, Chang-Pi-kuang, felt rather uneasy at the idea of returning alone to Canton without any ships, and he asked the Japanese to return the *Kuang-ping*, alleging that she belonged to the Canton squadron which had taken no part in the war. This comic

\* For the text of this stipulation, see Appendix F.

request was afterwards repeated by Taotai Niu. As it is probably the most ridiculous incident which ever happened in any war, the letter is given in an appendix.\* It shows better than a lengthy description the utter absence of national feeling in China, and the childish ideas of the Chinese in all international relations either of war or peace.

The Chinese set free by the terms of the capitulation were as follows:—

Navy . . . .	{	183 officers.
		30 students.
Army . . . .	{	2,871 warrant officers and marines.
		40 officers.
		2,000 rank and file.
Total . . . .		<hr/> 5,124 <hr/>

The vessels delivered up were the *Chen-yuen* (7,430 tons), *Ping-yuen* (2,850 tons), *Tsi-yuen* (2,355 tons), *Kuang-ping* (1,050 tons), and 6 small gun-boats: these with the 7 torpedo-boats captured when they attempted to escape, and with some of the sunken ships that could be floated, constituted a respectable fleet: its value was estimated at 30 million *yen*.†

After the evacuation, the Japanese troops abandoned all the land forts and destroyed them, removing only the serviceable artillery and war material. A garrison was put in Liu-kung Island, and the remainder

\* See Appendix H

† About three million sterling.

of the army re-embarked for Ta-lien to join the rest of the forces in Manchuria.

The capitulation was settled by Admiral Ito entirely on his own responsibility, and he was very anxious to know how his Government would view his conduct, but it met with the most enthusiastic approval.

The Wei-hai-wei campaign was very short; the first troops landed on the 20th of January, and on the 16th of February they were in possession of forts and ships. In four weeks the army had disembarked, advanced, attacked and won the place; they were even able to spare four days for the convenience of the departing Chinese. The fighting only lasted two weeks, from 30th of January to 12th of February, and it would not have lasted so long but for the storm, which suspended all operations for two days and gave the Chinese time to destroy the guns in the western forts. It was the most dramatic episode of the war, and nothing was wanting to enhance its spectacular effect. The hills encircling the bay formed a gigantic amphitheatre from which the vicissitudes of the struggle could be observed: military attachés and men-of-war of the principal navies of the world followed with intense curiosity all the operations, and the Japanese, conscious that they were acting before a gallery of nations, determined to display day by day all the resources of their skill and daring. *Nulla dies sine linea* was the motto which governed their actions. The stubborn resist-

ance of Liu-kung Island, which recalls to mind the defence of the island of Sphacteria in the Peloponnesian war, so vividly described by Thucydides, lent an element of momentary uncertainty which rendered the interest more intense. In a few days the



ADMIRAL TING

Japanese exhibited all the methods of modern warfare by land and sea; dashing assaults on the forts, skillful handling of guns and ships, daring torpedo attacks which strewed the harbour with sunken hulls.



The Japanese never relaxed their relentless hold on the foredoomed fleet until the inevitable surrender came. Then followed the striking correspondence between the admirals; the tragic fate of Ting, victim to the unfortunate defects of his country, as Ito had foretold in his first letter; and the imposing scene of the Japanese officers reverently visiting the remains of Ting, which may be compared with the most striking pages of the history of chivalry.

## CHAPTER VII.

## THE FIRST PEACE EMBASSY.

It has been recorded that after the fall of Port Arthur a kind of informal Peace Mission was sent to Japan ; but the Japanese politely refused to treat with persons unprovided with proper credentials. Later on, while the Wei-hai-wei expedition was being prepared, another Peace Embassy was appointed to negotiate with Japan. It consisted of two high officials, one of whom had been Minister to Washington, and the services of Mr. Foster were secured as unofficial adviser ; a long time was lost waiting for his arrival from America, and when he came, the two Chinese Ambassadors showed no haste to depart. At last, the news of the landing at Yungcheng, and of the Japanese advance on Wei-hai-wei hurried the departure of the Peace Embassy, which arrived at Hiroshima on the 31st of January. A pompous list of the *personnel* attached to the mission was given ; it was as follows :—

- H. E. Chang-yu-yuan, Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary.
- H. E. Shao-yu-lien, Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary.

- Wu-ting-fang (barrister-at-law), First Secretary (Expectant Taotai).  
Ku-Cha-hsin, Second Secretary (Secretary Judiciary Department).  
Jiu-Liang, Second Secretary (Secretary to Tsung-li Yamen).  
Liang-Ching, Third Secretary (Expectant Taotai).  
Kuang-Shang-i, Third Secretary (Expectant Taotai).  
Ching-Fah, Translator (Expectant Governor).  
Lo-Kan-lei, Translator (Expectant Governor).  
Lu-Yow-ming, Translator (Expectant Governor).  
Chien-Sha-tai, Attaché (Expectant Vice-Governor).  
Chang-Tao-Kuan, Attaché (Expectant Governor).  
Chang-Yu-ping, Attaché (Expectant Vice-Governor).  
Shang-Nu-tsai, Translator (Ex-Governor, Shantoushen).  
Chao-Shih-lien, Translator (Expectant Chief Salt Commissioner).  
Ching-Yin-chang, Translator (Expectant Educational Official).  
Hsui-Chan, Business Manager (Expectant Provisional Secretary).  
Hsiu-Po-ming, Business Manager (Expectant Provisional Secretary).  
Chang-Hua-fang, Student.  
I Ching-ki, Student.  
Wang Yu-yen, Student.  
Li Wang-to, Officially Appointed Merchant (Candidate for Guai-yo).  
Shih Hung-shing, Officially Appointed Merchant (Fifth rank).  
Shih Shang-chee, Officially Appointed Merchant (Fifth rank).  
Liu Sui-lin, Officially Appointed Merchant (Sixth rank).

All this pomp was to disguise the real nature of the mission, for, when on the 1st of February, the plenipotentiaries of the two nations exchanged credentials, those of the Chinese envoys were found insufficient. On the 2nd of February, the Japanese plenipotentiaries presented a memorandum stating, that as the Chinese envoys had not full powers, and

were obliged to refer all matters to Peking, the negotiations were terminated. Japan was always willing to reopen them when China sent duly accredited plenipotentiaries.

This extraordinary termination surprised the whole world. China had given every outward assurance of being in earnest in her desire for peace—an American statesman had been specially engaged as unofficial adviser to the mission; the American Minister at Peking had been requested to draft a form of credentials; but at the last moment his draft was secretly set aside and substituted by vague and unmeaning credentials. Mr. Foster and the American Minister were placed in a ridiculous position; but that is trivial compared to the loss sustained by China; she exposed herself to the derision of the whole world, thousands of lives and millions of money were wasted, and the whole Pei-yang squadron was destroyed or captured. All this was sacrificed for the pleasure of attempting a childish trick which did not succeed.

The texts of the credentials and the whole correspondence of the plenipotentiaries are contained in an appendix.\*

\* See Appendix I.

## CHAPTER VIII.

## CONTINUATION OF THE MANCHURIAN CAMPAIGN.

WHEN we last described the operations of the Japanese in Manchuria, the First Army (represented by the Third Division), under Lt.-General Katsura, was at Hai-cheng, where it had repulsed three attempts of the Chinese to re-capture the town on the 19th of December and 17th and 22nd of January; the Second Army (represented by a brigade) under Major-General Nogi had taken Kaiping on the 10th of January. The two armies starting from the Yalu and Chin-chow had converged towards the Liao river, and ended by forming one army, of which the Third Division constituted the right wing, and General Nogi's brigade the left wing. It will, therefore, be unnecessary to treat their movements separately.

While the fate of Wei-hai-wei was being decided in the beginning of February, neither of the hostile armies in Manchuria showed any activity. But later, the Chinese made two advances, for they cannot be called attacks, on Hai-cheng. This town is surrounded by five hills, of which the Japanese occupied four, the fifth being unnecessary for the defence, and being situated on their line of communications to Tomucheng,

which was secure against any attack in force from the enemy. The four fortified hills are thus situated :—

Tan-wan-shan about  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles S.W. of Hai-cheng.

Ching-chia-shan about 1 mile W. of Hai-cheng.

Huan-hsi-shan over 1 mile N. of Hai-cheng.

Shuang-lung-shan over 1 mile N.E. of Hai-cheng.

To the east and south of Hai-cheng the country is mountainous ; but to the west and north there is a large plain with two hills N.N.E. of Hai-cheng. From the south, the Newchwang river runs in a north-westerly direction up to Hai-cheng, where it takes a sharp bend around Ching-chia-shan and flows on almost due west to the Liao river. Tan-wan-shan, Ching-chia-shan, Huan-hsi-shan, and the two hills in the plain are almost in a line perpendicular to the course of the river.

On the 16th of February the Chinese advanced from Newchwang (old) and from the positions they held on the Liao-yang road, along the whole front of the Japanese line. At first, the Japanese did not answer the fire of the Chinese to encourage them to come closer ; but at 11 A.M., finding this expectation was useless they opened fire with their artillery, and the Chinese gradually retreated out of range. On the two wings, at Tan-wan-shan and Shuang-lung-shan, the Chinese advanced within rifle-range ; but a few volleys sent them back rapidly. It was not a battle, but an exchange of cannon-shots, and, owing to the bad marksmanship of the Chinese gunners, the Japanese lost only three killed and eleven wounded. At the

same time it must be noted that the Japanese found the enemy had made great improvements—shots came much nearer on this than on any previous occasion. But three killed is a very small result for a day's practice with twelve guns. The Chinese forces numbered about 16,000; and the Japanese counted 150 killed.

In the Chinese account of this battle, three Japanese guns were said to have been captured; but a retreat had to be made owing to the severe artillery fire. The following sentence deserves to be quoted in full "On retreating we laid an ambush and designedly threw our ranks into disorder for the purpose of drawing the enemy after us; but we failed in our purpose."

All these successive attacks on Hai-cheng had been directed by Generals Sung and I-ko-teng-a; but now a new leader appeared, who made another and last attempt to recover the town. Wu-ta-cheng, who has been already mentioned as assisting Li-Hung-chang during the negotiations of the Tientsin Convention of 1885, had been sent north to fight the Japanese. On his arrival at the seat of war, he published a proclamation which caused much amusement. He informed the Japanese that he had come to destroy them; but he expressed compassion for their sad condition, and generously invited them to come to his camp and submit, when, he feelingly added, he would treat them like his own soldiers. As Chinese soldiers are ill-fed, ill-treated, and often swindled of

their pay, such a ridiculous promise would be the last inducement which could lead soldiers to desert.

Wu-ta-cheng's advance was preceded by an attempt at strategy—the Chinese attacked Tomu-cheng, threatening the Japanese line of communications, before they advanced on Hai-cheng on the 21st of February. On this occasion the Chinese repeated their manoeuvres of the 16th with even greater timidity—one body advanced to within 1,700 yards of the Japanese position, and retired before the Japanese opened fire; others advanced a little closer, but retreated at the first shots; and others finally kept firing their rifles at a Japanese entrenchment—evidently hoping to scare the Japanese with a big noise. The Chinese were 20,000 strong, and had twenty guns, but only succeeded in killing two and wounding six Japanese; their own losses were about 100, due principally to the precision of the Japanese artillery.

The time had now come for the Japanese to assume the long-deferred offensive. It was undertaken with such rapidity, and the different divisions worked so harmoniously that a fortnight sufficed to defeat and disperse the greater part of the Chinese armies by a succession of crushing blows. The operation was commenced by the left wing of the united Japanese armies. General Yamaji had now joined General Nogi, and the Japanese forces around Kaiping amounted to about 12,000 men. With these troops an advance was made to Tai-ping-shan, which was occupied without much difficulty, but the Chinese,



under General Sung, advanced from three directions,\* about 12,000 strong, with 12 guns. They were repulsed to their entrenchments, which were successively stormed; three† were taken without much difficulty, but at the fourth‡ the Chinese made a stubborn resistance. They withstood the fire of the Japanese artillery at 1,600 metres, and the assault of three battalions on the front and two flanks. It was 4 P.M., and a portion of the attacking force had exhausted its ammunition, and was obliged to lie down for shelter against the enemy's fire. Two companies were sent forward as reinforcements, and the officers, telling their men to cease firing and use the bayonet, the Japanese charged the entrenchment, Major Saito rushing forward with uplifted sword and cutting down the defenders. The Chinese retreated to Po-miao-tzŭ at 5.30 P.M. Some of their troops were armed with the new German repeating rifles and used smokeless powder, so that their armament was superior to the enemy.

The Japanese troops had marched out at 2 A.M., and did not return to their quarters until 11 P.M., marching under arms for 21 hours through the snow. In the First Regiment 394 men had their feet frost-bitten, and in the Fifteenth Regiment there were even more cases.

The advance on Tai-ping-shan and its surrounding

\* Po-miao-tzŭ, Tang-chia-pu-tzŭ, and Lau-ye-miao.

† Hsiao-ping-shan, Ta-tzŭ-wo, and Tung (eastern) tzŭ-li.

‡ Hsi (western) tzŭ-li.

positions had a twofold object—it broke the Chinese line, and occupying Sung's troops at Ying-kow, prevented them co-operating with the other Chinese armies at Newchwang (old) and Liao-yang, which were to become the object of an important series of military operations in a few days.

The two Chinese armies, whose headquarters were at Newchwang (old) and Liao-yang, after their frequent repulses from Hai-cheng, never retired very far. They had hitherto been left unmolested, as it did not enter into the Japanese plan of campaign to pursue to any distance. At the same time the Japanese forces were not large enough for a bold offensive; but towards the end of February a portion of the Fifth Division, which was no longer required to protect the line of communications, since the Chinese general had removed to Liao-yang, was sent to Hai-cheng. General Katsura was now in a condition to assume the offensive.

The roads from Hai-cheng to Newchwang, from Hai-cheng to Liao-yang, and from Newchwang to Liao-yang form a triangle, and there are four other roads (besides cross paths) radiating from Hai-cheng. The Chinese troops were situated across the three eastern roads and the road from Hai-cheng to Liao-yang. It was the object of Katsura, taking advantage of the favourable position of Hai-cheng, to push back the Chinese along these divergent roads, inevitably separating the Liao-yang from the Newchwang troops. On the 28th of February the Third Division marched

out of Hai-cheng at 3 A.M. ; the Seventh Regiment, charging with the bayonet, took Shi-to-shan at 4 A.M. ; the Sixth Regiment attacked Sha-ho-yen in front, while the Sixth Brigade attacked its left, and moved towards Chang-hu-tai. By 7 A.M. all these positions on the two innermost of the four roads we have described were occupied ; and the Fifth Brigade, advancing by the most westerly road, took Ta-fu-tun by 10 A.M., when the whole Chinese line was pushed back. Some of the 15,000 Chinese engaged retreated to Pu-lai-tien and others to Newchwang (old), as had been foreseen by General Katsura. There still remained the fourth, the road from Hai-cheng to Liao-yang, and the Sixth Brigade, with some artillery, diverged in that direction, and by 2 P.M. had occupied the high ground near Tung-yen-tai. The Japanese lost 1 officer and 85 men wounded, and 10 killed ; the Chinese left 160 dead,

On the following day, 1st of March, this last movement—the pursuit of the Liao-yang troops — was continued. The Third Division had bivouacked at Tou-ho-pu, and at 7 A.M. it marched towards Kan-hsien-pu, where the Chinese were stationed : at 11.45 A.M. that position was taken, and the Japanese pushed on to the point where the Hai-cheng, Liao-yang, and Liao-yang-Newchwang roads meet. The two Chinese armies had now been completely separated, and General Katsura, by the peculiar disposition of the roads, was able to deal with them in detail.

The pursuit of the Liao-yang army was continued

on the 2nd of March for some distance beyond the junction of the two roads just mentioned, when General Katsura, having reunited all his troops, altered his order of march, converting his van into a rear-guard, and marched along the Liao-yang-Newchwang road to attack the latter town. On the 4th of March Newchwang (old) was attacked by three columns advancing from the north, north-west, and east. The column acting on the north-west took a



LIEUTENANT-GENERAL KATSURA.

position near Li-chia-wo-fu, so as to command the roads leading to Ying-kow and Tien-chwang-tai; the Japanese, with their usual tactics, had marched round the Chinese and threatened their line of retreat with one part of their forces, while another part attacked in front. The battle commenced at 9 A.M., and the Japanese met a vigorous resistance; the Chinese had constructed thick earthen parapets and had loop-holed the houses; they had, moreover, gatling guns,

and used smokeless powder for their rifles, so that the open ground which had to be traversed by one of the Japanese columns was swept by a hail of bullets. If the Chinese troops had been of equal quality to their own, the Japanese confess that the ground would have been impassable. But by 2.30 P.M. the town was entered, and the defenders fled in the direction of Ying-kow. A portion, about 5,000 or 6,000, were unable to escape, and with them the Japanese had to engage in a desperate house-to-house conflict which inflicted heavy losses; the fighting lasted late into the night, the sound of rifles being heard up to 11 P.M. A large body of Chinese entrenched in a wineshop offered an obstinate resistance until the Japanese engineers blew down a portion of the wall with dynamite, which caused such terror that they threw down their arms to the number of 300.

The Japanese had forty-two killed and 174 wounded, the Chinese about 1,800 killed and over 2,000 prisoners. The heavy losses of the latter were also due to their retreat being commanded by the Japanese guns. A large list of spoils taken was compiled by the Japanese with that precision almost amusing in its minuteness. It was as follows :—

2,138 rifles.

1,518,000 rounds of small arm ammunition.

1 field piece.

12 mountain guns.

2 guns of position (6-centimetre).

216 flags.

42 *fusils de rempart*.

1,648 boxes of gunpowder.

1,120 koku \* of rice.

150 koku of barley.

110 koku of Indian corn.

Horses enough to carry the baggage of the whole army.

80 or 90 tents.

213 horse shoes.

A quantity of clothing, fur coats, field ovens, and other articles.

Immediately after the capture of Newchwang (old) General Katsura with the Third Division marched towards Ying-kow, situated lower down on the Liao river; but he had been forestalled by Yamaji. That general, on the 6th of March, advanced to Hou-chia-ying-fang at the junction of the Ying-kow-Hai-cheng and Ying-kow-Tien-chwang-tai roads. General Sung, who had so long defended Ying-kow, had been obliged to evacuate that town and retreat to Tien-chwang-tai, as he was threatened to be crushed between the two wings of the Japanese army. Ying-kow was defended by a small garrison which offered very little resistance, and on the 7th of March the Japanese took all the forts situated on both banks of the Liao river, which presented no obstacle in its frozen condition.

General Yamaji sent officers to inform the foreign consuls that the Japanese intended to occupy the foreign settlement of Ying-kow. In the port the Japanese captured another vessel of the Pei-yang Squadron, which had been icebound during the

\* A koku is nearly five bushels.

winter; now only two vessels of the squadron remained undestroyed or uncaptured.

The Third and First Divisions, constituting the right and left wings of the Japanese army, after the capture of Newchwang (old) and Ying-kow, had drawn together, and now they marched together against Tien-chwang-tai, which for three months had been the general headquarters of the Chinese armies of Newchwang and Ying-kow.



LIEUTENANT GENERAL NODZU. \*

The attack was delivered on the 9th of March, and, as at Newchwang, the Japanese attacked in three columns. The action commenced at 7 A.M., and at 10.30 A.M. the place was taken. A column had been stationed on the line of retreat, and the routed Chinese were exposed to its deadly fire, which de-

\* He had been in command of the First Army after Marshal Yamata left (shortly after the passing of the Yalu). He was gazetted a marshal after the capture of Newchwang.

stroyed over 1,000 men ; their total loss was estimated at 2,000, while the Japanese lost only about eighty killed and wounded. There were only about 10,000 Chinese engaged, so that a portion of the defeated armies of Newchwang and Ying-kow must have already retreated further into the interior.

The Japanese offensive commenced by Yamaji's diversion at Tai-ping-shan on the 24th of February, was followed up by the defeat of the Liao-yang army on the 28th of February and 1st of March ; and by the capture of Newchwang on the 4th, of Ying-kow on the 7th, and of Tien-chwang-tai on the 9th ; this fortnight's campaign was the last one of the war, and it could not have been otherwise. China was now entirely at the mercy of the Japanese armies. By a short and brilliant series of manœuvres the troops at Liao-yang had been cut off from the rest of the empire, the remaining armies had been irretrievably broken, and the Japanese had nearly 100,000 men on the enemy's soil ready to strike a fatal blow. The possession of Ying-kow, shortly to be opened to navigation by the melting of the ice, gave them a new naval base of operations nearer to Peking ; the destruction of the Pei-yang squadron at Wei-hai-wei had left them the command of the sea without the slightest fear of hindrance, and they could attack when, how, and where they pleased.

---

There were no further operations of importance ;



but two incidents may be mentioned. A Third Expedition started from Japan on the 15th of March, and went to the Pescadores, a group of islands between the mainland and Formosa, and excellently situated for a base of operations against the latter. After some reconnoitring, an attack was made on the 23rd on Peng-hu Island (the principal one of the group). The Japanese fleet cannonaded the forts, which answered, but without ever hitting the ships. The *Yoshino* was damaged, but by a sunken rock unmarked in the charts. A force was landed, and the forts taken without much opposition, the Japanese only losing about three killed and twenty-eight wounded. The garrisons fled like frightened sheep, the men trampling on each other in their panic hurry to get to the shore and escape in junks and boats. In this last engagement of the Chinese troops amidst such disgraceful demoralisation it is grateful to record some singular instances of rare bravery. In one fort, while all the garrison fled without offering any serious resistance, half-a-dozen soldiers placed themselves here and there and tried to inflict some injury on the enemy; on another occasion, two bands of twenty and thirty men boldly resisted the advance of the whole Japanese force. Considering how a panic will spread amongst the best troops, the exceptional conduct of these obscure heroes deserves special praise, and it is to be regretted that their names have not been recorded to serve as rallying words to awaken a brighter future for their country.

The expedition to the Pescadores was not important enough to employ the whole Japanese fleet, and a portion of the squadron was busy in the north, searching the foreign vessels which crowded to Tientsin after the opening of the Pei-ho.\* The Japanese officers performed their work very politely but very thoroughly. The search on the sea proved fruitless, but while the *Yiksang* was discharging her cargo in lighters at Taku (at the mouth of the Pei-ho) a boat from a Japanese man-of-war came alongside and asked to have a case opened—it was found to contain cartridges! It formed part of a shipment of 240,000 cartridges. This contraband had been shipped on a false declaration, that it was bamboo-steel, but of course the Japanese took the ship before a Prize-court, which, after having detained the *Yiksang* for some time, finally released her and all her cargo except the contraband. It was a strange freak of fate that one of the first acts of war of the Japanese navy should have been the sinking of the *Kowshing* and the last the capture of the *Yiksang*, both steamers belonging to the same company.

\* The river of Tientsin which is closed to navigation in winter by ice.

## CHAPTER IX.

## THE SECOND PEACE EMBASSY.

ATTEMPTS had been made to hurriedly amend the failure of the First Embassy, by offering to amend telegraphically the credentials, and when that proposal appeared too unconventional for such an important matter, to forward new and satisfactory credentials to the envoys. But it became apparent that after such a *fiasco* Shao and Chang were not the proper persons to continue the negotiations. Moreover, it was perceived that a treaty of peace in the present critical circumstances could only be concluded by a statesman of unquestioned authority and who could bear the heavy responsibility. In China, amidst so much autocracy, there exists unbounded liberty of criticism; in fact, there is a special body of officials—the censors—whose duty it is to expose all abuses and condemn all measures injurious to the State. It was well known that peace could not be obtained from Japan without great sacrifices: it was therefore necessary to choose as plenipotentiary a statesman of sufficient authority to be able to bear the burden of responsibility, to defy the storm of slanderous criticism, and of such influence that his actions could not be disowned by the Government.

There was only one man in China who possessed these requisites—Li-Hung-chang, the Viceroy of Chihli. Whatever conditions he thought necessary to accept would be ratified by the Emperor, as his disgrace would involve almost all the high officials in the Empire. Since the outbreak of the war, Li-Hung-chang had been under a cloud: it is the system of the Chinese Government to mete out punishments for every error; officials are expected to petition the Emperor informing him of their misdemeanours and requesting punishment. At every reverse of the Chinese arms some dearly purchased honour had been withdrawn from the aged Viceroy, now a Peacock's Feather, now a Yellow Jacket. But in the great national crisis, created by the war with Japan, the Government became conscious of the silliness of such proceedings, and the man who had contributed to save the dynasty at the time of the Tai-ping rebellion by enrolling bands of volunteers in his native province of Anhui, the man who in the last decades had represented China in all her dealings with foreign powers, was reinstated in all his honours and called to Peking to confer with the Emperor and Empress-dowager. The result of these audiences was to entrust to him the mission of treating for peace with Japan.

Notwithstanding his enormous influence over the officials and people of China, Li-Hung-chang felt that in such a critical moment he could not bear alone such a heavy responsibility, and deliver his reputa-

tion to the easy after-criticism of those who would be bold as soon as the danger was passed. A subtle plan was devised to shift the responsibility amongst all the high officials of the Empire, by inviting them to send telegraphic memorials on the advisability of concluding peace. Strengthened by the expressed opinions of all the influential men of China and provided with unimpeachable credentials Li-Hung-chang started for his mission.

On the 19th of March he reached Shimonoseki, the place chosen by Japan as the site of the peace conference. He was accompanied by General Foster and Wu-Ting-fang, who had formed part of the First Embassy, and also by his adopted son Lord Li, a statesman who had resided in England, and who was specially qualified for the mission, having been for some years Chinese Minister at Tokio. The whole suite consisted of 132 persons, but there was no useless display of names and titles as on the preceding occasion: it was a serious mission which had come to transact business of the highest order.

On the 20th of March the Viceroy landed, on the 21st a conference was held and the credentials exchanged without any difficulty. The negotiations were proceeding with perfect smoothness, when one of those extraordinary incidents happened which seem contrived by an ironical Fate to defeat the expectations of men and to prove the vanity of all human foresight. On the 24th of March, as the

Viceroy Li-Hung-chang was returning from the conference, a fanatic of the name of Koyama, approached his palanquin and fired a pistol at him, the bullet entering the left cheek beside the nose.

The wound luckily was slight and caused no inconvenience, but the event caused a profound sensation and produced the most unexpected results, which from their deep seat in the recesses of the human heart have scarcely been recognised. Japan had striven hard to humble the arrogance of China, and had forced her foremost statesman in his old age to come as a suppliant for peace, and to her unspeakable shame his life was attempted on her soil. She had posed before the world, and spared no pains to shine by the valour of her soldiers, the skill of her generals and the humane treatment of the enemy's subjects and soldiers, and her unsullied record was broken by the senseless act of a miscreant.

For the first time she felt humbled before her adversary. Government and people vied in their efforts to atone for the disgraceful act. The Governor of the town and the Chief of Police were dismissed for remissness in their duties ; the Emperor sent his physician to attend the wound ; the Empress prepared with her own hands bandages for the illustrious invalid ; more than 10,000 letters were sent in a week from all parts of Japan to Li-Hung-chang expressing their abhorrence of the act. Yet probably this abominable incident contributed largely to the re-establishment of cordial relations between the two

countries. It had a salutary effect upon Japan; though she had kept singular composure amidst her victories, there was a danger she might become intoxicated by such an uninterrupted series of successes of every nature; Koyama acted the part of the slave that walked by the side of the victorious general in the Roman Triumph. It also had a favourable effect on China; the human heart is so strangely constituted that we are more inclined to forgive than to ask forgiveness, and China was flattered by finding Japan, at last, humbled before her, and she felt happy she could be generous. At the same time, all the Chinese belonging to the Embassy were surprised and deeply gratified by the spontaneous and universal manifestations of regret of the Japanese nation. Swayed by such sentiments the two nations were led to feel esteem and sympathy for each other.

It had also political effects of a very different nature. All the enemies of the aged Viceroy, all the snarling censors were ready to denounce him as a traitor to his country if he concluded a disadvantageous peace, but the edge was taken off their arguments when the old statesman returned with a bullet lodged in his skull.

Li-Hung-chang behaved with courage and dignity; he walked out of his palanquin without assistance, and when the bandages prepared by the Empress were shown to him, he took them up reverentially and said: "In truth the benevolence of Her Majesty the Empress of Japan is profound as the sea. When

I return home and tell my Imperial Mistress what has been done for me, she will be very satisfied."

The Japanese Government recognising that the Peace Negotiations were unavoidably delayed by the crime of Koyama, agreed to grant an armistice binding all the troops in Manchuria, Chihli and Shantung.\* This armistice in the north was to last 21 days, from 30th of March to 20th of April.

Li-Hung-chang was soon able to resume work, with the assistance of his son Lord Li, and on the 17th of April the treaty of peace between China and Japan was signed. The armistice was extended until the date for the exchange of ratifications, which was not to take place later than the 8th of May. Ratifications were exchanged on that date at Chefoo, the place indicated in the Treaty of Peace.†

\* See Appendix J.

† Appendix K contains the text of the treaty, and the negotiations that preceded it.



## CONCLUSION.

By the treaty of Shimonoseki, besides a large war indemnity, Japan was to receive Formosa, the Pescadores islands, and the Liao-tung peninsula, with the great naval stronghold of Port Arthur. This latter condition of the treaty was considered excessive by some of the European powers, who feared that the possession of such a formidable strategical position would enable Japan to exercise an undue influence at Peking. A coalition was formed by Russia, France, and Germany, who advised Japan, in the interests of the permanent peace of the Far East, to relinquish her claims on the Liao-tung peninsula. Japan consented to this proposal, showing to the world that the wisdom of her statesmen was equal to the skill of her generals. The European intervention caused much excitement in Japan, and there was some sharp censure of the ministers who yielded to its advice. Nothing could have been more unjust. A refusal to abandon the Liao-tung peninsula would have probably brought on a terrible war, which, though it might have been very glorious for Japanese daring, would have sacrificed all the practical results of the war. Besides, there was no dishonour, even to the most punctilious patriotism, to yield a little to the

courteous remonstrances of the three greatest military powers of the world. This alliance, the most formidable recorded in history (if we bear in mind the gigantic military developments of modern Europe), is the most flattering testimonial to the power of Japan in the Far East, and to the skill she displayed in the last war. It is a proof from the highest quarters that the China-Japan War is one of the most remarkable events of the century, and justifies the opinions expressed in the Introduction to this book.

The wonderful military successes of Japan are of such a peculiar nature, and suggest such complex considerations, that a careful analysis is necessary. Since the capture of Constantinople in 1453, and the rise of the Osmanli power which threatened Christian Europe for over two centuries, until crushed at Lepanto and Vienna by John of Austria and Sobieski, the world has not witnessed the growth of military power in an Eastern people. Moreover, the power of the Japanese is of a far higher order than that of the Osmanli Turks; the latter achieved their conquests by numbers and the courage of fanaticism, and were generally assisted by renegades in the skilled departments of warfare; the Japanese have conducted their military operations on scientific principles, and were not aided by a single European officer. If we consider the accessories of warfare, the difference excludes comparison; while the conquests of the Osmanlis were marked by wholesale massacres and outrages of every kind, the Japanese have shown a humanity and

moderation which would honour any Christian nation. Peaceful inhabitants were never ill-treated, and the ambulances and field hospitals extended the same treatment to the wounded of both sides. If we consider the numerical disparity of the two nations, we must look back to the conquests of Alexander and of the British in India to find an historical parallel, as there is little doubt that, left to themselves, the Japanese could have conquered the whole Chinese Empire.

There is another feature in the war which deserves attention : the whole invading force had to be transported by sea. In a few months Japan landed about 80,000 men on the enemy's coasts ; we must go back to the Punic wars to find a nation that has accomplished such a mighty effort. Moreover, this was done with a fleet little, if at all, superior to the enemy's, and with transport steamers mostly purchased during the war.

Of course, the rapid successes of the Japanese must be discounted by the fact that the war was undertaken against an unwarlike people destitute of military organisation ; but it must be remembered that the absence of any efficient military resistance was compensated by obstacles of another nature—the want of roads, difficult country, and the severe winter prevailing during the latter part of the campaign. These difficulties successfully and rapidly overcome by a nation carrying on the war across the sea, show that Japan possesses a very efficient military organisation,

and a commissariat which can provide against any emergency. The Japanese were not surprised at their success, and their only astonishment was that foreigners should ever have doubted the result.

The war has been a revelation to the world of the power of Japan, and has won for her universal recognition as a great civilised nation; but those who have not watched closely this enterprising nation must bear in mind that her military development is only a part of the general national progress; there are many other facts, less known, which are more important. Japan has carried on an expensive war without the assistance of foreign loans, entirely with her own financial resources, and has bought in the few months the struggle lasted 120,000 tons of shipping; the country did not feel the strain, and trade flourished. Her manufactures are steadily improving, and there is hardly an article produced in Europe or America which cannot be made now in Japan. In science she is advancing rapidly; an officer of her army has invented a rifle, and when the plague broke out at Hong Kong in 1894 Japanese experts were sent to make bacteriological studies on the disease; during the war, Dr. Kikushi (Surgeon-in-chief of the second army) discovered that the ashes from burnt straw (a material easily procurable, and necessarily clean from the process it has undergone) could be advantageously substituted for the lime-bandages advocated in France for the treatment of wounds.

But far above all these material results must be placed the magnificent burst of earnest patriotism pervading all ranks of society which was occasioned by the war. The whole nation felt and acted like one man; political parties, so violent in ordinary times, were silent during the war and all vied in self-sacrifice and patriotism. A country which has shown such sentiments possesses the chief element of national greatness.

The practical results of the war are very important for Japan: the Pescadores give her a fine strategical position, commanding maritime access to China, and the Island of Formosa, with its rich produce of tea, sugar and camphor, gives her a territorial increase which will greatly develop her trade. She now forms a splendid island empire stretching for nearly 30° of latitude up to Kamschatka, along the eastern shores of the Asiatic continent over which she is destined to exert great influence. The indemnity of 200 millions of taels \* will increase the national capital, and under the skilful management of her financiers it will probably produce a commercial and industrial expansion which will astonish the world as much as her military successes.

If the future of Japan promises to be bright, it must be confessed that she deserves it. For the last thirty years the best part of the nation has been quietly but steadfastly studying and working to rise to the level of the foremost nations of the earth.

\* Over thirty million sterling.

The youth of Japan have been exploring the whole world in search of everything which might contribute to the welfare and greatness of their country. Every steamer to Europe and America had Japanese passengers of every class, all bent on study and self-improvement. No branch of human activity has been neglected, and each nation has had to yield its best knowledge to the acquisitive curiosity of the Japanese ; even Ceylon has been visited by Japanese zealous to improve their knowledge of Buddhism. During the last generation Japan has been like a vast bee-hive, whose inmates were busy everywhere gathering the essence of the best they saw, and it is just they should now begin to enjoy the fruits of their industry.

This phenomenon is not a new one in the history of Japan : in the past she assimilated the learning of China so thoroughly, that at present Chinese literature is better cultivated in Japan than in the land of its origin. If the same success attends her present attempt to absorb the science and culture of Europe and America, Japan may become a crucible in which the knowledge accumulated by the secular experience of the East and the West will be fused and amalgamated, giving forth as its product a new form of civilisation on a wider basis.

The severe lesson of the war ought to produce a beneficial effect on China, but unfortunately there are no signs of it at present. The blow, materially, has been a very trifling one to the huge empire : the

loss of territory is insignificant, and the war indemnity only appears large owing to the want of financial organisation in the country. If we take the population of China at the lowest estimate, 200 millions, the indemnity amounts to less than  $\frac{1}{30}$  of what was paid by France in 1871 without its affecting her national prosperity. Though the wealth and resources of China are probably exaggerated, yet she can pay the sum without feeling any inconvenience. Her defeat has deeply wounded her pride, but this should produce a healthy reaction and the resolution to reform her institutions and national life. Unless this resolution is carried out and China succeed in imitating the material progress of Japan, and most of all in adopting her civic and military virtues, her future ~~looks very dark.~~

## APPENDICES.

### APPENDIX A.

#### PROGRAMME OF REFORMS PRESENTED TO THE COREAN GOVERNMENT BY THE JAPANESE MINISTER OTORI.

*I.—Reform in central and provincial governments and appointment of able officials.*

1. To define clearly the duties of all officials. All domestic and foreign affairs are to be under the control of the Giseifu (administrative council), and at the heads of the departments are to be placed the six Sohausho (ministers) as hitherto. Palace officials are to be distinguished from administrative officials, and the former should under no circumstances be connected with national administrative affairs.

2. As diplomatic and commercial relations with foreign countries are of the greatest importance they should be dealt with circumspectly, and a responsible minister be entrusted with them.

3. Offices which are necessary to carry out administrative orders should be retained, but all sinecure offices should be abolished. Offices should be amalgamated to simplify matters as much as possible.

4. The present provincial districts are too numerous. They should be reduced in number so as to diminish expenses; but special care should be taken not to interfere with administrative efficiency.



5. All officials should have fixed duties. Only those whose offices are absolutely necessary should be retained, and superfluous officials should be dismissed.

6. Appointment through family descent, position, or precedent should be abolished, and all offices should be opened to talent.

7. Appointment by payment of money should be abolished, as it is liable to gross evils.

8. All officials' salaries should be clearly fixed at such sums as may enable them to live honestly.

9. The acceptance by officials of pecuniary and other bribes should be strictly prohibited by law.

10. Private trading by all officials of the central and provincial governments should be strictly prohibited by law.

*II.—To increase national wealth by financial reorganisation.*

11. The national revenue and expenditure should be examined and clearly defined by a fixed system.

12. All affairs relating to public accounts should be strictly managed.

13. The monetary system should be immediately reorganised.

14. The agricultural products of the provincial divisions should be ascertained and the rate of taxation reformed.

15. All taxes should be reformed by law and new sources of revenue opened.

16. Where expenditure is not absolutely necessary reductions should be made, and where increase is necessary every effort should be made to meet it.

17. The government roads should be level and wide. Railways should be constructed between Seoul and the treaty ports; and there should be telegraphic communication with the cities, district offices, and garrisons, so as to increase the facilities of communication.

18. The business of the custom-houses at the treaty ports should be entirely managed by Corea, without any external interference.

*III.—To reorganise law and law courts.*

19. Such existing laws as are considered unsuitable to the times should be suspended or reformed, and new laws should be established to meet new requirements.

20. By reforming the law of judicial procedure the equity of the judiciary should be proved.

*IV.—By reorganising the army and police to suppress internal rebellion and maintain peace.*

21. Military officers should be educated.

22. The present army and navy should be reformed, and as many corps in new style should be established as the national finances permit.

23. As the establishment of police is most necessary, police-stations should be set up in Seoul and other important towns, and strictly disciplined.

*V.—To fix the educational system.*

24. The entire educational system should be appropriately reformed, and in every locality elementary schools established for the education of children.

25. After the establishment of elementary schools, middle schools and colleges should in the course of time be established when required.

26. The ablest among students should be sent abroad to study.

## APPENDIX B.

## DESPATCHES BETWEEN THE CHINESE AND JAPANESE GOVERNMENTS ON THE KOREAN QUESTION BEFORE THE COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES.

THE subjoined official translations of the despatches laid by Count Ito before the House of Peers on the 19th of October were given in the *Japan Mail* of 22nd of October, 1894.

## No. 1.

*Chinese Legation, Tokyo, the 3rd day,\* the 5th month, the 20th year of Kwang-su (the 7th day, the 6th month, the 27th year of Meiji).*

Monsieur le Ministre,—I have the honour to inform your Excellency that I am in receipt of a telegram from His Excellency Li, Superintendent of Commerce of the Pei-yang, to the effect that in the convention of the 11th year of Kwang-sü (the 18th year of Meiji) between China and Japan it is provided that, should there arise in future the necessity on the part of China to despatch troops to Korea owing to the existence of any disturbance in that country, the fact shall be previously communicated to Japan, and that the troops shall be withdrawn at once on the cessation of the disturbance and none shall be left behind, and the telegram adds that a communication had been received from the Korean Government containing the following statement:—

The people in Zeura-do, who are vicious in habit, having,

\* 7th of June, 1894.

under the leaders of the Togaku-to,\* attacked and taken several towns and villages, proceeded northward and took possession of Zenshu. The government troops which were despatched to suppress the revolt have not been successful. If this disturbance continues to spread and is allowed to exist for a long time much trouble may be given to China. When in the years 1882 and 1884 we suffered from internal commotions, the uprisings were in each case suppressed by the troops of China on our behalf. In accordance with those precedents we hereby present an earnest application for despatch of some troops to speedily quell the disturbance. As soon as the revolt is quelled we will request the withdrawal of the troops and shall not ask for their longer detention, so that they may not suffer the hardships of being abroad for a long period.

The telegram further states that the application upon examination is found to be urgent both in words and in fact, and that it is in harmony with our constant practice to protect our tributary states by sending our troops to assist them.

These circumstances were accordingly submitted to His Imperial Majesty, and, in obedience to his will, General Yeh, commander of troops in Chihli, has been ordered to proceed at once to Zeura and Chinsei in Korea with selected troops, and to speedily suppress the disturbance in such manner as he may deem most convenient in order to restore the peace of our tributary state, and to dispel the anxiety of the subjects of every nation residing in Korea for commercial purposes, and at the same time the general is commanded to return with the troops as soon as the desired object is attained.

The telegram finally declares that His Excellency, the minister to Japan, is required to make communication in pursuance of the said convention and is telegraphed to that effect, and is accordingly instructed to at once communicate the matter to the Japanese Foreign Office.

In making, therefore, the foregoing communication to Your

\* The Tong-lak party.

Excellency I avail myself to renew to you the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) WANG.

His Excellency Monsieur Mutsu,  
H. I. J. M.'s Minister for Foreign Affairs.

No. 2.

*Department of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, the 7th day,\* the 6th month, the 27th year of Meiji.*

Monsieur le Ministre,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's note of to-day, acquainting me, in accordance with the provision of the convention of the 18th day † of the 4th month of the 18th year of Meiji between our two Governments, that your Government have despatched troops to Korea.

In reply, I beg to declare that although the words "tributary" state appear in your note, the Imperial Government have never recognised Korea as a tributary state of China.

I avail myself, &c., &c.

(Signed) MUTSU MUNEMITSU,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

His Excellency Monsieur Wang,  
H. I. C. M.'s E. E. and M. P.

No. 3.

*Japanese Legation, Peking, the 7th day, ‡ the 6th month, the 27th year of Meiji.*

Messieurs le Prince et les Ministres,—In pursuance of instructions which I have just received from His Imperial Majesty's Government I have the honour, in accordance

\* 7th of June, 1894.

† 18th of April, 1885.

‡ 7th of June, 1894.

with the provision of the Convention of the 18th day of the 4th month of the 18th year of Meiji between our two Governments, to acquaint Your Highness and Your Excellencies, that owing to the existence of a disturbance of a grave nature in Korea necessitating the presence of Japanese troops there, it is the intention of the Imperial Government to send a body of Japanese troops to that country.

I avail myself, &c.

(Signed) KOMURA YATARO,  
H. I. J. M.'s Chargé d'Affaires.

His Highness and Their Excellencies  
of the Tsung-li Yamên.\*

No. 4.

*Tsungli Yamên, the 6th day,† the 5th month, the 20th year of Kwang sü (the 9th day, the 6th month, the 27th year of Meiji).*

Monsieur le Chargé d'Affaires,—We have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note under date of the 4th instant (the 7th day the 6th month of the Japanese Calendar) informing us that you have been instructed by your Government to acquaint us, in accordance with the provision of the Convention between the two countries, that owing to the existence of a disturbance of a grave nature in Korea Japanese troops will be despatched to that country.

Our country has despatched troops to Korea in compliance with an application from that country, for the purpose of assisting her to suppress the insurgents, and the measure is in accordance with the practice hitherto pursued by our country in protecting tributary states. Besides, the sole object being the suppression of the insurgents in the interior, the troops are to be withdrawn as soon as that object is attained. Although the condition of Jinsen and Fusan is

\* Chinese Foreign Office.

† 9th of June, 1894.

at present quiet and peaceful, our war vessels will be for a while stationed there for the protection of commerce carried on at those ports.

The sole object of your country in sending troops is evidently to protect the Legation, Consulates, and commercial people in Korea, and consequently it may not be necessary on the part of your country to despatch a great number of troops, and besides, as no application therefore has been made by Korea, it is requested that no troops shall proceed to the interior of Korea, so that they may not cause alarm to her people. And moreover, since it is feared that in the event the soldiers of the two nations should meet on the way, cases of unexpected accident might occur, owing to the difference of language and military etiquette, we beg to request in addition that you will be good enough to telegraph the purport of this communication to the Government of Japan.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances, &c., &c., &c.,  
President and Members of Tsung-li Yamen.

Y. Komura, Esq.,  
H. I. J. M.'s Chargé d'Affaires.

No. 5.

*Japanese Legation, Peking, the 12th day,\* the 6th month, the 27th year of Meiji.*

Messieurs le Prince et les Ministres,—Having received your note under date of the 9th instant, acquainting me that the despatching of troops to Korea is in accordance with the practice hitherto pursued by China in protecting her tributary states, and that no necessity exists on the part of Japan to send a large number of troops there, and requesting that those troops shall not be sent to the interior of Korea, I did not fail to at once communicate by telegram the purport of

\* 12th of June, 1894.

that note to my Government, and I have now the honour to inform Your Highness and Excellencies that I am in receipt of a reply by telegram to the following effect:—

The Imperial Japanese Government have never recognised Korea as a tributary state of China. Japan despatched her troops in virtue of the Chemulpo Convention, and in so doing she has followed the procedure laid down in the Treaty of Tientsin. As to the number of troops, the Japanese Government are compelled to exercise their own judgment. Although no restriction is placed upon the movement of the Japanese troops in Korea, they will not be sent where their presence is not deemed necessary. The Japanese troops are under strict discipline, and the Japanese Government are confident that they will not precipitate a collision with the Chinese forces. It is hoped that China has adopted similar precautions.

I avail myself, &c., &c., &c.

(Signed) KOMURA,

H. I. J. M.'s Chargé d'Affaires.

His Highness and Their Excellencies  
of the Tsung-li-Yamen.

No. 6.

*Department of Foreign Affairs—Tokyo, the 17th day,\* the 6th month, 27th year of Meiji.*

Monsieur le Ministre,—I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that the following is a résumé of the proposals made in my interview with you yesterday to your Government on behalf of the Imperial Government in respect of the present events in Korea as well as with a view to the adjustment of her affairs in future:—As to the present events, Japan and China to unite their efforts for the speedy suppression of the disturbance of her insurgent people. After the suppression of the disturbance, Japan and China,

\* 17th of June, 1894.



with a view to the improvement of the internal administration of Korea, to respectively send a number of Commissioners charged with the duty of investigating measures of improvement, in the first place on the following general points:—

(a) Examination of the financial administration.

(b) Selection of the Central and Local Officials.

(c) Establishment of an army necessary for national defence in order to preserve the peace of the land.

In making the foregoing communication, I avail myself, &c., &c., &c.

(Signed)

MUTSU MUNEMITSU,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

His Excellency Monsieur Wang,  
H. I. C. M.'s E. E. and M. P.

#### No. 7.

*Chinese Legation, Tokyo, the 18th day,\* the 5th month, the 20th year of Kwangsi (the 22nd day, the 6th month, of the 27th year of Meiji).*

Monsieur le Ministre,—I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that I am in receipt of a telegram from my Government to the effect that having carefully considered the proposal made by your Government in respect to the events in Korea and the adjustment of her affairs in future, the Chinese Government would reply as follows:—

As the disturbance in Korea has already been suppressed, it is no longer essential to trouble the Chinese forces on Korea's behalf, and therefore no necessity exists to consider the proposition that our two countries shall co-operate in suppressing the disturbance.

In regard to the adjustment of Korean affairs in future, the idea may be excellent, but the measures of improvement must be left to Korea herself. Even China herself would

\* 22nd of June, 1894.

not interfere with the internal administration of Korea, and Japan having from the very first recognised the independence of Korea can not have the right to interfere with the same.

As to the withdrawal of troops from Korea after the suppression of the disturbance, provision on that subject exists in the Treaty of 1885, concluded between the two countries, and therefore it is not required to discuss the matter over again on this occasion.

The above has already been communicated to Your Excellency in our interview, and in now repeating it for your further consideration, I avail myself, &c., &c., &c.

(Signed) WANG,

H. I. C. M.'s E. E. and M. P.

His Excellency Monsieur Mutsu,  
H. I. J. M.'s Minister for Foreign Affairs.

No. 8.

*Department of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, the 22nd day,\* the 6th month, the 27th year of Meiji.*

Monsieur le Ministre,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's note of the 22nd inst., in which Your Excellency, in pursuance of instructions from the Imperial Chinese Government, rejects the proposals advanced by His Imperial Majesty's Government for the tranquillisation and amelioration of Korea.

The Imperial Government, much to their regret, find it impossible to share the hopeful views entertained by Your Excellency's Government regarding the actual situation in Korea at the present time.

Sad experience teaches us that the Peninsular Kingdom is the theatre of political intrigues and civil revolts and disturbances of such frequent recurrence as to justify the

\* 22nd of June, 1894.

conclusion that the Government of that country is lacking in some of the elements which are essential to responsible independence.

The interests of Japan in Korea, arising from propinquity as well as commerce, are too important and far-reaching to allow her to view with indifference the deplorable condition of affairs in that kingdom.

In this situation an attitude of unconcern on the part of Japan would not only be a denial of the sentiments of friendship and good correspondence which the Imperial Government entertain for Korea, but it would be a censurable disregard of the law of self-preservation.

The necessity for the adoption of measures looking to the peace and tranquillity of Korea is, for the reasons already given, a demand which the Imperial Government cannot permit to pass unheeded, for so long as those measures are delayed so long will the cause of the disorder exist.

In the estimation of the Imperial Government, therefore, the withdrawal of their forces should be consequent upon the establishment of some understanding that will serve to guarantee the future peace, order, and good government of the country. That course of action is moreover, it seems to His Imperial Majesty's Government, not only in perfect harmony with the spirit of the Tientsin Convention, but it accords with the dictates of reasonable precaution.

Should the Government of China continue to hold views antagonistic to those which I have frankly and in good faith presented to Your Excellency, it cannot be expected that the Imperial Government will under the circumstances feel at liberty to sanction the present retirement of their troops from Korea.

I avail myself, &c., &c., &c.,

(Signed)

MUTSU MUNEMITSU,

Minister for Foreign Affairs.

His Excellency M<sup>onsieur</sup> Wang,

H. I. C. M.'s E. E. and M. P.

## No. 9.

*Japanese Legation, Peking, the 14th day,\* the 7th month, the 27th year of Meiji.*

Messieurs le Prince et les Ministres,—Having communicated to H. I. J. M.'s Minister for Foreign Affairs on the same day, the particulars of the statement made by Your Highness and Excellencies on my interview with you at the Tsung-li-Yamen on the 9th day, the 7th month, the 27th year of Meiji, I have the honour to inform you that I am just in receipt of a telegram from the minister to the following effect :—

The disturbances which are of frequent occurrence in Korea have their source in the derangement of internal administration of that country. Consequently, the Imperial Government believe it best to encourage the Korean Government to eradicate the cause of disturbance by introducing internal administrative reforms, and the Imperial Government considered that for the purpose of enabling Korea to accomplish the desired reforms, nothing would be better than the conjoint assistance be given to Korea, but to their surprise, the Imperial Chinese Government definitely rejected the proposal of Japan and limited themselves solely to a request for the withdrawal of the Japanese troops from Korea. Recently Her Britannic Majesty's Minister at Peking, animated by friendship and good-will towards Japan and China, tendered his good offices and endeavoured to reconcile the differences existing between the two countries, but the Imperial Chinese Government still continued solely to insist upon the retirement of the Japanese forces and manifested no disposition to acquiesce in the view of the Imperial Japanese Government. The only conclusion deducible from these circumstances is that the Chinese

\* 14th of July, 1894.

Government are disposed to precipitate complications; and in this juncture the Imperial Japanese Government find themselves relieved of all responsibility for any eventuality that may, in future, arise out of the situation.

In enclosing herewith the translation of the above telegram, I avail myself, &c., &c., &c.

(Signed) KOMURA,

H. I. J. M.'s Chargé d'Affaires.

His Highness and Their Excellencies  
of the Tsung-li-Yamen.

## APPENDIX C.

## THE DESTRUCTION OF THE "KOWSHING." STATEMENT OF THE SURVIVORS.

ON Wednesday morning at half-past ten o'clock, Mr. Detring and Mr. Loh Fêng-luh sat at the Imperial Chinese Admiralty, Tientsin, as agents of His Excellency Li-Hung-chang, to take the statements of two of the crew and three soldiers who had escaped from the massacre on board the *Kowshing*. There were present the United States, Russian, French and German Consuls, Mr. Edmund Cousins representing the owners of the *Kowshing*, Mr. Cockburn of the British Consulate, and others.

Mr. Detring, in opening the proceedings, said that the Chinese Government wishing to have the statements of those saved from on board the *Kowshing* formally made, had directed them to invite the consuls of the different nations and those interested in the fate of the people on board the *Kowshing* to meet and take part in the proceedings. The *Kowshing* was a British merchant steamer of 1,353 tons, chartered by the Chinese Government to take troops and arms to Korea on an appeal from the King of Korea to support his Government. Under the treaty of 1888 the Chinese Government had a right so to send troops to Korea, and it was not expected that the act would lead to hostilities. They were aware that it had done so, and to ascertain the circumstances was the object of their intended inquiry. With these few preliminary remarks he would at once open the proceedings.

Pedro Oriate, aged 42, born at Manila, said: He had been three months in the *Kowshing*. She left Taku bar at 9.30 P.M. on Monday, the 23rd of July. Nothing occurred

on the voyage. He first saw the islands of the Korean coast at about 8 A.M. on the 25th, and soon after sighted the mainland. He first saw a Japanese man-of-war, at 9 A.M. She first hoisted a signal to them to stop and then a signal to anchor. After they were anchored she sent a boat, and two officers and a sailor came on board. He saw the officers speak to the captain. He (Oriate) was on the ladder going up to the bridge.

Mr. Cousins said a person standing on the ladder could see and hear what took place on the bridge.

Oriate (continuing): The Japanese officers spoke to the captain, the pilot and a passenger. (Shown a photograph of Mr. von Hanneken). Did not see him speak to the Japanese, who examined the ship's papers and then returned to the launch. The *Kowshing* was at anchor. They had not passed any islands. From her first anchoring the steamer had never moved. He did not know that fighting was going on between Chinese and Japanese men-of-war. He saw three Japanese men-of-war. Two left and one remained and sent a launch on board. The men-of-war remained about a mile from the *Kowshing*. He did not see any other boat come. It came a second time. The Japanese spoke to the captain. No one on board the *Kowshing* fired, not one shot. When the Japanese fired first he was below, but was looking out at the men-of-war. They were all about a mile or less away. They fired from 12.40 to 1.30, when the *Kowshing* went down. He saw the firing. As soon as the fire began he went forward and stooped below the bulwarks to escape the shot. As soon as he felt the steamer settling down slowly, he climbed the foremast where he was when the French gunboat took him off. He could not say what became of the Europeans, there was such a crowd in the water. He believed they jumped into the water, but he did not see them. Some jumped into the water, some into boats which they swamped and went down. There were eight boats on board. Two were so made fast they could not be launched.

He was very frightened and did not see if any boats were destroyed by shot. There was great bloodshed. He was on the mast with four soldiers. There were about thirty-six on the other mast. There was little sea. He saw no bodies floating about. He was from 1.30 p.m. to 7 next morning on the mast. They saw no more of the Japanese ship. She had two masts and one funnel. She was painted white and was a large ship. He did not know how many men she carried. The French gun-boat took them off about 7 A.M. next day. They sent two boats and saved them all, himself, forty-two from the masts, and two in the water, one fireman who was swimming. The *Kowshing* was about a mile from the island. Mr. von Hanneken was on deck, but not on the bridge. The Japanese officers went into the chart-room. Mr. von Hanneken could hear what the Japanese officers said to the captain. Did not know if any one escaped by swimming to the island. Did not know if any people were shot in the water. The Japanese used revolving guns. The last time they boarded was at 12 o'clock. Only one Japanese came on board, and he said something in English and went back; he was a young man and he had come both times. He was not sure that any soldiers were on deck when the Japanese boarded. (It should be understood that the *Kowshing's* main deck was a flush deck from stem to stern only broken by the mast, funnel, sky-lights and captain's cabin and chart-house, above which was the bridge.) The soldiers were watching the men-of-war when they boarded. The British flag was flying before they sighted the Japanese. The house flag was flying at the mainmast, nothing at the foremast.

Tung Ha-hsin said he was a Canton man of Fung Sun and a fireman on the *Kowshing*. He was 26 years old and had been on board 12 years. At 8 o'clock he was in the engine-room. At 9.30 they anchored. He heard a gun and the ship was stopped. At 12.30 he came up and went to the forecastle to wash and get his food. At 1 o'clock he



climbed the mast. At 1.15 he swam to the long boat. The Japanese fired at them and eight men in the boat were killed. Forty or more were in that boat, which was sunk. Its rudder had been shot away. He could not swim to shore for the strong current. They stopped firing at 4 o'clock. He judged the time by the sun. It was the small gun-boat that fired on their long-boat. He was very frightened. He thought the gun-boat had three masts. There was a gun-boat that fired on his boat and the people swimming, after the *Kowshing* was sunk. The shot fell like rain among the swimming people. He was picked up by the French gun-boat at 6 o'clock next morning. He stuck to the boat all night. He only saw the second mate jump into the water. One boat with ten or more men reached the island. He thought some in that boat were foreigners because they wore white clothes. He saw them land. He saw Corean junks at a distance. The French gun-boat went to the *Kowshing*, but did not go to the island. He did not tell the French gun-boat that people were on the island. He did not know if it was inhabited.

Chang Yu-lin, an Anhui man, 40, said he was a soldier, a "sho-peli" (captain). He was below when the first shot was fired. He remained below till the vessel was sinking. Two torpedoes broke the vessel's bottom. He saw the torpedoes coming when looking through the port. He was about mid-ships. A number of soldiers were killed by the escaped steam. He saw in the place where he was many people killed. One shot came into his room and he went up. There was no steam in his room. He got hold of the rigging when the vessel went down. He sank with the ship. He cannot swim. He got up the mast by climbing the rigging. Thirty-three were on the mast where he was, and four on the other mast. He saw the quick-firing gun fired from the gun-boat at the people swimming. The people on the mast were not fired at. The Japanese gun-boat had two masts. He saw four white and one grey Japanese men-of-war. He saw

one man on each mast firing the quick-firing gun. (He described the turning of the handle and the whirring sound of the machine-gun). He did not know the Chinese and Japanese men-of-war had fought. They could see nothing of a Chinese man-of-war burning. It was the gun-boat that sank the *Kowshing*, that fired at the men in the water. He saw no boats go to the island.

Mou Ching-sing, 24, soldier, was amidships below when the firing began. When the vessel was sinking he jumped overboard and got hold of a floating ladder, and on getting to the mast got on it and left the ladder. He saw five Japanese ships; only one fired at the *Kowshing*. The Japanese gun-boat stayed after the *Kowshing* sank and fired on the boats and people in the water. Only one steamer fired on the people in the water. They lowered two gigs, but took in no people. He did not see what they were doing. The gigs would hold about ten men. He saw a number killed by the steam.

Wang Kwi-fung, a soldier, saw Mr. von Hanneken seize a life-buoy and jump overboard. He did not see any one reach the shore. The sea was bad; there was a strong breeze from land. He saw the Japanese fire from the masts on the people swimming. It was the same gun-boat that sunk the *Kowshing* that fired on the people. Three boats put off with loads. The Japanese sank two. All round the ship was like a fog (from the steam).

This concluded the statements of the survivors. The remainder of the men rescued by the French gun-boat *Lion* were in the hall. Some of them seem to have slight wounds and contusions. They were in general able-bodied looking men capable of doing good service. Those who made the statements above recorded did so in a plain straightforward way which was very impressive. In the main facts and most of the details they were in complete accord. The description of the action, of the machine-guns by two of the survivors was unmistakable and graphic. It may still be hoped that more Europeans have escaped.

*Mr. von Hanneken's Report.*

The s.s. *Kowshing* left on the 23rd of July Taku with a cargo of soldiers ; all told 1,220 men and 12 guns, except of the rifles and ammunition, etc., etc. She arrived in the morning of the 25th in sight of the islands of the Corean Archipelago outside the Prince Jerome Gulf.

At this time she sighted a big man-of-war on her port bow. This man-of-war was moving very fast towards west (about direction of Port Arthur) ; she looked to me like the Chinese *Ting-yuen* type ; she passed us on a great distance and we did not see any more of her.

At about 7 o'clock we sighted on our star-board bow a vessel under sail bound in the direction of Chemulpo, so that she would have had to cross our bow (or stern) if she kept on her course, and we kept our course for Yashan. At about 8 o'clock we sighted a large man-of-war coming out from behind the Island of Hsutau, and some ten minutes later we saw first one, then two (altogether three) more big ships coming out from behind the same island. All these vessels were of large ironclad type as far as we could make out.

At about 9 o'clock we made out on the most forward vessel the Japanese flag, above which was flying a white flag. She moved rapidly towards us, and when passing us saluted us by dipping her flag.


Our position at that time was thus :—

Island ×	6
	5
	4
	1
2	
	3
	× Island.

1. *Kowshing*.
2. Man-of-war with Japanese and white flag.
3. Chinese despatch vessel *Taokiang*.
- 4, 5 and 6, other men-of-war.

The ship which we had sighted under sail, and which had turned out to be the *Tsaokiang* had meanwhile lowered her sail and turned backward in the direction on Wei-hai-wei.

If we had been somewhat uneasy about this large display of Japanese fleet we were quite reassured about the peaceful intentions towards us when the passing ship dipped her flag to us and we thought they were chasing the *Tsaokiang*. The ships Nos. 4, 5, and 6, which had altogether turned out to be Japanese men-of-war, had been following their course, and such was our position,



when signals were hoisted on No. 4 Japanese ship and two blind guns told us to stop and drop anchor. We did so. The next signal was "Stop where you are or take the consequences." No. 4 Japanese ship then turned to port and approached No. 5, which was with No. 6, together moving on. All three ships moved on probably to semaphore to each other, being puzzled what to do after recognising the British flag on a ship which was evidently a Chinese transport as it appeared.

The No. 4 ship then turned back to us with all her guns run out and pointed at our ship, and stopped at a distance of about a quarter of a mile. We saw a boat lowered and coming towards us. The commander of the Chinese troops on board told me, and asked me to tell the captain, they would rather go down on the spot than to be made prisoners. They were very excited, and I had difficulty to appease them and to impress upon them that it was utterly necessary to keep order on board as long as parleying was going on.

I told Captain Galsworthy what the intentions of the commanders were.

The Japanese boat and several officers came on board ; the men in the boat were armed with rifles and sabres. The Japanese officers repaired to the captain's cabin ; he had to show his papers, etc., etc., and to prove that he really was in charge of a British vessel. He then was told curtly to follow the Japanese man-of-war. I was not present at this interview ; I had told the captain to send for me if need was. I was busy keeping commanders and soldiers at peace. We had arranged, Captain Galsworthy and I, before the Japanese boat came alongside that he should insist on being allowed to return to Taku, the port where we started from, since we had started from there before any declaration of war.

It seems that the Japanese *parlementaire* did not give any time to Captain Galsworthy to insist on anything when he told him to follow the Japanese man-of-war, and neither did I hear of this order before the Japanese officers left the ship.

When then Captain Galsworthy told me of the result of the parley, which I interpreted to the Chinese commanders, there was a great uproar amongst them and their soldiers. They menaced with swords and rifles captain and crew and all Europeans on board in case the captain dared to get up his anchor. Again I had to do my utmost to appease this turmoil, and then I told the captain to hoist a signal for the *parlementaire* boat to come back. She came, and this time I myself went to the gangway to speak with the Japanese officers. We could not risk to let the Japanese *parlementaire* come on board because soldiers with rifles and swords were flocking about, and surely would have made short business of them if they had shown any signs of not giving in to our request.

I told the Japanese officers, who arrived on the gangway ladder with their right hand to the sword hilt, "The captain's hands are forced ; he is not able to obey your orders ; the soldiers on board would not allow him to do so. Commander and soldiers insist to be allowed to return to the

port where they started from. The captain and I think that this is a just and fair request even if war should be already declared, considering that we started in time of peace."

I made sure that the *parlementaire* understood me. They left saying they would refer the matter to their captain.

After the boat arrived at the Japanese man-of-war we had to wait some time for an answer. At last the signal was hoisted: "Quit the ship as soon as possible." This could only be meant for the Europeans and crew, but there was no chance, and perhaps no intention to follow this advice.

The Chinese soldiers had taken charge of every davit. Captain Galsworthy then hoisted the signal "We are not allowed." The only answer which we got was an answering pennant. Then we saw the Japanese man-of-war moving and coming around, leaving us quite at amiss about her intentions. She came around, and when she was at a distance of about 150 metres—exactly alongside of our port side—she stopped. I saw a torpedo leaping from her torpedo port, and immediately afterwards all six guns opened fire. They discharged their guns twice before the torpedo arrived at its aim. It hit the ship amidships, probably exactly at her coal bunkers. The day became night—coal, splinters, water were filling the air. I believed we then all jumped and swam.

In swimming I saw the ship going down—she went stern first.

During this the firing continued, which was bravely answered with rifles by the poor wretches, who knew they had no chance in trying to swim. I saw a Japanese boat lowered, heavily armed with men. I thought they were coming to the rescue of the remaining men; but I was sadly mistaken—they fired into the men on board the sinking ship. I do not know what their purpose was in doing so. The fact is that the swimming men were fired at from the Japanese man-of-war and from the sinking ship, the men on board the latter one probably having the savage idea that if they had to

die their brothers should not live either. The *Kowshing* went down entirely after about half-an-hour or so from the time when the torpedo was fired.

There would have been plenty of chance for her to try for a better fate, by slipping her chain when she had been told to stay where she was or to take the consequences, and again by having recourse to a ruse, showing intentions to carry out the order of the Japanese man-of-war and then running into the island. This had all been suggested at the proper time.

But the perfect confidence of captain and officers in the protection of the ship against any warlike undertaking by the fact of her being a British vessel flying the British flag sealed her fate, and I am grieved to say also the fate of officers, crew, and soldiers of which, as much as I know, only about 170 men saved their life by swimming. So far I don't know of any other European who reached the shore.

(Sg.)      CONSTANTINE VON HANNEKEN.

Signed before me the 30th of July, 1894.

(Sg.)      W. H. WILKINSON,  
H. B. M.'s Vice-Consul,  
Chemulpo.

---

*The Sinking of the Kowshing. The Chief Officer's Account.*

The *Kowshing* left Taku on the evening of the 23rd of July, 9.30. She had embarked her troops, about 1,100, on the afternoon of the same day, and was the last of the ten transports up to that time engaged, and one of three English steamers, the other two being the *Irene* and *Frithing*.

All went well on board till the morning of the 25th. The troops behaved generally in a quiet and orderly manner, and seemed to be very happy and contented; but they had apparently little idea as to how or where they were to be engaged. I was on watch from 4 A.M. till 8 A.M. on the 25th, and about 7.30 I observed a man-of-war steaming rapidly towards us. She had Japanese naval colours flying

with a white flag above it. As she neared us, thinking her to be a Japanese man-of-war, and in accordance with our usual custom, the red ensign was hoisted and dipped and hoisted again; but to our surprise—the captain having now come on the bridge—she took no notice of it, and continued steaming away in a N.E. direction. The next thing observed was a small schooner-rigged vessel coming in from the S.E.; but she was too far off to determine her nationality. We heard afterwards, when on board the *Naniwa*, that the first seen was a Chinese man-of-war, the *Tsiyuen*, which had suffered severely in a previous encounter with the *Naniwa*, and was running away. The second was afterwards captured and proved to be the *Tsaokiang*, an old wooden despatch vessel built in Shanghai thirty years ago, and bound from Chefoo with despatches to Chemulpo.

We then were nearing Shopaioul Island, and when about a mile S.E. of it, saw three men-of-war (Japanese), one of which approached us and signalled us to stop, enforcing the order by firing two guns across our bows. We stopped and signalled having done so. Then we were ordered by signal to anchor, which was also done, the anchor being lowered down in 11 fathoms (high water). The man-of-war then steamed away and joined her two consorts, and a conference was evidently held. As she was going we asked by signal ‘if we were allowed to proceed;’ but were answered by the signal, “Heave to, or take the consequences.” There was much excitement amongst the Chinese at this time, and arms were being got up and ammunition was being served out, and the two generals were very anxious to know what we were signalling. The troops, by the advice of Major von Hanneken, the passenger above referred to, were all ordered below. The men-of-war now separated and one approached us covering us with her guns. She then sent an armed boat’s crew alongside with two officers, who came on board and examined the ship’s register, and also were informed of the fact that war had not been declared up to the date of our leaving port.



After examining our papers the officer informed the captain that he was to follow the *Naniwa*—that being the name of the man-of-war that had stopped us. The difficulty we were in was explained to the officer, and he was asked to obtain permission from his captain to allow us to return to China. He then returned to his ship for instructions.

The Chinese generals on having the order explained to them were very indignant and excited, and told Major von Hanneken to explain to us, that at the least sign of our complying with the orders of the Japanese war-ship, or at the slightest attempt on our part to leave the vessel, we should be killed at once. The general accompanied his threat with many significant gesticulations intimating that our throats would be cut. He detailed soldiers to attend immediately on the captain and myself and served out ammunition to his bodyguard. We tried to explain to the general through Major von Hanneken the absolute futility of attempting to resist the Japanese man-of-war; that one shot from her would sink us, and that it would be best to obey; but it was of no use, the general declaring his intention of dying where he was sooner than submit, and threatening us again. The *Naniwa* now signalled, "Weigh, cut or slip; wait for nothing." We answered with the signal, "Send a boat, I wish to communicate personally," and the *Naniwa* answered "Send immediately." A boat then started from the *Naniwa* and the Chinese soldiers crowded the gangway, and it was only after repeated efforts that the officers managed to keep them out of the way. We were not allowed to go to the gangway to meet the officer in charge of the boat, as the Chinese general seemed suspicious that we wanted to leave them. On the boat coming alongside the officer was met by the Chinese generals and Major von Hanneken as interpreter. The captain was also sent for. He explained to the officer the position we were placed in and the impossibility of our complying with his commander's orders, adding at the same time, that a solution of the difficulty might be found in our

being allowed to return to China. The officer promised to inform his commander and left.

All our officers and Major von Hanneken gathered on the bridge now to try and discuss events, and the Chinese were noisily arguing on the upper deck. I left the bridge and went aft to get my papers, and met on the after-deck the chief and second engineers, to whom I stated the grave nature of the case and added that, if the Japanese fired at us we should have to take to the water. This was the last I saw of them. On regaining the bridge I found that the man-of-war was flying the signal, "Quit the ship immediately," and we at once sent a quartermaster aft, with warning to the engineers to prepare for the worst. We then signalled "I am not allowed" and followed that by "Send a boat." The signal to quit the ship was still flying when another signal was hoisted from the man-of-war "Lifeboat cannot come." The *Naniwa* then steamed into position immediately abeam of us and whistled with her syren whilst doing so. She then, still keeping the two previous signals flying, ran up a red flag to her foremast-head and almost immediately afterwards discharged a torpedo at us. We watched this coming, and it stopped or turned short of the ship. The *Naniwa* being a quarter of a mile away and seeing this, the whole starboard broadside of five guns was discharged and the machine guns on the top were used. This broadside took her somewhere amidships and she listed over to starboard.

I then left the bridge and, getting hold of a spare life-belt pumped overboard from forward, coming up foul of the chain, down which numbers of the crew were swarming. I got clear and struck out for the island. Just then a loud explosion as of a shell bursting occurred on board and the air was full of falling cinders and other débris. I saw the captain ahead of me with his face all black, and further I saw Major von Hanneken swimming strong, and not far from him another European. Just after this, and when

about seventy or eighty yards from the ship, I found that rifle bullets were striking the water all around me; I turned and saw the Chinese soldiers shooting at me from the deck and gangway ports. I then protected my head with the life-belt and swam and drifted with the tide past the ship. After getting clear of the ship I again made for the island, but seeing many Chinese ahead of me I reflected that it would be just as dangerous getting on to the island with them as it had been on board, so I again turned and taking off all my clothes made for the *Naniwa*, which had now drifted considerably away from the ship and was not using her guns, as far as I can remember. I was not swimming long when I saw her lowering two of her boats, and one coming towards me, I was picked up. I explained to the officer the direction in which I had last seen the captain and the major swimming, and he directed the other boat to pull that way. No attempt was made to rescue the drowning Chinamen. Two volleys were fired from our boat with the object of sinking two of the lifeboats, which, having got clear of the ship, were filled with Chinese. Our boat was then recalled and I was taken on board, and dry clothes given me. Almost immediately after the captain was brought below in a very exhausted condition, and the quartermaster, Lucas Evangelista by name, who had a shot wound in his neck, and was immediately treated by the medical staff on board. We were very well treated, clothes and food being given to us, and even the sailors bringing presents of sweet biscuits and things for us to eat. I was called aft and asked to write an account of all that had transpired, which I did. The captain also was separated from me and given a state-room, whilst the quartermaster and I were lodged in the sick bay; this was to separate us. We were under guard the whole time and unable to leave the room. The vessel cruised about for some time, and then at 8 P.M. anchored in company with another man-of-war which was convoying the small Chinese gun-boat. The officers and men of the *Naniwa* were continuous in their

efforts to give us all they could and to make things pleasant for us as far as lay in their power.

On Thursday, the 26th, at 4 A.M. we got underway again and proceeded till 10 A.M., when we met the admiral and the fleet. Here we anchored, and I was again called aft to correct a copy of my written deposition. Clothes made on board were provided for us, and at noon we were transferred to the transport *Yayeyama*, the crew of the *Naniwa* waving us farewell. On getting on board the *Yayeyama*, Captain Hirayama received us very kindly and told us to make ourselves at home. We found on board the officers and crew of the *Tsaokiang*, Chinese despatch boat, also a Dane who was in the vessel at the time of her capture. We were berthed in the captain's own cabin, and the officers joined in making us welcome, inviting us to the ward-room and offering us clothes and other necessities.

At 1.30 P.M. the anchor was hove up and we steamed away for Japan. At 7 P.M. met and signalled two Japanese transports.

Friday, 27th.—Met and signalled Japanese transport in the morning at 7 A.M. off northern shore of Quelpart Island. At 7 P.M. off north end of Goto Island, where we slowed till daylight.

Saturday, 28th.—Found ourselves confined to our cabins in the morning entering Sasebo Bay. At 7 A.M. we anchored. Barges with an armed guard came alongside for the Chinese and for the Danish gentleman. We were introduced to Lieut. C. Tamari, Admiral's A.D.C., and taken with him in his steam-launch to the jetty. We were then conducted to the hospital, where a room was prepared for us on the ground floor. Lieut. Tamari gave us to understand that anything that we could ask for should be supplied. We begged him to notify our consul that many Europeans might still be alive on the island, and also to notify our agents. (Tailor and bootmaker were in attendance; soap, towels, and

all toilet requisites were sent. Beer and claret, cigars, etc., and anything that we fancied would be sent for from Nagasaki.) In the meantime he told us that the Minister of Marine had been telegraphed. Numbers of officers visited us and expressed their sympathy with us for the loss of our comrades, and also for our unavoidable detention.

Sunday, 29th.—A list of questions subjoined was handed to us to answer, sent by Rear-Admiral Y. Shibayama, I.J.N., Commander-in-chief of the naval station, Sasebo. Continued round of visitors bringing flowers, eggs, and offers of various things.

Monday, 30th, passed in the same way, every attention being paid to our comfort.

Tuesday, 31st.—Revised our answers, copies being sent us for that purpose.

Thursday, 2nd August.—Received a visit in the morning from President of the Imperial Board of Legislation, Mr. Suyimatsu Kencho, accompanied by Commander M. Saito, J.N., and Lieut. Tamari. Minute investigation followed, and we were allowed to write open letters to our agent and friends in Shanghai. In the afternoon received another visit and were asked to write answers to a few more pertinent questions regarding the loss of the *Kowshing*.

Friday, 3rd August.—Lieut. Tamari called with a letter from Rear-Admiral Y. Shibayama, giving us our freedom, etc., to make arrangements for our departure. We called by invitation on the admiral in the afternoon, and thanked him for the care and attention paid to us by all. Many officers called in the evening to congratulate us.

Saturday, 4th August.—The Government tender, *Sasebo Maru*, was placed at our disposal, and with many farewells left with Lieut. C. Tamari for Nagasaki, where we arrived at 1.30 P.M., and were met by the superintendent of water police and the superintendent of police, tendering their cards with offers of assistance. The British Consul took our

depositions, and copies were handed to the captain of the *Alacrity* for immediate conveyance to the Admiral.

LEWES HENRY TAMPLIN,

Belle Vue Hotel, Nagasaki.

P.S.—I wish to add that the Chinese crew and officers of the *Tsaokiang* were being treated with every care during our stay at Sasebo, and the Danish gentleman, Mühlensteth, had the same attention that we had. The Chinese and the Dane had all their personal property with them.

The following are the questions that we were required to answer :—

1. Nationality of ship.
2. My nationality.
3. Ship's owners.
4. Ship's agents.
5. Certificate of registry.
6. Ship's name.
7. Ship's complement.
8. Articles of agreement (crew).
9. Agreement between owners and Chinese.
10. Ship's manifest.
11. When and at what place engaged.
12. What port started from with the Chinese soldiers.
13. Date and time of starting.
14. Destination.
15. Orders and instructions from Chinese Government.
16. Arrangements and time for embarking troops.
17. Rank, name, and number of Chinese officers.
18. The number and nature of troops, and their description.
19. Supplies and provisions on board.
20. The management of the ship by the captain relating to the orders of the Japanese war-ship off Sho-paioul Island.
21. What instructions given by the officers commanding Chinese troops at the same time.
22. The condition of the Chinese troops at Yashan.

23. The position and number of the Peiyang squadron and torpedo-boats.

24. How many transports engaged by the Chinese Government.

25. What equipment had the Chinese troops on board the *Kowshing*.

26. What preparation had the Chinese squadron for action.

27. The fortifications and defensive power of the north coast of China.

### *Captain Galsworthy's Report.*

The British s.s. *Kowshing*, owned by the Indo-China Steam Navigation Co., left Shanghai on the 17th of July, bound to Taku, under charter to carry Chinese troops from that port to Yashan, on the coast of Corea. Arriving at Taku on the 20th, arrangements were made to ship the troops, and on the 23rd, 1,100 came on board, including two generals, a number of other officers of various rank, and a German ex-army officer named Hanneken, who came as an ordinary passenger. At 9.50 P.M. on the 23rd the ship proceeded on her voyage to Yashan. All went well until the morning of the 25th, when, off Shoupeul Island, we passed a man-of-war flying the Japanese naval ensign, with a white flag above it. This vessel proved to be the Chinese war-ship *Tsiyuen*. Shortly afterwards we sighted three Japanese men-of-war, the *Naniwa*, *Yoshino*, and another (probably the *Akitsushima*). The *Naniwa* at once steamed towards us, flying a signal ordering us to stop. She also fired two blank charges, and signalled us to anchor, which we at once did. The *Naniwa* then steamed away, apparently to communicate with the other ships. I at once inquired by signal if I might proceed, to which the *Naniwa* replied: "Heave to, or take the consequences." A boat then came from the *Naniwa*, and an officer came on board. He was received at the gangway, and he asked to see the ship's papers. They were shown to him,

and his attention particularly called to the fact that she was a British ship. Numerous other questions were asked and answered, the most important one being: "Would the *Kowshing* follow the *Naniwa*?"

Being utterly helpless against a man-of-war, I replied that there would be no alternative but to do so, under protest, if ordered. The officer then left the ship, and proceeded to the *Naniwa*. Shortly after, being still at anchor, I was ordered by signal to cut, slip, or weigh immediately. The Chinese generals learning the meaning of the signals, and finding preparations were being made to follow the *Naniwa*, objected most emphatically. They were told how useless it would be to resist, as one shot would sink them in a short time. The generals then said they would rather die than obey Japanese orders, and as they had 1,100 men against about 400 on the *Naniwa*, they would fight sooner than surrender. They were told that if they decided to fight, the foreign officers would leave the ship. The generals then gave orders to the troops on deck to kill us if we obeyed the orders of the Japanese or attempted to leave the ship. With gestures they threatened to cut off our heads, to stab, or shoot us; and a lot of men were selected to watch us and carry out the order. A signal was then made requesting the *Naniwa* to send a boat, in order to communicate the state of affairs. A boat was at once sent; but a crowd of armed Chinese took possession of the gangway, until I prevailed on the generals to send them away. Eventually the officers came alongside, and a message for the commander of the *Naniwa* was sent, stating that the Chinese refused to allow the *Kowshing* to be taken prisoner, and insisted upon returning to Taku. It was again pointed out that she was a British ship, and that she had left port before war had been declared. The boat then returned to the *Naniwa*, and on her arrival a signal was hoisted, ordering the Europeans to leave the ship at once. A reply was given that they were not allowed to leave, and asking for a boat to be sent. Notice was sent to the engineers to be handy on deck



in case the Japanese fired. The *Naniwa* shortly afterwards replied that a boat could not be sent.

The *Naniwa* then hoisted a red flag at the fore, which was apparently a signal for discharging a torpedo, as one was fired at the *Kowshing* but missed her. A broadside of five guns was then fired. At the time I was on the bridge, my officers having left it, and seeing that the soldiers set to watch me had left their station at the foot of the ladder, I rushed to the wheel-house, and, after obtaining a life-belt (the last one remaining) I jumped over the ship's side. In doing so I heard a terrific explosion, and upon returning to the surface of the sea I found the atmosphere was thick with smoke and fine coal-powder. I at once struck out for the shore, distant about  $1\frac{1}{4}$  mile. There were many Chinese in the water; but I only saw one European, Mr. von Hanneken. As the air cleared, a bullet struck the water close to my ear, and was followed by a shower of bullets. Knowing that shot from the *Naniwa* could not strike near me, owing to being sheltered by the hull of the *Kowshing*, I turned on my back, and saw Chinese soldiers firing at me from the deck and the 'tween deck ports. As far as possible, I protected the back of my head with the life-belt, and swam as low in the water as I could. Firing from the *Naniwa's* broadside and machine guns was continued until shortly before the *Kowshing* went down, stern first.

After being in the water some time I was picked up by the *Naniwa's* cutter in a very exhausted condition. The same boat had already rescued one of the quarter-masters, who had been wounded in the neck with a rifle-bullet. On arriving at the *Naniwa* we found that the chief officer was the only other person saved by the Japanese, leaving five Europeans connected with the ship and the passenger missing. I requested another boat to be sent, but am afraid no further attempts were made to find them. We anchored off Shipeiul about 9 A.M. The firing commenced about 1 P.M., and we were taken aboard the *Naniwa* about 2.30 P.M.

During the evening the *Naniwa* steamed away, arriving the next A.M. at the rendezvous of the Japanese fleet in Corea. We were then transferred to the *Yayeyama*, together with a Danish electrician named Mühlenstedt, and about sixty Chinese who were taken prisoners from the Chinese s.s. *Tsaokiang* the same day. The *Yayeyama* then proceeded to Sasebo, arriving on the A.M. of the 28th. From Sasebo, myself and Mr. Tamplin, the chief officer, came here in a small tender at noon on Saturday last, having in the meantime been interviewed by Mr. Suyematsu Kencho, President of the Imperial Board of Legislature, who came down from Tokio for that purpose. The quarter-master remained behind owing to his wound not having properly healed up, whilst Mr. Mühlenstedt is being further detained. During our detention we received every care and attention necessary for our comfort. After arriving here we proceeded to H.M.'s Consulate, and made an affidavit of the entire circumstances. The *Naniwa*, I may mention, had been damaged on the port-quarter from a shot fired from the *Tsiyuen* in the morning. I can positively say I did not see the Japanese fire on the Chinese in the water. The Chinese killed many of their own people."

## APPENDIX D.

## THE DECLARATIONS OF WAR OF THE TWO COUNTRIES.

*The Declaration of War by Japan.*

"WE, by the grace of Heaven, Emperor of Japan, seated on a Throne occupied by the same dynasty from time immemorial, do hereby make proclamation to all our loyal and brave subjects, as follows:—

"We hereby declare war against China, and we command each and all our competent authorities, in obedience to our wish and with a view to the attainment of the national aim, to carry on hostilities by sea and by land against China, with all the means at their disposal, consistently with the Law of Nations.

"During the past three decades of our reign our constant aim has been to further the peaceful progress of the country in civilisation; and, being sensible of the evils inseparable from complications with foreign States, it has always been our pleasure to instruct our Minister of State to labour for the promotion of friendly relations with our Treaty Powers. We are gratified to know that the relations of our Empire with those Powers have yearly increased in goodwill and in friendship. Under the circumstances, we were unprepared for such a conspicuous want of amity and of good faith as has been manifested by China in her conduct towards this country in connection with the Corean affair.

"Corea is an independent State. She was first introduced into the family of nations by the advice and under the guidance of Japan. It has, however, been China's habit to

designate Corea as her dependency, and both openly and secretly to interfere with her domestic affairs. At the time of the recent civil insurrection in Corea, China despatched troops thither, alleging that her purpose was to afford a succour to her dependent State. We, in virtue of the treaty concluded with Corea in 1882, and looking to possible emergencies, caused a military force to be sent to that country.

“Wishing to procure for Corea freedom from the calamity of perpetual disturbance, and thereby to maintain the peace of the East in general, Japan invited China’s co-operation for the accomplishment of that object. But China, advancing various pretexts, declined Japan’s proposal. Thereupon Japan advised Corea to reform her administration so that order and tranquillity might be preserved at home, and so that the country might be able to discharge the responsibilities and duties of an independent State abroad. Corea has already consented to undertake the task. But China has secretly and insidiously endeavoured to circumvent and to thwart Japan’s purpose. She has further procrastinated and endeavoured to make warlike preparations both on land and at sea. When those preparations were completed she not only sent large reinforcements to Corea, with a view to the forcible attainment of her ambitious designs, but even carried her arbitrariness and insolence to the extent of opening fire upon our ships in Corean waters. China’s plain object is to make it uncertain where the responsibility resides of preserving peace and order in Corea, and not only to weaken the position of that State in the family of nations—a position obtained for Corea through Japan’s efforts—but also to obscure the significance of the treaties recognising and confirming that position. Such conduct on the part of China is not only a direct injury to the rights and interests of this Empire, but also a menace to the permanent peace and tranquillity of the Orient. Judging from her actions, it must be concluded that China from the beginning has been bent upon sacrificing

peace to the attainment of her sinister object. In this situation, ardent as our wish is to promote the prestige of the country abroad by strictly peaceful methods, we find it impossible to avoid a formal declaration of war against China. It is our earnest wish that, by the loyalty and valour of our faithful subjects, peace may soon be permanently restored and the glory of the Empire be augmented and completed.

"(Given this 1st day of the eighth month of the 27th year of Meiji."

(His Imperial Majesty's Sign-manual.)

Counter-signatures of the Minister President of State and of the other Ministers of State.

---

*Declaration of War by the Emperor of China.*

Corea has been our tributary for the past two hundred odd years. She has given us tribute all this time, which is a matter known to the world. For the past dozen years or so Corea has been troubled by repeated insurrections, and we, in sympathy with our small tributary, have as repeatedly sent succour to her aid, eventually placing a Resident in her capital to protect Corea's interests. In the fourth moon (May) of this year another rebellion was begun in Corea, and the king repeatedly asked again for aid from us to put down the rebellion. We then ordered Li-Hung-chang to send troops to Corea; and they having barely reached Yashan the rebels immediately scattered. But the Wojên,\* without any cause whatever, suddenly sent their troops to Corea, and entered Seoul, the capital of Corea, reinforcing them constantly until they have exceeded ten thousand men. In the meantime the Japanese forced the Corean king to change his system of government, showing a disposition every way of bullying the Coreans.

It was found a difficult matter to reason with the Wojên.

\* An ancient name for the Japanese expressive of contempt.

Although we have been in the habit of assisting our tributaries, we have never interfered with their internal government. Japan's treaty with Corea was as one country with another; there is no law for sending large armies to bully a country in this way, and compel it to change its system of government. The various Powers are united in condemning the conduct of the Japanese, and can give no reasonable name to the army she now has in Corea. Nor has Japan been amenable to reason, nor would she listen to the exhortation to withdraw her troops and confer amicably upon what should be done in Corea. On the contrary, Japan has shown herself bellicose without regard to appearances, and has been increasing her forces there. Her conduct alarmed the people of Corea as well as our merchants there, and so we sent more troops over to protect them. Judge of our surprise then when, half-way to Corea, a number of the *Wojên* ships suddenly appeared, and taking advantage of our unpreparedness, opened fire upon our transports at a spot on the sea-coast near Yashan, and damaged them, thus causing us to suffer from their treacherous conduct, which could not be foretold by us. As Japan has violated the treaties and not observed international laws, and is now running rampant with her false and treacherous actions, commencing hostilities herself, and laying herself open to condemnation by the various Powers at large, we therefore desire to make it known to the world that we have always followed the paths of philanthropy and perfect justice throughout the whole complications, while the *Wojên*, on the other hand, have broken all the laws of nations and treaties which it passes our patience to bear with. Hence we commanded Li-Hung-chang to give strict orders to our various armies to hasten with all speed to root the *Wojên* out of their lairs. He is to send successive armies of valiant men to Corea in order to save the Coreans from the dust of bondage. We also command the Manchu generals, viceroys, and governors of the maritime

provinces, as well as the commanders-in-chief of the various armies, to prepare for war and to make every effort to fire on the Wojên ships if they come into our ports, and utterly destroy them. We exhort our generals to refrain from the least laxity in obeying our commands in order to avoid severe punishment at our hands. Let all know this edict as if addressed to themselves individually.

Respect this !

## APPENDIX E.

CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO THE DELIVERY OF THE TWO  
JAPANESE IN SHANGHAI.

ALL the papers concerning this affair were printed in consequence of the resolution of the Senate on 3rd of January, 1895. They form an interesting collection of fifty documents, despatches, telegrams, etc. From a careful perusal it is evident that the man who judged the case most correctly was Mr. Jernigan (U. S. Consul-General at Shanghai), the man who by his proximity to the *locus in quo* was best qualified to judge the affair. As we get farther away from Shanghai we find perceptions dimmer; at Peking there is a hazy uncertainty, and at Washington the case is totally misunderstood. Mr. Gresham (Secretary of State), who had the power to overrule the better judgment of his subordinates and foolishly used his power, did not understand and would not have explained to him a single point in the question.

As soon as the state of the Korean question became critical, and war between China and Japan seemed inevitable, the Government of the latter country asked the United States to protect Japanese subjects in China. The Chinese Government consented to this proposal, and asked for similar protection for her subjects in Japan. The United States Government committed the first mistake in assuming this double protection of the subjects of two nations at war, and we shall see that this original oversight weakened her position and rendered her protection utterly useless. Documents 1 to 6 (24th of July to 3rd of August) treat of this question, and the American officials in both countries were instructed *only*



to use friendly offices for protection of Japanese in China and Chinese in Japan.

In Documents 7 and 8 (8th and 14th of August) Mr. Denby (U. S. Chargé d'Affaires at Peking) communicates (to Washington) despatches of the Chinese Foreign Office complaining of Japanese spies in disguise travelling about the country. Mr. Denby (aware of the absurd and barbarous criminal laws of China) advised leniency and prudence lest innocent persons should be hastily condemned.

On the 13th of August two Japanese (Kusunchi and Fukuhara), dressed in Chinese clothes (which they had worn for three years), were arrested on the French Concession in Shanghai. The French Consul-General (who is also the chief authority in the French Concession), according to international stipulations, delivered the two Japanese to Mr. Jernigan, who was supposed to protect Japanese subjects. As the powers of Mr. Jernigan to this effect had been carefully limited, he was very much embarrassed by the case; the wisest and most correct course would have been to send back the two Japanese to the French Consul (that is to say, if he was not allowed to protect them). In fact, if he could do nothing for the Japanese, he could not accept charge of them.

Document 9 (August 18) contains Mr. Gresham's enquiries on the subject, as the Chinese Minister at Washington complained that the U. S. Consul at Shanghai was detaining two Japanese. Mr. Gresham had to be enlightened telegraphically by the Chargé d'Affaires at Peking, who in his turn had to receive explanations from Mr. Jernigan at Shanghai—naturally all this telegraphing failed to throw light on the real issues of the question. These explanations fill up the documents up to No. 21 (August 31), when Mr. Gresham repeated his orders that the two Japanese should not be detained by U. S. Consul at Shanghai. Mr. Denby unfortunately added to these instructions, deliver to Taotai (Chinese official), and the two Japanese were delivered on the 3rd of September and beheaded on the 8th of October.

During all this deplorable correspondence, Mr. Gresham takes the trouble to show that he was totally ignorant of the juridical aspect of the question. In Document 12 (August 21) he frankly acknowledges he does not understand why the French Consul had taken charge of the two Japanese and delivered them to the American Consul. In Document 18 (August 29) there are the following extraordinary statements. He writes to Mr. Denby: you cannot give asylum nor invest Japanese with extra-territoriality. "In a word Japanese subjects in China continue to be the subjects of their own sovereign" [an absurdly evident proposition] "and answerable to the local law to the same extent as heretofore" [a proposition which is false, and exposes Mr. Gresham's gross ignorance of the question on which he presumptuously took upon himself to lay down the law—Japanese had never been subject to local law and enjoyed extra-territoriality by treaty.] "The employment of good offices in their behalf by another power cannot alter their situation in this regard."

Only in Document No. 17 (a telegram to Mr. Denby, August 29) Mr. Gresham had a glimmer of the truth, which was however so ambiguously expressed that it led to the death of the two unfortunate youths who for three weeks had trusted to the protection of the American flag. In that telegram Gresham says: "Consul-General should *not have received two Japanese*, and is not authorized to hold them." In this phrase the whole question is put into a nut-shell by the man who perversely blinded himself to the correct solution. If the U. S. Consul could not receive Japanese, if he was forbidden to perform any official act on their behalf, why was he authorized to deliver Japanese, who were not amenable to Chinese law in the Foreign Settlements of Shanghai, to the Chinese officials? Why could he perform an official act against those people he was forbidden to protect officially? It is this which makes the whole affair so repugnant and casts such grim ridicule on the American flag and the protection it was supposed to offer. In the whole proceeding, the American

Consul acted as jailor and police officer of the Chinese Government—the only thing he did for the people he was supposed to protect, and whose protection he had assumed, was to deliver them unconditionally to their enemies. And what makes the matter still more poignant to an American is, that it was done in direct opposition to the conduct of the French Consul, the Consul of a nation which had not assumed the protection of Japanese subjects; that official had already settled the matter of jurisdiction by *not* delivering the two Japanese to the Chinese officials, but sending them to the U. S. Consul. If the latter could not protect nor hold them, he was bound not to alter their *status* nor exercise an hostile action against them; he should have returned them to the authorities (French) from whom he had received them.

Mr. Gresham's conduct in the whole transaction is inexcusable; he committed more than errors of judgment; not only was his ignorance of the legal question unpardonable, but his haste in precipitating his decision by telegram, instead of waiting for full details of the case and reading the clear explanations which he might have asked and received by post from his able subordinates who were on the spot, and were better qualified to see the true aspect of the question, throws the full responsibility of the horrible sufferings and death of those two poor young men on him, and he is answerable before history for the disgrace which fell on the American flag.

The rest of the Documents are principally filled with attempts at justification by the persons concerned in this sad affair. The only one who succeeds in clearing himself is Mr. Jernigan: with the constant limitations to his power enforced upon him from Washington, and with the explicit orders received, he had no option but to act as he did. Mr. Denby made laudable efforts to stem the wave of panic-struck barbarity which was sweeping through Chinese officialdom, but he failed in making one more effort to save the lives of the two Japanese, by omitting to give a reasonable

interpretation to the orders received from Mr. Gresham. The latter in his telegram (Document 17, August 29) had said: "Consul-General should not have received two Japanese, and is not authorized to hold them." The logical consequence, as we have seen, would have been to give them up to the French authorities from whom they had been received. This would have been a literal compliance with the orders from Washington, but Mr. Denby preferred to interpret the spirit of Mr. Gresham's instructions, and ordered Mr. Jernigan to *deliver to Taotai*.

Mr. Gresham, in his feeble attempts at exculpation, tries to bring to his assistance the declarations of Japanese officials that American jurisdiction over Chinese in Japan during the war would not be allowed. This only shows up the falseness of the position which had been taken up by the U. S. Government in consenting to protect the subjects of both belligerents: her action being hampered in both countries by the conduct and principle of the two belligerents, and by her wish to seem impartial and not support one nation in a matter which it could not carry through in the other. The declaration of the Japanese Minister has no value in the question, as there is nothing in Japan similar to the peculiar conditions of the Foreign Settlements in Shanghai.

## APPENDIX F.

## CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN ADMIRAL ITO AND ADMIRAL TING.

LETTER No. 1.—*From Admiral Ito to Admiral Ting.*

I HAVE the honour to address this letter to your Excellency. The vicissitudes of the time have made us enemies. It is a misfortune. Yet it is our countries that are at war. There need be no hostility between individuals. The friendship that formerly existed between you and me is as warm as ever to-day. Let it not be supposed that in writing this letter I am actuated by any idle purpose of urging you to surrender. The actors in great affairs often err; the onlookers see the truth. Instead of calmly deliberating what course of procedure of his own part is best for his country, best for himself, a man sometimes allows himself to be swayed by the task in which he is actually engaged and takes a mistaken view; is it not then the duty of his friends to advise him and turn his thoughts into the right channel? I address myself to you from motives of genuine friendship, and I pray you to appreciate them. What is the origin of the repeated disasters that have befallen the Chinese arms? There is, I think, little difficulty in discovering the true reason if one look for it calmly and intelligently. Your discernment has doubtless shown you the cause. It is not the fault of one man that has brought China into the position she now occupies; the blame rests with the errors of the Government that has long administered her affairs. She selects her servants by competitive examination, and literary attainments are the test. Thus it results that her officials, the repositories of administrative

power, are all literate, and literature is honoured above everything. Her practice in this respect is as uniform to-day as it was a thousand years ago. It is not necessarily a defective system, nor does it necessarily produce a bad government. But a country can never preserve its independence in practice by such means. For you know well what troubles Japan had to encounter thirty years ago, what perils she had to surmount. She owes her preservation and her integrity to-day wholly to the fact that she then broke away from the old and attached herself to the new. In the case of your country also that must be the cardinal course at present; if you adopt it, I venture to say that you are safe; if you reject it, you cannot escape destruction. In a contest with Japan it has long been fated that you should witness results such as are now before you. Can it be the duty of faithful subjects of the empire, men really solicitous for its welfare, to swim idly with the tide now sweeping over the country by the decree of an ancient fate, making no effort to stem it. A country with a history running back thousands of years, and territories stretching tens of thousands of miles, the oldest empire in the world, can it be an easy task to accomplish for such a country a work of restoration, replacing its foundation on a permanently solid basis. A single pillar cannot prevent the fall of a great edifice. Is there any latitude for choice between the impossible and the disadvantageous? To hand over squadrons to the foe, to surrender a whole army to an enemy; these are mere bagatelles compared with the fate of a country. By whatever reputation a Japanese soldier possesses in the eyes of the world, I vow that I believe your wisest course is to come to Japan and wait there until the fortunes of your country are again in the ascendant, and until the time arrives when your services will be again needed. Hear these words of your true friend. Need I remind you that the annals of history contain many names of men who have removed a stain from their names and lived to perform great deeds. McMahon, of

France, having surrendered and passed over into the enemy's country, came back after a time and assisted in reforming the French administration, the French not only forgetting his disgrace, but even elevating him to the post of President. Similarly, Osman Pasha, after losing the fortifications at Plevna, and being himself captured, came home to Turkey, where he rose to be minister of war, and acquired a high reputation in connection with his military reforms. If you come to Japan I can assure you of the good treatment you will receive and of the Emperor's favour. Not alone has His Majesty pardoned subjects of his own that raised the standard of rebellion, but has rewarded their talents by elevating them to positions of high trust, as in the case of Admiral Yenomoto, now a member of the cabinet, and Otori Keisuke, a Councillor of State. There are many such instances. In the case of men of note that are not His Majesty's subjects, his magnanimous treatment of them would certainly be even more marked. The great question that you have now to determine is whether you will throw in your lot with a country that you see falling to ruin, and be involved in a result inevitable under unchanged administrative circumstances, or whether you will preserve the strength that remains to you and evolve another plan hereafter. It has generally been the habit of warriors of your country to use haughty and rough language in addressing their foes, but I address this letter to you from motives of pure friendship, and I entreat you to credit my sincerity. If happily, reading these words, you accept my counsel, I will with your permission address some further remarks to you on the subject of giving practical effect to the idea.

(Signed) ITO YUKO, &c.

LETTER No. 1.—*From Admiral Ting to Admiral Ito.*

I RECEIVED the letter of suggestions addressed to me by the officer in command at Sasebo (evidently a mistake of the officer commanding the united squadrons),\* but did not reply because our countries were at war. Now, however, having fought resolutely, having had my ships sunk and my men decimated, I am minded to give up the contest, and to ask for a cessation of hostilities in order to save the lives of my people. I will surrender to Japan the ships of war now in Wei-hai-wei harbour, together with the Liukung Island forts and the armament provided that my request be complied with, namely, that the lives of all persons connected with the army and navy, Chinese and foreign, be uninjured, and that they be allowed to return to their homes. If this be acceded to, the Commander-in-Chief of the British naval squadron will become guarantor. I submit this proposal, and shall be glad to have a speedy reply.

(Signed)                      TING ZHUCHANG,  
    Tituh of the Peiyang Fleet.  
 (Dated)                      18th day of the 1st month of the  
    22nd year of Kwang-su  
    (February 12th, 1895).

To His Excellency Ito, Commander-in-Chief of the squadron.

LETTER No. 2.—*From Admiral Ito to Admiral Ting.*

I HAVE received your letter and noted its contents. Tomorrow I am prepared to take over the ships, forts, and all the

\* As we have shown, there is probability that the first letter from Admiral Ito to Admiral Ting was delivered by the British man-of-war *Severn*, in which case "Sasebo" might be a mistake for *Severn*, as it is very difficult to decipher foreign names written with the Japanese alphabet.



other material of war in your possession. With regard to the hour and other particulars, I shall be glad to consult with you when I receive a definite reply to this communication. When the transfer of everything has been concluded, I shall detail one of our ships-of-war to escort all the persons indicated in your despatch to a place convenient to both parties, but I desire to offer an expression of opinion on one point. As I had the honour to advise in my recent communications, I venture to think that for the sake of your own security and in the future interests of your country, it would be best that you should come to Japan and remain there until this war is over. If you decide to adopt that course, I offer you the strongest assurance that you shall be treated with every consideration and shall receive the fullest protection. But if you prefer to return to your own country, your wishes shall be respected. With reference to the suggestion that the British Naval Commander-in-Chief will act as guarantor of this arrangement, I think such a precaution wholly unnecessary. I place implicit reliance on your assurances as an officer. I trust that I shall receive a reply to this letter by 10 o'clock to-morrow morning.

(Signed) Ito YUKO,

Commander-in-Chief of the Squadron,  
on board H.I.J.M.S. *Matsushima*.

(Dated) February 12th.

To H. E. Ting Zhuchang, Commander-  
in-Chief of the Peiyang squadron.

LETTER No. 2.—*From Admiral Ting to Admiral Ito.*

YOUR answer, just received, gives me much satisfaction on account of the lives of my men. I have also to express gratitude for the things you have sent me, but as the state of war existing between our countries makes it difficult for me to receive them, I beg to return them herewith, though I

thank you for the thought. Your letter states that the arms, forts, and ships should be handed over to-morrow, but that leaves us a very brief interval at our disposal. Some time is needed for the military and naval folk to exchange their uniforms for travelling garments, and it would be difficult to conform with the date named by you. I therefore beg that you will extend the period, and enter the harbour from the 22nd day of this month, according to the Chinese calendar (16th of February), appointing a day for taking over the Liukung forts, the armament, and the ships now remaining. I pledge my good faith in the matter.

(Signed)      TING ZHUCHANG,  
18th day of the 1st month (Feb. 12th).

To H. E. Ito, Commander-in-Chief, &c.

Returned with the above three parcels of articles.

LETTER No. 3.—*From Admiral Ito to the Officer  
commanding the Peiyang Squadron.*

ON receipt of Admiral Ting Zhuchang's despatch, dated the 18th day of the 1st month, Chinese calendar (12th of February), I learned verbally from its bearer that Admiral Ting had killed himself. The information has caused me profound pain. With regard to the transfer of the ships, forts, and armament, the late Admiral's request that the date be deferred until the 22nd of the 1st Chinese month (the 16th of February) is consented to on the following conditions, namely, that a responsible Chinese officer come to my flagship by 6 p.m. to-day (February 13th) for the purpose of entering into a definite agreement as to the handing over of the above ships, forts, and weapons of war, and the release of the Chinese and foreigners in Wei-hai-wei. In my last letter to the late Admiral Ting, I expressed a wish to meet

him on the following day, and consult about the hour of the transfer and other details. I now desire to settle these points in conference with some Chinese officer duly authorised, but I wish to state distinctly that the officer coming to my ship for the purpose must be a Chinese officer not a foreigner. If he be a Chinese officer, he may count on being heartily welcomed.

(Signed) ITO YUKO,  
Commander-in-Chief, &c.

(Dated) February 13th.

To H. E. the officer in immediate  
command of the I'ei-yang squadron.

## APPENDIX G.

## CAPITULATION OF WEI-HAI-WEI.

ART. I.—There shall be furnished a full list of the Chinese soldiers and sailors and of the foreigners in Chinese employ who are to be set free in accordance with the present stipulation.

ART. II.—The Chinese officers and the foreign employés shall sign promises not to again take part in the present war between Japan and China.

ART. III.—The military equipment of Liukung shall be collected at certain definite places, which shall be reported to the Japanese, and the Chinese soldiers and sailors shall be landed at Peshantsin between 5 P.M. of the 14th and noon of the 15th, thence to be sent under escort of Japanese troops from Wei-hai-wei beyond the lines.

ART. IV.—The Chinese officer duly competent to represent the Chinese army and fleet in Wei-hai-wei shall appoint committees for the purpose of handing over the warships and forts, and shall cause them to submit by noon of the 15th a full list of the arms found in the ships and forts placed under their charge.

ART. V.—The Chinese officers and the foreigners in Chinese service shall be allowed to leave Wei-hai-wei on board the *Kang-chi* as set forth in Art. X.

ART. VI.—The officers shall be allowed to carry away their personal effects, with the exception of arms.

ART. VII.—The inhabitants of Liukung shall be advised to live on the island as before.

ART. VIII.—The landing of the Japanese on Liukung shall

begin at 9 A.M. of the 16th, and steps shall be taken to hand over the ships, forts, and so forth at once.

ART. IX.—Any inhabitants or other non-combatants that wish to leave the place shall be permitted to do so in Chinese junks, from the morning of the 15th, after having undergone inspection by Japanese naval officers.

ART. X.—In order to pay due respect to the memory of Admiral Ting, who died in the discharge of his duty to his country, Admiral Ito shall decline to receive the steamer *Kang-chi*, but shall leave it at the free disposal of Taotai Niu, who shall carry away in it the remains of the Admiral and others that died with him; these steps to be taken between noon of the 16th and noon of the 23rd of February. The ship shall be inspected by Japanese naval officers on the morning of the 15th.

ART. XI.—Should the Chinese in Liukung after the conclusion of this agreement offer any resistance to the Japanese, the agreement shall entirely lose its validity, and the Japanese will at once resume military operations.

## APPENDIX H.

## CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN TAOTAI NIU AND ADMIRAL ITO.

EXCELLENCY.—I beg to express my sincere thanks for your having permitted our soldiers to leave the island, as intimated in your answer to Admiral Ting's letter. I am also grateful for your having been so good as to consult with me twice subsequently. I learn from Chang Pi-kuang that your Excellency has signified your intention of restoring to us the *Kang-chi*, that she may carry the coffin of Admiral Ting as well as our officers out of the Bay. I beg you to accept my profound thanks.

(Signed) NIU-CHANG-PING.

(Dated) 22nd day of 1st moon (Chinese calendar)  
16th February.

---

EXCELLENCY,—I have the honour to point out that the *Kuang-ping* belongs to the Kwangtung Squadron. In the spring of last year, at the usual inspection by Li-Chung-tang, the *Kuang-chia*, the *Kuang-yi* and the *Kuang-ping* came to attend the assembly of the Northern Squadron, and at its conclusion ought to have returned, but for certain reasons remained with the Peiyang fleet temporarily. The *Kuang-chia* and the *Kuang-yi* have both been lost, and of the three Kwangtung ships only the *Kuang-ping* remains; Kwangtung had nothing to do with the present war, and if it loses all three ships we shall have no excuses to offer to the

Kuangtung Commander-in-Chief. Should your Excellency, sympathising with us, restore the *Kuang-ping*, I promise that she shall not again take part in the war. If you cannot consent to that, perhaps you will agree that the armament be taken from the ship, and that her hull only be restored, in which case Chang Pi-kuang will not be disgraced, but will have some apology to offer to his commanding officer. Trusting that your Excellency will appreciate the situation, I await your reply.

(Signed) NIU CHANG-PING,  
&c. &c.

## APPENDIX I.

## THE PEACE CONFERENCE AT HIROSHIMA.

[The following are official translations of the documents laid before the Imperial Diet by the Vice-Minister of State for Foreign Affairs on the 6th of February, 1895.]

*(Translation.)*

VISCOUNT MUTSU MUNEMITSU, Junŭ First Class of the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure, His Imperial Majesty's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, has the honour to announce to Their Excellencies the Plenipotentiaries of His Majesty the Emperor of China, that His Majesty, the Emperor of Japan, has appointed His Excellency Count Ito, Hirobumi, Junŭ Grand Cross of the Imperial Order of Paullownia, His Imperial Majesty's Minister-President of State, and the undersigned as His Plenipotentiaries to conclude with the duly authorised Plenipotentiaries of China, Preliminaries of Peace, and has confided to them full powers for that purpose.

(L.S.) VISCOUNT MUTSU MUNEMITSU,

H.I.M.'s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs.

Hiroshima, the 31st day of the 1st month of the 28th year of Meiji.

---

*(Translation.)*

The undersigned, His Imperial Majesty's Plenipotentiaries, have the honour to acquaint Their Excellencies the Plenipotentiaries of His Majesty the Emperor of China, that the



meeting of the Plenipotentiaries of the two Powers is appointed to take place at the Hiroshima Kencho, on the 1st day of the 2nd month of the 28th year of Meiji, at 11 o'clock A.M.

The undersigned will on that occasion be prepared to make with the Chinese Plenipotentiaries a reciprocal exchange of Full Powers.

COUNT ITO HIROBUMA,  
VISCOUNT MUTSU MUNEMITSU,  
H.I.M.'s Plenipotentiaries.

Hiroshima, the 31st day of the 1st Month of the 28th year of Meiji.

The 6th day of the 1st moon, the 21st year of Kwang-Su.

---

THEIR Excellencies Count Ito and Viscount Mutsu, Plenipotentiaries of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan—

We have the honour to inform Your Excellencies that in obedience to the command of His Majesty the Emperor of China, we proceeded to Japan with the Imperial letter and arrived at Hiroshima on the 6th day of the 1st moon of the 21st year of Kuang-Su.

We beg to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellencies' note to the effect that you have been especially appointed by His Majesty the Emperor of Japan to be Plenipotentiaries for the purpose of concluding with us Preliminaries of Peace, and to express high appreciation of the fact that Japan has not forgotten her old friendship.

We were about to request Your Excellencies to meet us by asking you to appoint the time of such meeting, when we had again the honour to receive your note communicating to us that the meeting will be opened at the Hiroshima Kencho at 11 o'clock on the 1st day of the 2nd month.

We beg in reply to say that we will, in compliance with your desire, attend the meeting at the appointed day and

hour. We have the honour to convey to Your Excellencies the assurance of our highest consideration.

CHANG IN HOON,

Holding the Rank of President of a Board, Minister of the Tsung-li Yamen and Junior Vice-President of the Board of Revenue.

SHAO YU LIEN,

An officer of the Button of the 1st Rank and Acting Governor of Hunan,

Plenipotentiaries of His Majesty the Emperor of China.

*(Translation.)*

Mutsuhito, by the Grace of Heaven, Emperor of Japan and seated on the Throne occupied by the same Dynasty from time immemorial.

To all to whom these Presents shall come, Greeting.

With a view to restoration of peace between Our Empire and that of China in order to maintain the peace of the Orient,

We, reposing special trust and confidence in Count Ito Hirobumi, Junu Grand Cross of the Imperial Order of Paullownia, Our Minister-President of State, and Viscount Mutsu Munemitsu, Junu First Class of the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure, Our Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, and having full knowledge of their wisdom and ability, do hereby name them as Our Plenipotentiaries.

We have given to Our Plenipotentiaries Full Powers to meet and treat, either separately or conjointly, with the Plenipotentiaries of China, and to conclude and sign Preliminaries of Peace.

We shall examine all stipulations which Our said Plenipotentiaries may agree upon and, finding such stipulations proper and in good and due form, We shall ratify them.

In witness whereof, We have hereunto set Our signature and caused the Great Seal of the Empire to be affixed.

Done at Hiroshima, this thirty-first day of the month of the twenty-eighth year of Meiji, corresponding to the two thousand five hundred and fifty-fifth year from the Coronation of the Emperor Jimmu.

(Seal of the Empire.)

(Countersigned.)

(Sign Manual.)

COUNT ITO HIROBUMI,  
Minister-President of State.

— — —  
(Translation.)

MEMORANDUM.

His Imperial Majesty's Plenipotentiaries have the honour to announce that the Full Powers which they have just communicated to the Plenipotentiaries of His Majesty the Emperor of China embody all the authority which His Majesty the Emperor of Japan has confided to them in connection with the negotiation and conclusion of peace.

In order to avoid, as far as possible, any future misunderstanding, the Japanese Plenipotentiaries desire reciprocally to be categorically informed in writing, whether the Full Powers which have been communicated to them by the Chinese Plenipotentiaries, but which they have not as yet examined, embody all the authority confided by His Majesty the Emperor of China to the Chinese Plenipotentiaries in connection with the negotiation and conclusion of peace.

Hiroshima, the 1st day of the 2nd month of the 28th year of Meiji.

— — — — —

*(English Translation accompanied by the Chinese original.)*

[To the Plenipotentiaries of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan.]

We have the honour to state that you handed to us on the 7th day of the 1st moon of the 21st year of Kuang-su, your Commission from your Imperial Majesty, and at the same time a Memorandum in which you ask of us a written reply respecting our Full Powers.

We beg to state in reply that our Commissions handed to you at the same time in exchange, embody Full Powers given by our Imperial Majesty for the negotiation and conclusion of peace, with authority to conclude articles to that end and to sign them. In order to ensure the more prompt execution of the treaty we may agree upon, we shall wire the terms for Imperial sanction, and fix the date for signature; after which the same shall be taken to China for examination by His Imperial Chinese Majesty, and being found proper and in good and due form, will be ratified.

8th day of the 1st moon of the 21st year of Kuang-su.

*(As translated by the Japanese Government.)*

By Decree We do appoint Chang In Hoon, holding the Rank of President of a Board, Minister of the Tsung-li Yamen and Junior Vice-President of the Board of Revenue, and Shao Yu Lien, an Officer of the Button of the First Rank, and Acting Governor of Hunan, as Our Plenipotentiaries to meet and negotiate the matter with the Plenipotentiaries appointed by Japan.

You will, however, telegraph to the Tsung-li Yamen for the purpose of obtaining Our commands, by which you will abide.

The members of your mission are placed under your control.

You will carry out your mission in a faithful and diligent manner and will fulfil the trust We have reposed in you.

Respect this !

Seal of Imperial Command. (The date.)

-   -   -   -   -

[Speech addressed by His Excellency Count Ito to Their Excellencies Chang In Hoon and Shao Yu Lien at the Conference of the 2nd of February, 1895.]

The measure which my colleague and myself find it necessary at this moment to adopt, is the logical and inevitable result of a situation for which we are in no wise responsible.

China has hitherto held herself almost entirely aloof from other Powers, and while she has in some instances enjoyed the advantages accruing to her as a member of the family of nations, she has perhaps more frequently denied the responsibilities of that relation. She has pursued a policy of isolation and distrust, and consequently her external relations have not been characterised by that frankness and good faith which are essential to good neighbourhood.

Instances are not wanting in which Chinese Commissioners, after having formally agreed to international compacts, have refused to affix their seals, and cases might be cited in which treaties solemnly concluded have been unceremoniously and without apparent reason repudiated.

Those unfortunate occurrences find a sufficient explanation in the fact that China was not on those occasions seriously in earnest, but beyond that it might be said with truth that the officials who were designated to carry on negotiations had not been clothed with the necessary authority for the purpose.

It has from the first been the wish of Japan to avoid results which history teaches her are liable to be the outcome

of negotiations with Chinese officials who are not clothed with full powers in the sense in which that term is usually understood. Consequently the Imperial Government made it a condition precedent to any peace negotiations that the Chinese Plenipotentiaries should be furnished with full powers to conclude peace, and it was only upon receiving positive assurance from the Chinese Government that that condition precedent had been complied with and that the Chinese Plenipotentiaries were on their way to Japan, that His Majesty the Emperor of Japan conferred upon my colleague and myself full powers to conclude and sign Preliminaries of Peace with the Plenipotentiaries of China.

That Your Excellencies' powers are, notwithstanding that assurance, fatally defective is to me a sure indication that the Government of China is not yet really solicitous for peace.

Criticism is nearly exhausted by a simple comparison of the two Instruments which were reciprocally exchanged at this board yesterday; but it is not out of place to point out that one fulfils the definition which is usually given among civilised States to the term Full Powers, while the other is destitute of nearly all those qualities which are regarded as essential to such powers; it even fails to indicate the subject upon which Your Excellencies are to negotiate; it does not authorise Your Excellencies to conclude or sign anything; it is silent on the subject of the subsequent Imperial ratification of Your Excellencies' acts. In short, it would seem that the authority which has been conferred upon Your Excellencies would be completely fulfilled by your reporting to your Government what my colleague and myself might have to say. In this situation it would be impossible for us to continue negotiations.

It may be urged that usage has not been entirely ignored in this instance. I cannot admit the sufficiency of such an explanation. I disclaim any right to interfere with the purely domestic customs of China, but I deem it not only

my right but my duty to insist that in international concerns affecting my own country, the peculiar methods of China shall yield to the superior rules of international intercourse.

The restoration of peace is a matter<sup>s</sup> of the greatest importance. To bring about a re-establishment of amicable relations it is not only necessary that Treaties with that object in view should be signed, but it is imperative that the engagements should be fulfilled in good faith.

While Japan has found no reason to approach China on the subject of peace, she nevertheless feels bound in deference to that civilisation which she represents, to listen to any *bonâ fide* overtures which China may advance, but she will decline to take part in the future in any fruitless negotiations or to become a party to a paper peace. The terms which Japan agrees to will be scrupulously observed by her, and she will at the same time insist upon a like observance of the terms by China.

Whenever, therefore, China finds herself seriously and sincerely desirous of peace and will confide actual full powers to Chinese officials, whose names and positions will serve as an assurance that the terms which they may agree to will be confirmed and carried out in good faith, Japan will be prepared to enter upon new negotiations.

(Translation.)

#### MEMORANDUM.

The Imperial Government repeatedly declared through the United States representatives at Tokyo and Peking, that the appointment of Plenipotentiaries with Full Powers to conclude peace was an indispensable pre-requisite to negotiations on the subject of peace.

His Imperial Majesty's Plenipotentiaries, however, find that the authorisation which Their Excellencies the Pleni-

potentiaries of His Majesty the Emperor of China communicated to them on the 1st instant, is wholly inadequate for the purpose for which it is claimed it was issued. It lacks nearly all the essential attributes of Full Powers as usually understood.

The Imperial Government have not receded from the position which they announced to the representatives of the United States that they had taken on the subject of Full Powers, and the Imperial Japanese Plenipotentiaries, having been entrusted by His Majesty the Emperor of Japan with actual, proper, and complete Full Powers, cannot consent to treat with Plenipotentiaries of His Majesty the Emperor of China who are only authorised to discuss matters, to report to the Tsung-li Yamen, and to obtain subsequent commands of the Throne by which they are to be guided.

Under these circumstances it only remains for Plenipotentiaries of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan to declare the present negotiations at an end.

Hiroshima, the 2nd day of the 2nd month of the 28th year Meiji.

[Despatch addressed by the Chinese Envoys to the Japanese Plenipotentiaries after the termination of the negotiations.]

*To the Plenipotentiaries of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan.*

Excellencies,—In the conference held with Your Excellencies to day, after listening to the speech of His Excellency Count Ito, of which a copy was handed to us and a memorandum setting forth the reasons why negotiations for peace were terminated, Your Excellencies took leave of us, with the information that arrangement would be made for our early transportation from your country.

Before our departure we deem it our duty to our Govern-



ment and to ourselves that we should leave with Your Excellencies the following statement. The commission which we handed you in our conference of yesterday, as we have fully explained, does confer upon us full powers to negotiate a treaty, and we have stated to Your Excellencies that we were prepared to sign with you a treaty of peace, if our negotiations should reach a satisfactory conclusion. This is confirmed in the most solemn and authoritative manner in the letter of our August Sovereign addressed to His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Japan, which we exhibited to you in our first conference, and which we solicited the privilege of delivering to His Imperial Majesty, but which request Your Excellencies declined to grant. A translation of that letter accompanies this communication.

We cannot agree with Your Excellencies that the instruction in our commission to wire for Imperial sanction the result of our negotiation in any way impairs or modifies our powers to sign a treaty. As we have already stated to you, its object was to ensure the more prompt ratification and execution of the treaty when signed.

That our interpretation of our power is supported by our Government is proved by the fact that at the request of your Government the United States Minister at Peking received from the Tsung-li Yamên an assurance that we were clothed with full powers to negotiate and sign a treaty of peace. Besides, we offered in our conference to-day to have any technical defects which you thought existed in our commission corrected by telegraph.

The commission which we submitted to you is similar in form to those with which His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of China has been accustomed to invest His Plenipotentiaries when despatched to other lands for the negotiation of treaties, and so far as we are aware, this is the first instance such credentials have been rejected.

Ours is a mission of peace, and it does not become us at this time to discuss the unfriendly allusions contained in the

speech respecting the Government of China. We need only express our deep regret that the earnest efforts which we have put forth to carry out the wishes of our August Sovereign for a speedy and satisfactory termination of the war which now distracts the two neighbouring nations have proven fruitless.

We cannot, however, close this communication without expressing our surprise at the manner in which we have been deprived of the customary privileges of Plenipotentiaries on a mission of peace. We have been informed by Count Ito that telegraphic communications in cypher with our government would not be permitted, and we have been notified by an official of the Japanese Foreign Office that a cypher telegram addressed to us has been received, but that it could not be delivered until we furnish the private code of our government for its translation. Before our departure from Peking we were assured by the Minister of the United States in that capital that we would be permitted, in accordance with international practice, to freely communicate in cypher with our government by telegraph.

We conclude with the expression of our thanks for the trouble the Japanese Government has taken in bringing us to this city and for its hospitable entertainment while here, and with assurances to your Excellencies of our distinguished consideration.

(Signed)      CHANG.  
                    SHAO.

This despatch was forthwith returned by Mr. Nakada, private secretary of the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, who handed the following note to the envoys:—

I have the honour to state that the ambassadorial capacity of their Excellencies Chang Yin Wan and Shao Yiulien having ceased to be recognisable simultaneously with the breaking off of the negotiation, their Excellencies Count Ito

and Viscount Mutsu are precluded from holding any communication with their Excellencies Chang and Shao. I am therefore instructed by their Excellencies the Minister-President of State and the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs to return the accompanying despatch to their Excellencies Chang and Shao.

(Signed) NAKADA KEIJI.

To their Excellencies, &c.

## APPENDIX J.

**HIS MAJESTY** the Emperor of Japan, in consideration of the fact that the progress of the Peace Negotiations has been interrupted by an untoward incident, issued instructions to the Empire's Peace Plenipotentiaries to agree to a temporary armistice. Consequently, His Imperial Majesty's Plenipotentiaries, Count Ito, Minister-President of State, etc., and Viscount Mutsu, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, etc., have concluded the following convention with Earl Li, Viceroy of Chihli, etc., the Plenipotentiary of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of China:—

**ART. I.**—The Governments of Japan and China hereby agree that the land and sea forces of the two countries shall observe an armistice in the districts of Mukden, Chihli, and Shantung, in accordance with the stipulations of this convention.

**ART. II.**—The forces required to cease fighting in virtue of this convention shall be entitled to retain possession of all the places now in their occupation. Provided that, under no circumstances whatever shall any advance be made beyond the aforesaid places during the period covered by this convention.

**ART. III.**—the Governments of the Empires of Japan and China hereby agree that, during the period covered by this convention, neither party, whether for offensive or defensive purposes, shall augment its armies now in the field, or shall send reinforcements, or shall in any other way increase their combative capacity. It shall, nevertheless, be within the competence of the Government of either empire to make

redistribution or transportation of its troops, provided that such redistribution or transportation be not intended to augment the armies now actually engaged in the field.

ART. IV.—With regard to the maritime transport of military necessities or other contraband of war, seizures made in accordance with the laws of war shall be permissible.

ART. V.—The Governments of the two Empires of Japan and China agree to carry into effect the armistice agreed upon by this convention for a period of twenty-one days, counting from the day of signature. With respect to positions now occupied by the troops of each empire and not within reach of communication by telegraph, rapid methods of transmitting the order to cease hostilities shall be employed, and the officers in command of the forces of the two empires, upon receipt of such order, shall mutually convey information of the fact to each other, and shall make arrangements for an armistice.

ART. VI.—It is agreed that, without any further intercommunication, this convention shall cease to have binding force at noon on the 20th day of the 4th month of the 28th year of Meiji, namely, the 26th day of the 3rd month of the 21st year of Kwang-su. But should the peace negotiations be broken off before that date, this convention shall simultaneously terminate.

(Dated) Shimonoseki; the 30th day of the 3rd month of the 28th year of Meiji; namely, the 5th day of the 3rd month of the 21st year of Kwang-su.

(Signed)—Here follow the signatures and seals of Count Ito, Viscount Mutsu, and the Viceroy Li.

## APPENDIX K.

## DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE TREATY OF PEACE.

(From the Peking and Tientsin Times.)

--

*Japan's First Draft of Treaty of Peace.*

*Shimonoseki, 1st April, 1895.*

HIS MAJESTY the Emperor of Japan and His Majesty the Emperor of China, desiring to restore the blessings of peace to their countries and subjects and to remove all cause for future complications, have named as their Plenipotentiaries for the purpose of concluding a Treaty of Peace, that is to say :

(Here are inserted names and titles of Plenipotentiaries.)

Who after having exchanged their Full Powers, which were found to be in good and proper form, have agreed to the following articles :

Article I.—China recognises definitively the full and complete independence and autonomy of Corea, and in consequence the payment of tribute and the performance of ceremonies and formalities by Corea to China in derogation of such independence and autonomy, shall wholly cease for the future.

Article II.—China cedes to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty the following territories together with all fortifications, arsenals and public property thereon :

(a.) The southern portion of the province of Shengking within the following boundaries :

The line of demarcation begins at the mouth of the River

Yalu, and ascends that stream as far as Sanchatsu, thence it runs directly north to Yūshutlisia; thence it runs directly west until it strikes the River Liao; it follows from thence the course of that river southward to  $41^{\circ}$  north latitude; from thence it coincides with that parallel of latitude to the westward as far as  $122^{\circ}$  longitude east of Greenwich, and from that point of intersection it follows the same meridian of longitude southward to the coast of the Bay of Liaotung, where it terminates.

This cession includes all Islands appertaining or belonging to the province of Shengking situated in the eastern portion of the Bay of Liaotung and in the northern part of the Yellow Sea.

(b.) The Island of Formosa, together with all Islands adjacent or belonging to the said Island of Formosa.

(c.) The Pescadores Group, that is to say, all Islands lying between  $119^{\circ}$  and  $120^{\circ}$  longitude east of Greenwich, and  $23^{\circ}$  and  $24^{\circ}$  north latitude.

Article III.—The alignments of the frontiers described in the preceding Article and shown on the annexed map, shall be subject to verification and demarcation on the spot by a Joint Commission of Delimitation consisting of two or more Japanese and two or more Chinese Delegates, to be appointed immediately after the exchange of the ratifications of this Act. In case the boundaries laid down in this Act are found to be defective at any point, either on account of topography or in consideration of good administration, it shall also be the duty of the Delimitation Commissioners to rectify the same.

The Delimitation Commission will enter upon its duties as soon as possible, and will bring its labours to a conclusion within the period of one year after appointment.

The alignments laid down in this Act shall, however, be maintained until the ratifications of the Delimitation Commission, if any are made, shall have received the approval of the Governments of Japan and China.

Article IV.—China agrees to pay to Japan as a war in-

demnity the sum of 300,000,000 Kuping taels. The said sum to be paid in five instalments; the first instalment being 100,000,000 taels, and the four remaining instalments being 50,000,000 each. The first instalment is to be paid within six months after the exchange of ratifications of this Act, and the four remaining instalments are to be respectively paid on or before the same date of the four succeeding years. Interest at the rate of 5 *per cent. per annum* shall begin to run on all unpaid portions of the said indemnity from the date the first instalment falls due.

Article V.—The inhabitants of the territories ceded to Japan who wish to take up their residence outside the ceded districts shall be at liberty to sell their real property and retire. For this purpose a period of two years from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of the present Act shall be granted. At the expiration of that period those of the inhabitants who shall not have left such territories shall, at the option of Japan, be deemed to be Japanese subjects.

Article VI.—All treaties between Japan and China having come to an end in consequence of war, China engages immediately upon the exchange of the ratifications of this Act to appoint Plenipotentiaries to conclude with the Japanese Plenipotentiaries a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation and a Convention to regulate Frontier Intercourse and Trade. The Treaties, Conventions and Regulations now subsisting between China and European Powers shall serve as a basis for the said Treaty and Convention between Japan and China. From the date of the exchange of the ratification of this Act until the said Treaty and Convention are brought into actual operation the Japanese Government, its officials, commerce, navigation, frontier intercourse and trade, industries, ships and subjects shall in every respect be accorded by China most favoured nation treatment.

China makes in addition the following concessions, to take effect six months after date of the present Act:

1st.—The following cities, towns and ports, in addition to



those already opened, are opened to the trade, residence, industries and manufactures of Japanese subjects, under the same conditions and with the same privileges and facilities as exist at the present open cities, towns and ports of China :

- 1.—Peking.
- 2.—Shashih in the province of Hupeh.
- 3.—Siangtan in the province of Hunan.
- 4.—Chungking in the province of Szechuen.
- 5.—Wuchow in the province of Kuangsi.
- 6.—Soochow in the province of Kiangsu.
- 7.—Hangchow in the province of Chekiang.

The Japanese Government shall have the right to station Consuls at any or all the above-named places.

2nd.—Steam navigation for vessels under the Japanese flag for the conveyance of passengers and cargo shall be extended to the following places :

- 1.—On the Upper Yangtze River from Ichang to Chungking.
- 2.—On the Siang River and Lake Tungting from the Yangtze River to Siangtan.
- 3.—On the West River from Canton to Wuchow.
- 4.—On the Woosung River and the Canal from Shanghai to Soochow and Hangchow.

The Rules and Regulations which now govern the navigation of the inland waters of China by foreign vessels shall, so far as applicable, be enforced in respect of the above-named routes, until new Rules and Regulations are conjointly agreed to.

3rd.—All goods imported into China by Japanese subjects, upon the payment, either at the time of entry or subsequently at the option of the importer or owner, of a commutation tax or duty of two per cent. upon the original cost, shall thereafter in every part of China, be exempt from all taxes, imposts, duties, charges and exactions of whatever nature or under whatever denomination levied in the name or for the profit of the Government, public functionaries, private in-

dividuals, corporations or establishments of any kind. In like manner and to the same extent, but without the payment of any commutation tax or duty whatever, an equal immunity from every kind\*of taxation shall be accorded by China in respect of all Chinese goods and produce purchased in China by Japanese subjects and declared to be for export, such immunity from taxation shall exist, from the date of such declaration up to the time of actual exportation. All Chinese goods and produce intended for home consumption, when conveyed in Japanese vessels from one open port to another open port in China, shall, upon the payment of the coasting trade dues existing at this time, be in the same manner and to the same extent, exempt, during the whole process of such conveyance, from all kinds of taxation, including import and export duties. It is, however, understood that the foregoing stipulations do not in anywise affect any arrangement for the time being in force regarding the taxation of imported opium.

4th.—Japanese subjects purchasing goods or produce in the interior of China or transporting imported merchandise into the interior of China, shall have the right temporarily to rent or hire warehouses for the storage of the articles so purchased or transported, without the payment of any taxes or exactions whatever and without the interference of any Chinese officials.

5th.—The Kuping tael shall be taken to be the tael in which all taxes, duties and fees are payable by Japanese subjects in China, and all such taxes, duties and fees may be paid in standard Japanese silver yen at their face or representative value.

6th.—Japanese subjects shall be free to engage in all kinds of manufacturing industries in China, and shall be at liberty to import into China all kinds of machinery, paying only the stipulated import duties thereon.

All articles manufactured by Japanese subjects in China shall in respect of inland transit and internal taxes, duties, charges and exactions of all kinds, and also in respect of

warehousing and storage facilities in the interior of China, stand upon the same footing and enjoy the same privileges and exemptions as merchandise imported by Japanese subjects into China.

7th.—China engages to at once proceed under the advice of experts to remove the Woosung bar at the mouth of the Huangpu River in such a manner as to maintain constantly a clear channel of at least twenty feet in depth at low water.

In the event of additional Rules and Regulations being necessary in connection with these concessions, they shall be embodied in the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation provided for by this Article.

Article VII.—Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding Article, the evacuation of China by the armies of Japan shall be completely effected within three months after the exchange of the ratifications of the present Act.

Article VIII.—As a guarantee of the faithful performance of the stipulations of this Act, China consents to the temporary occupation by the military forces of Japan of the following places :

Fêngtienfu (Moukden) in the province of Shengking.

Weihaiwei in the province of Shantung.

Fêngtienfu shall be evacuated by Japan upon the payment of the first two instalments of the war indemnity herein stipulated for, and Wei-hai-wei shall be evacuated upon the payment of the final instalment of said indemnity. It is however expressly understood that no evacuation shall take place until after the exchange of the ratifications of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation.

All expenses connected with this temporary occupation shall be defrayed by China.

Article IX.—Immediately upon the exchange of the ratifications of this Act, all prisoners of war then held shall be restored, and China undertakes not to ill-treat or punish prisoners of war so restored to her by Japan. China also engages to at once release all Japanese subjects accused of

being military spies or charged with any other military offences. China further engages not to punish in any manner nor to allow to be punished those Chinese subjects who have in any manner been compromised in their relations with the Japanese army during the war.

Article X.—All offensive military operations shall cease upon the exchange of the ratifications of this Act.

Article XI.—The present Act shall be ratified by their Majesties the Emperor of Japan and the Emperor of China, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at                      on the                      day of the                      month of the 28th year of Meiji, corresponding to

In Witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same and have affixed thereto the seal of their arms.

Done at Shimonoseki in duplicate, this                      day of the                      month of the 28th year of Meiji, corresponding to

### *China's Reply.*

*Shimonoseki, 5th April, 1895.*

In the brief time agreed upon within which I was to make my examination and reply to the draft of Treaty proposed by Their Excellencies the Japanese Plenipotentiaries, I have given to the important subject the most earnest study and care which it has been possible to devote to it, in view of the physical disability under which, unfortunately for my country, I am now suffering. If, therefore, this memorandum should not be as complete as might be desired, I can only plead these causes in excuse, and trust that within a few days I shall be able to answer fully and specifically all the points desired by the Japanese Plenipotentiaries.

Without taking up every Article in detail, I have sought to group together my views under the four important questions involved in the negotiations and embraced in the draft

of Treaty, namely; 1st, Corea; 2nd, Cession of Territory 3rd, Indemnity; and 4th, Commercial Privileges.

### 1.—*Corea.*

The Chinese Government some months ago indicated its willingness to recognise the full and complete independence and guarantee the complete neutrality of Corea, and is ready to insert such a stipulation in the Treaty; but in due reciprocity, such stipulation should likewise be made by Japan. Hence the Article will require to be modified in this respect.

### 2.—*Cession of Territory.*

The preamble to the proposed draft of Treaty sets forth that the object of making it is "to remove all cause for future complications." But this Article, in place of promoting that object, contains provisions which, if insisted upon and enforced, will be the sure and fruitful source of complications which may be transmitted through many generations.

It is the duty of the Plenipotentiaries of the two Governments, and it is a part of wise statesmanship, to negotiate such a peace as will make true friends and allies of these two great nations of the Orient, who are and must remain neighbours, and who have in common so many things in their history, literature, art and commerce. Territory long held by a nation, through many centuries and dynasties, becomes a priceless heritage. Nothing will so arouse the indignation of the people of China and create in them a spirit of undying hostility and hatred, as to wrest from their country important portions of their territory.

This will be especially the case with that portion of territory described in clause (a) of this Article, because it gives Japan a foothold and base for military and naval operations within easy reach of and constantly threatening the capital of the empire, and because it takes from the present dynasty of China a portion of its ancient possessions.

In this clause China hears Japan saying: "I am going to be your ever-threatening and undying enemy, with my army and navy ready to pounce down upon your capital when it suits me; and I propose to humiliate your Emperor by taking from him a valuable portion of his ancestors' home."

It further means a line of fortifications along the whole co-terminus frontier; large standing armies and navies near at hand at great expense to both nations, and constant danger from frontier broils and from the lawless on both sides of the dividing line.

Japan, in inaugurating the war, announced her object to be to secure the complete independence of Corea, and her diplomatic ministers in Europe and America declared that it was not the purpose of their Government to wage a war of conquest. If it should be consistent with these declarations, it is entirely possible to so modify Article II. and other Articles to be specified, as to make a lasting peace and one which will in the future make the two great peoples of the East sincere friends, and thus stand as an immovable bulwark against the encroachments of the hostile nations. But if a peace is to be exacted by Japan through the successful fortunes of war, which will necessarily awaken in the Chinese people a spirit of hostility and revenge, it may well be anticipated that both nations, without any bond of sympathy or interest, will fall a prey to outside enemies.

### 3.—*Indemnity.*

China does not think it is just to require her to pay an indemnity for the expenses of a war in which she does not regard herself as the aggressor, and during which she has not invaded Japanese territory; hence it seems illogical for China to pay an indemnity. But in view of the fact that my Government, desiring to bring the unfortunate war to a close, so as to relieve the people from suffering, in October last promised through the American Minister to pay indemnity, and in view of the further fact that an indemnity was one of

the conditions mentioned among the terms announced by Japan, on the 17th of February last, through the Minister of the United States in Peking, I am prepared to insert in the Treaty a provision for a reasonable indemnity.

In the first place, it is to be noted that Japan stated the object of the war was to secure the complete independence of Corea. On November 22nd of last year it was announced to the foreign Governments that China was ready to acknowledge the independence of Corea; and the expenses of the war beyond that time ought not to be included in the indemnity.

In requiring an indemnity of China it should not be fixed at a sum beyond her ability to pay, as her failure to pay would be held by Japan to be a violation of the Treaty, and might lead to a renewal of the war. The amount demanded is beyond the ability of China to pay under her present system of taxation. To increase the internal or domestic taxes at this time would lead to great discontent, and probably to insurrection, especially when added to the dissatisfaction of the people with the Emperor and his Government for making what they will style a humiliating and dishonourable peace. The Customs tariff on imports and exports cannot be increased, because of treaties with foreign Governments, which require ten years' notice and the unanimous consent of the Governments concerned.

This latter source of revenue is the only available fund which can be hypothecated or pledged to bankers or capitalists in negotiating foreign loans. It is already so fully pledged for war loans that only a part of it can be made available for a loan to pay off the indemnity. From a statement prepared by the Commissioner of Foreign Customs at Shanghai, on the 1st of March last, it appears that the Customs revenues of China were on that date pledged for the payment of war loans, in 1895, of Haikuan taels 3,937,420; in 1896, of Hk. taels 6,281,620; in 1897, of Hk. taels 5,142,238; and that upon these war loans it will be necessary within twenty

years to pay Hk. taels 78,017,103 out of the Customs revenues. It is to be noted that, since the 1st of March the amount of these loans has been considerably increased.

The credit of the Chinese Government and its ability to negotiate a loan have been greatly injured by the war. It has been compelled to pay 7 and even  $8\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. interest, and the lowest rate it has obtained abroad (and that for small sums only) was 6 per cent., with a heavy discount on the face value of the bonds. It is claimed by prominent and experienced bankers that the best rate which can be obtained at the conclusion of peace is  $6\frac{1}{2}$  to 7 per cent. on the full value of the bonds.

The average annual total revenue received from Chinese Customs, including transit dues and opium likin, from 1890 to 1893 inclusive, amounts to Hk. taels 22,548,150; and of this sum it has heretofore been customary to pay over to the provincial authorities six-tenths. If this important sum of ready cash is diverted to pay the indemnity, new taxation will have to be imposed in the provinces, and the people would complain. If a foreign loan is sought to be made to meet the indemnity asked by Japan, it would require in principal and interest, at  $6\frac{1}{2}$  per cent., if redeemable in twenty years, the enormous sum of Ha. taels 690,000,000, an amount entirely beyond the possibility of the Chinese Government to negotiate, and beyond its ability to meet by taxation.

This will be apparent to any one at all acquainted with Chinese revenues, when it is remembered that the indemnity to Japan is not the only financial burden which has been brought upon China by the war, and which must be immediately provided for. As already mentioned, the terms of peace when made known will cause the present dynasty and the Government to become unpopular with many of the Chinese people, and local discontent and disorder may be expected. Besides, there have been called into the field large numbers of raw and undisciplined troops, which with the conclusion of peace must be disbanded, and there is great



danger that they will commit acts of robbery and lawlessness which will seriously tax the Government to suppress. The energies of the Government will be tried to the utmost to preserve the peace, and without peace and order it will be impossible to raise even the usual revenues. It will, therefore, become necessary, in order to preserve internal tranquillity, to organise and equip an army according to modern methods of warfare, and to rebuild the navy which has been practically destroyed by the war. These will require large and immediate expenditures of money, but it will be impossible to raise the money for these purposes if this heavy indemnity is to be paid. The Government is contemplating various reforms and improvements in the country, but all these will be paralysed if Japan does not largely reduce her demand.

The indemnity is termed in the draft the proposed treaty "a war indemnity," which it is supposed means an indemnity to pay the expenses incurred by Japan in the prosecution of the war. But if that is the case, I think the Japanese Plenipotentiaries must admit that the sum demanded is largely in excess of that amount. It is not possible for one not possessed of the official details to know the exact amount of the war expenses of Japan up to the present time, but there are certain official and public data and statements which would seem to fix the limits within which that sum may be approximately estimated, and the Japanese Plenipotentiaries will be able to confirm or correct it. It is understood that there was in the Public Treasury of Japan, at the opening of the war, about 30,000,000 *yen*. How much of this sum was used for war purposes is not known to the public, but it may be assumed that all of it was appropriated for that purpose. Soon after the opening of hostilities a war loan of 150,000,000 *yen* was authorised. According to the report in the public press of Japan, the Prime Minister, His Excellency Count Ito, made a speech in the Lower House of the Japanese Parliament on the 20th of February last, in which after referring to the

failure of negotiations at Hiroshima early in that month, he used this language: "From the subsequent state of the war and under the present circumstances it is difficult to tell when peace will be restored, and it is not improbable that the war fund may become insufficient." He thereupon asked the Parliament to authorise an additional war loan to meet the emergency of a considerable prolongation of the war.

It seems fair to infer from this speech that the first war loan had not been exhausted and would not be unless the war was continued for some time. The Japanese vernacular newspapers, in referring to this speech and the action of the Parliament on the subject, stated that "the actual need of the fund will be some time in June or July next, and the Government is said to have submitted it to the Diet, not because the money is in urgent need, but because the Diet is just now sitting." (See *Asahi*, quoted in the *Yokohama Gazette*, February 23rd); and the following, "of the first war loan there remains 50,000,000 *yen* to be raised, and of the 80,000,000 already floated a considerable sum was still to be paid up." (See *Kokumin*, as quoted in the *Japan Mail* of February 23rd.) In addition account is to be taken of some popular contributions. But if these statements are to be accepted as approximately correct, it would seem reasonable to believe that the total money expenditure of Japan in the war up to the present time does not exceed 150,000,000 *yen*.

In estimating the war expenditure of Japan, it should not be forgotten that victory has given that country many valuable spoils of war, such as the captured naval vessels and the large amount of military material and supplies, which should fairly be deducted in fixing the gross amount of the indemnity.

To charge China with interest on the deferred payments of the indemnity is an onerous and unreasonable provision, and becomes doubly so when the enormous amount demanded is considered.

*4.—Commercial Privileges.*

In the very brief time allowed for an examination and reply to the Treaty draft, it has not been possible to study fully the complex and detailed questions to which the commercial privileges and stipulations asked for give rise. The following must be taken as merely an expression of views and full reservation is made to add to or correct them hereafter. It is hoped, however, that the following statement may aid the Japanese Plenipotentiaries in understanding some of the clauses to which China is disposed to agree and some respecting which modifications will be asked.

War having suspended the operation of the late Commercial Treaty, a new agreement is recognised by China as necessary, and she is ready to accept the existing treaties with Foreign Powers as the basis of negotiations; it will require, however, in due reciprocity that a stipulation be added to the introductory paragraph of the Article, granting favoured nation treatment to China in Japan.

Reply is for the present reserved on the 1st and 2nd clauses.

The 3rd clause provides for a reduction of the transit dues on Japanese imported goods to two per cent., or a practical decrease of one-half of one per cent.; and it is proposed to abolish altogether the existing transit dues on goods exported. When it is remembered that this same Treaty contains an Article demanding of China the payment of an indemnity beyond her present power to make, it seems most inappropriate to ask China to give up any of her existing sources of revenue. Rather ought Japan, in view of what has been stated respecting the Customs revenues, to agree to an increase of that tariff. At the same time that Japan is negotiating with Foreign Powers to secure an increase of her own tariff, it is hardly consistent to demand of China a reduction of her already low tariff.

The effect or object of the 3rd clause appears to be to exempt foreign goods from any dues or likin tax whatever

after they had passed out of the hands of the importer or foreign owner. This is a subject which has been often considered with foreign diplomatic representatives at Peking, and the fairness of such a claim has never been shown. There is no Government which more jealously guards its commercial privileges than Great Britain, and her subjects engaged in the Chinese trade have often moved her Ministers to secure relief from the likin tax, but without success. Lord Elgin, who accompanied the British army to Peking, and exacted from China after the occupation all the commercial privileges which he deemed just on the part of the victor, rejected the claim as now proposed and said he "did not see his way clear to further protection of imports against taxation once they have passed into the hands of a Chinese purchaser." (British Government Blue-book on Revision of Treaty of Tientsin, 1871, p. 443.) The British Board of Trade, having official supervision of foreign commerce, examined this subject at the request of the British Office of Foreign Affairs, and decided that "to insure the sale of the (imported) goods to their ultimate consumer with no enhancement of cost derived from taxation . . . is a view which cannot be entertained by Her Majesty's Government. There is nothing in the Treaty which appears to my Lords to justify such a sweeping demand, and in view of the internal taxation to which native goods are subject in China, it would be in their opinion both unjust and inexpedient to enforce such a demand, even if it were warranted by the terms of Treaty stipulations" (Ib. p. 347). Sir Thomas Wade, so familiar with Chinese trade, and so long the able representative of Her Majesty's interests at Peking, said the likin tax "is not in its nature more open to objection than our income tax, nor, indeed, to any extraordinary tax by which a State short of money may recruit its finances." And again, referring to the abuse to which the privilege asked for in the 3rd clause would give rise, he said, "it is hard enough on the Provincial Governments that they must give up their tolls on goods that are foreign-owned; but it will

be harder still if Chinese, armed with foreigners' certificates, are to carry Chinese-owned goods toll free from one end of the Empire to the other" (Ib. pp. 444 and 447). In view of these declarations, so well founded in justice and propriety, I feel sure the Japanese Plenipotentiaries will be willing to modify their proposition so as to secure the protection of imported goods only so long as they remain in the possession of the foreign owner. This will be secured by granting to Japan favoured nation treatment, and Japan should be satisfied with that.

It may be remarked on the 4th clause that, laying aside for the present the consideration of the justice of this claim, its prudence may be seriously questioned. To allow foreign merchants to temporarily establish themselves at great distances from the treaty ports, beyond the protection and control of their Consuls, would seem to be inconsistent with the practice of extra-territoriality, and greatly embarrassing to the Chinese authorities. Sir Thomas Wade, in discussing a similar proposition presented by British merchants, said: "I am decidedly against any sweeping demand with reference to it. . . . We are bound to ask nothing from her (China) except when we see our way to a fair provision for the control of the extra-territorialised foreigner." And again, "if our merchants are to congregate in any number in a Chinese town or suburb inland, I shall be much mistaken if we do not soon find the necessity of a land concession forced upon us" (Ib. pp. 435 and 449).

The 6th clause refers to the privilege of importing machinery into China to convert Chinese raw materials into manufactured goods, a question which has been much discussed with the Diplomatic Corps at Peking, and which has been settled against the privileges asked for in this clause. The prohibition of foreigners from engaging in China in manufacturing industries has been one of long standing and in which Foreign Governments have acquiesced, as a prohibition which properly belongs to the sovereignty and indepen-

dence of a nation. To allow foreigners to enter and establish factories for converting the natural products into manufactured goods would tend to destroy the livelihood of the Chinese and work a serious injury to native industries which it is the duty of the Government to protect. The regulation is one which has been in existence for many years, and one which has been adopted by other nations, and should not now be abolished. The provision inserted in the 6th clause exempting all articles manufactured by Japanese in China from all internal taxation is most objectionable and unduly discriminating. Besides, if these privileges are granted to Japanese subjects, they must necessarily be extended to all nations which have treaties with China, and the ruin of the native industries would be swift and certain.

The provisions contained in Article VIII., making the evacuation of the places named therein dependent upon the conclusion of the Treaty of Commerce provided for in Article VI., seems an unnecessary and unreasonable provision. By the terms of the latter Article Japan is at once guaranteed the most favoured nation treatment, and thereby placed on an equality in respect to commerce with all competitors.

The foregoing embraces a review of all the important and essential provisions contained in the draft of Treaty submitted for my consideration, and to which I have made as frank and as complete a reply as has been possible under the circumstances. A few Articles of minor importance or of mere detail have not been noticed, but it is believed that if an accord should happily be reached on the four questions above discussed, the Articles not treated of may be arranged in due time.

I trust I may be pardoned for saying that I have served my country for half a century, and it may be that I am nearing the end of my days. This mission is probably the last important service I will be permitted to render my Sovereign and his subjects. It is my sincere desire and my

highest ambition to reach such a conclusion of our negotiations as will bring lasting peace and friendship to the people and Governments which we represent.

We should listen to the voice of reason ; we should be so controlled by the highest principles of statesmanship as to safeguard the interests and the future welfare of these two great peoples, whose destinies and happiness for many generations are now in our hands.

It matters little to Japan, in this time of her abounding prosperity and greatness and in the abundance of able men, whether she to-day receives a larger or smaller indemnity, or whether she enlarges her boundaries by the annexation of a greater or smaller portion of the territory now within the reach of her armies ; but it is a matter of vast moment to her future greatness and the happiness of her people, whether or not by the negotiations now in hand her Plenipotentiaries make of the Chinese nation firm friends and allies or inveterate foes. As their representative I stand ready to join hands with Their Excellencies the Plenipotentiaries of Japan, in making such a peace as will leave no seeds of enmity to spring up and curse us in future generations, and such a peace as will bring honour to us and blessing and enduring friendship to the two great nations of the Orient.

LI HUNG-CHANG,

Ambassador Plenipotentiary of  
His Majesty the Emperor of China.

*China asked to Formulate her Proposals.*

*Shimonoseki, 6th April, 1895.*

At the meeting of the 1st day of the 4th month of the 28th year of Meiji (April 1st, 1895), the Plenipotentiaries of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, proposed that in presenting the conditions of peace, a mode of procedure should be adopted by which the draft Treaty of Peace would be pre-

sented article by article and the Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of China should express his acceptance or non-acceptance of the several articles one by one, thus disposing of each article in succession.

In view, however, of a desire repeatedly expressed by the Chinese Plenipotentiary that the draft Treaty might be presented to him *en bloc*, the Japanese Plenipotentiaries finally complying with his wishes, presented to him the draft Treaty in its entirety under an assurance that he would, within the space of four days' time, either signify his acceptance of the Treaty as a whole or indicate the particulars in which it was unacceptable.

In now examining the memorandum presented by the Chinese Plenipotentiary, the Japanese Plenipotentiaries are disappointed to find that the communication is confined to an elaborate recital of the domestic difficulties of the Empire of China coupled with a request to the Japanese Plenipotentiaries for a reconsideration of the conditions of peace.

The memorandum not only cannot be taken as a reply to the draft Treaty presented by the Japanese Plenipotentiaries, but it fails even to definitely express the wishes or desires of the Chinese Plenipotentiary.

In conclusion, reminding the Chinese Plenipotentiary that the domestic difficulties of China do not properly fall within the sphere of the present discussion, and that demands arising as a consequence of war cannot be regarded as matters for negotiation in the ordinary acceptation of that term, the Japanese Plenipotentiaries beg to express their desire that the Chinese Plenipotentiary will, without additional delay, definitively announce his acceptance or non-acceptance of the draft Treaty of Peace already presented, either *en bloc* or severally article by article, and in case any alterations are desired, that he will present them in concrete form.



*Counter-proposal by Chinese Plenipotentiary.**Shimonoseki, 9th April, 1895.*

It is a source of much regret and disappointment to me that the Memorandum which I sent to the Japanese Plenipotentiaries on the 5th instant should not have been regarded as satisfactory. So far from its being confined to a recital of the domestic difficulties of China, it will be found to be a specific expression of my views on every important Article and paragraph in the draft of Treaty submitted for my consideration.

But in my earnest desire to conform to the utmost of my power to the wishes and convenience of the Japanese Plenipotentiaries, I have prepared and send herewith a counter-draft of Treaty which will be found to constitute a reply to every Article in the draft of Treaty submitted by the Japanese Plenipotentiaries. It will be noted that a new Article has been added, which I trust will be found acceptable.

The counter-draft made under my responsibility as a Plenipotentiary is the extent to which it is possible for me to go in the present stage of negotiations. If the propositions therein contained do not meet fully the views of the Japanese Plenipotentiaries, I feel sure an agreement may be most readily promoted by verbal conferences; and, in view of the short time remaining of the armistice, I hope the Japanese Plenipotentiaries will fix a time for a conference with the least delay possible.

---

*China's Counter-draft of Treaty of Peace.**Shimonoseki, 9th April, 1895.*

His Majesty the Emperor of China and His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, desiring to restore the blessings of peace to their countries, and to establish upon a solid basis relations of friendship and intercourse which shall confer reciprocal

benefits upon the subjects of both, and assure the harmony and mutual confidence which should subsist between good neighbours, have named as their Plenipotentiaries for the purpose of concluding a Treaty of Peace; that is to say:

His Majesty the Emperor of China . . . and His Majesty the Emperor of Japan . . . who, after having exchanged their Full Powers, which were found to be in good and proper form, have agreed to the following Articles:

Article I.—China and Japan recognise definitely the full and complete independence and autonomy and guarantee the complete neutrality of Corea, and it is agreed that the interference by either in the internal affairs of Corea in derogation of such autonomy, or the performance of ceremonies and formalities by Corea inconsistent with such independence, shall wholly cease for the future.

Article II.—China cedes to Japan in full sovereignty the following territories together with all towns and cities, public offices, granaries, barracks and public buildings therein.

(a).—One prefecture, one sub-prefecture, and two districts in the South of the Fêngtien province, namely,

- 1.—The district of Antung.
- 2.—The district of Kungtien.
- 3.—The prefecture of Fênghwang.
- 4.—The sub-prefecture of Hsiuyen.

The boundaries of the above-mentioned prefecture, sub-prefecture and districts shall be taken in strict accordance with the Chinese official surveys.

(b).—The Pescadores group of islands, lying within the 23rd and 24th parallels of latitude and the 119th and 120th degrees of longitude East.

Article III.—(Japanese text accepted without change.)

Article IV.—China agrees to pay to Japan as a war indemnity the sum of 100,000,000 Kuping Taels. The said sum is to be paid in five instalments, the first instalment being 28,000,000 Kuping Taels, and the four remaining instalments being 18,000,000 Kuping Taels each. The first

instalment is to be paid within six months after the exchange of ratifications of this Treaty, and the four remaining instalments are to be respectively paid within each of the four succeeding years which terminate six months after the exchange of ratifications of this Treaty ; but China shall have the right to anticipate at her pleasure any or all of said instalments.

Article V.—The inhabitants of the territories ceded to Japan, who wish to take up their residence outside the ceded districts, shall be at full liberty to sell their real and personal property and retire, without their being subjected, on this account, to any contribution, tax, or charge whatever. For this purpose a period of two years from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of the present Treaty shall be granted. At the expiration of that period those of the inhabitants who shall not have left such territories shall be deemed Japanese subjects.

The property in the ceded territories, real and personal, owned by non-resident Chinese shall be respected by the Japanese Government, and shall enjoy the same guarantees as if belonging to Japanese subjects.

Article VI.—All treaties between China and Japan having come to an end in consequence of war, China and Japan engage immediately upon the exchange of the ratifications of this Treaty, to appoint Plenipotentiaries to conclude a treaty of commerce and navigation and a convention to regulate frontier intercourse and trade. The treaties, conventions and regulations now subsisting between China and European powers shall serve as a basis for the said Treaty and convention between China and Japan, and as regards all the open ports, navigation, taxation, storage of goods, the mode of taxation, etc., Japan will be treated in the same way as the most favoured nation. From the date of the exchange of the ratifications of the Treaty until the said Treaty and convention are brought into actual operation, the Japanese Government, its officials, commerce, navigation, frontier intercourse and

trade, industries, ships and subjects shall in every respect be accorded by China most favoured nation treatment.

And reciprocally from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of this Treaty until the said Treaty and convention are brought into actual operation, the Chinese Government, its officials, commerce, navigation, frontier intercourse and trade, industries, ships, and subjects shall in every respect be accorded by Japan most favoured nation treatment.

Article VII.—Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding Article the evacuation of China by the armies of Japan shall be completely effected within one month after the exchange of the ratifications of the present Treaty.

Article VIII.—As a guarantee of the faithful performance of the stipulations of this Treaty, China consents to the temporary occupation by the military forces of Japan of Wei-hai-wei, in the province of Shantung. Upon the payment of the first two instalments of the war indemnity herein stipulated for, one-half of the Japanese forces stationed there shall be withdrawn, and upon the payment of the final instalment of the said indemnity, the said place shall be evacuated by the remaining Japanese forces.

Article IX.—(Japanese draft accepted without change.)

Article X.—All offensive military operations shall cease upon the signing of this Treaty by the Plenipotentiaries of both countries.

Article XI.—In order to avoid future conflict or war between China and Japan, it is agreed that should any question arise as to the interpretation or execution of the present Treaty of Peace, or as to the negotiation, interpretation or execution of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation and the Convention for Frontier Intercourse provided for in Article VI. of this Treaty, which cannot be adjusted by the usual method of diplomatic conference and correspondence between the two Governments, they will submit such question to the decision of an arbitrator to be designated by some

friendly Power to be selected by mutual accord of the two Governments, or, in case of failure, to agree as to the selection of said Power, then the President of the United States shall be invited to designate the arbitrator; and both Governments agree to accept, abide by, and carry out in good faith the decision of said arbitrator.

Article XII.—The present Treaty shall be ratified by Their Majesties the Emperor of China and the Emperor of Japan, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at.....on the .....day of the.....month of.....

In Witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same and have affixed thereto the seal of their arms.

*Japan Replies to Counter-proposal and reduces Demand.*

*Shimonoseki, 10th April, 1895.*

*Preamble.*

The Japanese Plenipotentiaries cannot consent to any amendments of the Preamble.

Article I.—The Japanese Plenipotentiaries find it necessary to adhere to this Article as originally presented to the Chinese Plenipotentiary.

Article II.—The Japanese Plenipotentiaries find it impossible to accept the amendment hereunder, proposed by the Chinese Plenipotentiary. They consent, however, to modify their original demand, so that it shall read as follows:—

“China cedes to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty the following territories, together with all fortifications, arsenals, and public property thereon:

“(a)—The southern portion of the province of Shengking within the following boundaries:

“The line of demarcation begins at the River Yalu and ascends the stream to Anpinghokou; from thence the line

runs to Feughuang; from thence to Haichêng, and from thence to Yingkou, where it terminates. The places above named are included in the ceded territory.

"This cession also includes all Islands appertaining or belonging to the province of Shengking situated in the eastern portion of the Bay of Liaotung and in the northern part of the Yellow Sea.

"(b).—The Island of Formosa together with all islands adjacent or belonging to the said Island of Formosa.

"(c).—The Pescadores Group, that is to say, all Islands lying between the 119° and 120° longitude east of Greenwich and the 23° and 24' north latitude."

Article IV.—The Japanese Plenipotentiaries cannot accede to the proposal of the Chinese Plenipotentiary hereunder. They will, however, consent to amend their original demand as follows:

"China agrees to pay to Japan as a war indemnity the sum of 200,000,000 Kuping taels. The said sum to be paid in eight instalments. The first instalment of 50,000,000 taels to be paid within six months, and the second instalment of 50,000,000 taels to be paid within twelve months after the exchange of the ratifications of this Act. The remaining sum to be paid in six equal annual instalments as follows: The first of such equal annual instalments to be paid within two years; the second within three years; the third within four years; the fourth within five years; the fifth within six years; and the sixth within seven years after the exchange of ratifications of this Act. Interest at the rate of 5 *per centum per annum* shall begin to run on all unpaid portions of the said indemnity from the date the first instalment falls due. China shall, however, have the right to pay by anticipation at any time any or all of said instalments."

Article V.—The Japanese Plenipotentiaries cannot consent to the Amendments proposed to this Article.

Article VI.—The Japanese Plenipotentiaries are unable to give their adhesion to the counter proposal hereunder of the

Chinese Plenipotentiary. They will, nevertheless, consent to the following modifications of the original Article :

“ All treaties between Japan and China having come to an end in consequence of war, China engages, immediately upon the exchange of the ratifications of this Act, to appoint Plenipotentiaries to conclude with the Japanese Plenipotentiaries a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation and a Convention to regulate Frontier Intercourse and Trade. The Treaties, Conventions and Regulations now subsisting between China and European Powers shall serve as a basis for the said Treaty and Convention between Japan and China. From the date of the exchange of the ratifications of this Act until the said Treaty and Convention are brought into actual operation the Japanese Government, its Officials, Commerce, Navigation, Frontier Intercourse and Trade, Industries, Ships and Subjects shall in every respect be accorded by China most favoured nation treatment.

“ China makes in addition the following concessions to take effect six months after the date of the present Act :

“ 1st.—The following cities, towns and ports, in addition to those already opened, shall be opened to the trade, residence, industries and manufactures of Japanese subjects, under the same conditions and with the same privileges and facilities as exist at the present open cities, towns and ports of China :

- 1.—Shashih in the province of Hupeh.
- 2.—Chungking in the province of Szechuen.
- 5.—Soochow in the province of Kiangsu.
- 4.—Hangchow in the province of Chekiang.

“ The Japanese Government shall have the right to station Consuls at any or all the above-named places.

“ 2nd.—Steam navigation for vessels under the Japanese flag for the conveyance of passengers and cargo shall be extended to the following places :

- 1.—On the Upper Yangtze River from Ichang to Chungking.

2.—On the Woosung River and the Canal from Shanghai to Soochow and Hangchow.

“The Rules and Regulations which now govern the navigation of the inland waters of China by foreign vessels shall, so far as applicable, be enforced in respect of the above-named routes until new Rules and Regulations are conjointly agreed to.

“3rd.—Japanese subjects purchasing goods or produce in the interior of China or transporting imported merchandise into the interior of China, shall have the right temporarily to rent or hire warehouses for the storage of the articles so purchased or transported, without the payment of any taxes or exactions whatever and without the interference of any Chinese officials.

“4th.—The Kuping tael shall be taken to be the tael in which all taxes, duties and fees are payable by Japanese subjects in China, and all such taxes, duties and fees may be paid in standard Japanese silver yen at their face or respective value.

“5th.—Japanese subjects shall be free to engage in all kinds of manufacturing industries in China, and shall be at liberty to import into China all kinds of machinery paying only the stipulated import duties thereon.

“All articles manufactured by Japanese subjects in China shall in respect of inland transit and internal taxes, duties, charges and exactions of all kinds, and also in respect of warehousing and storage facilities in the interior of China, stand upon the same footing and enjoy the same privileges and exemptions as merchandise imported by Japanese subjects into China.

“In the event of additional Rules and Regulations being necessary in connection with these concessions, they shall be embodied in the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation provided for by this Article.”

Article VII.—The Japanese Plenipotentiaries are unable to accept the amendment hereunder.



Article VIII.—The Japanese Plenipotentiaries cannot accept the substitute proposed hereunder, but they will agree to amend the original Article as follows :—

“As a guarantee of the faithful performance of the stipulations of this Act China consents to the temporary occupation by the military forces of Japan of Wei-hai-wei in the province of Shantung.

“Upon the payment of the first two instalments of the war indemnity herein stipulated for and the exchange of the ratifications of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, the said place shall be evacuated by the Japanese forces, provided the Chinese Government consents to pledge, under suitable and sufficient arrangements, the Customs Revenue of China as security for the payment of the principal and interest of the remaining instalments of said indemnity. In the event of no such arrangements being concluded, such evacuation shall only take place upon the payment of the final instalment of said indemnity.

“It is, however, expressly understood that no such evacuation shall take place until after the exchange of the ratifications of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation.

“All expenses connected with the temporary occupation shall be defrayed by China.”

Article X.—The Japanese Plenipotentiaries find it necessary to adhere to this Article as originally drafted by them.

Article XI. (New.)—The proposal hereunder cannot be accepted by the Japanese Plenipotentiaries.

### *Japan's Ultimatum.*

*Shimonoseki, 11th April, 1895.*

His Excellency Count Li-Hung-chang,

His Imperial Chinese Majesty's Plenipotentiary.

Excellency,—I deem it advisable to confirm in writing the substance of the observations which I had the honour to

verbally address to your Excellency yesterday in connection with the modified conditions of peace which I then presented to you.

I informed your Excellency and I now desire to repeat that those modified demands must be regarded as final, and that a categorical reply will be expected within the space of four days from yesterday.

I acquainted your Excellency that the Japanese Plenipotentiaries had not failed to take into serious consideration the remarks which your Excellency had made respecting the demands of the Imperial Japanese Government as originally formulated, and I stated that a reduction in those demands to the lowest possible point of concession had been made in consequence of those remarks in which your Excellency had pointed out the difficulties that would confront China if the full measures of Japanese original conditions were insisted upon.

The reduction of the indemnity by one-third; the adoption of easier terms of payment; the acceptance of one place instead of two for temporary occupation; the opportunity of substituting a financial in place of a territorial guarantee; the suppression of the clause regarding commutation and other internal taxation, and the withdrawal of the claim for the removal of the obstruction to navigation at the mouth of the Huangpu river, would, I explained, relieve China of those financial embarrassments which in your Excellency's estimation rendered the full realisation of Japan's monetary demands extremely difficult.

I also made it clear to your Excellency's appreciation, I trust, that the same spirit of conciliation had also contributed to bring about the very large abridgment of Japan's territorial demands.

In conclusion I permit myself to repeat what I have frequently endeavoured to impress upon your Excellency's mind, that war is progressive in its consequences as well as its operations, and that it is not to be expected that con-

ditions of peace which Japan is now happily able to accept will be possible later on.

I renew to your Excellency the assurance of my distinguished consideration.

ITO HIROBUMI,  
II. J. M. Plenipotentiary.

*China's last Protest and Appeal.*

*Shimonoseki, 12th April, 1895.*

His Excellency Count Ito Hirobumi,  
Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan.

Excellency,—The note which your Excellency did me the honour to address to me yesterday respecting the progress and incidents attending the Peace negotiations makes it necessary, in justice to my Government and myself, that I should submit thereto a brief reply.

It is to be borne in mind that I was required to present in writing a categorical reply to the terms of peace demanded by Japan before I should be granted any conference with the Japanese Plenipotentiaries for discussing the terms of peace, and at the first conference granted me for that purpose I was met by the Japanese final proposal as now urged by your Excellency before any oral discussion had taken place. Under such circumstances it can hardly be claimed that Japan's final proposal had been reached after a full opportunity had been afforded me to make known the views of my Government.

While it is gratifying to know that the enormous indemnity originally demanded has been somewhat reduced, it still remains an amount far greater than the cost of the war, and constitutes a burden too heavy for China to bear, and one which would make it impossible to carry out much-desired reforms and improvements in the country.

It has not been possible for me to understand how the conditions of peace have been made much less onerous by what your Excellency terms "the very large abridgment of Japan's territorial demands." The line of demarcation in the final proposal includes, with slight exceptions, all the territory in the province of Shengking which has ever been occupied by the Japanese forces; and in addition the final proposal has demanded the cession of a rich, populous, and important part of the Empire (Formosa) whereupon no Japanese soldier has as yet set foot. Such a demand is not in accord with the practice of nations negotiating for peace.

While I cheerfully recognise the action of the Japanese Plenipotentiaries in abating some of their objectionable commercial demands, the final proposal still remains unprecedented and unreasonable in its terms in this regard and highly derogatory to the sovereignty of an independent nation. It requires the negotiation of a Commercial Treaty and frontier regulations under the duress of retaining Chinese territory, and refuses to submit any question of variance to the arbitration of a friendly Power. Pending the negotiation of the Commercial Treaty it demands favoured nation treatment for Japanese in China, and refuses the same guarantee or any stipulation for Chinese in Japan. It claims the privilege for Japanese to rent warehouses and import and purchase goods, and produce at any place in the interior of China away from the Treaty ports, without the interference of any officials; also, that the Japanese should have the right to engage in manufacturing industries anywhere in China, and without the payment of any domestic taxes on the goods manufactured; and that Japanese coin be made receivable at its face value for payment of duties and taxes.

I have written the foregoing, not with the view of provoking further discussion, but with the object of concisely repeating what I said to your Excellency when the final proposal was presented to me at the only conference afforded me for discussing terms of peace, and in the hope that the objections

here set forth may be carefully considered by your Excellency and that I may be informed of the result thereon at the next Conference promised me by your Excellency, at which I expect to submit the reply to the final proposal which my Emperor shall authorise me to make.

I renew to your Excellency the assurances of my high consideration.

LI HUNG-CHANG,  
Ambassador Plenipotentiary of His Majesty  
the Emperor of China.

*Final.*

*Shimonoseki, 13th April, 1895.*

His Excellency Count Li Hung-chang,

His Imperial Chinese Majesty's Plenipotentiary.

Excellency,—I have had the honour to receive your Excellency's Note of yesterday, which professes to be in reply to mine of the day previous.

The object of my communication of the 11th inst. was, by repeating in writing what I had previously verbally declared, to make your Excellency fully alive to the actual situation. I wished your Excellency to understand that full consideration had been accorded to your Excellency's representations, and that the modified demands of the Imperial Government must be regarded as final, admitting only of a categorical reply.

I fear, from the Note now under acknowledgment, that my purpose was misinterpreted, since your Excellency, while disclaiming any wish to provoke a discussion, criticises the final demands of the Imperial Government, as well as the course of procedure which has been followed, and expresses the hope that your Excellency's objection may be taken into consideration.

It only seems necessary for me to say in response to your Excellency's Note, that the demands which I handed to your Excellency on the 10th inst. being final, are no longer open to discussion.

Demands arising as a result of war are not proposals in the ordinary sense of that word, and the Japanese Plenipotentiaries by permitting the demands of the Imperial Government to be made the subject of discussion went to the extreme limit of concession in the interest of peace, and if their spirit of conciliation has been misunderstood they have the right to disclaim all responsibility for the consequences.

It only remains for me to add, in order to prevent future misunderstanding, that my refusal at this time to enter upon a new examination of Japan's demands does not imply an acquiescence on my part in your Excellency's observations or conclusions.

I renew to your Excellency the assurance of my distinguished consideration.

ITO HIROBUMI,  
Plenipotentiary of His Majesty  
the Emperor of Japan.

# INDEX.

AI-HO river, the, 189, 192  
*Akagi*, Japanese war-ship, 87; at the  
 battle of Hai-yang Island, 186-185,  
 at Ta-lien Bay, 215, 216  
*Akitsu-hima*, Japanese war-ship, 87,  
 95, 170; at the naval battle of  
 Hai-yang Island, 167-185  
 ——— off Teng-chou city, 270, 271  
 Akiyama, Major, 217, 218  
*Amagi*, Japanese war-ship, 87  
 America, and Corea, in 1871..41;  
 Corea opened to trade of, 44;  
 Mr. Jernigan, Consul of Shanghai,  
 115, 116, 375-379  
 An-ju, town of, 186  
 An-song, skirmish at the ford of,  
 108, 109  
 An-tung, capture of, 193, 191  
 Armistice, granted by Japan, 327;  
 text of the, 403, 404  
 Army of the Chinese Empire, 69-75  
 ——— Japan, 78-85  
 Asakawa, Captain, 218; saved by  
 Private Tio, 219, 221  
*Asaki Maru*, s.s., 206  
 Asan, Chinese force landed at, 62,  
 63, 66, 93-95; campaign at,  
 104-113  
 Asano, Japanese general, 33  
 Assassination of Kim-Ok-Kiun at  
 Shanghai, 51-57  
*Atago*, Japanese war-ship, 87  
  
 BABA, Major, 111  
 Battles. *See* Asan; Chinchow;

BATTLES (*cont.*)  
 Haicheng; Hai-yang Island;  
 Kaiping; Newchwang; Port  
 Arthur; Phyöng-yang; Ta-lien  
 Bay; Wei-hai-wei, &c.  
 Booms constructed by the Chinese  
 across Wei-hai-wei Bay, 276, 281  
 Braves, the, part of the Chinese  
 army, 69, 73  
  
 CANTON SQUADRON of the Chinese  
 navy, 75, 77  
 Chang, General, at Wei-hai-wei, 295,  
 299  
 ——— Captain of the Chinese ship  
*Kuang-ping*, 297, 300  
 Chang-chia-kou-tzu, 277  
 Chang In Hoon; peace conference at  
 Hiroshima, 391-402, 408-437  
 Chang Yu-lin, of the *Kowshing*, 352,  
 353  
*Chao-wu*, of the Foochow squadron, 77  
*Chao-yung*, Chinese man-of-war, 76;  
 the naval battle at Hai-yang Island,  
 167-185  
 Chemulpo, opened to Japanese trade  
 in 1880..44; Chinese war-ships  
 sent to, 63; Japanese troops at,  
 63, 64, 119  
*Chen-an*, Chinese man-of-war, 76  
*Chen-ching*, Chinese man-of-war, 77  
*Chen-chung*, Chinese man-of-war, 76  
*Chen-hai*, Chinese man-of-war, 76  
*Chen-hong*, Chinese man-of-war, 77  
*Chen-Hsi*, Chinese man-of-war, 76

- Chen-nan*, Chinese man-of-war, 76  
*Chen-pei*, Chinese man-of-war, 76, 297  
*Chen-pien*, Chinese man-of-war, 76  
*Chen-tung*, Chinese man-of-war, 76  
*Chen-yuen*, Chinese man-of-war, 76, 86, 177; the naval battle at Hai-yang Island, 167-185; at Wei-hai-wei, 276, 301  
Chihong river, 122  
Chia, Chinese general, 200  
*Chih-yuen*, Chinese man-of-war, 76; sent to Asan, 63; the naval battle of Hai-yang Island, 167-185  
China; the soldiers of, 5-7; historical relations of Japan, Corea and, 9-34, 45, 46; wars undertaken by, against Corea, 12-16; coasts of, infested by Japanese pirates, 21-24; assists the Koreans against Japanese invasion, 28-33; the Manchus in, 35, 36; tributary missions sent by Corea to, 36; land between Corea and China annexed by, 43; sends troops to Asan to check the Tong-haks, 62-68, 93; army of, 69-75; navy of, 75-78; naval battle at Phung Island, 93-103; campaign at Asan, 104-113; declaration of war between Japan and, 113-117; attack on the army of, at Phyang-yang, 120-163; army of, at Phyang-yang, 141-146; the naval battle of Hai-yang Island, 164-185; campaign of Japanese first army in Manchuria, 186-202, 237-260, 308-321; campaign of Japanese second army corps in the Regent's Sword Peninsula, 203-236, 261-268; the Wei-hai-wei campaign, 269-304; first peace embassy sent by, to Japan, 305-307; second peace embassy, 322-327; the treaty of peace at Shimonoseki, 328, 329; practical results of the war, 332-334; documents relating to peace treaty, 391-402; text of the treaty of peace, 403-437; despatches between the governments of Japan and, on the Korean question, 338-346; text of the armistice between Japan and, 403, 404; text of the declaration of war by, 372-374  
Chin-chow, advance on and capture of, 207-213, 231, 235, 261  
Chinese troops, at Chin-chow and 'Ta-lien, 214; at Port Arthur, 224  
Ching-chia-shan, 309  
*Ching-yuen*, Chinese man-of-war, 76, 77; the naval battle of Hai-yang Island, 167-185; at Wei-hai-wei, 276, 296  
Chi-t'ü, Chinese political refugee, and Corea, 11  
Chin-lien-ch'eng, town of, 188, 192-194, 238  
*Chiyoda*, Japanese war-ship, 87, 178; at the naval battle of Hai-yang Island, 167-185; at 'Ta-lien Bay, 215, 216  
Choi-Chai-Tu, and his doctrines, 58, 59  
*Chokai*, Japanese gun-boat, 87; at 'Ta-lien Bay, 215, 216; at Wei-hai-wei, 288  
Cholla, province of, disturbances in, 60-62  
Chong-ju, 186  
Christians, persecution of, in Corea, 37, 38, 42  
Chung-hwa, town of, 133-135  
Cockburn, Mr., 349  
Commercial privileges granted to Japan by China in the Treaty of Peace, 407-410, 418-422  
Consular Body at Shanghai; and the murder of Kim-Ok-Kiun, 54-57, 375-379  
Corea; historical relations of China,



KOREA (*cont.*)

Japan and, 9-34, 15, 16; invaded by the Japanese under Hideyoshi, 23-34; sketch of modern history of, 35-50; France and, in 1866.. 37, 38; persecution of Christians in, 37, 38, 42; Oppert's expeditions to, on the s.s. *China*, 39-41; America and, in 1871.. 41; China annexes part of, 43; the Japanese in front of Seoul in 1876.. 44; opened to trade with the United States, 44; Japanese in Seoul attacked by the Koreans, 46-49; the Tientsin Convention and, 50; Chinese and Japanese troops sent to, in 1891.. 62-67; reforms in, suggested by Otori, 67, 68, 335-337; outbreak of hostilities in, the King's Palace at Seoul attacked by the Japanese, 88-93; the King of, 92; naval battle at Phung Island, 93-103; the Asan campaign, 101-113; Japanese troops stationed in, 130; advance on, and capture of town of Phyang-yang in, 120-163; Japan and, 370-372; China and, 372-371; complete neutrality of, 112

Corean question, despatches between the Governments of China and Japan on the, before the commencement of hostilities, 338-348

Correspondence between Admiral Ito and Admiral Ting, 380-386

— relating to the delivery of the two Japanese in Shanghai, 375-379

Cousins, Mr. Edmund, 349, 350

DECLARATION OF WAR by China, text of the, 372-376

— by Japan, text of the, 370-372  
Denby, Mr., and the Japanese spies arrested in Shanghai, 376-379

Despatches between the Governments of China and Japan on the Corean question before the commencement of hostilities, 338-348

Detring, Mr., sent as peace envoy to Japan, 236; and the destruction of the *Kowshing*, 349

Dockyard at Port Arthur, 231

Drilled or trained army of China, 69, 73

EIGHT BANNEIS, the, part of the Chinese army, 69-71

Emperor of Japan, the, at Hiroshima, 118

*Fei-ling*, Chinese man-of-war, 77

Feng, Chinese General, 200

Feng-huang, 238, 240-243

Feng-huang-cheng (Phoenix City). 195, 213

Feng-huang-shan (Phoenix Hill), 261, 267

Feng-liu-chi (Phoenix Grove), 277, 278

Fengtienfu, 110

First army, Japanese, 191, 192; invasion of China, 186-202

Flags of the Chinese general, 140

Fleet, Japanese, at Ta-lien Bay, 215, 216

Fong, Captain of the *Tai-yuen*, 97

Foochow squadron of the Chinese Forbidden Land, the, 37. *See* Corean navy, 75, 77

Formosa, Japan and, 328, 332, 406

Forts at Chin-chow, 214

— at Port Arthur, 221-225

— at Phyang-yang, 145, 146, 161

— at Wei-hai-wei, 274-276

Foster, General, 324

France, and Corea, in 1866.. 37, 38

French missionaries in Corea, 37-41

*Fu-ching*, of the Foochow squadron, 77

- Fuji-san, Japanese and, 28  
 Fukuhara, a Japanese arrested in Shanghai, 375-379  
*Fu-po*, of the Foochow squadron, 77  
 Fusan, opened to Japanese trade in 1876..44; Japanese troops landed at, 119  
*Fusô*, Japanese war-ship, 87; at the naval battle of Hai-yang Island, 167-185; at Ta-lien Bay, 215, 216  
 GALSWORTHY, Captain of the s.s. *Kowshing*, 98-103, 355-358; report of, 366-369  
 Gemnu Gate, Phyöng-yang, stormed by the Japanese, 156-159  
*General Sherman*, American schooner, destroyed by the Koreans, 39, 41  
 Gensan, Japanese troops landed at, 119, 146  
 ——— detachment, march on Phyöng-yang, 128, 129, 131, 143, 144, 153-159  
 Green Standard, the, part of the Chinese army, 69, 71-73  
 Gresham, Mr., U. S. Secretary of State, 375-379  
 •*Hai-an*, Chinese man-of-war, 77  
*Hai-ching* of the Canton squadron, 77  
 Hai-cheng, Japanese attack on, 245-260, 268, 308-313  
 Hai-yang Island, naval battle of, 164-185  
 Hanaoka, Major, mortally wounded, 228, 229  
 Hanneken. *See* Von Hanneken.  
 Harada, the hero of the Gemnu Gate, Phyöng-yang, 157, 158  
 Hasegawa, Major-General, 203  
*Hashidate*, Japanese war-ship, 87, 180; at the naval battle of Hai-yang Island, 167-185; at Ta-lien Bay, 215-216  
 Hashimoto, Major, 91  
 Heaven-touching Pass, 196, 238-241  
 ———, in Manchuria; also near Wei-hai-wei. *See* Mo-tien-ling.  
 Hermit nation, the, 37, 44. *See* Corea.  
 Hideyoshi, invasion of Corea, 23-34, 140, 144  
 Hirayama, Captain, 363  
 Hiroshima, G<sup>+</sup>; headquarters of the Japanese army transferred to, 118; peace conference at, 391-402  
*Hiyei*, Japanese war-ship, 87, 171; at the battle of Hai-yang Island, 166-185  
 Hoffmann, Mr., and Captain Fong, 97  
 Hoi-ryong, besieged by Konishi, 28  
 Hsin-yen, capture of, 198-201, 237; occupied by Oseko, 246  
 Hsiung-yo-cheng, town of, 262  
 Huang-chin-shan (Golden Hill) fort, 230  
 Huang-chin-tzù (Yellow Peak), 199, 200  
 Huan-hsi-shan, 309  
*Huan-tai*, Chinese man-of-war, 77  
 Hua-yuan-chiang (Flower Garden River), 205  
 Hua-yuan-kou (Flower Garden Port), 205, 207  
 Hung-chia-po-Azù (Red House Village), 198  
 Hung-Tjyong-Oh assassinates Kim-Ok-Kiun, 51-57  
 Hung-wu, first Ming Emperor, 21  
 Hu-shan (Tiger Mountain), 189-192  
 Hwang-ju, capture of, 132, 133  
 ICHIKOSHE, Major, 122, 124, 126, 132  
 I-ko-teng-a, general of Tartar troops, 238-243, 310  
 Imai, Lieutenant, 287

Indemnity to be paid by China to Japan, 406, 407, 413-417

Ito, Admiral, 117, 182; battle of Hai-yang Island, 165-185; and the Chinese fleet at Wei-hai-wei, 232; attack on, and capture of, Wei-hai-wei, 273-304; correspondence with Admiral Ting, 380-386; correspondence with Niu-chang-ping, 389, 390

Ito Hirobumi, Count, and the Tientsin Convention, 49, 50; and Mr. Detring, 236; peace conference at Hiroshima, 391-402, 405-437

*Itsukushima*, Japanese war-ship, 87, 179; at the naval battle of Hai-yang Island, 167-185; at Tai-lien Bay, 215, 216

*Iwaki*, Japanese war-ship, 89

JAN SHIMA, Lieutenant, 290

Japan; people of, always a warlike nation, 2, 3; history of, 4, 5, 8; historical relations of China, Corea, and, 9-34, 45, 46; paper money of, 17, 18; invaded by Kublai Khan, 19-21; pirates of, infest the coast of China, 21-24; under Hideyoshi invade Corea, 23-31; insulted by the Tai-won-Kun of Corea, 42, 43; sends troops to Corea to check the Tong-Haks, 63-66; reforms in Corea, suggested by, 67, 68, 335-337; army of, 78-85; navy of, 86, 87; campaign in Corea: attack on the King's Palace at Seoul, 88-93; naval battle at Phung Island, 93-103; the Asan campaign, 104-113; declaration of war between China and, 113-117, 370-372; naval demonstration of the fleet at Port Arthur, 117-119; attack on, and capture of P'yong-yang, 120-163; the naval battle of Hai-yang Island, 164-185; campaign of first army

# JAPAN (cont.)

in Manchuria, 186-202, 237-260, 308-321; campaign of second army corps in the Regent's Sword Peninsula, 203-236, 261-268; the Wei-hai-wei campaign, 269-304; first peace embassy sent to, by Chiun, 305-307; second peace embassy, 322-327; the treaty of peace, 328, 329, 405-437; the power of Japan, 329-332; practical results of the war, 332-334; despatches between the Governments of China and, on the Korean question, 338-348, the treaty of peace at Shimonoseki, 328, 329; documents relating to the treaty of peace, 391-402; text of the, 403-437; text of the armistice between China and, 403, 404

Japanese in Seoul, attacked by the Koreans in 1882.. 46, 47, 89; second attack in 1881.. 48, 49, 89

Jernigan, Mr., and the Japanese spies arrested in Shanghai, 375-379

Jih Island, at entrance to Wei-lai-wei, 271, 275, 295

Jingu, Queen, 17, 18

KAI-CHI, Chinese man-of-war, 77

*Kaimon*, Japanese war-ship, 87

Kaipung, town, capture of, 263-268, 311-313

Kai-song, city of, 122, 123

*Kang-chi*, Chinese man-of-war, 76, 388; at Wei-hai-wei, 276, 300

Kang-hwa, city of, taken by the French in 1866.. 38

Kang-hwa Island, Japanese sailors fired on at, in 1875.. 43

Kang-wa-sai, 219-252

Kani, Captain, suicide of, 229

Kano, Colonel, 263

Kato Kiyomasa, General, invasion of Corea, 25-33

- Katsura**, General, in Manchuria, 191-193, 246-255, 261, 308-319  
**Katsuragi**, Japanese war-ship, 87; at Ta-lien Bay, 215, 216  
**Kawasaki**, Sergeant, 122, 200, 201  
**Kencho**, Mr. S., 304, 369  
**Kikushi**, Dr., 331  
**Kim-chhön**, 123, 126  
**Kim-Ok-Kiun**, 46; government of, 48; assassination of, 51-57; effect of the death of, on the Koreans, 62  
**King's Palace**, Seoul, attacked by the Japanese, 88-93  
**King-yuen**, Chinese man-of-war, 76; the naval battle at Hai-yang Island, 167-185  
**Kiushiu**, rebellion in, 17; men of the Japanese army, 228  
**Komura Yataro**, Japanese minister, despatches of, on the Korean question, 310-318  
**Kongo**, Japanese war-ship, 87; at Ta-lien Bay, 215, 216  
**Konishi Yukinaga**, General, invasion of Corea, 25-33, 140, 144, 163, 184  
**Korai**, people named, 11  
**Koshi**, Major, suicide of, 105  
**Kotaka**, Japanese torpedo-boat, 294  
**Kowshing**, British s.s. sunk by the *Naniwa*, 98, 103, 321; statement of the survivors, 349-369  
**Koyama**, fires a pistol at Li Hung-chang, 325, 326  
**Kuang-chia**, Chinese man-of-war, 76, 300, 389  
**Kuang-ki**, Chinese man-of-war, 77  
**Kuang-king**, Chinese man-of-war, 77  
**Kuang-ping**, Chinese man-of-war, 76, 389; the naval battle of Hai-yang Island, 167-185; at Wei-hai-wei, 276, 297, 300, 301  
**Kuang-ting**, Chinese man-of-war, 77  
**Kuang-yi**, Chinese man-of-war, 76, 96, 97, 102, 300, 389  
**Kublai Khan's invasion of Japan**, 19-21  
**Kumamoto brigade of the Japanese army**, at Wei-hai-wei, 269, 276-277, 278, 281  
**Kure**, Japanese squadron of, 86, 87  
**Kuroda**, Major-General, 192  
**Kusunchi**, a Japanese, arrested in Shanghai, 375-379  
**Kyeng-Jin**, city of, 58  
**Lai-yuen**, Chinese man-of-war, 76, 173; the naval battle at Hai-yang Island, 167-185; at Wei-hai-wei, 276, 293  
**Lang**, Captain, Admiral of the Chinese navy, 75  
**Li**, Lord, son of Li Hung-chang, 324, 327  
**Liao river**, 308, 317  
**Liao-tung**, Chinese province of, 12, 22, 26, 27  
**Liao-tung Peninsula**, the, 328  
**Liao-yang**, 313, 314, 319  
**Lien-shan-kuan** (United Mountain Pass), 196, 201  
**Li-Hung Chang**; annexes neutral country between Corea and China in 1877.. 43; and the Tientsin Convention, 49, 50; enlists volunteers in the Chinese army, 72, 73; sends Mr. Detring as peace envoy to Japan, 236; Admiral Ting and, 296, 297; sent by China as peace embassy to Japan, 322-327, 391-402, 405-437; shot by a fanatic, 325, 326  
**Lion**, French gun-boat, rescues some men of the *Kowshing*, 101, 353  
**Liu-chia-tun**, village of, 208  
**Liu-tung Island**, at entrance to Wei-hai-wei, 274-304  
**Li-yu-sung**, Chinese general, 29  
**Loh Feng-luh**, Mr., and the destruction of the *Kowshing*, 349

- Loyson, Père Hyacinth, 51  
 Lü-shun-Kow. *See* Port Arthur.
- MACHIDA, Lieutenant, 121, 124, 133, 200  
 Ma-chuan-tzū, 250  
 Main body of Japanese troops; march of and attack on P'hyōng-yang, 127, 129, 135-138, 141, 142, 159, 160  
 Manchuria; Japanese first army in, 186-202, 237-260, 308-321  
 Manchus, the, in China, 35, 36  
 Marui, Major, at Port Arthur, 218, 221, 226  
 Masumidzu, Lieutenant-Colonel, 217  
 Matsusaki, Captain, killed at An-song, 107, 108, 112  
*Matsushima*, Japanese war-ship, 87; at the naval battle of Hai-yang Island, 167-185; at Ta-lien Bay, 215, 216  
*Mayu*, Japanese war-ship, 87; at Ta-lien Bay, 215, 216  
 Ma-yu-Kun, Chinese general, 151  
*Mei-yun*, Chinese man-of-war, 76  
 Mihara, attempt to swim the Yalu river, 188  
 Mihara, Colonel, 199-201  
 Military service compulsory in Japan, 79  
 Mimura, Lieutenant, 156, 158  
 Min, the powerful faction in Corea, 46, 48, 62, 91  
 Min, Prince, 48  
*Min-chieh*, Chinese troopng-vessel, 76  
 Mines, Chinese, and powder, 212, 213  
 Mixed Brigade, march of and attack on city of P'hyōng-yang, 128, 129, 131-138, 149-153  
 Miyake, Sergeant, swirns the Yalu river, 189  
 Mochihara, Captain, 291, 292  
 Mok-tan-son, hill near P'hyōng-yang, 140-144; taken by the Japanese, 153-159  
 Mongols under Kublai Khan invade Japan, 19-21  
 Mori, Major, 91  
 Mo-tien-ling (Heaven-touching Pass) in Manchuria, 196, 238-241; near Wei-hai-wei, 278  
 Mou Ching-sing, soldier aboard the *Kowshing*, 353  
 Mühlenstedt, Mr., of the s.s. *Kowshing*, 96, 365, 369  
 Mukden, Japanese march on, 202, 244  
*Musashi*, Japanese war-ship, 87  
 Mutsu Munemitsu, Viscount, Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, despatches of, on the Korean question, 340-348; peace conference at Hiroshima, 391-402
- NAKADA, Mr., 401, 402  
 Nakaman, Lieutenant, 218  
 Nam-chhon-chon, 123, 124  
*Nanira*, Japanese war-ship, 87; the sinking of the s.s. *Kowshing*, 95-103, 359-369; at the naval battle of Hai-yang Island, 167-185; at Ta-lien Bay, 215, 216; off Teng-chou city, 270, 271  
*Nan-jui*, Chinese man-of-war, 77  
*Nan-shen*, Chinese man-of-war, 77  
*Nan-yang* (or Southern) squadron of the Chinese navy, 75, 77  
 Naruta, Captain, 296  
 Naval battles. *See* Hai-yang Island, P'hung Island, Wei-hai-wei.  
 Navy, the Chinese, 75-78  
 ——— the Japanese, 86, 87  
 Newchwang river, 309  
 ——— (old), 309; attack on, 313-317  
 Nieh, Chinese general, 200  
 Nishi, Major-General, 208, 231  
*Nishin*, Japanese war-ship, 87  
 Niu-chang-ping of Wei-hai-wei, 300, 301; correspondence with Admiral Ito, 389, 390

- Nobunaga, 23  
 Nodzu, Lieutenant-General, attack on Phyong-yang, 125-129; in Manchuria, 185, 150, 159, 160, 191-193, 318  
 Nogi, Major-General, in Manchuria, 208, 226, 308, 319; capture of Kaiping, 262-268  
 OGAWA, Ensign, at battle of Kaiping, 267  
 Oki, Colonel, 263, 264, 267  
 Okuyama, Major, 137, 138, 150, 153, 160, 193  
 Omori, Ensign, 151, 152  
 Onoguchi, Private, at Chin-chow, 211, 212  
 Oppert, Mr., in Corea, 38-41  
 Orankai, country of the, 28  
 Oriate, Pedro, of the *Kowshing*, 349-351  
 Oseko, Major-General, 127; operations of, in China, 192, 197, 202, 237, 246, 249, 256  
 Oshima, Major-General, 64; and the Asan campaign, 104-113; attack on Phyong-yang, 125-129, 140, 142, 141; wounded before Phyong-yang, 152; in Manchuria, 251, 253, 256  
 Oshima, Japanese war-ship, 87; at Ta-lien Bay, 215, 216  
 Otago, Japanese gun-boat, at Wei-hai-wei, 288  
 Otera, Major-General, killed at Wei-hai-wei, 279, 280  
 Otori, Japanese minister to Corea, 63, 89, 90, 105; insists on reforms in Corea, 67, 68, 335-337  
 Oyama, Marshal, commander-in-chief of Japanese army corps in Regent's Sword Peninsula, 203-236, 269  
 PAIK-SAN, mountain stronghold of the Toug-Ikaka, 61  
 Pan-chia-tai, place called, 241  
 Pao-hua, Chinese gun-boat, 293  
 Pao-min, Chinese man-of-war, 77  
 Paper money of Japan, 17, 18  
 Peace conference at Hiroshima, documents relating to, 391-402, 405-437  
 Peace embassies sent by China to Japan, 305-307, 322-327  
 Pei-ho river, 321  
 Pei-yang (or Northern) squadron of the Chinese navy, 75, 76, 165, 270, 317, 319; at Wei-hai-wei, 274-304  
 Peng-hu Island, 320  
 Peony Mount, Phyong-yang; Japanese under Konishi attacked at, 29. See also Mok-tan-sun  
 Pescadores Islands, 328, 332, 406; Japanese expedition to the, 320, 321  
 Phung Island, naval fight at, 93-103  
 Phung-san, 132  
 Phyong-yang; Japanese under Konishi retreat from, 26, 29, 140, 141; attack on and capture of by the Japanese, 120-163; Chinese army at, 110, 130, 141-146; plan of, 148  
 Ping-yuen, Chinese man-of-war, 76; sent to Chemulpo, 63; the naval battle of Hai-yang Island, 167-185; at Wei-hai-wei, 276, 301  
 Pi-tzu-wo, town of, 206, 207  
 Po-chih-ya-su, attack on, 277  
 Polo, Marco, and the Mongol invasion of Japan, 20, 21  
 Po-miao-tzu, 312  
 Port Adams, 262  
 Port Arthur, 273, 328; harbour at, 78; naval demonstration by the Japanese fleet at, 117-119; position and defences of, 207, 221-225; capture of, by the Japanese, 217-236

- Ports opened to Japanese trade by the Treaty of Peace, 408
- Powder-mines, the Chinese and, 212, 213
- Pu-lan-tien (Port Adams), 262
- REFORMS in Corea, suggested by Japan, 67, 68, 335-337
- Regent's Sword Peninsula, campaign in the, 203-236, 261-268
- Ridel, Bishop, 37
- Roze, Admiral, before Seoul, 37, 38, 41
- SAIGO of Satsuma and Corea, 42, 43
- Saikio Maru*, Japanese armed merchant steamer, 166, 175; at the battle of Hui-yang Island, 167-185
- Saito, Major, 312; advance on Chiu-chow, 206-210
- Sak-riong detachment, march to, and attack on Phyong-yang, 126-129, 138-141, 153-159
- Sam-deung, town of, 139
- Sasebo, Japanese squadron of, 86, 87
- Sato, Colonel, march to and attack on Phyong-yang, 127-129, 143, 144, 155-158; crosses the Yulu river, 190; in Manchuria, 246, 255
- Satsuma rebellion in Japan, 89
- Second army corps, Japan's; campaign of the, in Regent's Sword Peninsula, 203-236, 261-268
- Seoul, entered by General Konishi, 25, 29, 30; the French in front of, in 1866.. 37, 38; Japanese before, in 1876.. 44; Japanese in, attacked by the Koreans, 46-49; entered by Japanese troops in 1891.. 63; attack on the king's palace at, by the Japanese, 88-93
- Severn*, H.M.S., at Wei-hai-wei, 273, 298
- Shanghai; assassination of Kim-Ok-Kiun at, 51-57; disgraceful episode at, 114-116; correspondence relating to the delivery of the two Japanese at, 375-379
- Shao Yu Lein, peace conference at Hiroshima, 391-402, 405-437
- Sheepskin overcoats, purchased by the Japanese Government for the troops, 242, 243
- Shibada, Lieutenant-Colonel, 129
- Shibayama, Rear-Admiral, 364-366
- Shih Tsu. *See* Kublai Khan
- Shimonoseki, treaty of peace arranged at, between China and Japan, 324-329, 391-402, 405-437
- Shinra, King of, 17
- Shinakami Genjiro, bugler, 112, 113
- Shuang-lung-shan, 309
- Shufeldt, Commodore, and Corea, 41
- Sin, General, 195
- Sin-gé, town of, 138
- So-Hung, 124, 132
- Söng-chlon, town of, 143
- Song-hwan, Chinese troops at, 106, 110, 111
- Spoils captured by the Japanese; at Phyong-yang, 161; at Chiu-lien-ch'eng, 194; at Chiu-chow, 215; at Newchwang, 316, 317
- Storm, a terrific, at Wei-hai-wei, 281, 282
- Su-ku-chöng, 190
- Sung, Chinese general, 188, 192, 248-252, 255; residence of, at Antung, 194; retreat of his troops towards Mukden, 195; attack on Hai-cheng, 310-313; at Ying-kow, 317
- Su-sa-chang, Japanese troops at, 105, 106
- Su-Wön, Japanese troops at, 105
- TACHIMI, General, crosses the Yalu river, 186-196, 237; enters Feng-huang, 195, 196; in Manchuria, 239-243

- Tactics of the Chinese troops at battle of Kaiping, 267, 268**  
**Tadzuki, Major-General, 127, 129, 131, 138-141, 154, 155, 158, 159**  
**Ta-hsi-kou (Great Western Ditch), 196**  
**Tai-dong, River, 121, 124, 205; crossing of the, 139-142**  
**Tai-ku-shan (Great Orphan Mountain), 197, 201**  
**T'ai-ping rebellion, the, 323; Chinese army in the, 72, 73**  
**T'ai-ping-shan, advance on, 311-313**  
**T'ai-tsung, son of Emperor Tang, 14-16**  
**Tai-wen Kun, or Regent of Corea, 39, 40, 42, 47, 57; army of, 61; placed in power by the Japanese, 91, 92; corresponds with the Chinese generals at P'yŏng-yang, 130**  
**Takachicho, Japanese war-ship, 87; at Ta-lien Bay, 215, 216; at battle of Hai-yang Island, 167-185**  
**Tukai, Japanese war-ship, 87; at Ta-lien Bay, 215, 216**  
**Takeda, Lieutenant-Colonel, 107, 109**  
**Take-no-Uchi, Sub-Lieutenant, 121, 133**  
**Ta-lien Bay, 271; advance on and capture of, 207-217**  
**Tamari, Lieutenant-Colonel, 363, 364**  
**Tamplin, chief officer of the s.s. *Kow-shing*, report of, 358-366**  
**Tanabe, Captain, 139**  
**T'ang dynasty, the, 13**  
**Tang-shan, town of, 195**  
**Tan-wan-shan, 309**  
**Tartar troops under General I-koteng-a, 238-243**  
**Ta-tung-kou (Great Eastern Ditch), 197**  
**Tem-san Mountain, 264**  
**Teng-chou, city of, 270-272**  
**Teng-ying-chou, Chinese man-of-war, 77**  
**Tenryo, Japanese war-ship, 87**  
**T'ien-chwang-tai, 318, 319**  
**Tientsin Convention, the, 49, 50, 62, 63, 65**  
**Tiger Mountain, 189-192**  
**Ting, Admiral, commander of the Chinese fleet, 117; and Captain Fong, 97; the naval battle of Hai-yang Island, 164-185; Von Hanneken sent to assist, 177; at Wei-hai-wei, 232; defence of Wei-hai-wei, 273-304; death of, 297-299; correspondence with Admiral Ito, 380-386**  
**Ting-hai, of the Foochow squadron, 77**  
**Ting-yuen, Chinese man-of-war, 76, 86, 176; the naval battle at Hai-yang Island, 167-185; at Wei-hai-wei, 276, 278, 289, 291**  
**Tio, Private, saves Captain Asakawa, 219, 221**  
**Toda, Captain, 286**  
**Togo, Captain, 288**  
**Tokiyama, Lieutenant, drowning of, 108**  
**Tomida, Major, 154, 155**  
**Tomu-cheng, Chinese attack on, 311**  
**Tomoyasu, Lieutenant-Colonel, 129, 241**  
**Tong-Haks, the (religious sect), in Corea, 57-66, 93, 339**  
**Torpedo-boats, attack of Japanese, at Wei-hai-wei, 281-297**  
**Tsao-ho-kou (Grass River Pass), 196, 239, 240**  
**Tsao-Kiang, Chinese man-of-war, 76; sent to Chemulpo, 63; captured by the *Akitsushima*, 95, 359**  
**Tse-hai, Chinese man-of-war, 77**  
**Tsaiji, Major, 212**  
**Tseng-Kuo-Fan, and the "Green Standard" army, 71, 72**  
**Tse-ting, Chinese man-of-war, 77**



- Tai-an*, Chinese man-of-war, 76  
*Tai-yuen*, Chinese man-of-war, 76;  
 chased by the *Yoshino*, 96, 98,  
 102, 359, 369; the naval battle at  
 Hai-yang Island, 167-185; at  
 Wei-hai-wei, 276, 301  
*Tao-pao-Kuei*, Chinese general, 158,  
 160, 161  
*Tsui-chia-fang*, Chinese defeated at,  
 239, 240  
*Tsukushi*, Japanese war-ship, 87; at  
 Ta-lien Bay, 215, 216  
*Tsung-Hsin*, place called, 132  
*Tu-men-tzu*, 198, 199  
*Tung-Ha-hsin*, fireman of the  
*Kowshing*, 351, 352  
 UJINA, port of Hiroshima, 64  
 Urusan, the siege of, 31-33  
 VALDEZ, Mr., Portuguese consul at  
 Shanghai, 54-57  
 Von Hanneken, German officer, and  
 the s.s. *Kowshing*, 96-103, 350-  
 369; his report on, 354-358; sent  
 to assist Admiral Ting, 177; forts  
 at Chin-chow built by, 214  
 WANG, Chinese minister, despatches  
 of re the Korean question, 338-348  
 Wang Kwi-fung, soldier on board the  
*Kowshing*, 353  
 War indemnity to be paid by China  
 to Japan, 406, 407, 413-417  
 Wars undertaken by China against  
 Corea, 12-16  
*Wei-Ching*, Chinese man-of-war, 77  
 Wei-hai-wei; harbour at, 73; naval  
 demonstration by the Japanese  
 fleet at, 117-119; attack on and  
 capture of, 269-301, 410; fortifi-  
 cations of, 274-276; capitulation  
 of, 387, 388  
*Wei-yuen*, Chinese man-of-war, 76;  
 the naval battle at Hai-yang  
 Island, 167-185; at Wei-hai-wei,  
 276, 293  
 Wi-ju, Japanese scouts at, 187,  
 168  
 Wrestling, Japanese soldiers and, 260  
 Wu, Empress, 16  
 Wu-Ta-Cheng, Chinese General, 310;  
 army organised in Manchuria by,  
 74, 75  
 Wu-Ting-fang, 324  
 YABUKI, Colonel, 191  
*Yaeyama*, Japanese war-ship, 87,  
 363, 369; off Yung-cheng, 272  
 Yalu river, 119; landing of troops  
 at, 165; the crossing of the, 186-  
 190; naval battle off the: see Hai-  
 yang Island.  
 Yamagata, Marshal, 164, 190; attack  
 on Phyöng-yang, 127-129, 146; in  
 command of the First Army, 186-  
 202  
 Yamagi, General, in Manchuria, 311,  
 317-319  
 Yamaguchi, Major, 139, 110, 154  
 Yamaji, Lieutenant-General, cam-  
 paign in the Regent's Sword Penin-  
 sula, 203, 208-236  
*Yamato*, Japanese war-ship, 87  
 Yang-dök, town of, 143  
*Yang-wei*, Chinese man-of-war, 76;  
 sent to Chemulpo, 63; the naval  
 battle of Hai-yang Island, 168-  
 185; in flames, 170, 171  
 Yang-ti, Emperor, 12-14  
 Yanome, Lieutenant, 212  
 Yeh-chih-chao, Chinese commander-  
 in-chief, 110, 111, 160  
*Yiksang*, capture of the, 321  
 Ying-kow, 317, 319  
 Yinsen: see Giansan.  
 Yokosuka, Japanese squadron of, 86,  
 87  
*Yoshino*, Japanese man-of-war, 86,  
 87, 95, 169, 295; pursues the *Tai-*

- yen*, 95, 96; at the battle of Haiyang Island, 167-185; at Ta-lien Bay, 215, 216; off Teng-chou city, 270, 271; damaged off Peng-hu Island, 320  
*Yuan-Kai*, of the Foochow squadron, 77  
*Yuan-Shi-kai*, Chinese resident minister in Corea, 90  
*Yung-cheng*, city of, 272  
 ——— Bay, 262  
*Yung-jao*, of the Canton squadron, 77  
*Yu-yuan*, Chinese man-of-war, 77

LONDON:  
PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED,  
STAMFORD STREET AND CHANCERY CROSS.